The greatest issue of all: Berlin, American national security, and the cold war by Coleman, David G.
''The Greatest Issue of All'': 
Berlin, American National Security, and the Cold War 
David G. Coleman 
A dissertation submitted for fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
Department of History 
University of Queensland 
February 2000 
Abstract 
The Berlin problem was a constant test of wills in the early Cold War. 
In a contest where resolve was pre-eminent - or more specifically, the 
international credibility of that resolve - Berlin became in Washington's view 
"the greatest issue of all ." The issue occupied a unique place in American 
foreign policy. It was at once a potent symbol of American determination to 
resist the encroachments of Soviet-led Communism as well as a "strategic 
nightmare." Militarily untenable, and yet vital to American security interests, 
in Washington's estimation Berlin's defence justified, at least in theory, 
general nuclear war. 
American responsibility for a sector of Berlin was the result of a 
nebulous process of postwar planning, much of which was conducted before 
U.S. troops reached Europe in June 1944. Defying all expectations, the U.S. 
_presence in West Berlin continued throughout the entire Cold War. During 
that time, Berlin was both cause and location of some of the Cold War's worst 
moments. 
Unlike earlier studies of the Berlin issue, this dissertation examines the 
broader view of Washington's commitment to Berlin. Drawing extensively 
from recently declassified primary materials, as well as important secondary 
sources, it attempts to fill a significant gap in our understanding of the 
American commitment to Berlin. In so doing, it demonstrates that 
Washington's view of the problem was unique. Furthermore, although 
presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy all faced crises over Berlin, 
each perceived the problem in different ways. In fact, there was an important 
shift in Washington's perception of the Berlin problem from the time when 
Truman drew the line in Berlin as part of his administration's policy of 
containment, to the more assertive defence of U.S. credibility under 
Eisenhower and Kennedy. Also, U.S. officials did not concern themselves with 
Berlin only in times of crisis . Rather, it was an ongoing dilemma that required 
constant attention. In this process the experiences from several other 
ostensibly unrelated Cold War issues, such as the Korean War and the Cuban 
missile crisis, were incorporated by American administrations into their 
understanding of the U.S. commitment to Berlin. Through examining 
Washington's perception of the Berlin issue during the period from 1948 to 
1 963, this study concludes that until American policymakers began to direct 
more of their attention towards Vietnam in the mid-1960s, Berlin was their 
foremost concern and was a central element of how the United States waged 
the Cold War. In this way, the Berlin issue conditioned American 
·policymakers in a manner and to an extent that has been greatly 
underappreciated. 
The immediate threat to free men is in West Berlin. But that isolated outpost is 
not an isolated problem. The threat is worldwide . . . .  For West Berlin-lying 
100 miles inside East Germany, surrounded by Soviet troops and close to 
Soviet supply lines, has many roles. It is more than a showcase of liberty, a 
symbol, an island of freedom in a Communist sea. It is even more than a link 
with the Free World, a beacon of hope behind the Iron Curtain, an escape 
hatch for refugees. West Berlin is all of that. . But above all it has now 
become -as never before-the great testing place of Western courage and 
· will, a focal point where our solemn commitments stretching back over the 
years since 1945, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation. 
--John F. Kennedy, 25 July 1961 
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Preface 
In preparation for the National Security Council (NSC) meeting 
_ scheduled for 18 January 1 962, McGeorge Bundy, John F. Kennedy's Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, compiled a list of talking points for the 
- President. Kennedy intended to take the rare step of personally providing 
specific, formal guidance to his top advisers on how he saw the world 
situation as his administration entered its second year. Together with Bundy, 
he expected several issues to dominate the foreign policy and defence 
establishments, among which were difficulties within NATO, arms control, a 
nuclear test ban treaty, the restructuring of the defence forces and budget, 
growing problems in Vietnam and Laos, and increasing ties between the 
Soviet Union and Cuba. But, after discussing some of these key issues, Bundy 
came to Berlin. "This," he said, "is the greatest issue of all."1 
1 McGeorge Bundy, "Outline for Talk to NSC, January 18, 1962," 17  January 1962, Foreign 
Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1961 -63, 8:238. 
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This value judgement had become a familiar theme in the White 
House. Over the previous fourteen years, Berlin had in fact become central to 
Washington's perception of the Cold War. Indeed, as Ernest R. May recently 
noted, so far as the United States was concerned, Berlin was the "heart of the 
Cold War."2 American troops first entered the city as occupiers in July 1 945. 
Although Franklin D. Roosevelt had predicted that the United States would 
maintain a military presence in Europe for no more than two years after 
Germany's defeat, it was not until September 1994 that Bill Clinton declared 
that the mission had been accomplished, and the United States finally 
withdrew its military presence from the city. In the intervening period, 
particularly from 1948 to 1 963, Berlin was both location and cause of some of 
the Cold War's worst moments. In response to these challenges Washington 
developed its own unique view of the problem. And since Washington 
remained the primary, if certainly not the only player on the Western side, 
any attempt to understand the nature of the Cold War must take into account 
Washington's view of the Berlin problem. 
Unlike most of the other crisis points of the Cold War, Berlin was 
repeatedly propelled to centre stage. In the so-called "high Cold War" the 
- American commitment to Berlin formed the cornerstone of U.S. foreign 
policy. Having defined this commitment as paramount to its national security, 
the United States upheld its promise in the face of repeated Soviets threats, 
even at the risk of nuclear war, and despite the inherent vulnerability of its 
position which long-serving Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee J. William Fulbright once called "a strategic nightmare. " 
Accordingly, from 1948, when Stalin first exploited the West's vulnerability in 
that city, until 1963, when the issue withdrew rapidly from the forefront of the 
Cold War contest in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis and as U.S. officials 
turned their attention increasingly to Vietnam, the Berlin question posed both 
2 Ernest R. May, "America's Berlin: Heart of the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, 77, 4 
(July/ August 1998): 148-160_ 
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dangers and singular opportunities. The purpose of this study is to explore 
the depth of Washington's concern for its commitment to Berlin and how U.S. 
policymakers perceived and responded to those dangers and opportunities 
that it posed. 
While the importance of Berlin to the Cold War has been well 
established, it is only with the wealth of new manuscript and archival 
materials, hitherto denied to historians, that the true depth of Washington's 
concern can be fully appreciated. That President Kennedy, when faced with 
Soviet nuclear missiles installations only ninety miles from Florida, could tell 
some of his chief advisers that the Soviets "don't give a damn about Cuba. But 
they do care about Berlin and about their own security," is testimony to the 
depth at which the problem permeated Washington's assessments of the Cold 
War.3 Yet it is not only the fly-on-the-wall revelations of the Kennedy tapes 
that attest to the depth of this concern. Particularly from 1948, when the 
Soviets first challenged the United States over Berlin, until 1 963 when the 
issue faded quickly as a crisis flashpoint, Washington policymakers struggled 
with the problem. Even when the Berlin situation appeared outwardly 
tranquil, they produced an abundance of memoranda, studies and policy 
papers, held numerous meetings and discussions, and repeatedly raised the 
issue in international conferences and diplomatic dialogue. In recent years the 
great bulk of this material has become available through the diligent efforts of 
organizations such as the Department of State's Office of the Historian which 
produces the Foreign Relations of the United States series, the National Security 
Archive in Washington D.C., as well as through the persistent efforts of 
individuals taking advantage of the Freedom of Information Act and the 
Presidential Libraries' enhanced discretionary authority to review documents 
for declassification on-site through the Mandatory Review process. The result 
is a public record in which nearly all of the former gaps resulting from 
3 Transcript of ExComm Meeting, 19 October 1962, in Ernest R. May and Philip D. 
Zelikow, eds. ,  Tlze Kennedy Tapes, (Cambridge, Mass. :  Harvard University Press, 1997), p .175 .  
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security classification have now been filled. The weight of this evidence is 
compelling. The publication of the volumes of the Foreign Relations of the 
United States series for the Berlin crisis period from 1 958-1963, a relatively 
small portion of the documentary record, as one observer noted, "illustrates 
both the complexity of the question and its centrality to any understanding of 
the history of the Cold War."4 Taking these volumes along with the full range 
of materials not included in them because they were outside the scope of the 
FRUS series, or were declassified since the volumes were compiled, results in 
a formidable array of primary source materials. This, then, provides the solid 
documentary foundation from which to proceed. 
This study relies heavily on these archival and manuscript sources -
those recently declassified as well as those not so recently made available. 
Because the bulk of the existing histories of the Berlin crises were written 
during the Cold War, it became apparent during the course of researching 
that many of the traditional contributions to the historiography of the Berlin 
problem rested on what was often selective rec;tding of the primary evidence 
and the strong influence of Cold War rhetoric. This study attempts to use the 
documentary record to penetrate this "Berlin mythology." Secondly, and 
more importantly, archival materials released in recent years shed new light 
on some orthodox interpretations, at times debunking them in the process. 
For instance, it is now clear that, contrary to the rhetoric, Harry S. Truman 
never considered the airlift to be a convincing or even satisfactory response to 
the Soviet challenge; that as a result of the Korean War, Washington braced 
for a challenge to Berlin modelled on Korea; that in late-1953 Eisenhower 
transformed U.S. contingency policy into an aggressive plan to force a 
resolution as soon as any direct threat was encountered and that this mind-set 
figured centrally in his administration's treatment of Khrushchev's ultimatum 
in 1958-1959; that, again despite the rhetoric, many in Washington believed 
4 Thomas A. Schwartz, "The Berlin Crisis and the Cold War," Diplomatic Histon;, 21, 1 
(Winter 1997) : 139. 
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that the Wall actually stabilized the situation, while most believed that it was 
in preparation for the real crisis; and that the expectation of an ultimate test of 
wills centred on Berlin had become so acute by 1962 that Kennedy considered 
· the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba not so much as a "Cuban" or 
"missile" crisis as the opening move in an offensive against West Berlin. The 
cumulative effect is to indicate that Berlin was the primary on-going concern 
of Washington between 1 948 and 1 963. The constant need to maintain the 
credibility of America's commitment to Berlin imposed strict parameters on 
the development and pursuit of Washington's policies on matters as far 
ranging as nuclear deterrence, arms control, the Far East, Latin America, and, 
of course, Europe. 
In this way, the Berlin problem was inextricably linked with other 
important concerns. Much of the historiography of the Berlin issue treats the 
problem as a microcosm of the so-called "German question. "  In large 
measure, this is warranted in that many of the issues that most concerned 
both East and West about the future of Germany were central to disputes 
_centred on Berlin. Yet Berlin also assumed a significance of its own, over and 
above the parameters of the debates over Germany in general. How tightly 
Washington coupled the German and Berlin problems at any given moment 
depended on both the temper of the administration and diplomatic 
expediency. For this reason, during the course of this study wider issues in 
U.S.-German relations not directly involved in the Berlin problem at a given 
time are dealt with in the most general terms. 
In many respects the defence of Berlin was probably the quintessential 
test of nuclear deterrence, because the West's position could never be 
defended by conventional means. Because of this, it became central to the key 
deterrence doctrines of Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. Therefore, 
understanding the nature of the Berlin problem and Washington's perception 
of it reveals much about the evolution of deterrence and the Cold War more 
generally. Without the ultimate threat of nuclear war Washington's 
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commitment to Berlin was an impossible task. It remained a special case even 
at times when the administration entertained the notion of a conventional 
defence of Europe. Why the United States would accept such an Achilles' heel 
is the subject of this study, but U.S. military forces actually stationed in the 
city were never more than a tripwire for Soviet aggression. Nuclear strategy 
developed along with Berlin policy, and each was integral to the other. And 
because Berlin was indefensible, any military exchange that did occur had a 
strong likelihood of rapid and uncontrolled escalation. The result was that 
underlying all of Washington's promises to Berlin was the imposing and real 
possibility of nuclear war. 
Yet of all the points of conflict during the Cold War, Berlin was 
perhaps the most artificial in that it was a creation largely of wartime 
planning for postwar Germany. Paradoxically, however, it was this very 
artificiality that endowed the issue with its special status in the East-West 
stt_�ggle. No American or Soviet sovereign territory was under immediate 
threat; no significant numbers of Soviet or Am�rican citizens were in direct 
danger; no nuclear missiles were based in the city that might be capable of 
striking enemy soil; and Berliners themselves exerted no meaningful pressure 
on either Soviet or American politics. In fact, the Berliners, with those in the 
Western sectors numbering little over two million, had been recent enemies. 
The notion that World War III might one day be fought on their behalf could 
hardly have been anticipated in 1945. 
Policymakers, then, assigned a significance to Berlin that was out of all 
proportion to its value in real terms. Moreover, they placed it at the pinnacle 
of U.S. national security interests. Possessing no inherent value of its own, it 
had to be endowed with its significance through the ideological justifications 
of containment. Washington, in particular, bestowed upon the city the status 
of the symbol of American resolve to honour its commitments the world over. 
Honouring the commitment to Berlin became a matter of prestige; but it was 
also based upon a calculation of U.S. national interests. The significance of the 
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defence of Berlin, reasoned Washington, lay in its example to the rest of the 
world. If Berlin fell to Communism, American assurances would be 
considered worthless the world over. In this way Washington's commitment 
to Berlin was the result of a conscious calculation of how American national 
security was best served. It was more than self-serving rhetoric when 
Kennedy said in 1 962 that Americans "cannot and do not attempt to 
differentiate between the safety of the Western Berliners and our own." It was 
on this basis, in fact, that the United States developed its policy towards 
Berlin. "Until the end of the Cold War," writes May, "the U.S. commitment to 
defend West Berlin would differ in no material way from the commitment to 
defend New York or Los Angeles."5  So far as Washington was concerned, the 
fate of the nation rested in the defence of Berlin. And this led directly to a 
perennial expectation that the ultimate test of wills was yet to be faced. 
It is this calculation of the national interest with which this study is 
concerned. In essence, the major questions it attempts to address are: "Why 
did the United States maintain its commitment to Berlin?" ; "How did it go 
a�out honouring that commitment?" ; and "What was Washington's 
perception of its commitment?" Concentrating on the three presidents 
primarily involved (Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy) -because, in 
Kennedy's own words, the president is the "ultimate source of action"6-this 
study discusses and examines the shifts in U.S. policy towards its 
commitment. Washington's perception of this. problem was not developed in 
isolation of other Cold War experiences. Shifts in this perception were often 
provoked by lessons gleaned about Soviet capabilities and intentions in other 
theatres and under different circumstances. The most direct correlations can 
be witnessed in the cases of the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis, but 
other experiences filtered through less noticeably in a steady process. 
5 Kennedy to the People of West Berlin, 15 October 1962, box 85, NSF, JFKL; May, 
"America's Berlin," p .151 . 
6 John F. Kennedy, dictated memoir entry, cassette L, Telephone Conversations, 
Presidential Recordings, JFKL. 
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Washington's understanding of its commitment was also directed by 
decisions taken in the White House. Truman made the initial decision to stay 
in Berlin irrespective of the consequences. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy 
inherited the Berlin commitment, and both reacted to it in quite different 
ways. 
The nature of the problem resulted in complex negotiations and 
diplomacy, often involving four or more parties, each with its own approach 
and agenda. But as well as this horizontal diplomatic activity, it was also the 
subject of vertical consideration in that the issue was of constant concern to 
several different levels within the various governments. To complicate 
matters even further, the Berlin problem was sometimes dealt with in the 
context of German reunification and sometimes on its own merits. And it 
involved simultaneous activity at political, diplomatic, legal, military, and 
propaganda levels. In view of this complexity, the intention of this study is 
not to provide a blow-by-blow narrative of every facet of the Berlin problem, 
but rather to focus on Washington's policym�ing elite and those key 
�oments between 1948 and 1963 that either fundamentally influenced the 
way in which their view of the Berlin problem evolved or revealed an 
important aspect of that perception. In the process, it is argued that the 
ongoing threats to Berlin had a cumulative effect and conditioned how 
American policymakers approached the Cold War conflict in a manner and to 
an extent that has been greatly underappreciated. 
Finally, but importantly, this study focuses on the view from 
Washington. In recent years there have been several efforts to synthesize Cold 
War history into multiarchival studies, incorporating multifarious viewpoints. 
\1ost notably for the purposes of this study are those by John Lewis Gaddis 
md Marc Trachtenberg, which have both made significant and provocative 
:ontributions to the field.7 Yet, our understanding of why and how the United 
7 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Knmu: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford :  Clarendon, 
997); Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: Tlze Making of the European Settlement, 1 945-
'963, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) . 
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States committed itself to Berlin remains incomplete. The view from 
Washington was often strikingly different to that from Moscow; indeed the 
two main protagonists often made it appear as though there were two 
· separate crises at any given moment, with the claim that they were both 
ostensibly related to Berlin being the only common denominator.  Also, 
Washington was apprehensive about the threat to its commitment even when 
there was no immediate crisis . Various administrations planned behind 
closed doors and developed their understanding of the threat even when the 
city was not under the international spotlight. What emerged from all of this 
was a view unique to Washington, and one that rarely corresponds with 
Moscow's view as historians understand it. U.S. officials perceived the 
problem in any number of different ways relating to any given crisis or 
challenge. Rarely was a consensus reached, and often policy was inconsistent. 
Even the value judgement of the American commitment to the city fluctuated. 
Yet, only when this is fully understood can the issue be placed in the 
international context and some attempt be made to interweave Washington's 
yiew with that of Moscow, London, Paris, Bonn, and East Berlin as the 
archival sources become available. 
By way of addressing these issues, Chapter One provides both the 
historical and historiographical context of this study and sets the foundations 
of the argument pursued throughout this study. Chapter Two is a synopsis of 
the origins of the Berlin problem as it emerged towards the end of the Second 
World War and in the immediate postwar period. Since many aspects of this 
process were referred to in later years when the Berlin issue was the point of 
conflict, it is necessary to provide this background. Chapter Three concerns 
the episode in which the Soviets first exploited the vulnerability of the West's 
presence in the city and, in so doing, confirmed the worst fears that the West 
harboured of Soviet expansionist ambitions in Europe. Stalin blockaded 
Berlin, and Truman drew the line with his decision to stand in Berlin 
irrespective of the consequences, thereby providing containment's fall-back 
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line. Chapters Four and Five discuss a neglected period in the historiography 
of the issue. There is an examination of how the Korean War provoked 
Washington to approach its commitment to Berlin with greater sophistication. 
Then, recently declassified archival materials are used to shed light on an 
important, dual shift in America's Berlin policy implemented by the first 
Eisenhower administration in 1953 and 1954 when it moved towards both a 
more aggressive use of the city's symbolism and more confrontational 
contingency planning. Chapter Six looks at how the second Eisenhower 
administration faced the renewed pressure created by Khrushchev's 
ultimatum of late 1958 and how it handled the ongoing crisis through 1959 
and 1960 in a posture that was more aggressive than that which was 
understood publicly at the time. Chapter Seven concerns a series of some of 
the most traumatic moments of the Berlin problem: the renewal of 
Khrushchev's ultimatum in Vienna in June 1961, the building of the Wall in 
August, and the tank confrontation of October. The overall effect of these 
episodes, it is argued, convinced U.S. officials pot so much that they were 
_ witnessing the culmination of pressure as that they were yet to face the 
ultimate test. Thus, when the Cuban missile crisis broke in October 1962, 
many in Washington, most notably President Kennedy himself, stood 
convinced that they were facing the opening move in the ultimate test of wills 
over Berlin. Only in the wake of the missile crisis did the Berlin issue recede 
as the Cold War was transformed into a different kind of conflict. 
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Note on quotations: 
-- In order to minimize "cablese" and in the interests of clarity, when articles 
were absent from diplomatic cables they have been re-inserted into the text of 
direct quotations. 
-- The spelling used in this dissertation conforms with Australian-English, 
except in the case of direct quotations, where the original spelling is retained. 
Chapter One 
Berlin and Cold War History 
In the Cold War, Berlin became, in the often-quoted phrase, a test of 
wills . But more importantly, in Washington's view, it was primarily a test of 
the American will . Indeed, Washington's concern with the Berlin problem was 
so all-pervasive that it conditioned American actions and perceptions in other 
theatres and over other issues. It was regarded as the linchpin of U.S. foreign 
policy. As Ernest May notes, the American commitment to Berlin acted as "a 
straitjacket for the United States for the duration of the high Cold War." For 
this reason, understanding this commitment provides a key to understanding 
American Cold War foreign policy more generally. The perpetual need to 
maintain the credibility of the American commitment to Berlin was of 
constant concern to Washington. Yet, as John Lewis Gaddis observes, 
"Credibility is, after all, a state of mind, not an objective, independently 
measurable reality." Consequently, Washington's view of the status of its 
1 
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credibility fluctuated and shifted. A study of this process reveals much about 
how the United States perceived and waged the Cold War.1 
The peculiar circumstances of the Berlin situation destined the city to 
become the focus of conflict. A Western outpost located deep inside Soviet­
occupied territory, its survival in terms of the Western presence hinged upon 
at least a workable relationship between East and West. But as the Cold War 
broke out in Europe, East-West relations deteriorated rapidly and Berlin was 
caught in the middle. Because of the ensuing contest for the city, Berlin 
assumed many roles: as "superdomino," "barometer of tension," "symbol of 
confrontation," and as "metaphor" and "microcosm of the Cold War." And all 
the while, both Washington and Moscow repeatedly expressed their 
willingness, if not their enthusiasm, to risk all to win the city. But, by the same 
token, the peculiar circumstances of Washington's commitment to Berlin 
earned it a special place in U.S. Cold War policy. As May recently observed, 
"For Americans, the Cold War always had Berlin at its center."  Martin J. 
Hillenbrand, former Ambassador to the Federal Republic and long-time high 
,level participant in U.S.-German relations since 1945, has similarly thrown 
down the challenge to historians to appreciate the pivotal position it occupied 
in American concerns. More recently, Marc Trachtenberg has described the 
Berlin crisis period of 1958 to 1962 as " the central episode of the Cold War," a 
sentiment shared by Thomas A. Schwartz. 2 
Given this growing appreciation of the centrality of Berlin to the 
American diplomatic experience of the Cold War, it is somewhat surprising 
that there have been so few attempts to look at the problem as a long-term 
commitment.3 While the crisis periods of 1948-1949 and 1958-1963 have 
individually attracted considerable attention, few historians have made any 
1 May, " America's Berlin," p.159; Gaddis, We Now Know, p.151 . 
2 May, "America's Berlin," p.148; Martin J .  Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time: Memoirs of 
a Diplomat, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), pp.120-121; Hillenbrand' s remarks at 
the launch of his memoirs, Washington D.C., 22 June 1999; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 
p.247; Schwartz, "The Berlin Crisis and the Cold War," p .139. 
3 For a notable exception, see May, " America's Berlin." 
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more than a superficial link between the two periods and traced the 
development of the problem through 1948-1963 . Writing in 1963, Jean Edward 
Sm'ith provided the closest approximation of this kind of treatment in The 
Defense of Berlin, but confined as he was only to unclassified sources, he was 
unable to penetrate the shroud of secrecy surrounding Washington's inner 
policymaking circle. Philip Windsor's City on Leave (1963) and Eric Morris's 
Blockade: Berlin and the Cold War (1973) are of a similar style and suffer from 
the same restrictions on documentary material . James S. Sutterlin and David 
Klein have produced a more recent study in Berlin: From Symbol of 
Confrontation to Keystone of Stability (1989), but their emphasis is on explaining 
the background to the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement, in the course of which 
they provide an outline of the problem as it developed. With the exception of 
Sutterlin and Klein's brief synopsis of the background to the Berlin situation, 
none of these studies makes a concerted effort to penetrate the policymaking 
circle using archival sources. ,Furthermore, none of these studies examines in 
any depth how U.S. policymakers approached the problem when the issue 
was not the immediate point of crisis - that is, from 1949 to 1957, a period 
crucial to any understanding of the relationship between the blockade and the 
way in which Eisenhower responded to Khrushchev's ultimatum. Beyond 
U.S. involvement in the economic revitalization of West Berlin, this period has 
also been ignored. 4 
In short, Washington's evolving perception of the problem between 
1948 and 1963 has generally been neglected. Access to the archival and 
manuscript materials that have recently been declassified now clears the way. 
Through the use of these materials this study attempts to address this 
4 Jean Edward Smith, The Defense of Berlin, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1963); Eric Morris, 
Blockade: Berlin and tlze Cold War, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1973); James S. Sutterlin and 
David Klein, Berlin: From Symbol of Confrontation to Keystone of Stabilihj, (New York: Praeger, 
1989); Philip Windsor, City on Leave: A Histon; of Berlin, 1 945-1962, (London: Chato and 
Windus, 1963). For U.S. involvement in West Berlin's economic recovery during the 1950s, see 
Smith, Defense of Berlin, pp.131-150; Eleanor Lansing Dulles, Chances of a Lifetime, (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp.241-256; Willy Brandt, My Road to Berlin, as told to Leo 
Lania (London: Peter Davies, 1960), pp.247-263. 
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deficiency by examining the development of Washington's understanding of 
its commitment to Berlin between 1948 and 1963. By reappraising existing 
historical views and shedding new light on some neglected aspects of the 
issue, it hopes to come to a greater understanding of this central aspect of the 
Cold War. 
The Perception of the Problem 
Assessing Moscow's perceptions and intentions remains problematic, 
despite the considerable advances in the historiography of the last decade. 
The combination of the inherent secrecy of a totalitarian regime and typically 
inscrutable and complicated personalities at the pinnacle of that bureaucracy, 
results in what Martin Hillenbrand has referred to as an "explanatory gap" in 
relation to Moscow's policy towards Berlin. This is further compounded by 
limitations on historical research imposed by restricted access to Soviet 
documents of the era and questions about the reliability of those documents 
. that are available.5 The intentions of Stalin may never be known with any 
degree of certainty, partly because he behaved in many respects as a "latter­
day tsar," in Gaddis' s words, and therefore left little in the way of a 
documentary record. Historians of Soviet history encounter similar difficulties 
with his successors. As McGeorge Bundy stated the problem in his 1988 book 
Danger and Sun1ival: "We know all of what he [Khrushchev] said publicly, 
most of what he did, but not much, with any great certainty, of what he 
5 See Raymond L. Garthoff, "Some Observations on Using Soviet Archives," Diplomatic 
Histon;, 21, 2 (Spring 1997) : 243-258; Melvyn P. Leffler, "Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold 
War Reopened," Foreign Affairs, 75 (July/ August 1996) : 120-135; Adam B. Ulam, "A Few 
Unresolved Mysteries About Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: A Modest Agenda for 
Research," Journal of Cold War Studies, 1, 1 (Winter 1999) : 110-116; Anna Kasten Nelson, 
"Illuminating the Twilight Struggle: New Interpretations of the Cold War," Chronicle of Higher 
Education, (25 June 1999) : B4-B6; James G. Hershberg, "Soviet Archives: The Opening Door," 
Cold War International History Project (hereafter CWIHP) Bulletin, 1 (Spring 1992) : 1; Hope 
M. Harrison, "Inside the SED Archives: A Researcher's Diary," ibid., 2 (Fall 1992) : 20. Since 
the status of the accessibility of former Soviet bloc archives fluctuates, the CWIHP Bulletin 
provides regular updates. 
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thought."6 While this remains a perennial challenge to historians regardless of 
the subject, the Soviet leadership has proved particularly impenetrable.  There 
have, of course, been some notable recent efforts to unravel the mysteries of 
· the Kremlin's perception of the Berlin issue. But taking Khrushchev's 
ultimatums of the 1958-1961 period as a case in point illustrates some of the 
difficulties. Some have seen Khrushchev's primary design to be to prevent the 
arming of the West German military, or Bundeswehr, with nuclear weapons. 
Most notably, Marc Trachtenberg has recently revitalized this contention by 
arguing that Khrushchev's  primary objective was to exert pressure on West 
Berlin as a lever to prevent the Eisenhower administration from extending its 
nuclear-sharing policy to Bonn. Without access to the bulk of declassified 
materials now available, Adam B. Ulam made the same contention in 1968, 
leaving the reader in little doubt that he believed that "the main Soviet 
objective was to secure an agreement that would make it impossible for West 
Germany to obtain nuclear weapons." In his 1971 study, The Berlin Crisis, Jack 
Schick agreed.7  Others have disputed such a monocausal approach, finding 
jnstead a "complex of motives" behind Khrushchev's behaviour. Although 
most concede that nuclear weapons in the hands of West Germans caused 
6 Gaddis, We Naw Know, p.51;  McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the 
Bomb in the First FifttJ Years, (New York: Random House, 1988), p .363. For some of the major 
works that attempt to penetrate Stalin's thinking on the Cold War using former Soviet 
archives, see Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurihj: T1ie Stalin Years, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996); Edvard Radzinsky, Stalin, trans . H.T. Willetts (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1996); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the 
Kremlin 's Cold War: From Stalin to Khmslzclzev, (Cambridge, Mass. :  Harvard University Press, 
1996), pp.1-137; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin 's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1 943 to 
1 956, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); "Symposium: Soviet Archives: Recent 
Revelations and Cold War Historiography," Diplomatic History, 21, 2 (Spring 1997) : 217-306. 
For a brief synopsis of some of the considerable remaining questions on Stalin's foreign 
policy, see Ulam, "A Few Unresolved Mysteries About Stalin and the Cold War in Europe."  
On Khrushchev, see for example Gaddis, We Now Knaw; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the 
Kremlin 's Cold War, pp.174-274; May, " America's Berlin," p .157. 
7 Trachtenberg, Constmcted Peace, pp.251-282; idem, History and Strategij, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1 991), pp.169-234; Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet 
Foreign Policy, 1 91 7-67, (New York: Praeger, 1968), p.620 (same in znct ed published 1974); Jack 
M. Schick, The Berlin Crisis, 1 958-1962, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971 ) .  
See also Wolfgang Krieger, "The Germans and the Nuclear Question," German Historical 
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considerable concern in Moscow, they argue that other issues were equally, if 
not more important. Yet even in this line of thought there are strong 
differences. Vladislav Zubok concludes that although Khrushchev's  initial 
ultimatum was "ninety percent improvisation," his driving motives for action 
were long in building. These certainly included fear of nuclear weapons being 
passed to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), but in Zubok' s view this 
was one motive amongst many which included bolstering Sino-Soviet 
relations and consolidating the sovereignty of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) . Gaddis assesses that it was designed to secure Western 
concessions on East German sovereignty, or, more drastically, to score a 
prestige victory by forcing the United States and its allies to liquidate their 
position in the city. Khrushchev himself maintained his public justification 
that it was solely to stabilize the GDR and thereby neutralize a volatile issue. 
Others have even questioned Khrushchev's role, suggesting that the driving 
forces were elsewhere·. Hope Harrison emphasizes the efforts of GDR leader 
Walter Ulbricht to manipulate Khrushchev to serve East German ends, while 
. Robert Slusser posits that it was the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, 
not Khrushchev, who masterminded the crisis.s In view of the wide range of 
Institute (Washington D.C.), Occasional Paper no.14 (1995); Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our 
Time, pp.124-127. 
8 Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962," CWIHP, Working 
Paper no.6 (May 1993) : 3-9; idem and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin 's Cold War, pp.190-201;  
Gaddis, We Now Know, p.140; Hope M. Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose' : New 
Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 
1958-1961," CWIHP, Working Paper no.5  (May 1993); idem, "The Berlin Crisis and the 
Khrushchev-Ulbricht Summits in Moscow, 9 and 18 June 1959," CWIHP Bulletin, 11 (Winter 
1998) : 204-217; Douglas Selvage, "Khrushchev's November 1958 Ultimatum: New Evidence 
from the Polish Archives," ibid., pp.200-203; idem, "The End of the Berlin Crisis, 1961-62: 
New Evidence from the Polish and East German Archives," ibid., pp.218-223; Hillenbrand, 
Fragments of Our Time, pp.126-127; Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. and ed.  
Strobe Talbott (London: Andre Deutsch, 1971), pp.452-457; idem, Khrushchev Remembers: The 
Glasnost Tapes, trans. and ed. Jerrold L. Schecter and Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1990), pp.163-170; idem, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. and ed. 
Strobe Talbott (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), pp.501-504; Robert M. Slusser, "The Berlin 
Crises of 1958-1959 and 1961," in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, eds, Force 
Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, (Washington D.C. : Brookings 
Institution, 1978), p.366. Gromyko's memoirs shed remarkably little light on his own role in 
the crisis. Andrei Gromyko, Memories, trans. Harold Shukman (London: Hutchinson, 1989), 
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arguments, it remains problematic to establish with any degree of certainty 
what Moscow's view of the situation actually was. Indeed, not much seems to 
have substantively changed since Bundy's observation. Whatever explanation 
· one arrives at, however, it is difficult to disagree with Henry Kissinger's 
observation that Khrushchev was better at starting crises than finishing them.9 
Despite the controversy, what becomes clear is that a uniquely 
American perspective developed. Whatever conclusion one reaches about 
Moscow's view of the conflict, it was different - often markedly so - to 
Washington's. By factoring in its own priorities, interests, historical "lessons," 
and assessments of its adversary's intentions and capabilities, Washington 
reached its own conclusions. These variables resulted in a perception of the 
problem that was not always consistent. It was often influenced by 
incongruous assessments based on differing emphases on any particular 
concern in the complex world of the Cold War. Moreover, preliminary 
declassification of Sovjet archival materials suggests that Washington often 
misperceived Moscow's intentions. Yet real or. imagined, the effect and 
_importance of Washington's perception of the threat were the same. At crucial 
points U.S. policymakers based their policy on the Berlin situation as they saw 
it, threatening war if they believed the situation warranted it and approaching 
other problems in light of this threat. Therefore, understanding how they 
perceived the central Berlin problem reveals much about how they conceived 
of the Cold War more generally.10 
pp.169-170. See also an important study by Hannes Adomeit. Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis 
Behavior: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), esp. 
pp.188-193. 
9 Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994) .  
10 Political scientists have long been fascinated by the part played by perceptions on 
decision-making. See for example James L. Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers 
Since tlze Mid-Nineteenth Centun;, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.255-280; 
Andrew Scott, I11e Functioning of tlze International Political System, (New York: Macmillan, 
1967), pp.80-105; Karl W. Deutsch, Analysis of International Relations, 2nct ed. (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J . :  Prentice Hall, 1978), pp.85-89; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); idem, Tlze Logic of Images in International 
Relations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) . See also Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of 
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Washington's perception of the issue was further influenced by 
personalities of the participants. Those in the White House and the Kremlin 
were, of course, central to the issue. While there were some elements of 
continuity, there were also clear discontinuities in how Truman, Eisenhower, 
and Kennedy responded to the problem, just as there were in Moscow in the 
transition from Stalin to Khrushchev. German personalities from Konrad 
Adenauer to Willy Brandt to Walter Ulbricht all contributed to the changing 
circumstances, as did leaders in London and Paris. The diplomatic currents of 
the Cold War ensured that at any given moment the concerns, priorities, and 
personalities of these leaders coalesced in different combinations. At lower 
levels were advisers that often figured prominently in different periods of 
Washington's consideration of the problem. For example, Dean Acheson, 
secretary of state in the Truman administration, made major contributions to 
the Kennedy administration's understanding of the problem almost a decade 
after he himself had overseen the lifting of the blockade and had left office. So 
too did General Lucius D. Clay, a key figure in . the Berlin blockade, who was 
again utilized by Kennedy in 1961 . General Maxwell D. Taylor, a key figure in 
the development of Flexible Response, and General Curtis LeMay, the so­
called "father of the Strategic Air Command," both had first-hand experience 
of Berlin and the conditions imposed by its special status, and drew on their 
experience in their service throughout the period of this study. On the 
diplomatic front, Llewellyn Thompson, Charles Bohlen, and Foy Kohler all 
had their own extensive experience in dealing with Moscow on the issue. And 
the State Department, in particular, had a core of long-serving professional 
foreign service officers who maintained their involvement with US-Berlin 
policy often for the entire period of this study and beyond. Martin 
Hillenbrand, Robert D. Murphy, John J. McCloy, Livingston T. Merchant, 
the Past: the Use and Misuse of His ton; in American Foreign Policy, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1973) . 
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Allan Lightner,11 and Colonel Henry A. Byroade were just some of the notable 
officials who comprised the "old Berlin hands" radiating from State's German 
desk who were constantly called upon by several administrations to explain 
and deal with the Berlin problem. While often participating only behind the 
scenes, their roles in drafting memoranda and speeches, carrying out studies, 
and offering expert advice ensured that their influence was always present in 
varying degrees.12 
The impact of the perpetual threat to Berlin on U.S. officials ran deeper. 
In the first two decades following the Second World War, at one point or 
another, most of the foreign policy advisers that became most influential in 
the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations had "cut their teeth," 
as it were, by grappling with the difficult but important problems of Germany 
and Berlin. As Carolyn Woods Eisenberg points out, "Virtually every 
important foreign policy actor had a hand in the German question and their 
decisions in this field were integrally connected to all the major policy 
questions of the time."13 Accordingly, many of Washington's semor 
policymakers were conditioned by both training and experience to expect 
trouble over Berlin. This cumulative process reached its peak in the Kennedy 
administration when the President was surrounded by advisers who had 
nearly all been intimately involved with the problem at some point over the 
previous fifteen years. However, the effect of this fluctuated. At times, their 
concern and intimacy with the Berlin problem directly influenced how 
Washington perceived the problem. At other times, their views were 
disregarded for any number of reasons. Moreover, from the lower levels, the 
characteristics of diplomatic bureaucracy often led to reports and memoranda 
that emphasized and often exaggerated the importance of the particular 
subject of study. In the case of Berlin, this tendency was heightened by the 
n Edwin Allan Lightner, Jr. 
12 For the role some of these individuals played in developing U.S. policy towards Berlin, 
see Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp.127-128, 135-136. 
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preconceptions of Washington's principals themselves. Eisenhower and 
Kennedy needed little convincing that Berlin was central to the Cold War, and 
Kennedy, in particular, often seized upon studies and memoranda to escalate 
the problem in the list of his administration's priorities . The overall result was 
that experience in dealing with the Berlin question greatly influenced the way 
in which U.S. policymakers framed and executed Cold War policy. 
Creating the Problem 
Ironically, the Berlin problem, which was the focal point of some of the 
Cold War's worst moments, developed directly out of the wartime Allies' best 
efforts to ensure the post-World War II peace. There was nothing deliberate or 
ideological about American policymakers committing themselves to 
maintaining an isolated military outpost in the middle of hostile territory. 
Rather, as James Sutterlin and David Klein note, that situation was part of 
"the enduring fruits of confusion."14 In the closing stages of World War II, a 
complex interplay of concerns, assumptions, and events led to the British and 
Americans, and later the French, each accepting r�sponsibility for a sector of 
Berlin that was 110 miles inside Soviet-occupied territory. With their focus 
fixed squarely on the larger "German question," Allied planners simply did 
not envisage the Berlin problem. 
Two important assumptions underpinned all of Washington's 
planning for postwar Germany. Firstly, Washington expected the postwar 
peace to be guaranteed by collective security in the form of the United 
Nations. Secondly, and more importantly, the U.S. military presence in 
Europe was designed as an interim measure until such time as peaceful 
European political forces regained strength and the world could feel safe from 
German aggression. The Allies hoped that if German militarism could not be 
13 Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The Amen.can Decision to Divide Germany, 
1 944-1 949, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.ix. 
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tamed, then at least i t  could be denied the means with which to propagate 
and expand. American participation in this process was assumed to be a 
temporary expedient lasting no more than a few years. Indeed, Roosevelt had 
promised as much at the Yalta Conference, anticipating that he would not be 
able to maintain U.S. forces in Europe for any more than two years in the face 
of domestic isolationist pressure.1s 
The improvised plans for the division of Germany into occupation 
zones, drafted at the height of the war effort in 1944 and 1945, ultimately led 
to the artificial situation in Berlin, with the creation of inherent instabilities 
that came to feature centrally in the ensuing Cold War. The final eighteen 
months of World War II, when the foundations of occupation policy were 
developed, was a complex time. Bitter fighting both in Europe and the Pacific, 
the dawn of the nuclear age, a drastically altered geo-political landscape, and 
most importantly, an uncertain future all contributed to the general 
uncertainty regarding planning for the postwar world .  And although there 
have been many, often passionate attempts . to apportion blame for the 
creation of the Berlin problem, in reality there was no single force controlling 
the policymaking process. Rather, it was a desu�tory and sporadic process 
over which no individual or government agency had control. As Daniel J. 
Nelson points out in the most thorough study of the origins of the Berlin 
problem, the unworkable situation in postwar Germany and Berlin resulted 
from many factors and failures at all levels of government activity.16 As one 
observer noted, the history of framing policy for postwar Germany is "an 
amazing tale of clashing personalities and bureaucratic structures, which 
together delayed and obscured policy goals to an extraordinary degree." 17 
Those departments most directly involved - War, State, and Treasury - were 
14 Sutterlin and Klein, Berlin, pp.1-23. 
is FRUS 1 945, Yalta: 617. 
16 Daniel J .  Nelson, Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma, (Alabama: University of Alabama 
Press, 1978) . 
17 Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Gennany: Retreat to Victon;, (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1977), p.19. 
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rendered ineffectual by interdepartmental quarrelling. Eisenhower, at that 
time the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe (SCAEF), 
explicitly rejected his own mandate for planning for postwar Germany.is 
Roosevelt, who had the opportunity to give at least loose guidance to the 
planning process, did not do so, in the belief that the primary postwar 
objective of American policy should be cooperation with the Soviet Union. A 
natural result of this, he maintained, would be to ensure that German and 
Japanese militarism could no longer threaten the peace.19 
As an interim measure, a tripartite body, the European Advisory 
Commission (EAC), was set up to negotiate the political aspects of the 
postwar occupation.20 Since it was the EAC that agreed on the zonal 
boundaries in mid-1944, in the early Cold War years it was this body - or 
more specifically John G.  Winant, the American representative - that bore the 
brunt of American criticism for the creation of such an impossible situation 
that the Soviets could exploit so easily.21 However, with Philip E. Mosely, 
himself a key participant in the drafting of the .zones, leading the way, others 
have sought to exonerate the EAC. Pointing to a lack of active participation of 
all of its member governments - particularly the United States - and the 
behaviour of military authorities which some characterize as sabotage, they 
18 During his presidency, Eisenhower repeatedly claimed to have counselled in 1944 and 
1945 against trying to administer the occupation from Berlin. For some of Eisenhower's many 
revisionist accounts of his involvement in the allocation of zonal boundaries and his 
anticipation of difficulties as early as 1944, see MemCon, 6 March 1959, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:433; 
MemCon, 1 1  December 1958, ibid., p .174; MemTeleCon, Eisenhower and Dulles, 27 
November 1958, box 37, DDE Diaries, Whitman, DDEL; MemCon, Pre-Press Conference, 10 
December 1 958, box 38, ibid. 
19 Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, (London: Collins, 1964), pp.280-281; Frank 
Spencer, "The United States and Germany in the Aftermath of the War," International Affairs, 
44 (1968) :  48-62. 
20 On the role and development of the EAC, see Bruce Kuklick, "The Genesis of the 
European Advisory Commission," Journal of Contemporary Histon;, 4, 4 (October 1969) : 189-
201; Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were 
Drawn," Foreign Affairs, 28, 4 (July 1950): 580-604; George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1 925-1 950, 
(London: Hutchinson, 1968), pp.164-187; Nelson, Wartime Origins, pp.10-23; Harley A. Notter, 
Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1 939-1 945, (Washington D.C. :  U.S. Dept of State, 1949) . 
21 Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp.284-286; Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany, 
(London: William Heinemann, 1950), p.15; Franklin, "Zonal Boundaries and Access to 
Berlin," pp.25-26. 
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argue that responsibility lay elsewhere, often with the very people who were 
attacking the EAC.22 Indeed, most subsequent works agree that the bulk of the 
responsibility for the apparent failure of the EAC rests in Washington, not 
London. The War Department zealously coveted its own authority on 
occupation policy, while State was too ill-equipped and ill-informed to 
compensate. The result, George F. Kennan wrote somewhat diplomatically, 
was "ill-advised."23 
Berlin, then, was designated as a special jointly occupied region within 
the Soviet zone. The most contentious aspect of this has been the fact that no 
arrangements for Western land access to Berlin were ever formally recorded. 
Since this deficiency was at the core of the ongoing contest for the city, it has 
provoked much heated debate. Because of the complexity and relative 
nebulousness of its origins, many government bodies and individuals have 
been blamed. The criticism can generally be divided into that which sees it as 
a failure of planning and that which focuses on Eisenhower's decision to halt 
the Anglo-American forces at the Elbe River. So far as the failure of 
government planning goes, as already noted, most studies emphasize 
Washington's unclear vision and relegation of the issue to a low priority. They 
see no single decision or action as the determining factor, but rather point to a 
host of contributing factors. However, Eisenhower's decision to halt the 
Allied Expeditionary Forces at the Elbe River, fifty miles west of Berlin, has 
often been cited as a serious mistake. Seizing upon Winston Churchill's 
spirited efforts to persuade Eisenhower to reconsider his strategy, 
Eisenhower's detractors inflamed the debate considerably in the early 1950s 
when Eisenhower revealed his decision to enter the political arena. In 
response, Eisenhower remained defensive about his decision. Feeling obliged 
to justify it, he elaborated at length in his memoirs of the war years, Crusade in 
22 Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany"; Kennan, Memoirs, 1 :164-187; Nelson, Wartime 
Origins; Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany, pp.19-53; Smith, Defense of Berlin, 
pp.18-33. 
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Europe, the objectivity of his decision. These memoirs, first published in mid-
1948, were written before the Berlin issue had degenerated to fully-fledged 
crisis . Yet, tension had been building for some time, and Eisenhower was 
responding · to an increasing public scrutiny of the origins of the problem. 
Moreover, as he was writing his account, Eisenhower was in a position to be 
privy to the news arriving from Germany through 1946 and 1947 foreboding a 
showdown. The result is an account that although not mentioning the Berlin 
crisis by name, justifies his own role in the way the situation had come about. 
He continued to defend his actions periodically through his public life by 
contributing to a debate that remained active so long as Berlin remained 
threatened.24 Several subsequent, detailed examinations of the issue, including 
Stephen Ambrose's Eisenhower and Berlin, 1 945, Forrest Pogue's essay "The 
Decision to Halt at the Elbe," and Jean Smith's study, generally demonstrate 
that even though Eisenhower exaggerated some elements of his reasoning 
and may have underappreciated the political ramifications, the decision was 
taken not because of some conspiracy with the Soviets agreed at Yalta, as 
some originally feared, but on sound military considerations in keeping with 
his mission.25 Moreover, Eisenhower's detractors have never satisfactorily 
explained what substantive difference it would have made to the subsequent 
crises if Allied Expeditionary Forces and not the Red Army had captured 
Berlin.26 The occupation zones had been settled long before, and to suggest 
that the United States should have flagrantly violated this agreement is to 
23 George F. Kennan to Gordon Craig, 28 July 1998, reprinted as " A Letter on Germany," in 
New York Review of Books, 45, 19 (3 December 1998) : 19. See also Kennan, Memoirs, l :chapt.7. 
24 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crnsade in Europe, (New York: Doubleday, 1948), pp.435-440, 
517-518. For an example of the ongoing controversy, even after Eisenhower had left office, see 
the lengthy exchanges in Congressional Record, Senate, 107, 15 (15 September 1961) :  19704-
19709. 
25 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 1 945: The Decision to Halt at the Elbe, (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1967); Forrest C. Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the Elbe," in Command 
Decisions, ed. Kent Robert Greenfield (Washington D.C. : Dept of the Army, 1960), pp.532-549; 
Smith, Defense of Berlin, pp.34-53. For Drew Pearson's original speculation in the New York 
Times that some deal had been done with Stalin at Yalta, see New York Times, 21 April 1945. 
26 See Robert D. Murphy recorded interview by David C. Berliner, 12 October 1972, OHP, 
DDEL. 
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retrospectively and artificially impose on Washington policymakers in 1945 
the attitude of policymakers later in the decade. There were, to be sure, some 
who had premonitions of East-West conflict. As early as April 1944, U.S. 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union E. Averell Harriman began warning 
Washington that the dispute over the future of Poland had exposed a new 
dimension to Soviet diplomacy that was "startling in its aggressiveness, 
determination and readiness to take independent action."27 British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill took up a similar line. But, at least for the 
moment, such warnings did not reflect Washington's policymaking 
mainstream. It was cooperation, not confrontation that drove U.S. policy in 
1945.28 
Thus, with neither a clear idea of objectives for postwar Germany, nor 
efficient policymaking machinery, when victory was achieved in Europe in 
May 1945, the United States had, in the words of Frank Ninkovich, "no 
conceptual road map, no clear image of Germany's place in the world, no idee 
maftresse with which to plot Germany's future.". As it happened, Moscow had 
an equally unclear vision subject to Stalin's sudden and unpredictable shifts 
on the topic . Consequently, in the early years the occupation was conducted 
on an ad hoc basis with major decisions being made in the field by military 
commanders. The result in the American zone, Ninkovich wrote, was "an 
27 Harriman to Hull, 20 April 1944, FRUS 1 944, 4:862-863; Harriman to Hopkins, 10  
September 1944, ibid. ,  pp.988-990; W .  Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to 
Churchill and Stalin, 1 941-1946, (New York: Random House, 1975), pp.315-334; Rudy 
Abramson, Spanning the Centun;: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1 891-1986, (New York: 
William Morrow, 1992), pp.344-368 .  
28 For a small selection of some of the vast literature on the on the origins of the Cold War 
in the 1944-1946 period during which U.S. policy shifted from cooperation to confrontation, 
see John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1972); idem, We Now Know, pp.1-25; Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.1-
65; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Securihj, the Trnman Administration, 
and the Cold War, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp.3-10; Joseph M. Siracusa, Into 
the Dark House: American Diplomacy and the Ideological Origins of the Cold War, (Claremont, Cal. : 
Regina, 1998), pp.31-56; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the 
National Security State, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp.42-162; Lloyd C. Gardner, Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. and Hans J. Morgenthau, The Origins of the Cold War, (Waltham, Mass . :  Ginn, 
1970); Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1 945-1 992, 7th ed. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1993); Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin 's Cold War, pp.36-48, 275-282. 
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occupation that was to administration what jazz i s  to classical music ."29 
Nevertheless, the U.S. Military Government (OMGUS) managed to function 
largely on an improvised basis. When, during a speech at Stuttgart in early 
September 1946, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes acknowledged publicly the 
deepening divide in Germany and spoke of the commitment of the United 
States to the Western zones' development, he essentially confirmed what had 
been evident for some time: that the two-year occupation envisaged by 
Roosevelt would be inadequate. In these circumstances, there appeared little 
choice but that military government should continue administering Germany. 
But events elsewhere began to intrude. 
The Blockade and Airlift 
While the Berlin problem originated in wartime planning and in the 
immediate postwar occupation, the foundations for both the U.S. commitment 
to Berlin and Washington's perennial expectation of a challenge to that 
. commitment lay in the response to the Berlin blockade. The circumstances of 
the postwar world determined that Truman would oversee a period of great 
turbulence and transition. Many decisions were made and commitments 
undertaken that had profound ramifications on how the world was shaped. 
Indeed, veteran diplomat and Kremlinologist Charles Bohlen claimed that it is 
"an incontestable fact that the major foundations of American foreign policy 
for decades were adopted during Truman's administration." Others have 
agreed with the significance of the period, although debate the merits of 
29 Frank A. Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German 
Question Since 1 945, (New York: Twayne, 1995), p.26. For Soviet planning, see Norman M. 
Naimark, The Russians in Gennany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1 949, 
(Cambridge, Mass. :  Harvard University Press, 1995), pp.9-10; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the 
Kremlin 's Cold War, pp.46-49; Vojtech Mastny, Russia 's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, 
Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1 941-1 945, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1979), p.261; R.C. Raack, "Stalin Plans His Post-War Germany," Journal of Contemporary 
Histon;, 28, 1 (January 1993) : 53-74. 
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Truman's stewardship of foreign policy.30 It was during his administration 
that such cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy as containment, the Marshall 
Plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were laid. So too, 
was the American commitment to Berlin. It was Truman who committed the 
United States to maintaining its presence in an untenable position " come what 
may," and it was he who first exploited the symbolism of that commitment. 
Once this promise was made, subsequent presidents could not tum away 
from Berlin without, in their assessments, irreparably damaging U.S. 
credibility and prestige. 
Truman's promise was made in response to one of the most acute 
Soviet challenges to the city, the Berlin blockade. Often described as the first 
battle of the Cold War, it was set against the backdrop of the emerging East­
West conflict, during which the occupation zone boundaries had solidified 
into the division of Germany. While responsibility for this process remains 
controversial,31 the result was that Berlin became a Western outpost isolated 
3° Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to Histonj, 1 929-1969, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), p.301; 
Francis Fukuyama, "A Moral Compass to the World," review of Aclzeson by James Chase, Neu1 
York Times Book Review, (23 August 1998) : 6. For a recent synopsis of assessments of Truman's 
foreign policy record, see Arnold A. Offner, " 'Another Such Victory' : President Truman, 
American Foreign Policy, and the Cold War," Diplomatic Histonj, 23, 2 (Spring 1999) : 127-155. 
31 The division of Germany has had important ramifications for the debate on the origins 
of the Cold War. Traditionalist and postrevisionist historians generally contend that it was 
the result of Stalin's aggressive postwar expansion. See for example Gaddis, We Now Know, 
esp. pp.1-53; idem, Tlze Long Peace: Inquiries Into the HistonJ of tlze Cold War, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), pp.48-71; idem, The United States and the Origins of tlze Cold War, 1 941-
1 947; Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: Tlze Onset of tlze Cold War, (New York: Norton, 1970); 
Raack, "Stalin Plans His Post-War Germany"; idem, Stalin 's Drive to tlze West, 1 938-1945, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) . Revisionist historians have attributed various 
levels of responsibility to the United States. See for example Eisenberg, Drawing the Line; 
idem, review of We Now Knmo by Gaddis, Journal of American Histonj, (March 1 998) : 1462-
1464; Bruce Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash witlz Russia Over 
Reparations, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); Lloyd C. Gardner, "America and the 
German 'Problem,' 1945-1949," in Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, ed. Barton 
J. Bernstein (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970); Geoffrey Warner, "The Division of Germany, 1946-
1948," International Affairs, (January 1975): 60-70. Others dispute that there was either type of 
"grand design." See John H. Backer, Tlze Decision to Divide Germany: American Foreign Policy in 
Transition, (Durham, N.C. :  Duke University Press, 1978) . For some other important 
discussions of the role of the division of Germany in the origins of the Cold War, see Melvyn 
P. Leffler, "The Struggle for Germany and the Origins of the Cold War," German Historical 
Institute (Washington D.C.), Occasional Paper no.16 (1996); idem, Preponderance of Power, esp. 
pp.63-71, 116-121, 182-219; Charles S. Maier, ed., The Origins of tlze Cold War and Conternporan; 
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deep within Communist controlled territory. In mid-1948, Stalin moved to 
exploit this situation and the concomitant absence of formal arrangements for 
Western access by restricting land traffic through the Eastern zone. 
The blockade, which became deeply entrenched in Cold War 
mythology, was the first direct East-West confrontation of the Cold War and 
played a central role in defining not only the course of the Cold War, but also 
in framing Washington's perception of that conflict. As Thomas Schwartz 
notes, "The Cold War would have taken a very different course had the West 
been forced out of Berlin or sacrificed its rights there."32 "In retrospect," writes 
Avi Shlaim, "it is clear beyond any shadow of doubt that this was the most 
critical crisis of the cold war." "The stakes could hardly have been greater," he 
continues, because "the future of Germany, the future of Western Europe and 
the future of the precarious postwar international order all hung in the 
balance."33 Even for those who find Shlaim' s appraisal exaggerated, the 
blockade did, in the words of Daniel Yergin, confirm the "end of the peace." 
By adding a military dimension to a hitherto economic and political contest, 
the blockade confirmed the worst fears of Soviet intentions. For the first time, 
major war became a real possibility .34 By demonstrating that it was willing to 
act militarily on the ideological and political conflicts of interests identified by 
Europe, (New York: Franklin Watts, 1978); Naimark, The Russians in Germany; Kennedy-Pipe, 
Stalin 's Cold War; Anne Deighton, Tlze Impossible Peace: Britain, tlze Division of Germany, and tlze 
Origins of the Cold War, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); idem, "The 'Frozen Front' : The Labour 
Government, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1947," 
International Affairs (London), 63 (Summer 1987): 449-465; Lynn Etheridge Davis, The Cold War 
Begins: Soviet-American Conflict Over Eastern Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1974); Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-
1952," in Charles S. Maier, ed., The Cold War in Europe, (New York: Markus Wiener, 1991), 
pp.143-165; W.W. Rostow, The Division of Europe: 1 946, (London: Gower, 1982); Yergin, 
Shattered Peace; Mastny, Russia 's Road to the Cold War; Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp.378-
455. 
32 Thomas Alan Schwartz, "Lucius D.  Clay: Reluctant Cold Warrior?" review of Lucius D. 
Clay by Jean Edward Smith, Diplomatic Histon11 16, 4 (Fall 1992) : 625. 
33 Avi Shlaim, "Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War," International Affairs 
(London), 60, 1 (Winter 1983/84) : 1 .  
34 Yergin, Shattered Peace, p.366; May, "America's Berlin," p.148; Samuel R .  Williamson, Jr., 
and Steven L. Rearden, Tlze Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1 945-1 953, (New York: St. 
Martin's, 1993), p.77. 
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Churchill, Kennan, and others, Moscow tested U.S. strength in a very public 
and unambiguous way. In this way, the blockade highlighted not so much 
American military vulnerability - that much had been evident to 
administration officials for some time - as Moscow's willingness to exploit 
that vulnerability. In response to the cumulative effect it had with other 
challenges in the Middle East and Europe, Washington rallied its forces . 
When Truman decided in July 1948 that the United States would make 
a stand in Berlin regardless of the consequences, he effectively drew 
containment's fall-back line. By its very nature, containment needed such a 
line, and Truman's decision imposed that role upon Berlin. From that 
moment, Berlin was central to U.S. national security as a symbol of American 
political will. Consequently, Washington struggled with the problems of 
making the entire fabric of containment dependent on maintaining an isolated 
and untenable outpost. For there was never any illusion that Berlin could be 
defended by conventional military means. In fact, the decision to stay defied · 
military common sense. Accordingly, several key policymakers advocated 
withdrawal - albeit on more dignified terms than under the duress of a 
blockade - largely because every contingency contemplated by defence 
planners reduced to the same unyielding truth: Berlin was militarily 
indefensible.  
How then, was the United States going to make good its commitment? 
The key appeared to lie in the American nuclear monopoly. Yet the postwar 
demobilization had seriously depleted the practical options available to the 
United States to exploit that advantage. The blockade, therefore, catalyzed a 
review of the defence posture of the United States beginning with nuclear 
strategy. Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
used the blockade in their efforts to thwart Truman's tight defence budgets, 
seizing the opportunity to argue that relying on a perception of strength was 
not enough; it had to be backed up by tangible military capabilities. 
Furthermore, the blockade demonstrated the inadequacies of American 
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nuclear strategy when Washington was forced to improvise an atomic 
deterrent by sending B-29 bombers to Britain and Germany. But without the 
necessary infrastructure, and more particularly without having been 
converted to carry atomic payloads, the effectiveness of these planes in 
practical terms was limited. The United States, many feared, had made 
commitments that exceeded its military capabilities . In short, it appeared that 
fiscal restraint had led to strategic bankruptcy. Thus, the blockade was the 
first in a series of shocks - along with Communist victories in Czechoslovakia 
and China, the Korean War, and the first detonation of a Soviet atomic 
device - that contributed to a major re-evaluation of U.S. defence posture and 
strategic thinking as part of the militarization of containment.35 
But the immediate reaction was to institute the famous Berlin airlift. 
This was a novel, innovative, and impressive application of Anglo-American 
technical and logistical know-how that achieved a significant psychological 
effect. It provided powerful images of the incessant stream of British and 
American aircraft transporting basic living supplies for Berlin's population. It 
_ was not coincidence that these images, which were widely distributed 
throughout the Western world's press, placed strong emphasis on the moral 
35 As Gaddis points out, the influence the U.S. nuclear monopoly exerted on Soviet policy 
before and during the blockade is questionable. Gaddis, We Now Know, p.98. For Forrestal's 
resistance to Truman's budgetary constraints, see James V. Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. 
Walter Millis (New York: Viking 1951), pp.424-460; Leffler, Preponderance of Power, pp.220-265. 
Some historians have taken a more extreme view of the National Military Establishment's 
desperation. See for example Frank Kofsky, Ham; S. Truman and tlze War Scare of 1 948, (New 
York: St Martin's, 1993) .  On early American nuclear strategy and the militarization of 
containment, see Williamson and Rearden, The Origins of U.S .  Nuclear Strategy; John Lewis 
Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security 
Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp.89-126; Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, 
pp.66-91; idem, Histon1 and Strategtj, pp.100-152; David Alan Rosenberg, "American Atomic 
Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," Journal of American History, 66, 1 (June 1979) : 62-
87; idem, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy: Theory vs. Practice," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, (March 
1987) : 20-26; idem, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-
1960," In ternational Security, 7 (Spring 1983) : 3-71;  idem, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945-1950," 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 38 (May 1982) : 25-30; Lawrence Freedman, Tlze Evolution of Nuclear 
Strategi;, (New York: St Martin's, 1981); Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1983); Gregg Her ken, " 'A Most Deadly Illusion' : The Atomic Secret and 
American Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1945-1950," Pacific Historical Review, 49, (1980): 51-76; 
Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1 945-1 950, (New York: Garland, 1988) . 
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right of feeding the city's children. U.S. policymakers therefore strove to 
explain the issue in moral terms. But the airlift did not represent a strong 
policy choice. At the time, there were few U.S. officials who believed that it 
· was a satisfactory response to the Soviet challenge; indeed, there were even 
fewer who thought it would succeed. Subsequent administrations explicitly 
rejected the airlift option, partly on the basis that it would be interpreted as 
political weakness. Yet, as the Berlin mythology grew, the airlift came to be 
considered one of the decisive "successes" of American Cold War policy. 
Publicly, it was a triumph. But privately some policymakers questioned 
whether it might not have revealed too much of what Truman was not 
prepared to do. The Germans and the rest of the world had been impressed 
by the show of commitment that the Western Allies had made for Berlin, but 
in national security terms vis-a-vis the Soviets, many in the administration 
believed that the blockade had revealed America's weakness in its inability to 
force the Soviets to lift it. To Washington policymakers, the outcome of this 
first battle of the Cold War was ambiguous. The . airlift was a success in terms 
. of symbolism, but the Soviets had really committed little to maintaining the 
blockade, raising the question of what, in real terms, they had lost by lifting 
it.36 
Even Truman, whose own temperament was famously inclined 
towards decisive action, repeatedly expressed his frustration that his 
administration could not devise a stronger reaction to the Soviet challenge. It 
was, in effect, a default reaction because every all other options had been 
rejected. Even after the blockade was lifted, Truman privately expressed 
misgivings about the wisdom of instituting another airlift if the blockade was 
reimposed. It had effectively delayed a showdown by avoiding the immediate 
issue, but it had not been a decisive demonstration of American resolve. It 
36 While policymakers questioned whether the Soviets had " lost" anything, with the 
advantages of retrospect and archival access historians have seen a greater impact on Soviet 
policy. See especially Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin 's Cold War, p .52; Gaddis, We 
Now Know, pp.48, 121 .  
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was widely acknowledged that the only reason it had succeeded was that the 
Soviets had apparently judged that it was too risky to interfere with it. 
Western rights in Berlin were not substantively improved by the lifting of the 
blockade. More importantly, nothing that the West had done had discouraged 
the Soviets from doing it again. 
Post-blockade accounts, however, took a different Hne by generally 
exaggerating the significance of America's "victory. "  In this way, American 
Cold War rhetoric and propaganda heavily influenced how the episode was 
portrayed. By the time that he came to write his memoirs in the early 1950s, 
Truman described the airlift as "a beacon light of hope for the peoples of 
Europe."37 Similarly, Clay, who had persistently castigated Washington in 
1948-1949 for its "weak" stand by insisting that an airlift was the wrong 
solution for the Berlin situation and had even later told the Eisenhower 
administration that an airlift should be regarded as "appeasement," had 
apparently revised his views by the time he came to write his own memoirs in 
1950 in which he emphasized the role of the airlift and counterblockade in 
"forcing" Stalin to back down.38 For the most part, subsequent studies 
perpetuated the Truman-Clay view of the crisis, and, in doing so, 
consolidated the Berlin mythology. W. Phillips Davison and Jean Edward 
Smith both characterized the airlift as a dramatic victory for the West that 
indicated that the political initiative had passed from Moscow to 
Washington.39 A plethora of other works, especially during the 1970s and 
1980s continued the theme of a "moral victory" for the West. The airlift, they 
contend, was a response that showed sensible restraint in the face of 
37 Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 1 946-52, (New York: Da Capo, 1956), p .131 .  
38 Clay, Decision in Gennany, esp. p.392. For Clay's advice to the Eisenhower 
administration, see McCloy to Merchant, 10 December 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:166-167. When 
Jean Edward Smith interviewed him in 1971, Clay continued to be critical of the airlift option. 
Lucius D. Clay recorded interview by Jean Edward Smith, February 1971 (part 22), OHP, 
DDEL. General Frank Howley, the commandant of the American sector during the blockade, 
provided his own heavily emotive account. Frank Howley, Berlin Command, (New York: G .P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1950) . 
39 W. Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1958), pp.270-280; Smith, Defense of Berlin, pp.132-133. 
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unmasked Soviet aggression, catalyzed the formation of NATO, consolidated 
the principles of "free Europe," and displayed American and British flexibility 
and strength.40 Truman biographer David McCullough goes even further in 
· describing the Berlin airlift as "one of the most brilliant American 
achievements of the postwar era and one of Truman's proudest decisions."41 
In this, he is expressing the characterization of the airlift as it has entered the 
Berlin mythology. 
Yet, this overwhelmingly positive depiction is not a true representation 
of policymakers' views at the time. Even Clay, when called upon for his views 
on Khrushchev's ultimatum, suggested that an airlift would be an act of 
appeasement rather than defiance. While most would not go so far as Robert 
Murphy's 1964 description of the episode as · a  "deceptive victory" that was in 
truth "a surrender of our hard-won rights in Berlin," many U.S. officials 
privately viewed the Washington's handling of the crisis more ambivalently 
than they publicly admitted. It was, at best, a qualified victory.42 Of course, it 
40 Richard Collier, Bridge Across the Sktj: The Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 1 948-1 949, (London: 
Macmillan, 1978); Morris, Blockade; Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1977); Mark Arnold Forster, The Siege of Berlin, (London: Collins, 1979); Ann Tusa and 
John Tusa, The Berlin Blockade, (London: Coronet, 1988) .  See also Hans Speier, Divided Berlin: 
The Anatomy of Soviet Political Blackmail, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1961) .  By drawing on 
historical sources political scientists have provided some important studies of the blockade. 
For an enduring and important study of American decision-making during the blockade, see 
Avi Shlaim, Tlze United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1 948-1949: A Study in Crisis Decision­
Making, (Berkely: University of California Press, 1983) . Alexander George's and Richard 
Smoke's study is more dated, but useful nonetheless. Alexander L. George and Richard 
Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign PoliClj, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 
pp.107-139. See also M. Steven Fish, "The Berlin Blockade Crisis of 1948-1949," in Avoiding 
War: Problems in Crisis Management, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder, Col . :  Westview, 1991), 
pp.195-221; John R. Oneal, Foreign PoliC1J Making In Times of Crisis, (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 1983), pp.216-290; Richardson, Crisis DiplomaClj, pp.192-203; Adomeit, Soviet 
Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior, pp.67-182. 
41 David McCullough, Truman, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p.631 . 
42 For Clay's views, see McCloy to Merchant, 10 December 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:166-167. 
For Murphy's views, see Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp.392-393; Dean Acheson, 
Present at tlze Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 
p.348. Murphy told an interviewer in 1972 that he was convinced that "a lot of things 
happened subsequently which would not have happened if we had made a stand." Robert D. 
Murphy recorded interview by David C. Berliner, 12 October 1972, OHP, DDEL. For an 
instance where Murphy views on the shortcomings of the airlift was injected directly in the 
policymaking process, see MemCon, Murphy, Twining, Lemnitzer, Hillenbrand, LeMay, et 
al., 21 November 1958, FR US 1 958-60, 8:100 .  
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remained impossible to admit as much, since the situation still hinged on 
projecting a positive image. However, George Kennan publicly criticized the 
administration's handling of the issue when he came to write his memoirs in 
· the late 1960s. Like Murphy, Kennan had the benefit of knowing that the 
Berlin issue became subject to recurring Soviet challenges. Therefore, he saw 
the blockade not on its own merits, but in its role in the ongoing tension 
caused by the division of Germany. To Kennan, the Paris Council of Foreign 
Ministers (CFM) was ultimately more important than the blockade itself, and 
the decision taken by Acheson and his staff not to pursue a reunified 
Germany - however understandable his reasons were - proved disastrous to 
Europe. Washington, Kennan argued, had missed an opportunity to solve the 
problem. He himself had put for his own detailed plan for how this might be 
' 
accomplished, but Acheson had chosen to disregard his counsel . Because of 
this missed opportunity, Kennan regarded the handling of the entire episode 
a failure.43 
In post-Cold War historiography, the blockade is often treated merely 
_ as a precursor to the crises period of 1958-1963. To modern historians, the 
relatively crude diplomacy of the blockade holds far less appeal than do the 
more sophisticated and dangerous crises of the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations. Even its contribution to liberal-capitalism's ultimate 
11 triumph" is considered negligible in comparison with the European 
Recovery Program and other initiatives. It was not, after all, a planned 
element of U.S. Cold War strategy. This is reflected by the fact that in his 
study of the Truman administration's /1 grand strategy," Melvyn Leffler 
accords the blockade only a handful of paragraphs in over five hundred pages 
of text. Gaddis effectively dismisses it as the fumblings of an administration 
on a steep diplomatic learning curve while placing greater emphasis on the 
way it frustrated Stalin's plans for expansion. Trachtenberg accords it 
considerably more significance largely as a major episode in a series of 
43 Kennan, Memoirs, 1 :446-448; Kennan, " A Letter on Germany." 
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challenges that convinced the administration to re-evaluate its defence 
posture and to make a greater security commitment to Western Europe.44 
Studies capitalizing on the resurgence of interest sparked by the airlift's 
fiftieth anniversary again perpetuated the Truman-Clay line.45 
But regardless of the historical verdict, so far as U.S. officials were 
concerned, the crisis had been defused, but not solved. Although the 
transport restrictions had been lifted, there appeared little to prevent Moscow 
from reimposing them at its own whim. Recognition that American actions in 
1948-1949 had done little to deter further Soviet action against Berlin brought 
with it the perennial expectation that the West would once again face a 
challenge in Berlin. And now that the United States had irrevocably 
committed itself to Berlin's defence, the stakes were even higher. Thus, it was 
in the outcome of the blockade that the foundations lay of Washington's 
perennial anticipation of a challenge to its commitment to Berlin. 
44 Leffler, Preponderance of Power, pp.217-218; Gaddis, We Now Know, pp.98, 121; 
Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.78-88; Williamson and Rearden, The Origins of U.S. 
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the Eastern zone. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp.440-448; Milovan Djilas, Conversations 
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Sudoplatov, Jerrold L. Schecter, and Leona P. Schecter (London: Little, Brown, 1994), p.210. 
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The Forgotten Years 
The years 1949 to 1957 might justifiably be called the forgotten years of 
Berlin historiography. Berlin was not an immediate scene of major crisis, yet 
· the record clearly shows that Washington did not simply forget about the 
problem in 1949 after the lifting of the blockade, only to be reminded of it 
when Khrushchev presented his ultimatum in November 1958. Moreover, the 
policy upon which the Eisenhower administration based its response to 
Khrushchev's  challenge was strikingly different from that which had emerged 
immediately after the blockade; in the intervening period was a crucial 
process of transition that has not be adequately explored largely because 
much of it occurred in secret. Only recently has the documentary record 
become available, making it possible to reconstruct and examine this 
neglected period. 
The first major provocation to Washington's review of its Berlin policy 
was the Korean War. As Lawrence Kaplan points out, Korea was "a milestone 
in the evolution of American diplomatic history." He goes on to point out that 
. the impact of Korea on American Cold War policy can best be observed in 
Europe, rather than Asia.46 Indeed, as Walter LaFeber writes, the Korean War 
was a "war for both Asia and Europe." 47 This is especially true of the Berlin 
situation. Despite the geographical separation, policymakers became 
concerned with what they identified as the "Berlin-Korea parallel ."  Seeing 
what it believed to be Moscow's hand in North Korea's invasion, Washington 
feared that it was witnessing a new Soviet capability that could give the USSR 
a decisive edge in the Cold War.4s Until that time, U.S. defence planners 
directed their efforts towards preparing for the Red Army sweeping through 
Western Europe and other equally absolute threats which could presumably 
be countered by long-range strategic bombing of the USSR' s military-
46 Lawrence Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Fonnative Years, (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky, 1984), p .149. 
47 LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, pp.99-145. 
4s Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, p.99. 
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industrial centres.49 The North Korean attack, however, challenged their 
assumptions. "War-by-proxy," or the use of troops from Soviet satellites to 
probe Western intentions and capabilities without actually using Soviet 
troops, added a new, menacing dimension to the East-West conflict. 
Diplomatic historians have long recognized the significance· of Korea in 
the massive defence build-up in Europe undertaken by the Truman 
administration,so but have neglected the more immediate impact on policy 
and planning in relation to Berlin. Every indication led Washington to 
anticipate that Moscow could - and probably would - employ the so-called 
"Korean model" in Germany in general, and Berlin in particular. Within days 
of the outbreak of hostilities, Washington warned U.S. commanders in Europe 
to remain alert for fear that the North Koreans' attack "may indicate riskier 
Soviet policy henceforth of using Satellite armed forces in attempting to reach 
limited objectives for the expansion of Communism." Ernest May has put it 
more succinctly by noting that the attack "was widely viewed as a rehearsal 
for a comparable effort in Europe."51 And Berlin appeared to offer the ideal 
setting. 
Ultimately, of course, the Soviet Union did not send East German 
troops to attack the West's position in Berlin, and more recent sources have 
revealed that, quite apart from the debate about Stalin's intentions, such a 
move was never a viable option.52 Yet, the prospect- and it was the 
perception of a threat that was the core issue - led to extensive revision of 
49 Ibid., pp.1-91 . 
50 See for example Kaplan, The United States and NA TO; Trachtenberg, Constmcted Peace, 
pp.99ff; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp.89-126; Walter LaFeber, "NATO and the Korean 
War: A Context," in American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance, ed. Lawrence S. Kaplan 
(Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1991), pp.33-52; Ernest R. May, "The American 
Commitment to Germany, 1949-55," ibid., pp.52-80; Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: 
At the Center of Decision, (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989, pp.117-137. 
s1 Dept of Army to CINCEUR, 28 June 1 950, box 2, TS General 1949-52, HiCom McCloy, 
RG 466, NA; May, " America's Berlin," p .154. 
s2 Philip A Karber and Jerald A Combs, "The United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat 
to Western Europe: Military Estimates and Policy Options, 1945-1963," Diplomatic Histon;, 22, 
3 (Summer 1998) :  416-417; David E. Murphy, Sergei A Kondrashev, and George Bailey, 
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existing national security policy designed to maintain the American presence 
in the city. As it was eventually tabled in 1952, in the form of a policy paper 
only recently declassified in full, NSC 132/1 "U.S. Policy and Courses of 
Action to Counter Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin," Washington's 
Berlin policy underwent a striking shift during the Korean War from 
relatively straightforward planning for the contingency of another blockade to 
defending against a more sophisticated and ambiguous threat an attack on 
West Germany or Berlin by recently formed East German paramilitary forces. 
But this shift was more than the preparation of practical measures that might 
be invoked if Berlin was threatened. Rather, Korea stimulated a conceptual 
shift in Washington that required "imaginative changes both within the 
Western Europe community and between the United States and its NATO 
allies."53 Such changes were especially pertinent to the Berlin situation. 
When Eisenhower assumed the presidency in 1953, he inherited 
Truman's NSC policy papers, including, of course, NSC 132/1 .  So long as the 
relevant NSC papers remained classified, it appeared, as Trachtenberg noted 
in 1991, that "the change in administration in 1953 led only to a minor 
sharpening of policy" because the basic shift had actually occurred by the end 
of the Truman administration.54 The contention of this study, however, is that 
recently declassified records indicate that the Truman administration oversaw 
a refinement of policy and the beginnings of a conceptual shift in light of the 
Berlin-Korea parallet while the Eisenhower administration greatly 
accelerated this process and took it in another direction. In her 1981 study, 
Blanche Wiesen Cook speculated that the foundations for Eisenhower's 
response to Khrushchev's ultimatum were to be found in the policy 
documents of 1953-1954. But since these documents remained classified, Cook 
was unable to pursue the matter. Indeed, Eisenhower himself had confirmed 
Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 
p.86. 
53 Kaplan, The United States and NATO, p.150. 
54 Trachtenberg, History and Strategij, pp.209-210 .  
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as much in 1961, when he wrote for the Saturday Evening Post that the Berlin 
policy papers he approved in January 1954, on the whole "continued to be 
followed quite consistently during the ensuing years."ss Those documents, 
which have only recently been released, confirm this. They reveal that in late 
1953 and early 1954 Eisenhower made decisive changes to Washington's 
policy towards Berlin that would be fundamental to the American response to 
Khrushchev's threats later in the decade. Washington's new policies were not 
a reversal, but they did represent a significant change in direction. This went 
along two distinct, yet closely related paths. 
The first was a deliberate attempt to cultivate Berlin as an instrument 
of propaganda in the wider effort to undermine Communist control in 
Eastern Europe. Although Rollback, as this policy came to be known in its 
most confrontational form, found its limits in the East German uprising of 
June 1953, which demonstrated just how risky its pursuit could be, it was to 
have an important and lasting legacy on how Washington perceived the 
Berlin issue during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.56 Truman's 
overall approach to the Berlin problem was focused on defence; Berlin was 
valued as a demonstration of American resolve to defend containment's fall-
back line. Yet Eisenhower came to office believing Truman's brand of 
containment to be negative, even dangerous in the long-term, and therefore 
set his government on the course of seizing the opportunity to make positive 
use of the American commitment to Berlin by maximizing the inherent 
propaganda benefits of the situation. In this, Berlin became a focal point in the 
wider psychological war for Eastern Europe. In short, Eisenhower would use 
Berlin to steal the initiative back from Moscow. As a consequence, Berlin 
became at once fall-back position and front line. 
55 Blanche Wiesen Cook, 71ie Declassified Eisenlwwer: A Divided Legacy, (New York: 
Doubleday, 1981), pp.209-210; Dwight D. Eisenhower, "My Views on Berlin," Saturday 
Evening Post, 234, 49 (9 December 1961 ) :  26. 
56 Christian F. Ostermann, "The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the 
Limits of Rollback," Cold War International History Project, Working Paper no.11 (December 
1994) . 
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In mid-1953, this process became acute when uprisings emanating 
from the Eastern sector of Berlin spread through the GDR. Recent sources 
from both American and Eastern bloc archives indicate that Western 
propaganda played an important role in prolonging the June 1953 riots, and, 
furthermore, that the uprising had deeper ramifications than has traditionally 
been appreciated. In the post-Cold War period, some have credited the 
uprisings with irrevocably undermining the legitimacy of the GDR regime's 
claim to statehood by dispelling once and for all any hopes it held of winning 
the confidence of the East German people.  In this way, they argue, it 
contributed to the eventual downfall of the GDR.57 Partly for this reason, in 
1994 Christian Ostermann concluded that the June 1953 upheaval should be 
considered " one of the most significant focal points in the history of the Cold 
War."58 For the immediate period, however, Washington's policy was a failure 
largely because it revealed, in the words of one observer, that it had "no 
intention of providing anything more than rhetorical help to 
revolutionaries ."59 In the absence of Western intervention, the rioters were 
quickly overcome by Soviet tanks. But the importance of this episode for this 
study is not in its immediate failure, as it is in the rhetorical and political 
legacy. Once again, Berlin was at the front line of the Cold War. More 
importantly, the policy that had placed it there - Rollback - had also 
entrenched certain phrases and ideas into the dialogue of the Berlin issue. 
The second, more tangible, element of the Berlin issue the Eisenhower 
administration pursued was an important review of contingency planning. 
Several years later, in 1958 and 1959, the President was publicly vilified for his 
apparent passivity in response to Khrushchev's ultimatum. But as historian 
William Burr pointed out in 1994, using then recently declassified documents, 
57 See for example Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis in Communism and the End of East 
Germany, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp.6, 15-16. 
58 Ostermann, "The Limits of Rollback," p.2. 
59 E. Garrison Walters, "Out of the Shadow: The United States and Eastern Europe," 
review of Of Walls and Bridges: Tlze United States and Eastern Europe by Bennett Kovrig, 
Diplomatic Histon;, 1 7, 1 (Winter 1993) : 154. 
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Eisenhower's public position on Khrushchev's challenge was deceptive. 
Rather than being passive and dangerously cautious as early critics charged, 
the record clearly shows that behind closed doors "policymakers in 
· Washington, while not looking for trouble, were willing to use force, even at 
the risk of general war."60 Moreover, the mask of passivity was not the result 
of an absence of planning as was once feared. On the contrary, documents 
declassified since 1994 confirm that the position Burr described had been 
policy for some time and was, in fact, based on fundamental policy decisions 
made in late 1953 and early 1954 that were codified in the form of a recently 
declassified NSC policy paper designated as NSC 5404/1 "U.S. Policy on 
Berlin." During this period, Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs transformed U.S. 
contingency planning from the essentially passive defence envisaged by the 
Truman administration into an aggressive plan designed to force Moscow to 
face the question "War or Peace?" as soon as any direct threat to 
Washington's commitment to Berlin was encountered. Dissatisfied with an 
airlift as a response to a Soviet blockade, . Eisenhower directed his 
_administration to develop plans that would bring the issue to a head 
immediately. He would do this by taking the contentious step of employing 
limited military force to reopen the access routes and probe Soviet intentions, 
a strategy flatly rejected by the previous administration. Moreover, 
Eisenhower specifically recognized that in such a case the United States might 
need to "go it alone" without its NATO allies . 
Of course, the significance of such contingency plans should not be 
exaggerated and is directly related to how seriously the administration feared 
that they might have to be invoked. But policymakers continued to expect a 
challenge to Berlin. When these fears were realized later in the decade, it was 
on the foundation of planning conducted in 1953 and 1954 that Washington 
60 William Burr, "Avoiding the Slippery Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the 
Berlin Crisis, November 1958 - January 1959," Diplomatic Histon;, 18, 2 (1994) : 178. See also 
Cook, Declassified Eisenhower, pp.210-211 .  Burr includes a brief discussion on the contents of 
Berlin and Cold War History I 32 
reacted. Yet the true significance of these changes in Berlin contingency 
planning lay in revealing the mind-set of the new administration. It was a 
mind-set that was to lay the foundation of how the administration faced the 
· challenge later in the decade, even though Eisenhower and Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles departed from the explicit recommendations of the 1953-
1954 period when faced with Khrushchev's ultimatum. But the Eisenhower 
administration's attitude was notably different from the Truman 
administration's and led to a quite different approach to the problem. In this 
respect, even more so than specific contingency plans that may or may not be 
invoked, the changes made during the first Eisenhower administration had a 
lasting impact. 
Khrushchev's Ultimatums 
As some observers have noted, the 1980s and early 1990s saw an 
"Eisenhower boom"61 during which an array of his_torians reinterpreted the 
_historical depiction of Eisenhower, particularly in the light of the records of 
Eisenhower's secretary, Ann Whitman. What the so-called Whitman File 
revealed was a very different president from the one that contemporaries saw 
publicly. Within a short period, Eisenhower revisionism had made 
considerable progress in transforming the historical view of Eisenhower from 
a passive and "hands-off" leader into one that was actively engaged in 
directing his administration's policies. What was formerly considered 
NSC 5404/1 but had no access to the documents concerning the origins and development of 
the paper. Ibid., pp .181-182. See also Trachtenberg, Histon; and Strategi;, pp.209-211 .  
61 Stephen G.  Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship," Diplomatic 
Histon;, 17, 1 (Winter 1993) : 97. For a slightly updated version of this essay, see idem, 
"Eisenhower Revisionism: The Scholarly Debate," in America in the World: T11e Historiography 
of American Foreign Relations Since 1 941, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), pp.300-325. 
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detachment from policymaking was reinterpreted by historians as a deft 
hidden-hand. 62 
A product of this wave of Eisenhower revisionism was a re-evaluation 
of the Eisenhower-Dulles relationship . As historians subjected this 
relationship to greater scrutiny, an "unexpected" Dulles emerged. This 
Dulles, famous for "brinkmanship" and Massive Retaliation, accepted 
considerable input from others, especially Eisenhower himself. As Richard 
Immerman noted in one of the earlier re-evaluations of the Eisenhower-Dulles 
relationship, the popularly held assumption that Dulles manipulated 
Eisenhower was rendered "problematic" at best in light of the new evidence. 
Moreover, Dulles's own strategic vision has been shown not to be as static as 
it was once characterized. Indeed, historians in recent years have emphasized 
Dulles's hitherto underappreciated flexibility. But such revelations have not 
necessarily diminished appreciation of Dulles's central role; it has simply 
shown it to be more sophisticated than was previously thought.63 
62 Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader, (New York: Basic 
Books, 1982) . 
63 Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower-Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" Political 
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When it came to the Berlin issue, although Dulles was seen by the 
outside world - including Moscow - as the main force in Washington's 
foreign policy, the documentary record reveals that the Eisenhower-Dulles 
relationship was particularly complex. At times Dulles played a remarkably 
small role, as was the case in the development of NSC 5404/1 .  At other times, 
he drove the debate, relying heavily on the advice of Robert Murphy, who 
had risen to under secretary of state for political affairs, and Livingston 
Merchant. Both of these men, in turn, relied on the Office of German affairs.64 
Yet it was often Eisenhower, relying on his extensive personal experience of 
the issue and confident in his own judgement, who made important strategic 
decisions. But even Eisenhower's flexibility and openness to sensible solutions 
has more recently been appreciated. While Dulles possessed a strong legal 
mind that suited the rigours of diplomacy, when it came to the many integral 
military implications of the Berlin problem, Dulles was often willing to defer 
his own judgement to that of the "experts." And although Eisenhower 
allowed the Joint Chiefs a relatively free hand to pursue the development of 
NSC 5404/1,  he was quick to remind them that it was he who had the final 
say.65 Dulles was at the peak of his powers by the time that Khrushchev 
presented his ultimatum in November 1958, but personal illness saw a rapid 
decline from when he was hospitalized in mid-February. From his hospital 
bed, he acted at diminished capacity until his resignation in mid-April 1959. 
He died a little over a month later. His successor, Christian Herter, had 
neither the personal prestige nor attracted the same degree of Eisenhower's 
respect. But with the challenge to Berlin temporarily ebbing, this was not 
64 Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, p.127. 
65 Khrushchev clearly saw Dulles as his primary adversary. Zubok, "Khrushchev and the 
Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962," p.7. For Dulles's role in framing U.S. Berlin policy, see Hillenbrand, 
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critical . Furthermore, Eisenhower's own deep involvement with the problem 
along with the continuing influence of State's experts maintained a 
considerable degree of continuity between the Dulles and post-Dulles periods. 
As both Trachtenberg and Hillenbrand point out in their own 
important additions to the literature, the Berlin crisis, particularly in the 
Eisenhower years, has yet to receive the historical scrutiny it deserves.66 In 
recent years, the bulk of the historical attention has been directed towards 
explaining Khrushchev's ultimatum from the perspective of the Eastern bloc. 
In this, the work of Hope Harrison and Vladislav Zubok has been particularly 
influential . The most important result has been to add depth to the historical 
understanding of Khrushchev's behaviour. Rather than the rather simplistic 
and crude characterization of Khrushchev's methods and behaviour 
previously offered, Harrison and Zubok have highlighted complex political 
factors both within the Kremlin and in USSR-GDR relations.67 
Some students of the crisis period from 1958 to 1963 suggest, as 
McGeorge Bundy has done, that it " is best examined as a single phenomenon 
centrally defined by the purposes and choices of Khrushchev."6s While 
Harrison's work would now seem to qualify this assertion on the basis that 
Walter Ulbricht's influence can be seen more strongly from 1960 onwards, 
there is considerable merit in such an approach. Trachtenberg and 
Hillenbrand seem to agree.69 Others such as Robert Slusser have seen distinct 
crises rather than phases of the same crisis .7o There were significant 
66 Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, p.251 n.1; idem, Histon1 and S trategtj, pp.169-170; 
Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp.124-127, 135-136. 
67 See especially Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose"' ; Zubok, " Khrushchev and 
the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962." For a fuller discussion of the Eastern bloc perspective, see above, 
pp.3-6. 
68 Bundy, Danger and Survival, p.358. Gaddis 
69 Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp.120-121; Trachtenberg, Histon1 and Strategy, 
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Khrushchev scrambling to keep up." Gaddis, We Now Know, p.143. 
70 Slusser, "The Berlin Crises of 1958-1959 and 1961";  Jack M. Schick, "The Berlin Crisis of 
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differences in how the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations perceived 
the problem, in large measure because of the personal views of the presidents 
themselves. But there were in even larger differences in how they responded 
to the problem. 
Just as Eisenhower bore the brunt of contemporary criticism for his 
apparent passivity in response to Sputnik, the "bomber gap," and then the 
"missile gap," contemporary assessments of Eisenhower's handling of the 
Berlin crisis were generally not flattering. When the United States was faced 
with one of its greatest Cold War challenges, Eisenhower appeared 
complacent. But the access to archival materials upon which Eisenhower 
revisionism thrived allowed new insights in Eisenhower's handling of the 
crisis. And just as these materials debunked much of the earlier criticism, they 
show that Eisenhower's public demeanour masked not only a firm 
determination to protect U.S. rights in the city, but also an impressive array of 
contingency planning and preparatory measures. Ever since the 
administration had taken office, it had recognized the problem and invested 
considerable effort in dealing with it. And while this planning was not ever 
invoked, it did form a solid foundation upon which to develop policy.71 
When Khrushchev first presented his ultimatum in November 1958, it 
sparked, as Bundy judged it, "what is otherwise missing in the nuclear age: a 
genuine nuclear confrontation in Europe."72 And, as Trachtenberg notes, the 
Berlin crisis transformed what was previously abstract consideration of the 
role of nuclear weapons in NATO's defence policy into something "very 
real."73 In the age o.f missiles and massive strategic arsenals it appeared 
unlikely that any military action that started in Berlin could be contained 
locally before it had escalated to full-scale nuclear war. Indeed, that was 
71 Burr, "Avoiding the Slippery Slope." Under the auspices of the National Security 
Archive, Burr has compiled an impressive collection of primary documents on the Berlin 
crisis during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. William Burr, ed., The Berlin 
Crisis, 1 958-1 962, (Alexandria: Chadwyck-Healey, 1991) .  
n Bundy, Danger and Suroivat p.359. 
73 Trachtenberg, HistonJ and Strategy, p.214. 
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precisely the threat upon which Massive Retaliation rested. Despite his critics, 
Eisenhower, while sensibly dreading this prospect, was nevertheless prepared 
for it. But from this stance, Eisenhower and Dulles gradually began to move 
towards some kind of negotiated settlement. 
Kennedy and Berlin 
While the release of archival materials have worked in favour of 
Eisenhower's historical assessment, the result for Kennedy has been decidedly 
more ambiguous. As Burton I. Kaufman has noted, "There is probably no 
presidency on which public perceptions and historical evaluations have 
remained more at odds than that of John F. Kennedy." Much of the recent 
historiography of Kennedy's foreign policy has sought to tread a middle path 
between the overwhelmingly positive image propagated by early proponents 
of the Camelot legend and severe criticism.74 Compared with other issues in 
Kennedy's foreign policy, Berlin occupies a rela.tively ambiguous position. It 
has generally not been regarded as one of his foreign policy "successes" with 
the Test Ban Treaty and resolution of the Cuban missile crisis. Nor has it 
74 For important historiographical discussions of the Kennedy administration, see Burton I .  
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provided ready ammunition for his critics in the way that the Bay of Pigs, 
Vietnam, or the Cuban missile crisis have. Those who have lauded Kennedy's 
handling of the crisis of 1961 often base their praise on the assumption that 
Kennedy prevented further Soviet action, an issue that remains open to debate 
because Khrushchev's thinking remains typically inscrutable.7s 
Most of the historical study of the Kennedy administration's Berlin 
policy has focused on the Berlin Wall. Yet, although this concrete incarnation 
of the Iron Curtain provided the Cold War with perhaps its most potent 
symbol, it posed less of a challenge in policymaking terms than did 
Khrushchev's aide memoire of June 1961 or the events of late 1962.76 
Nevertheless, many have asked the politically and emotionally charged 
question, "Why did Kennedy allow the Wall to stand?" The answer lies in the 
major re-evaluation of Washington's Berlin policy undertaken before August 
1961 . During that process, Washington added precision to its understanding 
of what its vital interests were in remaining in the city. With the important 
participation of advisers who had played key roles in the Truman 
. administration, the Kennedy administration sought to use the lessons of the 
recent past to refine its own understanding of what U.S. national security 
policy should be. A result of this process was the conclusion, as Kennedy later 
told Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT), "the time for a fight over an effective 
Western role in East Berlin passed, if it ever existed, many years ago - about 
the time of the first blockade."77 
75 Zubok and Pleshakov contend that the expectation on the part of the Americans that the 
Wall was in preparation for further moves was exactly what Khrushchev wanted them to 
believe because he could not admit to the "failure" of the Wall. "For this reason," they write, 
"Khrushchev still pretended that the Wall was not an alternative to, but just a preparation for, 
the inevitable signing of a separate peace treaty with the GDR." Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside 
tlze Kremlin 's Cold War, p.256. 
76 For examples of some of the studies that have identified the Berlin Wall as the 
culmination of the Berlin crisis, see Curtis Cate, The Ides of August: Tlze Berlin Wall Crisis, 1961 ,  
(New York: M. Evans, 1978); Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis; Schick, The Berlin 
Crisis; Smith, The Defense of Berlin. 
77 Kennedy to Mansfield, 28 August 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:289. 
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The crisis began in earnest at the Vienna Summit of June 1961 . The 
building of the Wall two months later and the tank confrontation in October 
were both tense moments, but so far as Washington was concerned the worst 
was yet to come. This anticipation of an ultimate test of wills over Berlin 
culminated in Kennedy's perception of the threat when, in the Cuban missile 
crisis of October 1962, he was faced with what is often regarded as the most 
dangerous episode of the Cold War.78 While Berlin was not the only concern 
of the President during the crisis - the risk of war, either through provocation 
or miscalculation, certainly caused serious apprehension- the American 
commitment to Berlin remained a central element in the decision-making 
process during the fortnight of the missile crisis. If Kennedy allowed 
Khrushchev to move the venue to Berlin, then U.S. policymakers judged they 
78 Interestingly, Paul Nitze, an important participant in both the Berlin crisis and the 
Cuban missile crisis takes a different view by judging that the Berlin crisis in 1961 held the 
greater danger of nuclear confrontation. Nitze, From H!roshima to Glasnost, p.205. The 
historical literature on the Cuban missile crisis is extensive. McGeorge Bundy's comment that 
"forests - have been felled to print the reflections and conclusions of participants, observers, 
and scholars" is not without an element of literal truth, especially in the period since Bundy 
wrote. For a selection of the leading works shaping current historiography of the crisis, see 
Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 2°d edn, (New York: Longman, 
1999); May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, 'One Hell 
of a Gamble ': Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1 958-1 964, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); 
Gaddis, We Naw Knaw, pp.260-280; Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989); idem, "Some Observations on Using the 
Soviet Archives"; James G. Blight and David A Welch, On tlze Brink: Americans and Soviets 
Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989); Robert Smith Thompson, 
Tlze Missiles of October: The Declassified Stan; of John F. Kennedy and tlze Cuban Missile Crisis, 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Philip Nash, The Otlzer Missiles of October: Eisenhower, 
Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1 957-1963, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); 
Mark J. White, 71ze Cuban Missile Crisis, (London: Macmillan, 1996); idem, "The Cuban 
Imbroglio: From the Bay of Pigs to the Missile Crisis and Beyond," in Kennedy: The Nao 
Frontier Revisited, pp.63-90; James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A Welch, Cuba on the 
Brink, (New York: Pantheon, 1993); James A. Nathan, ed., 77ze Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) . For some important accounts by participants in the crisis 
see Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1971); Dean Acheson, "Dean 
Acheson's View of Robert Kennedy's Version of the Cuban Missile Affair: Homage to Plain 
Dumb Luck," Esquire, (February 1969): 76-146; Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp.391-462; Roger 
Hilsman, Tlze Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle Over Policy, (Westport: Praeger, 1996); George 
W. Ball, T11e Past Has Another Pattenz, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), pp.286-309; Nitze, From 
Hiroshima to Glasnost, pp.214-238; Schlesinger, A I1wusand Days, pp.794-819; Sorensen, 
Kennedy, pp.667-718; Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1972), pp.261-281; Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, (New York: Times, 1995), pp.71-95. 
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would be faced with a more serious crisis where, as Arthur M. Schlesinger 
evaluated, "the stake was greater than Cuba and our position weaker." 79 
In 1997, Thomas Schwartz speculated that the so-called Kennedy tapes, 
then unavailable, "might have provided information about Berlin and its 
connection to the Cuban crisis ."80 In fact, those tapes, which are now available, 
along with a considerable batch of files released by the John F. Kennedy 
Library within the last two years, suggest that Kennedy perceived the Cuban 
missile crisis as less a "Cuban" or "missile" crisis than another Berlin crisis.s1 
While such an assertion might appear to go against the grain of almost forty 
years of historical scrutiny of the crisis, the idea of a Berlin-Cuba link is not 
new. In fact, it was the widely held view of the participants and contemporary 
observers. Perhaps one of the most articulate expressions of such a view was 
written by John C. Ausland in 1966. Having served as deputy director of the 
Berlin Task Force during the Kennedy administration and having been much 
involved in policy towards both Berlin and Cuba, he wrote of a "Berlin-Cuba 
crisis" lasting from 1961 until 1964, of which the . Cuban missile crisis was the 
peak, and suggested that the Soviet missiles in Cuba "may not have been as 
unrelated to Berlin as their distance would seem to appear." Ausland posited 
that " it was probably no coincidence that at that time he expected the missiles 
in Cuba to be operational."82 Similarly, in an important 1967 study of Soviet 
79 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p.804. See also Dobrynin, In Confidence, p.80; 
Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, p.353. 
so Schwartz, "The Berlin Crisis and the Cold War," p.143. 
81 Transcripts for the bulk of the relevant tapes are published in May and Zelikow, Kennedy 
Tapes . However, several important tapes remain untranscribed in the Kennedy Library's 
holdings. In the last two years, the Kennedy Library's declassification efforts have resulted in 
the release of a particularly rich batch of documents. Of particularly note are boxes 85  to 99 of 
the Country files of the National Security files collection. 
s2 Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis, p.xiii; idem, Six Berlin Incidents, 
1 961-1964: A Case Study in the Management of U.S.  Policy Regarding a Critical National Security 
Problem, in Berlin Crisis, document no.2929. More recently, Hillenbrand wrote of a "common 
assumption that the Soviets would inevitably react in Berlin, where we were physically 
weakest, in retaliation for what we might do with respect to Cuba." Hillenbrand, Fragments of 
Our Time, p.203. See also Schwartz, "The Berlin Crisis and the Cold War," pp.143-144; Bundy, 
Danger and Survival, pp.391-462; Sorensen, Kennedy; pp.669-670, 677, 681, 687; Schlesinger, A 
71wusand Days, p.804. Writing from a more political science oriented perspective, Richard 
Betts observes that the nuclear issues in both the Berlin and missile crises were intimately 
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policy, Michael Tatu stated unequivocally that "the objective of the [Cuban] 
maneuver was clearly Berlin."83 Yet even though connections between Berlin 
and Cuba have often been discerned, gaps in the public record have meant 
that the Berlin-Cuba relationship has remained, as William Burr put it in 1992, 
"largely elusive" and, as Trachtenberg observed in 1991, "very unclear." Even 
so, on the evidence then available Trachtenberg concluded that the missile 
crisis "should be interpreted as the final phase of the Berlin Crisis."84 With the 
recent declassification of key materials in American archives, many of the 
gaps have been filled and historians can now begin to appreciate the full 
implications of Kennedy's perception of the nexus between Berlin and Cuba. 
Such a link, Trachtenberg now says, is "crucial" to understanding the period. 
Ernest May, Philip Zelikow, and Graham Allison have also recently reached 
similar conclusions.85 Irrespective of whether or not Khrushchev intended to 
exploit such a link - a  judgement which remains difficult to make due to the 
dearth of reliable high level evidence from the Soviet side - it is clear that 
Kennedy's concern for the American commitment. to Berlin occupied a central 
place in his decision-making process. 
In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, the Berlin issue faded from the 
forefront of the Cold War conflict. But this was not before intense study by the 
administration on whether or not the resolution of the missile crisis opened a 
window of opportunity for the United States to press for its own Berlin 
solution. Ultimately, Kennedy decided not pursue it, thereby allowing one of 
the most dangerous issues in East-West relations to recede in the new kind of 
Cold War that emerged. Berlin was again the site of potential conflict in 
entangled, with the result that "Cuba was tacitly a fourth Berlin crisis."  Richard K. Betts, 
Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Deterrence, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987), p.110.  
83 Michael Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin, trans . Helen Kate! (New 
York: Viking, 1969), p.232. First published 1967. 
84 Trachtenberg, Histon; and Strategi;, p.231; Burr, "US Policy and the Berlin Crisis," p.40; 
Schwartz, "The Berlin Crisis and the Cold War," pp.143-144. For an early study of Berlin 
diplomacy during 1962, see Jack M. Schick, "American Diplomacy and the Berlin 
Neiotiations," Western Political Quarterly, 18, 4 (December 1965) : 803-820. 
5 May, "America's  Berlin," p . 1 57;  Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, pp.99- 1 09 ;  May and 
Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp.25,  34-39;  Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.3 52-3 5 5 .  
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October 1963 in the so-called Tailgate crisis, but this episode did not 
substantially affect Washington's perception of the problem. American 
policymakers certainly did not forget about the Berlin problem, even after the 
Quadripartite Agreement of 1971 stabilized the situation, but after the Cuban 
missile crisis they simply did not assign it the same centrality in American 
foreign policy that they had up to that point. Increasingly, they had in their 
minds another problem - Vietnam. 
Chapter Two 
The Origins of the Problem, 1943-1945 
You will note that in none of this do I mention Berlin. That place has 
become, so far as I am concerned, nothing but a geographical 
location, and I have never been interested in these. 
--Dwight D. Eisenhower to Bernard Law Mon tgomery, 31 March 1 945 
While policy towards defeated Germany had been discussed at various 
levels of the U.S. government ever since America entered the Second World 
War, it was not until the second half of 1943 that tentative plans began to 
emerge.1 The first serious planning for an international occupation of 
Germany based on zones came from military strategists . The increasingly 
likely prospect of a sudden collapse of the German government, especially in 
view of Roosevelt's recent revelation that the Allies would accept nothing less 
than "unconditional surrender," prompted military planners to develop plans 
for such a contingency. In July 1943, at the behest of the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff (CCS), planning began on two important sets of plans designed to work 
in tandem, OVERLORD and RANKIN. While OVERLORD was the opening of the 
1 Wolfgang Schlauch, "American Policy Toward Germany, 1945," Journal of Conte111poran1 
Histonj, 4, 4 (1970): 114; Nelson, Wartime Origins, pp.24-37; Zink, The United States in Germany, 
pp.5-25. 
43 
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Western front with a cross-channel invasion, RANKIN was to be implemented 
in the event of a sudden collapse of the German government and involved 
getting Anglo-American troops into Germany as quickly as possible to 
establish order and supervise demilitarization.2 Military planners saw the 
division of Germany into three zones as being the best means of 
administering the occupation, with Soviet forces in the east, British forces in 
the northwest and American forces in the southwest. Yet they remained 
undecided on where the administrative hub should be located. Because the 
planning for RANKIN was done exclusively from an operational military 
perspective, the rough zones that were drawn corresponded with probable 
invasion routes and had little to do with political considerations. Importantly, 
the Soviets took no part in either the development or acceptance of the plan. It 
was accepted in principle by the Anglo-American CCS at the first Quebec 
Conference on 23 August 1943, and became the first high-level agreement to 
codify the division of Germany into three occupation zones. Though he was 
not present at the meeting at which RANKIN �as discussed, Roosevelt's 
response when briefed on the plan was that he wanted Western troops "to be 
ready to get to Berlin as soon as did the Russians."3  
With agreement on this military plan secured, political considerations 
began to be slowly injected into the debate. The dismemberment of Germany 
had been a controversial topic in Washington, London, and Moscow for some 
time, and came to head during the debate over the so-called Morgenthau 
Plan. Although officially rejected, the dismemberment of Germany was to 
have a lasting influence .4 Perhaps one of the most important aspects the 
2 There were actually three RANKIN plans (A, B, and C) developed by COSSAC. RANKIN C 
was the one designed for a collapse of the German government. RANKIN A and B involved 
weakening or voluntary withdrawal of German forces . When RANKIN C was accepted by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff it was designated as CCS 320. Nelson, Wartime Origins, pp.26-29. 
"RANKIN" was later used by the Joint Chiefs in reference to the Berlin blockade and the JCS 
1907 series that dealt with it. 
3 FRUS 1943, Washington and Quebec 1 943, pp.1010-1018. 
4 Philip E.  Mosely, "Dismemberment of Germany: The Allied Negotiations from Yalta to 
Potsdam," Foreign Affairs, 28, 3 (April 1950) : 487-498; Walter L. Dorn, "The Debate Over 
American Occupation Policy in Germany in 1944-1945," Political Science Quarterly, 72, 4 
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debate was that it exposed the fact that any planning for postwar Germany 
necessarily involved weighty political questions. After the failure of 
Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill at the Teheran Conference of November 1943 
to reach agreement on the general principles upon which planning for 
postwar Germany would be based, it fell to each government to submit its 
recommendations to London to the newly created EAC, a body designed with 
political objectives in mind and set up by the foreign ministers of the United 
States, Britain, and Russia as a result of a general failure to reach agreement at 
the Moscow Conference of October 1943.5 It was the British who best seized 
the opportunity to use this body for occupation planning. British Foreign 
Minister Anthony Eden's visit to Washington in March 1943 had convinced 
him that the problem of how best to disarm and occupy Germany after her 
defeat required urgent attention. Encouraged by Roosevelt's recent 
commitment that American forces would be part of an occupation force in 
Germany,6 Eden prompted the British government to refine RANKIN to 
become a blueprint that might be used for the occupation. The resulting plan, 
developed by a committee chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee, 
divided Germany into three, roughly equal occupation zones, with Berlin as a 
(December 1957) : 481-501 . The "Morgenthau Plan" was proffered by then-Secretary of the 
Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. Its hard-line, punitive sentiment was at the centre of 
considerable controversy during 1943-44. See Warren Kimball, ed., Swords or Plouglzslzares ? 
I11e Morgentlzau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1 943-1 946, (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1976); 
Cordell Hull, Memoirs, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948), 2:1602-1622; Henry 
Morgenthau Jr., Germany is Our Problem, (New York: Harper, 1945); John Morton Blum, From 
tlze Morgentlzau Diaries: Years of War, 1 941-1945, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967); John L. 
Chase, "The Development of the Morgenthau Plan Through the Quebec Conference," Journal 
of Politics, 2 (May 1954) : 324-359; Fred Smith, "The Rise and Fall of the Morgenthau Plan," 
United Nations World, (March 1947) : 32-37; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An 
Intimate Histon;, (New York: Harper, 1950), pp.818-819.  For Stalin's views on the 
dismemberment of Germany, see Raack, "Stalin Plans His Post-War Germany," p .59. 
5 Nelson, Wartime Origins, p.32. 
6 Roosevelt had made this commitment during a meeting on 27 March 1943 while Eden 
. was in Washington. A few days earlier Roosevelt had sent a memorandum to Hull that 
effectively began serious postwar planning among the Allies . Roosevelt wrote: "I wish you 
would explore, with the British, the question of what our plan is to be in Germany and Italy 
during the first few months after Germany's collapse . . .  My thought is, if we get a substantial 
meeting of the minds with the British, that we should then take it up with the Russians." 
Cited in Hull, Memoirs, 2:1284-1285. See also Robert E.  Sherwood, ed., Tlze White House Papers 
Origins of the Problem I 46 
separate occupation area under multinational control. The city was clearly 
delineated as an island within the Soviet zone, although no mention was 
made of specific rights for British and American troops to traverse Soviet­
occupied territory.7 
International Planning in the EAC 
The British put the Attlee Committee's proposal before the EAC on 15 
January 1944.8 Roosevelt, when briefed on the British proposal by Admiral 
William D .  Leahy aboard the USS Iowa en route to Cairo and Tehran, 
expressed his dissatisfaction. But his main objection was that it assigned the 
British the northwest zone, which meant that U.S. occupation forces would 
have to rely upon access through a politically unstable France that, to some 
American observers, threatened turmoil at best and perhaps even Communist 
revolution. To avoid such a situation Roosevelt asserted that the United States 
should have a large northwest zone that included .Berlin, and that the Soviets 
could form another state east of the city, but he was adamant that the United 
States should control the German capital . Although France and Italy should 
be abandoned to the British and French, he said, it was important that the 
United States won the "race for Berlin." At the conclusion of the briefing 
Roosevelt sketched his ideas on occupation zones on a National Geographic 
map at hand.9 
of Ham1 L. Hopkins, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1949), pp.712-714; idem, Roosevelt and 
Hopkins, pp.714-716. 
7 Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, (London: Penguin, 1985), p .443; Nelson, 
Wartime Origins, pp.29-30; William Strang, Home and Abroad, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1956), 
p.203. 
. 8 Nelson, Wartime Origins, p.30. For the establishment of the EAC, see ibid., pp.10-23; Bruce 
Kuklick, "The Genesis of the European Advisory Commission," Journal of Contemporan1 
Histon11 4, 4 (October 1969) : 189-201 . 
9 FRUS 1 943, Cairo and Tehran, p.253-55; Roosevelt to Stettinius, 21 February 1944, Map 
Room files, FDRL. Following the President's lead, Hopkins proposed sending in U.S. troops 
within two hours of Germany's collapse. The Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently took up 
Hopkins' suggestion, and a quick airborne assault on Berlin became part of Operation 
ECLIPSE. See James M. Gavin, On to Berlin: Battles of an Airborne Commander, 1 943-1 946, (New 
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However, neither Roosevelt's thoughts on occupation zones nor his 
roughly sketched map were ever passed on to the State Department, nor was 
Secretary Cordell Hull privy to the military plans. Operating virtually without 
external guiding principles - as George F. Kennan would have it, continuing 
"to stumble along in total darkness"10 - by mid-December 1943 State's 
Interdivisional Committee on Germany had drafted a proposal for the 
allocation of occupation zones in postwar Germany. While the War 
Department favoured the idea of occupation zones primarily because of its 
administrative logic, State saw a division as the best means of decentralizing 
the German political structure and thereby preventing a resurgence of 
Prussianism. State's plan was intended to be forwarded to the Working 
Security Council (WSC), which had been created with representatives from 
State, War, and Navy Departments to channel the administration's 
instructions to Ambassador John Winant, the American delegate on the EAC. 
Unlike the CCS plan, which was founded on military strategy and logistics, 
State's paper studied . in more detail the issues. and implications, and it 
included demographic and economic studies of the proposed zones. Berlin, 
with its existent centralized records offices, communication staff, and 
bureaucracy was assumed to be the natural seat of occupation authority. 
Philip Mosely, one of State's ·representatives on the WSC and a key influence 
in the drafting of the plan, identified another important factor in Berlin's 
favour: the likelihood that any attempt by the Western powers to create a new 
capital, especially in the Western zones, would provoke violent objections by 
the Soviets . An alternative, therefore, was never proposed since, as Mosely 
reasoned, " it seemed unwise to begin negotiation for an agreed Allied policy 
by presenting a proposal which could only lead at once to deadlock, thus 
sacrificing larger interests of Allied cooperation to a contingent advantage 
which might or might not be of practical importance." At Mosely's 
York: Viking, 1978), pp.269-271. For the complete ECLIPSE plans and supplemental 
documentation see box 180, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA. 
io Kennan, Memoirs, 1 :168.  
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suggestion, the Interdivisional Committee's plan also called for access 
corridors to be established between the Western sectors and Berlin. This plan, 
however, fell victim to the interdepartmental rivalry that was impeding the 
work of the WSC, and it was therefore never submitted to the EAC for 
international consideration.11 
Meanwhile, a month after the British proposal was put to the EAC, the 
Soviet delegate, Fedor T. Gusev, presented his government's counter­
proposal, with zonal boundaries identical to those of the British plan, thereby 
indicating agreement. In fact, the American and British delegations viewed 
the Soviet proposal with some relief, since it appeared to indicate good 
prospects for postwar cooperation between the occupying powers. As Mosely 
observed: "The Soviet acceptance, without bargaining, of a zone of slightly 
more than one-third of Germany, appeared a sign of a moderate and 
conciliatory approach to the problem of how to deal with postwar 
Germany."12 Yet it also aroused some suspicions.B 
During this crucial period of planning the lack of central authority to 
determine postwar policy severely hampered the American effort. Even the 
War Department, which claimed to represent most clearly the President's 
thinking on postwar issues, did not receive specific guidance on postwar 
occupation policy. Deriving its mandate mainly from its intimacy with 
wartime military strategy, the War Department coveted its role, with its Civil 
Affairs Division representatives repeatedly frustrating State with their 
unwillingness to collaborate with their civilian colleagues. Empowered with a 
veto in the WSC, the Civil Affairs Division had a profound influence on both 
the development and transmission of instructions to Winant. In fact, the Civil 
Affairs Division was so determined not to make a productive contribution to 
the EAC that Kennan, at that time in London as counsellor to Winant, 
characterized its participation on the WSC as "so lacking in both candor and 
11 Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were 
Drawn," Foreign Affairs, 28, 4 (July 1950) : 587; Smith, Defense of Berlin, pp.20-21 . 
12 Mosely, "New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," p.591 . 
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enthusiasm as to give the impression of sabotage."14 Even after the clearest yet 
expression of Presidential guidance was voiced on board the USS Iowa, rather 
than sharing this information with State or the WSC, the War Department 
embarked upon an independent course. Prompted partly by Roosevelt's 
renewed interest in the occupation, the Civil Affairs Division transformed the 
President's rough sketch into a proposal that caused considerable 
consternation when sent to Winant in London. 
The plan essentially reversed what had already been agreed upon in 
the EAC. Until this time, the Civil Affairs Division had been adamant that 
planning for a zonal occupation of postwar Germany exceeded the 
competence of the EAC and was a matter that should be left to the military. 
Yet they now submitted their own plan that included a large northwestern 
zone for the United States without providing any details on Berlin's status. 
Despite attempts by State's delegates on the WSC to obtain background 
further than vague claims that it was based on information coming directly 
from the President, the WSC transmitted the proposal to Winant on 6 March 
_ 1944. However, neither the history nor content of the document augured well 
for tripartite agreement. It had been initially an American counterproposal to 
the Attlee Committee proposals for revising RANKIN. It had been presented by 
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the CCS at the Cairo Conference in 
December 1943 and since being referred the military bureaucracy had, for all 
intents and purposes, been discarded. CCS 320/ 4, as it had been assigned at 
Cairo, excluded Berlin and allocated a disproportionately large northwestern 
zone to the U.S. The document that was transmitted to Winant in March 1944 
was apparently an unrevised copy of this original JCS proposal. In Kennan's 
view, it "made no substantive sense and was not even responsive to the 
known realities of the situation." 15 
13 Kennan, Memoirs, 1 :167-168. 
14 Ibid., p .172. On the role of the Civil Affairs Division in the formulation of policy towards 
postwar Germany, see Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany, pp.31-34. 
15 Nelson points out that there is some dispute over precisely what was presented to the 
WSC. Mosely, who was at that time a member of the WSC, wrote that the zonal boundaries 
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The new plan placed Winant in a difficult position. Both the British and 
Soviet delegates had already agreed on zonal boundaries, at which time the 
United States had registered no serious objections. Yet three weeks after this 
de . facto agreement on a system of zonal division that was essentially 
equitable, Winant was presented with CCS 320/ 4. It was not only in an 
unsuitable format for EAC consideration, but also reversed the British and 
American zones and gave the Americans a disproportionately large zone. In 
contrast with the logic of maintaining some semblance of existing geographic 
and administrative boundaries, CCS 320/ 4 totally disregarded these and 
drew boundaries without any apparent rationale and certainly without 
explanation. Winant and his advisers, who had appreciated the Soviets' 
restraint in accepting a zone of equal size with those of Britain and the U.S., 
were understandably alarmed that their government now expected the 
Soviets to accept a zone reduced by almost half. Believing such expectations 
to be unreasonable, Winant refused to forward the proposal to the EAC and 
dispatched Kennan, along with the delegation's military adviser General 
Cornelius W. Wickersham, to Washington to sort out the confusion. Finding 
State just as bewildered, Kennan approached the President directly. Though 
preoccupied with his dispute with the British over the northwestern zone, 
Roosevelt straightened out the immediate problem and instructed his 
government to accept the zonal boundaries as they had been agreed by the 
British and the Soviets. At the same time, however, he insisted that the 
allocation of the northwestern zone be subject to further negotiations between 
the London and Washington.16 
This dispute over zonal boundaries overshadowed any apprehension 
that members of the administration might have held concerning the status of 
radiated from Berlin, thus giving each zone frontage onto Berlin. CCS 320/4, however, which 
was what Winant actually received, places Berlin on the boundary of the American and 
Soviet zones with the British zone well to the south.  Nelson, Wartime Origins, p.42; Mosely, 
"The Occupation of Germany," p.591; William M. Franklin, "Zonal Boundaries and Access to 
Berlin," World Politics, 16, 1 (October 1963) : 17. Kennan uses this example as one of many to 
illustrate a scathing attack on senior State Department officials . Kennan, Memoirs, 1 :173-174.  
16 Kennan, Memoirs, 1 :169-172; FRUS 1 944, 1 :208-209. 
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Berlin in the occupation regime. A few isolated expressions of concern were 
lost in the bureaucratic confusion over the American position on the 
allocation of occupation zones . Despite Roosevelt's earlier assertion that the 
United States "must have Berlin" - a  decision which was not widely 
circulated - throughout the discussions of late 1943 and 1944 Washington 
showed itself as not particularly interested in the future of Berlin beyond a 
vague recognition that it was a natural choice as the seat of the Allied Control 
Council (ACC), the tripartite body set up for the administration of the whole 
of occupied Germany, and that it should be a joint responsibility under 
tripartite occupation. Rather, it was the British and the Soviets who led the 
debate on the status of Berlin in their original EAC proposals. After the British 
had placed Berlin deep in the Soviet zone, the Soviets had agreed to a special 
occupation regime for the city and suggested a ten to fifteen kilometre region 
around Berlin to be occupied by American, British, and Soviet troops.17 The 
British, feeling that this cut across too many administrative boundaries, 
sought instead for a closely defined "Greater Berlin" area. In late June Gusev 
submitted a proposal for the division of Berlin into sectors. The ensuing 
discussion was concerned primarily with the allocation and use of facilities 
such as airports. On 12 July, the EAC agreed to include a clause defining 
Berlin's sectors in the zonal protocol. During all of these discussions on Berlin, 
Winant, again lacking instructions from Washington, was left with little 
option other than to respond to Soviet and British initiatives . 
During June and July 1944, the EAC deliberated on a protocol to codify 
the occupation agreements, with Berlin being the major focus during July. 
American military authorities strongly resisted an agreement that would 
divide Berlin into fixed sectors, arguing that the state of the city and its ability 
to support the American troops would be decisive factors and that these could 
not be determined without first-hand inspection. The Soviets, however, 
pushed for a definite agreement on the sectors of Berlin. Eventually, in mid-
17 FRUS 1944, 1 :173-179. 
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July, in return for ratification of the protocol on occupation zones, the 
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson authorized Winant to abandon his 
attempts to secure a clause for later adjustment of the Berlin sector 
boundaries . On 12 September 1944, the EAC reached agreement on the 
"Protocol on Zones of Occupation of Germany and Berlin." It was designed to 
come into effect simultaneously with the signing of the "Instrument of 
Unconditional Surrender" and referred to "Greater Berlin" as that defined by 
the Law of 27 April 1920 and divided the city into three sectors.is As well as 
being the seat of the ACC, the former Nazi capital was to have its own 
tripartite military council to be known as the Kommandatura. Four days after 
the EAC' s agreement, the Combined Chiefs, finding no reason for concern, 
approved the protocol. There matters stood until the Yalta Conference of 
February 1945 when Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin formally approved the 
plan. 
Meanwhile, Roosevelt became concerned that his government might be 
committing too early to agreements for postwar Ge.rmany. Most of these plans 
had, after .all, been developed before the cross-channel invasion. On 20 
October, Roosevelt told Hull, "I dislike making detailed plans for a country 
which we do not yet occupy," and that the final occupation system would be 
totally dependent on what the armies found in Germany when they got there. 
The EAC, he reminded Hull, was "'advisory' and that you and I are not 
bound by this advice. This is something which is sometimes overlooked and if 
we do not remember that word 'advisory' they may go ahead and execute 
some of the advice, which, when the time comes, we may not like at all. "19 
From October 1944 until April 1945, therefore, the EAC was severely limited 
in what it could discuss. Without a mandate for developing its own agenda, it 
18 At this time France was not an agreed party to the occupation and was not to formally 
become so until the Yalta conference in February 1945. The French sector was subsequently 
carved out from the British and American sectors, leaving the Soviet sector entirely as it was 
originally agreed by the EAC. 
19 FRUS 1 944, 1 :358-359. 
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could not undertake any real discussions or negotiations until its participating 
governments agreed to invest their confidence in the body. 
The Capture of Berlin 
In 1945, the capture of Berlin became a matter of serious contention not 
between Moscow and the West as one might have expected, but between 
Washington and London. As the end of the war approached, political issues 
gradually began to replace wartime considerations. Churchill, prophesying a 
conflict of interests between East and West, argued that the capture of Berlin 
would become a major factor in shaping postwar relationships amongst the 
victorious powers. However, Washington's policy remained driven by 
military expediency in keeping with the practice that had existed for the 
duration of American involvement in the war. Roosevelt and his Chief of Staff 
George C. Marshall had been consistently unwilling to interfere to any 
significant extent with the Eisenhower's military decisions. Churchill and the 
British Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, were more concerned with the 
symbolic political consequences of tactical decisions. Suspicious of Stalin's 
intentions for postwar Europe, Churchill was anxious for Anglo-American 
forces to capture Berlin ahead of the Red Army. This strategy, he contended, 
was not only the most expeditious route to victory, but also the safest in terms 
of ensuring the postwar peace.20 
Since D-Day the Allied forces had been directed towards Berlin. Yet, by 
March 1945 Eisenhower found that the field situation had changed. The 
frustratingly slow progress of the winter was · replaced by impressive 
advances since crossing the Rhine. Despite this rapid headway, however, 
Soviet forces were far more likely to capture Berlin than the Western allies. 
The Red Army, commanded by Marshal Georgi Zhukov, had a million men 
20 See Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp.401-442; Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin; John 
Ehrman, Grand Strate�;, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), 4:134-161; Pogue, 
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only thirty miles east of the city, while the most advanced Allied forces, those 
of British Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery, were still 190 miles west 
of the Elbe River. Between the Elbe and Berlin lay a further fifty miles of lakes, 
rivers, and canals, terrain that would slow the advance considerably.  As well, 
the most advanced U.S. forces, under the command of General Omar N. 
Bradley, had reached the outer limits of a supply line that was already largely 
being sustained by air. Bradley estimated that it would cost 100,000 casualties 
for Anglo-American forces to push beyond the Elbe and capture Berlin - in 
his words, "a pretty stiff price for a prestige objective . . .  especially when 
we've got to fall back and let the other fellow take over."21 Bradley's 
evaluation, along with Eisenhower's own strategic assessment, led to a 
decision to halt the Anglo-American forces at the Elbe, a decision that 
unleashed a veritable storm of controversy.22 
In light of the military situation, Eisenhower decided to turn the 
Anglo-American forces away from Berlin, and on 28 March he sent a cable 
outlining this strategy to Stalin, with a copy also sent to the CCS. Although 
Eisenhower did not explicitly state as much, his strategy implied that Berlin 
would be left to the Red Army.23 Stalin readily agreed, indicating in his reply, 
dated 1 April, that Eisenhower's plans mirrored his own. So far as capturing 
the German capit<;ll, he said, the city had "lost its former strategic 
importance," and therefore he would "allot secondary forces in the direction 
"The Decision to Halt at the Elbe"; Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Stan;, (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1951 ), pp.532-549. 
21 Bradley, A Soldier's Stan;, pp.535-536; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp.418-422; 
Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, p.89. 
22 Part of the reason for the ongoing controversy about this decision was the way in which 
it became public in mid-1945. In the New York Times Drew Pearson speculated (erroneously) 
that some arrangement had been agreed with Stalin at Yalta. He further revealed that on 13 
April advance patrols of Anglo-American forces had got so far as Potsdam but had been 
ordered to retreat. New York Times, 21 April 1945. See also Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 
pp.418-422; Ambrose, Eisenlzmuer and Berlin; idem, Eisenhower: 1890-1 952, (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1983), pp.392-4-4; Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the Elbe"; Smith, Defense of 
Berlin, pp.34-53; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp.310-314. 
23 Eisenhower to John Russell Deane, 28 March 1945, in Tlze Papers of Dwiglzt David 
Eisenhower: The War Years, ed. Alfred D. Chandler (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970), 4:2551 . 
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of Berlin." The Soviet offensive on the city, he said deceptively, was 
scheduled for the second half of May.21 
As yet, Eisenhower had not directly addressed the capture of Berlin. 
However, on 31 March, he explicitly rejected an Anglo-American assault on 
the city, telling Montgomery: "You will note that in none of this do I mention 
Berlin. That place has become, so far as I am concerned, nothing but a 
geographical location, and I have never been interested in these.  My purpose 
is to destroy the enemy's forces and his powers to resist." 25 But Montgomery, 
along with his American counterpart General George S. Patton, vehemently 
opposed the "new" strategy, making no secret that they regarded it as a 
" terrible mistake."  On a professional level Montgomery and Patton argued 
that Berlin did, in fact, hold significant military value. However, both ­
particularly Montgomery - also took the plan as a personal rebuke, since each 
had boasted publicly that he would lead the Allied forces into the city. 
Montgomery's "Berlin Express" had been given a new destination and not 
one entirely to his liking.26 
24 Eisenhower Papers: War Years, 4:2584 fn.1 .  Stalin, however, probably was more interested 
in capturing Berlin than his note suggested. He had promised Zhukov the prize of Berlin in 
November 1944, and simultaneously with receiving Eisenhower's note the Soviet High 
Command was considering two detailed operation plans presented by Zhukov for an assault 
on Berlin. At a meeting of the Soviet High Command on 1 April, Stalin signed Zhukov's 
operational directive ordering a major offensive on Berlin to be launched no later than 16 
April and to last 12 to 15 days. That very day Stalin sent his reply to Eisenhower dismissing 
the strategic importance of capturing Berlin and stating that the Soviet campaign on the city 
would not begin until late May. In the subsequent period, despite intense military 
preparation for the seizure of the city that would involve more than 190 Soviet divisions, 
Stalin remained evasive in .answering queries from Harriman on Soviet plans for the 
offensive. See John Erickson, The Road to Berlin, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), 
pp.528-529; Tony Le Tissier, Zhukov at the Oder: The Decisive Battle for Berlin, (Westport: 
Praeger, 1996); Raack, Stalin 's Drive to the West; Erich Kuby, The Russians and Berlin, 1 945, 
trans. Arnold J. Pomerans (London: Heinemann, 1968); Georgi K. Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov's 
Greatest Battles, (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp.262-264; idem, The Memoirs of Marshal 
Zhukov, (New York: Jonathan Cape, 1971), pp. 585-625; John Strawson, The Battle for Berlin, 
(London: B.T. Batsford, 1974); Otto Preston Chaney Jr., Zhukov, (London: David and Charles, 
1972), pp.306-318; Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, pp.434-435. 
2 5  Eisenhower to Montgomery, 31 March 1945, Eisenhower Papers, 4:2568. 
26 William B. Breuer, Feuding Allies: The Private Wars of tlze Higlz Command, (New York: John 
Wiley, 1995), p.293. In fact, after issuing the new strategy, both Eisenhower and Bradley 
became dissatisfied with what they considered unnecessarily slow progress by Montgomery's 
forces in the north and feared that his enthusiasm had disappeared along with the prospect of 
leading the symbolic assault on Berlin. Several prodding notes from Eisenhower, as well as 
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But the resistance that Eisenhower faced from some of his most senior 
commanders in the field was less significant than the violent dispute that 
erupted between himself, Churchill, and the British Chiefs of Staff. In the first 
instance, the British Chiefs protested that Eisenhower exceeded his authority 
by communicating directly with Stalin without consulting them.27 However, 
despite calls from London for the U.S. JCS to intervene, Washington saw no 
reason to question Eisenhower's judgement that Berlin was of secondary 
significance. The protests of the British Chiefs of Staff were quickly dismissed 
by Eisenhower and the American Joint Chiefs on the basis of military 
expediency, in that the strategy was not "new" and was the most militarily 
sound course to end the war. Eisenhower complained to Marshall that "I do 
not quite understand why the Prime Minister has been so determined to 
intermingle political and military considerations in attempting to establish a 
procedure for the conduct of our own and the Russian .troops when a meeting 
takes place."2s Furthermore, Eisenhower claimed, through Allied bombing 
and the partial transfer of German governmental offices, Berlin had lost much 
_of its former military importance. Even so, he pointed out, his strategy 
remained flexible insofar as the city could be quickly seized if circumstances 
made it possible to do so with minimum casualties. But until such time as the 
CCS determined that political considerations outweighed purely military 
face-to-face meetings with Bradley, failed to spur him on_ Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A 
General 's Life, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp.426-427. 
27 Eisenhower to Marshall, 30 March 1945, Eisenhower Papers, 4:2373; Churchill to Ismay, 31 
March 1945, in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp.403-404. This issue of "proper procedure" 
was not shared by the Americans. In fact, the idea of a direct line of communication between 
Eisenhower and the Soviet Army Staff was not new. In June-July 1944, the idea of creating a 
liaison was discussed by Harriman and Roosevelt. Later, at a meeting of the JCS on 4 
February 1945 held during the Yalta conference, Roosevelt, Leahy, Marshall, and Harriman 
all agreed that direct communications between Eisenhower, Montgomery, and the Soviet 
General Staff were highly desirable. Consequently, Roosevelt signed memoranda to both 
Churchill and Stalin requesting their agreement on direct communications. See Roosevelt to 
Harriman, 6 July 1944, box 11,  Map Room, FDRL; Minutes of President's Meeting with JCS, 4 
February 1945, box 29, Map Room Papers, FDRL; FRUS 1 945, Malta and Yalta, pp.564-567. 
2s Eisenhower to Marshall, 23 April 1945, Eisenhower Papers, 4:2640. 
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considerations in the theatre, he considered it "military unsound" to make the 
capture of Berlin a major objective.29 At the same time, he told Montgomery: 
As regards Berlin, I am quite ready to admit that it has political and 
psychological significance but of far greater importance will be the 
location of the remaining German forces in relation to Berlin. It is on 
them that I am going to concentrate my attention. Naturally, if I get an 
opportunity to capture Berlin cheaply, I will take it.30 
The British high command, however, was quick to question 
Eisenhower's motives and accused him of basing his decision on political 
factors. An important element of this accusation was the question of how 
much influence the earlier agreements on zonal boundaries exerted on 
Eisenhower's judgement. This issue was fanned particularly by Eisenhower's 
own insistence that his decision was based solely upon military 
considerations. Despite his insistence to the contrary, the political factors of 
observing zonal boundaries appear to have played a significant part. 
Eisenhower had been fully briefed on the agreements reached regarding 
zones of occupation, and he expressed concern that the impressive advances 
of the Anglo-American forces in early 1945 had exceeded the assumptions 
upon which occupation plans rested. By April 1945 Allied troops were well 
inside the territory that had been assigned to the Soviets by Roosevelt, 
Churchill, and Stalin at Yalta. Therefore, Eisenhower was confronted by a 
decision as to whether to continue advancing and then be forced to withdraw 
once the victory was won, or to halt his forces in order to minimize the 
difficulties of withdrawal. Displaying awareness that Soviet-American 
interaction might not be smooth, he told Marshall that if the Soviets pushed 
forward to the limits of their occupation zone "the American forces are going 
to be badly embarrassed." Consequently, he hoped "to protect my 
subordinate commanders from uncertainties and worry" by removing the 
possibility of it becoming an issue. Moreover, Bradley's advice was directly 
29 Eisenhower to Marshall, 7 April 1945, ibid., p.2401 . 
30 Eisenhower to Montgomery, 8 April 1945, ibid., p.2594. 
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influenced by prior knowledge of the occupation zones, since he could see 
"no justification for taking casualties in the capture of a city we would 
promptly hand over to the Russians ."31 If military considerations were 
paramount, questions over future relations with the Soviets were at least a 
factor in the final decision. 
Though the Cold War was not yet declared, Churchill, sensing the 
increased aggressiveness in Soviet international relations that Harriman had 
earlier reported to Roosevelt and Hull, tried desperately to make the 
Americans understand the political significance of the capture of Berlin and, 
in doing so, made it plain that he considered Eisenhower's strategy a serious 
mistake. "We should shake hands with the Russians as far to the east as 
possible," he told Eisenhower.32 And the prestige of capturing the German 
capital, he argued, would go far towards ensuring the West's influence in the 
postwar order - in fact, it might become the deciding factor in negotiating 
with Stalin. He became increasingly insistent over the week following 
Eisenhower's cable to Stalin. After efforts to influence Eisenhower himself 
failed,33 as did appeals to Marshall and the American Joint Chiefs, Churchill 
took the issue directly to Roosevelt in an attempt to have Eisenhower's "new" 
strategy overruled and to convince the President that Berlin was far more 
than just "a geographical location."  Berlin, Churchill said, was still of 
paramount strategic importance because 
nothing will exert a psychological effect of despair upon all German 
forces of resistance equal to that of the fall of Berlin. It will be the 
supreme signal of defeat to the German people. On the other hand, if 
left to itself to maintain a siege by the Russians among its ruins, and 
as long as the German flag flies there, it will animate the resistance of 
all Germans under arms.34 
31 Ibid.; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp.419-420; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, pp.532-537. 
32 Churchill to Eisenhower, 2 April 1945, Eisenhower Papers, 4:2579 n.1 . 
33 See Eisenhower to Churchill, 1 April 1945, ibid., pp.2572-2574; Churchill to Eisenhower, 
2 April 1945, ibid., p.2579 fn. 1 .  
34 Churchill to Roosevelt, 1 April 1945, in Warren F. Kimball, ed., Clzurclzill and Roosevelt: 
Tlze Complete Correspondence, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 3:603-605. 
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More importantly, Churchill argued that by abandoning Berlin the Allies 
would forfeit important diplomatic leverage in postwar negotiations with 
Stalin. With the capture of Vienna imminent, he cautioned, "if they also take 
Berlin will not their impression that they have been the overwhelming 
contributor to our common victory be unduly imprinted in their minds, and 
may this not lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable 
difficulties in the future?"3s 
Roosevelt was unimpressed. Regarding himself as the moderator 
between Churchill and Stalin, he rejected the implication that distrust 
amongst the Allies should determine military strategy.36 He expressed 
complete support for Eisenhower's judgement and, making little reference to 
Churchill's assertions of Berlin's political and strategic symbolism and to 
future tension between the East and West, alluded to Eisenhower's argument 
that strategy had not, in fact, substantially changed. As Eisenhower and 
Marshall had been, Roosevelt was careful to address the suspicion of the 
British Chiefs of Staff that the apparent deviation in objectives was a reflection 
on their abilities . British pride, especially fragile at having their national 
resources commanded by an American, became particularly inflamed at the 
implicit suggestion that Montgomery's forces were not capable of leading the 
assault on Berlin. Roosevelt cautioned Churchill against forcing a rift on the 
issue, finding it regrettable that "at the moment of great victory by our 
combined forces we should become involved in such unfortunate reactions."37 
Undeterred, Churchill was even more explicit in a message to 
Roosevelt on 5 April, attempting to capitalize on a sharp disagreement 
between Roosevelt and Stalin sparked by Stalin's suspicion that the West was 
35 Ibid. Soviet forces entered Vienna less than a week later, on 7 April. On Churchill's 
attempts to influence Eisenhower's decision, see Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp.399-411;  
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp.422-423; John Charmley, Clwrclzill 's Grand Alliance: Tlze 
Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1 940-57, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1995), pp.162-
163; Breuer, Feuding Allies, pp.293-294. 
36 For an enduring study of the relationship between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, see 
Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: Tize War They Waged and tlze Peace They Sought, 2nd ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) . 
37 Roosevelt to Churchill, 4 April 1945, in Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 3:607-609. 
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seeking a separate peace.  Sensing that Moscow was "surprised and 
disconcerted" at the rapid advance of Anglo-American forces, he warned 
bluntly that the only chance for preventing Soviet control of Europe rested in 
convincing the Kremlin that the West would not be "bullied into submission." 
If this failed, Churchill wrote, "then indeed I should despair of our future 
relations with them." For the Prime Minister, the issue of whether it was 
Soviet or Anglo-American forces that captured Berlin would be a determining 
factor in "saving the future." 38 But Roosevelt was not inclined to interfere with 
military strategy. His death on 12 April effectively ended the debate, and 
Truman assumed the presidency with the pace of events forcing decisions on 
more fundamental issues . Therefore, despite Churchill's opposition, 
Eisenhower prevailed, and the advance of the Allied Expeditionary Force was 
halted on the banks of the Elbe River, where it met the Red Army on 25 April. 
Meanwhile, the Red Army had begun its assault on the city. After a 
costly urban battle, Zhukov's forces secured the city on 2 May. Days later, 
with their capital captured, Hitler dead, and their army shattered the 
_Germans surrendered.39 With Germany defeated, Churchill again attempted 
to gain negotiating leverage for dealing with Stalin by delaying the 
withdrawal of Anglo-American troops to their occupation zones, in the 
process undertaking an intense campaign to induce Truman to accept the 
international responsibilities that the United States had earned as a victorious 
power. Fearing that the United States might return to its pre-war isolationism 
and that the Anglo-American axis may forfeit a claim in the international 
38 Churchill to Roosevelt, 5 April 1945, ibid., p .613. In fact, Churchill had played his own 
important part in legitimizing the extension of Soviet power into Europe by reaching an 
understanding with Stalin on spheres of influence in the Balkans in the so-called "percentages 
agreement." See Joseph M. Siracusa, Into tlze Dark House: American Diplomacy and tlze Ideological 
Origins of tlze Cold War, (Claremont: Regina, 1998), chap.1; Albert Resis, "The Churchill-Stalin 
Secret 'Percentages' Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944," American Historical 
Review, 83 (1978) :  368-387. For more general discussions of the division of Europe into spheres 
of influence or de facto empires, see Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, chap.1;  Gaddis, We Now 
Know, chap.1; C.L. Sulzberger, Such a Peace: The Roots and Ashes of Yalta, (New York: 
Continuum, 1982) . 
39 Kuby, Tlze Russians and Berlin, 1 945; Erickson, Road to Berlin, pp.531-622; John Toland, 
The Last Hundred Days, (London: Arthur Barker, 1966) . 
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hierarchy, Churchill pressed for an immediate commitment while the full 
military strength of the Anglo-American forces remained in Europe. Yet, 
American military plans required the transfer of available forces to the Pacific 
theatre, and Truman was also faced with strong public pressure to return 
home those troops no longer required in the war effort. Nevertheless, 
Churchill argued that " the Allies ought not to retreat from their present 
positions to the occupational line until we are satisfied about Poland and also 
about the temporary character of the Russian occupation of German." In his 
view, the successful peace treaty was dependent on the presence of the full 
U.S. military contingent. There was a great threat that Stalin would install the 
Red Army throughout eastern and central Europe. Once there, he warned, 
they would be difficult to remove. He argued further that the United States 
and Britain needed to force the pace, since "time is on his side if he digs in 
while we melt away," and warned gravely, if outstanding differences were 
not settled "before the United States armies withdraw from Europe and the 
Western world folds up it war machines, there are no prospects of a 
satisfactory solution and very little of preventing a third world war." 40 
However, Truman, under intense pressure from the "bring the boys 
home" campaign heightened by an upcoming Congressional election and still 
needing to win the war in the Pacific, insisted that American forces be 
rationalized immediately, and instructions were issued to begin the 
withdrawal on 21 June. It was envisaged that on that date Allied troops 
would also move into the Berlin area and establish the Kommandatu ra  as 
agreed at Yalta. But Stalin delayed these plans until 1 July and made it clear 
that entry into Berlin would be conditional on withdrawal from the Soviet 
zone.11 This short period when the Soviets were the sole occupiers of Berlin 
was to have important ramifications in 1 948 . In the two months between the 
40 Churchill to Truman, 1 1 and 13 May 1945, FR US 1 945, Potsdam, pp.7, 10. 
41 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Stalin 's Correspondence with Roosevelt and Truman 
1 941-1 945, (New York: Capricorn, 1965), pp.245-247; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 
Stalin 's Correspondence with Churchill and Attlee, (New York: Capricorn, 1965), pp.365-366; Clay 
to Parks, 16 June 1945, box 1, TS Correspondence, U.S. PolAd Berlin, RG 84, NA. 
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capture of the city and the entry of Western troops the Soviets were able to 
consolidate their control over important communications networks and 
public utilities. 
Postwar Berlin and the Potsdam Conference 
Anglo-American troops began to occupy their assigned sectors of the 
city on 1 July as scheduled, and by 7 July the U.S. Office of Military 
Government (OMGUS) had opened its Berlin offices.42 While Eisenhower, 
now the U.S. Military Governor, remained temporarily in Frankfurt with the 
bulk of SHAEF' s administration before returning to the United States for a 
month of victory parades and golf, his deputy, General Lucius D. Clay, 
supervised Berlin operations, assisted by his political adviser from State, 
Robert D.  Murphy.43 But Allied bombing and Soviet shelling had taken their 
toll, and the city that they now occupied had suffered badly. As Truman told 
the American people: "War has indeed come home to Germany and to the 
German people . .  . in all the frightfulness with which the German leaders 
started and waged it. "  44 U.S. officials reported a grim situation. Allied 
bombing and Soviet artillery had reduced much of the city to rubble. Food 
was scarce, bodies cluttered the flooded subway system, thousands of 
displaced persons were roaming around the streets, and the ranks of the 
homeless swelled as many residents were evicted in order to accommodate 
the incoming conquerors. "Never did I see a more sorrowful sight," Truman 
recorded in his diary after his own visit to the city, "nor witness retribution to 
the nth degree."  45 
42 Zink, The United States in Germany, pp.29-42. The French sector of Berlin was not finally 
settled until 26 July at the Potsdam Conference, and French troops took control of their sector 
on 12 August. 
43 Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany, p .55. 
44 Truman's radio address to the nation on the Potsdam Conference, 9 August 1945, 
Presidential Papers: Truman: 1 945, p.203. 
45 Truman diary entry, 16 July 1945, Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, 
ed. Robert H. Ferrell (New York: Harper, 1980), p.52. For accounts by U.S. officials, see Gavin, 
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The devastation of Berlin posed a new problem for the occupation 
authorities. Although it was anathema to the hard-line rhetoric of punishing 
Germany that had persisted during the war effort, voiced most strikingly in 
the Morgenthau Plan but also clearly evident in the secret U.S. occupation 
guideline JCS 1 067, the occupation forces felt a responsibility to prevent the 
German people from starving.46 Planning for the postwar occupation had 
always been based on the premise that the only financial burden on the 
occupying powers would be to supply their own relatively small contingents 
of troops. Indeed, it was widely assumed that reparations exacted from the 
Germans would help reimburse the occupation powers for some of the costs 
of the war. As for the people of Berlin, the Western Allies assumed that since 
it was in the Soviet zone, the Soviet Military Government would bear the 
costs .  Yet it soon became apparent that this would not be the case, and the 
occupation powers found themselves faced with a decision to allow recently 
defeated enemies to starve or to support them out of their own occupation 
costs.  Although the full implications of this were not immediately apparent in 
_ 1 945, supplying the civilian German population became a major issue in the 
Cold War conflict in Berlin, as both East and West attempted to "buy" 
support by exploiting the difficult living conditions of Germans in general, 
and Berliners in particular.47 
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humanitarian concerns were not shared by most policymakers during wartime. Hull, 
Memoirs, 2:1617. For "Operation RESCUE" see Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p.310.  
47 See particularly William Stivers, "The Incomplete Blockade: Soviet Zone Supply of West 
Berlin, 1948-1949," Diplomatic History, 21, 4 (Fall 1997) : 569-602. Others have pointed out that 
the Soviets considerably undermined their cause in "winning the hearts and minds" of the 
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It was into this devastated city that the allied leaders ventured for their 
first postwar conference. With the flags of the occupation powers flying over 
the former Nazi capital, Truman, Stalin, and Churchill (who was replaced by 
Clement Attlee part way through the conference) met to decide the fate of the 
defeated nation. The Potsdam Conference convened on 1 7  July 1945 (with the 
French notably absent) and, as the meeting at which the fate of postwar 
Europe was decided, it became a reference point for the early Cold War.48 The 
conference protocol was in part the practical manifestation of principles that 
had been agreed at Yalta. It established a Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), 
contained a compromise agreement was reached on the controversial issue of 
Poland, and included provisions for reparations and control of the defeated 
territories . But the main issue was Germany. Detailed provisions were drafted 
for disarming and demilitarizing Germany that included political and 
economic measures that, although dividing the . country into zones of 
occupation, were based on the principle that Germany would be treated as a 
single economic unit. This principle was to become one of the most 
contentious issues of the occupation and the history of postwar Germany is 
replete with charges and countercharges of violations of the Potsdam 
agreements.49 
Germans during this period with widespread rapine and looting. See especially Naimark, The 
Russians in Gemzany, esp. pp.78-83; Brett-Smith, Berlin '45, pp.157-167. 
48 For the significance of the Potsdam Conference, see Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, 
pp.15-33; Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp.111-119; Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: Tlze Potsdam 
Conference, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); idem, From Trust to Terror: Tlze Onset 
of tlze Cold War, 1 945-1 950, (New York: Norton, 1970), pp. 43-45; Charles Mee, Meeting at 
Potsdam, (New York: M. Evans, 1975); James L. Gormly, From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big 
Tlzree Diplomacy, 1 945-1 947, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1990); Leffler, Preponderance of 
Power, pp.37-38; Gaddis, We Now Know, p.95; idem, Tlze United States and tlze Origins of tlze Cold 
War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 236-243; Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 
332-412; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp.326-343; John Gimbel, "On the 
Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement: An Essay on United States Postwar Germany 
Policy," Political Science Quarterly, 87, 2 (June 1972) : 242-269; Norman A. Graebner, Cold War 
Diplomacy: American Foreign Policy 1 945-1975, (New York: D.  Van Nostrand, 1980), p.22; 
Melvyn P. Leffler, Tlze Specter of Communism: Tlze United States and tlze Origins of tlze Cold War, 
1 91 7-1 953, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), pp.47-49; Siracusa, Into tlze Dark House, pp.140-
142. 
49 FRUS 1 945, Potsdam, pp.1478-1498. Trachtenberg points out that American indignation 
on this issue was largely unfounded and self-serving in that Secretary of State James F. Byrnes 
Origins of the Problem I 65 
The Question of Access 
Throughout this nebulous process of planning for postwar Germany, 
the question of what guarantees U.S. troops would have of continued access 
to their garrisons in Berlin was rarely raised. Yet in every Berlin crisis during 
the Cold War, American government officials, members of Congress, the 
press, and private citizens alike repeatedly asked "Why were no access rights 
secured on paper in 1 945?" the answer, the American government repeatedly 
told them, was that President Roosevelt had entrusted the Soviets to exercise 
common decency, a trust that had since been betrayed as the Kremlin showed 
itself in the postwar years to be duplicitous and expansionist. The more 
accurate answer, however, is that few officials thought of it, and those that 
did were quickly silenced in the interests of other agreements or issues. In 
1 945, access to Berlin was not- and could never have been - high on the list of 
American priorities. Having finally won the war in the .European theatre, the 
U.S. military was transferring its efforts to the Pacific. Even within Europe 
there were other more pressing matters that needed attention. Apart from 
�hat, no amount of foresight could have been expected to predict future 
problems. As Clay pointed out, "When the war ended and we were sitting 
over there with the greatest army that had ever been seen, nobody was 
concerned about anybody blocking us on road and railroads."50 Quite simply, 
in the period in which the occupation zones were being negotiated, during 
1 944 and early 1 945, access to Berlin was not a serious political issue, nor was 
it envisaged that it would ever become so. 
As a consequence, no explicit arrangements for access to Berlin were 
formally recorded during the entire process that the occupation of Germany 
was being planned, a deficiency that lay at the core of later problems. In 
had already established privately with the Soviets the principle of treating their respective 
zones of Germany as de facto spheres of influence, and the occupation had been conducted 
on this basis for some time. Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.21-28; Herter to 
AmEmbassies, 1 3 November 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:59. 
so Lucius D. Clay recorded interview by Richard D. McKinzie, 16 July 1974, OHP, HSTL; 
Clay recorded interview by Jean Smith, February 1971, OHP, DDEL; Robert D. Murphy 
recorded interview by Jean Edward Smith, 23 February 1971, OHP, DDEL. 
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contrast, Winant and the EAC spent considerable time establishing formal 
agreements for American troops to traverse the British zone.st Similarly, a 
formal agreement was secured establishing the right of American occupation 
forces to transit through France, and the occupation statute for Austria 
contained explicit arrangements for free access by both air and land through 
all Austrian territory while en route to Vienna.s2 Yet neither American nor 
British officials pressed for a similar guarantee for access to Berlin. 
There were, however, some at a lower level who raised the issue of 
access. Probably the first mention of the issue was in the proposal drafted by 
State's Interdivisional Committee in mid-December 1 943. After zones were 
allocated and Berlin was identified as the logical administrative centre, 
Mosely revised the plan to include two land corridors that connected the 
British and American zones to their sectors in Berlin. Rather than being 
transport lanes as were later utilized, these corridor� consisted of districts 
along the corridors' paths. Mosely' s revisions were intended to provide 
uninterrupted access to Berlin; that is, no access agreement would be 
_necessary because Americans would be traversing areas under their own 
responsibility. However, having been drafted at a time when the Civil Affairs 
Division refused to discuss in the WSC what it considered to be "military 
matters," this proposal languished in the lower levels of bureaucratic dispute 
and was never submitted to the WSC, making it impossible for it to be placed 
on the international negotiating table.s3 
On 13 May 1944, shortly after being authorised by Roosevelt to accept 
the zonal boundaries proposed by the British and Soviets, Winant returned to 
Washington for consultation. During the next fortnight he held extensive talks 
51 The Anglo-American agreements secured rail, road, and canal facilities for American 
troops through the British zone between Berlin and the American port facilities at Bremen 
and Bremehaven. CCS 320/27, 16 September 1944, box 29, Map Room, FDRL. 
s2 The arrangements for access to Vienna had been agreed by the EAC on 9 July 1945. 
Western officials were apparently under the impression that Gusev had suggested that the 
arrangements for access to Vienna would stand for Berlin as well, and therefore did not 
pursue it further. Feis, From Trust to Terror, p.330. 
· 53 Mosely, "New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," p.587. 
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with the War Department on whether or not to pursue an agreement in the 
EAC concerning guaranteed access to Berlin. While the content of these 
discussions remains somewhat unclear, the most likely account is presented 
by Mosely, who at that time was Kennan's successor in London as Winant's 
counsellor. 54 His version of the discussions, which is consistent with the War 
Department's record of uncooperative behaviour, was that Winant pushed for 
an agreement on free access as a precondition to accepting the Soviet zone's 
boundary. Gusev, Winant believed, had seemed fairly amenable to such an 
agreement in earlier discussions. The Civil Affairs Division, however, insisted 
that to codify access rights at this point, three weeks before D-Day, would 
limit freedom of action in the future. As one observer has noted, "The War 
Department did not so much have a policy as a desire to keep its options 
open."ss According to Mosely, they argued that it was impossible at that time 
to predict precisely what they would require since they did not yet know the 
state of the heavily bombed city, nor the full nature of their responsibilities in 
the occupation regime. As well, it was entirely possible, even probable, that 
when American troops actually entered Germany they would find the 
facilities that they had planned to use destroyed. Therefore, any agreement 
made in the EAC might well prove inadequate once the time came to actually 
supply the American troops.56 
Whatever the content of Winant's discussions with the War 
Department, the outcome was that Winant did not raise the matter of access, 
either formally or even informally, with the EAC. Some early Cold Warriors 
attributed Winant' s silence on the EAC to a personal decision based on a 
misguided reliance on personal diplomacy. A belief that he held special 
influence with Gusev, they charge, clouded his judgement and encouraged 
him to flagrantly disregard Washington's directives. Consequently, they 
54 Nelson, Wartime Origins, pp.44-45; Sharp, Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of 
Germany, pp.66-67; Smith, Defense of Berlin, pp.21-25; Kennan, Memoirs, 1 :1 72-173. 
ss Peterson, The American Occupation of Gemzmzy, p.37. 
56 Mosely, "New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," p.593. See also Murphy interview 
by Berliner, 12 October 1974. 
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charge him with "grave responsibility" for the failure to secure access 
agreements. Mosely has vehemently attacked such accusations, and rather 
blamed the Civil Affairs Division for refusing to allow Winant to negotiate 
just such an agreement.57 Corroborating Mosely's argument are Winant's own 
telegrams to Washington. Displaying a degree of diplomatic acumen that 
belies charges of naivety, Winant saw advantage in securing agreement on 
occupation zones before Allied troops entered Germany, telling Roosevelt in 
January 1 945 that "our experience in dealing with the Russians has shown 
that it is easier to get agreement prior to occupation than after occupation." 5s 
He expanded upon this in a cable to John McCloy, at that time the assistant 
secretary of war responsible for the occupation, arguing that the best 
guarantee for a continued working relationship lay in securing set 
agreements. "Without such agreements," he said, "many frictions and 
conflicts might arise between the occupying forces,. and such conflicts could 
hardly fail to have a profound influence on Allied harmony, which in turn is 
the necessary basis for our policy in other parts of the world and in our efforts 
to establish a security organisation."59 
Winant' s personal responsibility for the lack of an access agreement 
was further diluted by State's own assessment of the Berlin problem. 
Prompted by Winant' s questioning, State undertook an extensive study of the 
issues involved in accepting the British-Soviet proposals. Submitted on 31 
May 1 944, the paper stated explicitly that "an arrangement which would 
make each zone contiguous to Berlin is not feasible because of the location of 
the capital ." However, State did not believe this would present a problem in 
the context of the occupation because "a tripartite governing machinery for 
the whole of Germany, in which the three powers would be equal partners, 
57 Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, pp.284-286; Clay, Decision in Germany, p.15; Franklin, 
"Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin," pp.25-26; Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany." 
In his memoirs, Murphy implies that he and Mosely agreed on Winant's "grave 
responsibility" for the failure to secure access agreements when they met several years after 
the war and after Winant's death. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p.286. 
ss Winant to Roosevelt, 28 January 1945, box 195, Winant Papers, FDRL. 
59 Winant to McCioy, 24 February 1945, ibid. 
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would tend to minimise the significance of the exact location of the zonal 
boundary lines."60 Therefore, finding neither the War nor State departments 
enthusiastic about negotiating access guarantees, Winant returned to London 
and allowed the question to drop. For the next six months the EAC 
concentrated on negotiating the "Instrument of Unconditional Surrender" and 
the "Protocol on Zones of Occupation." After Roosevelt terminated U.S. 
participation in postwar planning in October 1 944, the EAC remained 
effectively dormant and did not return to active discussion until April 1 945, at 
which time it was concerned primarily with assigning the French a zone from 
the British and American zones. By then Allied forces were deep inside 
Germany's borders and military government was being established. 
The most important agreement on access rights was an oral assurance 
given during a meeting of the three military governors in Berlin on 29 June 
1945. This meeting took place almost two months after the German surrender, 
and was an attempt for the occupation powers to co-ordinate operational 
matters. Several months earlier, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had tried to 
�stablish an understanding on access to Berlin among the combined military 
authorities . In messages to the Soviet and British General Staffs, the JCS 
proposed acceptance of "the general principle of freedom of transit" across all 
occupied areas.61 They did not receive a reply, and apparently interpreting the 
absence of a rejection as acceptance, did not press the issue further. 
Accordingly, when Clay met with his British and Soviet counterparts in June 
in order to discuss the movement of troops into their respective pre-arranged 
occupation zones and the establishment of the ACC, no agreement allowing 
Western troops to traverse Soviet-occupied territory had in fact been reached. 
During the course of the meeting Zhukov was eager to ensure that Soviet 
troops would be stationed in their assigned zones as soon as possible and, as 
Stalin had done earlier, made it quite clear that the withdrawal of Anglo-
60 State, "The Treatment of Germany: Policy Recommendations," 31 May 1944, box 333, 
Hopkins Papers (Sherwood Collection), FDRL. Italics added. 
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American troops from the Soviet areas was a precondition of entry into Berlin. 
When Clay agreed to a four-day time limit for the withdrawal of American 
troops from Soviet areas, Zhukov agreed to honour Stalin's commitment to 
allow a reconnaissance parties into Berlin on 1 July, with the bulk of the 
troops to enter the city on 4 July.62 Despite Clay's desire not to agree to 
specific air or land traffic routes lest it prejudice the right to use any other 
routes, Zhukov's insistence on allowing the Western allies the use of only one 
autobahn, two rail lines, and two air corridors was carried. To the chagrin of 
the British and American governments in later years, none of these 
agreements was formally recorded. Clay later explained this by stating that 
though he recognized /1 the import of the issue," he did not want /1 an 
agreement in writing that established anything less than unrestricted access."  
Content for the time being to have the use of  at least some transit lanes, Clay 
made it clear that he saw the agreements reached at this meeting as 
temporary, and reserved the right to reopen the question in the ACC.63 
However, the ACC never came to discuss the issue, and when the Soviets 
challenged American and British access rights in 1 948, Washington and 
London found themselves in the difficult position of appealing on the 
grounds of an oral agreement reached during a meeting of which no formal 
tripartite record was kept. 
By September 1 945, Japan had been defeated, and the United States 
began a process of rapid demobilization. The nuclear age had unequivocally 
begun with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki . East­
West relations, though under the scrutiny of American policymakers, had not 
yet deteriorated to the point that a consensus was reached that Cold War had 
61 JCS to Deane, 27 February 1945, box 35, Map Room Papers, FDRL; Nelson, Wartime 
Origins, pp.127-128. 
62 Ibid., pp.130-134; Clay to Floyd L. Parks, 16 June 1945, box 1, U.S. PolAd Berlin, RG 84, 
NA. 
63 Clay, Decision in Germany, pp.25-26; Nelson, Wartime Origins, pp.130-134. Although no 
formal minutes were kept General Parks did keep detailed notes of the discussion. Notes of 
Meeting, 29 June 1945, FRUS 1945, 3:353-361.  For a thorough compilation of documents 
pertaining to access, see boxes 24 through 26, General 1947-52, ExecSec, RG 466, NA. 
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broken out. As matters stood in Germany, the United States had become 
responsible, not only for a zone of occupation, but also for a sector of Berlin 
that lay deep within Soviet occupied territory. A combination of factors, then, 
had led to the acceptance of this responsibility without securing any access 
guarantees. Though President Truman had not explicitly confirmed 
Roosevelt's view that American troops would be out of Europe within two 
years, it was assumed that the occupation of Germany would be temporary. 
In the meantime, the occupation did not operate smoothly. Yet it was not only 
the Soviet Military Government that impeded harmonious quadripartite 
relations. rather, the French, irritated by their exclusion from the Potsdam 
meeting and insistent that the Saar and Ruhr be utilized to rebuild the French 
economy, consistently clashed with the United States and Britain. These 
conflicts in the Western occupation powers were compounded by a 
deteriorating East-West relationship, the U.S. Military Government's 
predicament of operating under two often conflicting occupation directives, 
JCS 1 067 and the Potsdam Protocol, and inflamed even further by heated 
_international exchanges on reparations. The result was a situation ripe for 
deepening conflict. 64 
64 On the U.S. Military Government occupation of Germany, see Peterson, The American 
Occupation of Germany, pp.114-338; Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany, 
(New York: Macmillan, 1947); idem, The United States in Germany; Schwartz, America's 
Germany. For the other occupation powers, see Naimark, Tlze Russians in Germany; J.P. Nettl, 
The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, 1 945-50, (London: Oxford University Press, 
1951); Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of 
the Cold War, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); Noel Annan, Changing Enemies: The Defeat and 
Regeneration of Germany, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996); Roy F. Willis, The French in 
Germany, 1945-1949, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962); John W. Young, France, tlze 
Cold War, and the Western Alliance, 1 944-49, (New York: St Martin's, 1990); Smith, Defense of 
Berlin, pp.71-89. 
Chapter Three 
Confirming the Worst Fears, 1948-1949 
We have lost Czechoslovakia, Norway is threatened. 
We retreat from Berlin. When Berlin falls, Western 
Germany will be next. If we mean . . .  to hold Europe 
against Communism, we must not budge. 
-Lucius D. Clay to Kenneth C. Royall, 10 April 1 948 
By 1 948 it had become apparent to U.S. policymakers that Soviet 
intentions were fundamentally inimical to their own. The Berlin blockade of 
1 948-1949 provided Washington with what it took to be tangible proof that 
the Soviet Union not only had the capability to act on these intentions, but also 
that it had the ·will to pursue them. Poland, Greece, Iran, and Turkey had 
already been the subjects of early East-West disagreement, but in each case 
the conflict, although serious, had been indirect and had remained essentially 
political and economic. In Berlin in 1948, however, by closing the land routes 
from the Western zones to Berlin the Soviets directly challenged the West to 
respond with military means. In this way, the blockade brought home for 
many Americans the real possibility of another war and made the Cold War 
72 
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an inescapable fact.1 Truman's response was to stay put, and in so doing he 
made a commitment that had crucial implications for the Cold War. 
Although the crisis lasted on and off for over a year, the most critical 
period was the first few months of the Soviet challenge, that is, from late 
March to the end of July, 1948.2 During this time, the American commitment 
to Berlin was made, the city assumed its symbolism for containment, and 
Moscow was served notice that the United States had no intention of 
surrendering Western Europe. In this formative period, the views of General 
Lucius Clay, who had replaced Eisenhower as U.S. military governor, and his 
State-appointed political adviser Robert Murphy were central . Even if their 
advice was not always followed, as in the case of their repeated 
recommendations for the use of armed convoys, their numerous cables, 
reports, and teleconferences from Germany were fundamental to the 
development of how Washington developed its perception of the problem. 
And at crucial moments, Clay personally appeared before the NSC to 
participate directly in Washington's deliberations. Significantly increasing the 
weight of his advice on Washington and his freedom of action in Germany 
was his close_ working relationship with James F. Byrnes, Truman's first 
secretary of state.3 This relationship also enhanced Clay's personal access to 
the President. But when it was not going directly to the White House, Clay's 
advice, often supported by Murphy, went directly to a core of Washington 
officials who improvised the administration's handling of the crisis . This 
group consisted of George Marshall, now secretary of state, and his under 
secretary, Robert A Lovett. These two drew on the experience of a number of 
State officials, most notably Director of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) George 
Kennan. On the military side, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, newly 
appointed Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, and de facto Chairman of the 
1 May, " America's Berlin," p.148. 
2 Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade, pp.43, 283. Shlaim confines the crisis 
period specifically to the period 20 March to 22 July. 
3 Gardner, " America and the German 'Problem,' 1945-1949," p .118 .  
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Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley were the primary participants .4 To various 
degrees they seized upon the warnings of Clay and Murphy and took their 
advice to the President who made the final decisions, often independently. 
When Truman won re-election in November 1948, it triggered a reshuffle in 
Washington. Marshall tendered his resignation and was succeeded by Dean 
Acheson, who increasingly marginalized Kennan. As well, Forrestal was 
replaced by Louis A. Johnson.5 Despite offering to resign several times, Clay 
remained in Germany. 
Expecting Trouble 
The Soviet blockade in mid-1948 was not unexpected. U.S. officials had 
anticipated a challenge somewhere. What form it would take and where it 
would occur were the unknown factors, with Iran, Turkey, Korea, and 
Germany all potential sites. And, as Samuel Williamson and Steven Rearden 
quite correctly point out, "The struggle over Berlin and the ripples emanating 
from it are not the whole story of 1948."6 In February 1948, the 
Czechoslovakian coup exacerbated Washington's growing uncertainty about 
Soviet intentions . Though not wholly unanticipated, the coup was a severe 
blow to what little comfort Washington felt with regard to Europe; in the 
CIA' s words, it revived fears that Europe might rush to join "the Communist 
band wagon."7 Moreover, France and Italy appeared the most likely next 
targets. Tension also remained high in Greece and the Middle East.8 -
4 For speculation on what might have been had these individuals not been dominant in 
U.S. policymaking during the blockade, see May, " America's Berlin," p.151. 
5 For Forrestal's decline, see Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, Driven Patriot: T11e 
Life and Times of James Forrestal, (New York: Random House, 1992), pp.422-468; Arnold A.  
Rogow, James Forrestal: A Study of Personalihj, Politics, and Policy, (New York: Macmillan, 
1963), pp.306-319; Forrestal Diaries, pp.531-555. 
6 Williamson and Rearden, I1ze Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategi;, p.77. 
7 See, for instance, Leffler, Preponderance of Power, pp.204-205; PPS/ 13 "Resume of the 
World Situation," 6 November 1947, State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, (New York: 
Garland, 1 983), 2:129; Hillenkoetter to Truman, 2 January 1948, box 249, PSF, HSTL; Kennan, 
"Remarks Delivered Before the Armed Services Committee," 8 January 1948, box 8, RG 330, 
NA; Kennan to Marshall, 3 February 1948, box 33, PPS, RG 59, NA. Quote from CIA 3-48 
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While the West was becoming increasingly suspicious of Soviet 
intentions it began to recognize the vulnerability of its presence in Berlin. In 
December 1947, Walter Bedell Smith, who had become the U.S. ambassador to 
the USSR, urged Washington to face any difficulties that might arise in Berlin 
with " a firm insistence of our rights."9 This was largely in response to a British 
suggestion that seriously aroused American sensitivities. Sir Ivone 
Kirkpatrick, a senior official from the British Foreign Office, had suggested 
that the Western allies make a pre-emptive "dignified withdrawal" from the 
city before they were forced to leave because he saw the situation as 
ultimately untenable.10 Murphy and Smith were appalled. Smith warned 
Marshall that appeasing Moscow was a perilous course. He had no doubt that 
the Soviets would do everything within their power to encourage such a 
withdrawal - indeed there were indications that such a campaign had already 
been launched - but "for us to yield to such blackmail would be most 
dangerous."  He judged that Stalin was unlikely to push matters to breaking 
point until he had consolidated Eastern Europe. " If I am wrong," he said, 
"then the sooner the issue is joined the better."11 
Simultaneously with this Anglo-American controversy, an internal 
review of U.S. policy towards Berlin was circulating in the State Department. 
It warned of an imminent threat to the Allied position in Berlin. Soviet 
ambitions, the report argued, were being thwarted by the Western allies' 
presence in Berlin because the Soviets could never consolidate their zone's 
Communist regime without the city as its capital . Several avenues appeared 
open to the Soviets to pressure the West into leaving, one of which was to 
"Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States," 10 March 
1948, box 203, PSF, HSTL. 
s For a comparative study of U.S. policy towards the Berlin and Palestine problems, see 
Jerry Philipp Rosenberg, "Berlin and Israel, 1948: Foreign Policy Decision-Making During the 
Truman Administration." (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1977) . 
9 Smith to Marshall, 30 December 1947, FRUS 1 947, 2:908. 
10 Waldemar Gallman to Marshall, 23 December 1947, FR US 1 947, 2:904-905. As 
Trachtenberg points out, such a view was not novel in London. Bevin had taken a similar line 
as early as May 1946.  Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, p.81 n.59. 
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restrict communication and transport with the city and thereby force the 
Western powers to withdraw. This, the report warned, would be a blow to 
U.S. interests, largely because of its flow-on effects. Not only would it 
seriously damage U.S. prestige, but it would also bring the Soviets a 
significant step closer to control of the whole of Germany.12 
Allan Lightner, the author of this report, was not alone in his fears. In 
December 1 947, director of the newly created Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, added his own voice to the 
growing chorus when he warned the President that Moscow appeared likely 
to undertake "a  program of intensified obstructionism and calculated insult" 
in an effort to drive the West powers from Berlin.13 In January 1 948, the Army 
General Staff said that there was no new evidence to suggest that the Soviets 
were about to challenge Berlin, but warned that any attempt to do so, whether 
it be by direct military force or the imposition of administrative difficulties, 
could lead to war.14 Thus, by the beginning of 1 948 the Truman administration 
had already identified its position in Berlin as vulnerable. It also knew that its 
European policies might provoke the Soviets into exploiting this weakness. 
The Truman Doctrine, the European Recovery Program, the London 
Programme for German self-government, and moves towards a closer 
military relationship between the United States and Western Europe were all 
recognized as potentially provocative. 
11 Smith to Marshall, 30 December 1947, FRUS 1 947, 2:908; Murphy to Marshall, 24 
December 1947, ibid., p .905. 
12 Lightner to Samuel Reber and Charles E. Saltzman, 26 December 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:905-
907. 
13 Hillenkoetter cited in Trevor Barnes, "The Secret Cold War: The CIA and American 
Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946-1956, part I," Historical Journal, 24, 2 (1981) :  409. See also CIA 
4-48 "Review of the World Situation," 8 April 1948, box 203, PSF, HSTL; ORE 29-48 "Possible 
Program of Future Moves in Germany," 28 April 1948, box 2, ORE Estimates 1946-1950, RG 
263, NA. 
14 Kenneth W. Condit, The Histon; of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
National Policy, (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1979), 2:129-130. See also Royall to Forrestal, 
" US Course of Action in the Event the Soviets Attempt to Force Us Out of Berlin," 19 January 
1 948, CD 6-2-9, box 27, Numerical 1947-50, Correspondence Control, Admin.Sec., RG 330, 
NA; Robert Blum to John H. Ohly, 21 January 1948, ibid.; Ohly to P.H. Greasley, 22 January 
1 948, ibid. 
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By January 1 948, the situation in Germany was, in Clay's view, "more 
tense than at any time since surrender."15 U.S. officials in Germany were 
increasingly reporting difficulties with day-to-day relations with the Soviets . 
While there were several factors underlying this increasing animosity on both 
ideological and practical levels, it was manifesting itself in procedural 
difficulties that were becoming commonplace at almost all points of contact. 
In Berlin, where military forces from the four occupying powers were forced 
to deal with each other on a daily basis, these minor conflicts assumed an 
exaggerated importance .  It led to the situation where, in the words of one 
former official based in the city, "You might say we midwifed the Cold War 
there in Berlin."16 
With increasing frequency, U.S. officials in Germany were observing 
signs of increasing tension. For some time they had been reporting sporadic 
interference with rail and road traffic between the Western zones and Berlin, 
and the frustrations experienced earlier at the London CFM had filtered down 
to every level of contact. By late 1947, quadripartite government cooperation 
in Germany had disintegrated. Clay reported that by the first meetings of the 
ACC for 1948 "the wraps were off," and he predicted "heavy going ahead."17 
In an important dispatch in early March 1948, Murphy described an apparent 
change in tactics on the part of the Soviets. After a "refatively harmonious 
period," he said, the atmosphere had steadily deteriorated "to a point at 
which it appears that agreement is impossible on even the most routine 
questions." The Soviets' objective, he suspected, was to sabotage the 
quadripartite administration of Berlin.1s 
15 Clay to Draper, 16 January 1948, quoted in Tusa and Tusa, The Berlin Blockade, p.125; 
Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.79-80. 
16 Karl Mautner, "The View From Germany," in Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War, ed. 
Thomas T. Hammon (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), p .231 . See also Robert 
Engler, "The Individual Soldier and the Occupation," Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 267 (January 1950) : 77-86. 
17 Clay, Decision in Germany, p.343. 
is Murphy to Marshall, 3 March 1948, FR US 1 948, 2:878-879. 
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During March, the Soviets intensified their harassment of Berlin's 
access routes by placing increasingly severe restrictions on transport to and 
from the city.  This essentially local issue was thrust into Washington's 
attention when Clay issued an unashamedly alarmist warning that war /1 may 
come with dramatic suddenness."19 On 20 March, the Soviets contributed to 
the crisis atmosphere by walking out of the ACC and continuing to 
undermine the viability of the Berlin Kommandatura, rendering both 
administrative bodies ineffectual.20 These events provoked Murphy to 
elaborate on his earlier suspicions. As he saw it, the Soviets were trying to 
force the three Western powers out of Berlin in order to eradicate the last 
"center of reaction" behind the Iron Curtain. He predicted that the next step 
in the campaign would be to denounce earlier "rights" of occupation and 
insist upon Western withdrawal. With agreement on this very unlikely, the 
Soviets would most likely try to "make it increasingly impossible or 
unprofitable for the Western powers to remain on." Yet, however "delicate 
and difficult" the situation became, Murphy insisted that maintaining the 
position in Berlin was imperative to U.S. security interests because /1 our 
withdrawal, either voluntary or involuntary, would have severe 
psychological repercussions which would, at this critical stage in the 
European situation, extend far beyond the boundaries of Berlin and even 
Germany." Moreover, he predicted that this was precisely what the Soviets 
had in mind.21 
19 In his memoirs, Clay retrospectively claims the document as foresight of the Berlin 
blockade. This cable, however, was deliberately melodramatic to stimulate support for 
Universal Military Training and increases in military appropriations. Clay, Decision in 
Gennany, p.355; Jean Edward Smith, ed., The Papers of Lucius D. Clay, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1974), 2:589-590; Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, 2:359-360; Kennan, Memoirs, 
1 :400; Forrestal Diaries, pp .387-390 . In the fallout from Clay's cable, Murphy attempted to back 
up Clay's claims by sending off cables he had been holding for some time that took a similar 
line. See for example Murphy to Marshall, 5 February 1948 (sent 10 March), box 1, TS Corr. 
Murphy, PolAd Berlin, RG 84, NA. 
20 The Soviets, with some justification, claimed that the American representative on the 
Kommandatura Colonel Frank Howley had, in fact, been the one who walked out of the 
meeting. See Sokolovsky to Clay, 21 June 1948, box 4, Misc Files on Berlin, ExecSec, RG 466, 
NA. 
21 Murphy to Marshall, 1 April 1948, FR US 1 948, 2:885-886. 
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On 30 March, ten days after the Soviet walkout of the ACC, the Soviets 
confirmed Murphy's fears when they consolidated their hitherto sporadic 
interference by announcing new restrictions on traffic passing through the 
Soviet zone, effective from 1 · April. Clay immediately took up a British 
suggestion to supply the military garrisons in city by air, and on his own 
initiative placed armed guards on all military trains with orders to shoot if 
Soviet soldiers insisted on boarding.22 He also asked Washington for authority 
to employ armed convoys to reopen rail and road access to the city. In a tone 
similar to Smith's, Clay told Bradley, 
Obviously the full consequences of this action must be understood. Unless we 
take a strong stand now, our life in Berlin will become impossible. A retreat 
from Berlin at this moment would, in my opinion, have serious if not 
disastrous political consequences in Europe. I do not believe that the Soviets 
mean war now. However, if they do, it seems to me that we might as well find 
out now as later. We cannot afford to be bluffed .23 
Though conscious of the "grave possibilities inherent in such a procedure," 
Murphy endorsed Clay's plan for arming U.S. convoys on the basis that " on 
the question of the risk of war in undertaking it [employing armed convoys], 
there is, it seems to me, no greater risk than the one we run in remaining in 
Berlin."24 
Washington was alarmed at Clay's belligerency and the risk of 
escalating the conflict. As Bradley later put it, "this was neither the time nor 
place to open fire on the Russians ." "Had I enough hair on my head to react," 
he added, " this cable [from Clay] would probably have stood it ,on end."25 
With Truman's approval, an ad hoc group consisting of Bradley, Royall, 
22 For the origins of the idea for the airlift see Clay Papers, 2:696-704; Lucius D . Clay 
recorded interview no. 28 by Jean Edward Smith, February 1971, OHP, DDEL; Shlaim, 
"Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War," p.5. 
23 For military matters such as this, Clay reported in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief 
of U.S. forces in Europe to Chief of Staff Bradley. On military government matters he reported 
to Secretary of the Army Royall. Clay Papers, 2:597-603; Clay to Bradley, 31 March 1948, box 
16, Subject, Clark Clifford Papers, HSTL. 
24 Murphy to Lovett, 31 March 1948, box 1, TS Cables to SecState 1945-49, PolAd Berlin, RG 
84, NA; Murphy to Lovett, 1 April 1948, ibid. 
2s Bradley, A General's Life, p.478. 
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Forrestal, Lovett, and Eisenhower (who happened to be in Washington) 
promptly ordered Clay to cancel his plan and placed U.S. military forces 
throughout the world.26 In a series of teleconferences following this meeting, 
Bradley and Royall told Clay to schedule train movements as he saw fit, but 
not to arm the guards with any more than their usual weapons, even though 
the British were doing so. They emphasized that he was not to increase the 
armaments on the trains nor allow U.S. troops to fire unless fired upon. Their 
thinking, as Royall explained it, was that "if our action now should provoke 
war we must be sure that the fault is not ours." Clay made no attempt to 
conceal his disappointment, and openly disagreed with his orders, 
complaining that he was "not too sure I was right in ever bringing it up." He 
insisted that "there is no middle ground which is not appeasement," and 
warned that "we are now faced with a realistic and not a legalistic problem" 
in which "legalistic argument no longer has meaning." The challenge, he said, 
was to make American determination to resist the blockade understood by 
forty-two million Germans and two hundred million Western Europeans.27 
Having been thus restrained by Washington, Clay's public reaction 
was to declare that the United States intended to "sit tight" but would avoid 
provocative action. Washington echoed this calm yet defiant posture. In both 
Germany and Washington U.S. officials were careful in their dealings with the 
press not to appear too alarmist, deciding instead to use the opportunity to 
emphasize the determination of American character and a defiance based on 
moral grounds. Royall did, though, concede publicly that it was "an explosive 
26 Wedemeyer to U.S. Theatre Commanders, 31 March 1948, box 1 76, Central Decimal 
1948-50, RG 218, NA. 
27 Telecon, Royall, Clay, and Bradley, 31 March 1948, box 176, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 
218, NA; Smith, Clay Papers, pp.602-607; Condit, JCS and National Policy, p.125; Bradley, A 
General's Life, p.478; Forrestal Diaries, pp.407-408. In later years, Clay repeatedly pointed to this 
rejection of his advice as a lost opportunity to stand up to Moscow once and for all. During a 
1974 interview he said that when Truman approved the airlift during one of Clay's visits to 
Washington, "he also told me that he wanted to know that he wasn't the one that had not 
approved my armed convoy. All the military chiefs were against it. He said, 'I didn't want to 
go against my military chiefs. If they had been for it, you would have had it."' Lucius D. Clay 
recqrded interview by Richard D. McKinzie, 16 July 1974, OHP, HSTL. 
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situation."28 Some members of Congress were less restrained.  Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge Jr. 's (R-MA) indignation led him to call for "prompt military 
preparedness," while other senators expressed their outrage that U.S. rights 
were being challenged and threatened economic retaliation against the 
USSR.29 
Clay followed Washington's orders but continued to warn his 
superiors privately not to underestimate the significance of the situation, one 
he held was fraught with the gravest implications. During a teleconference 
with Royall on 10 April 1948, Clay gave his blunt appraisal of the impending 
crisis in Europe: "We have lost Czechoslovakia, Norway is threatened. We 
retreat from Berlin. When Berlin falls, Western Germany will be next. If we 
mean . . .  to hold Europe against Communism, we must not budge."  He 
assured Washington that "we can take humiliation and pressure short of war 
in Berlin without losing face," but that "if we withdraw, our position in 
Europe is threatened ."  " If America does not understand this now, does not 
know that the issue is cast," he warned, "then it never will and Communism 
will run rampant. I believe the future of democracy requires us to stay . . .  This 
is not heroic prose because there will be nothing heroic in having to take 
humiliation without retaliation."30 Murphy took a similar line. Frustrated by 
what he saw as a distinct lack of urgency in Washington, he accused the State 
Department of being dangerously preoccupied with "the field of dialectics" 
and ignoring the fact that "the Berlin situation has passed from that stage into 
a physical struggle for the maintenance of our position in that- city ."  He 
supported negotiations but held little hope of them accomplishing anything. 
He warned State bluntly that " semantics will not cure the Berlin situation."31 
28 Royall quoted in New York Times, 3 April 1948. 
29 See Nnu York Times, 3 and 4 April 1948. 
30 Telecon, Clay and Royall, 10 April 1948, quoted in Clay, Decision in Germany, p.361 . 
31 Murphy to Marshall and Lovett, 11 July 1948, box 1, TS Cables to SecState 1945-49, U.S. 
PolAd Berlin, RG 84, NA; Murphy to Hickerson, 13 April 1948, FRUS 1 948, 2:892. The 
tenseness of the situation was felt in Moscow also. Smith, having heard on BBC radio that 
"his customers," the Soviets, had clamped down on British military goods trains from Berlin, 
sent his commiserations to Murphy: "I suppose it is cold comfort to remind you of what you 
already know, i.e., that things will become worse before they get better, but if it is any 
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Nevertheless, the April "mini-blockade" lasted only eleven days. The 
Western troops had enough supplies in the city to last through any minor 
annoyances that the Soviets might instigate, and a limited airlift seemed to 
promise further scope for dealing with the problem at a local level before 
elevating it to Washington and London. The airlift was suspended on 11 April 
and normal traffic resumed the next day. Washington, however, expected 
further action, possibly involving a correlated move in Vienna. The motives 
behind the "mini blockade" remained unclear, although it did suggest a more 
definite effort to force the Western powers from the city. Until the Soviet 
walkout from the ACC, the convening of the Soviet-sponsored People's 
Congress, and the imposition of travel restrictions, warnings by U.S. officials 
of Soviet action against Berlin were speculative of a general Soviet plan. By 
the end of April, however, there appeared to be tangible proof. Yet, Soviet 
intentions remained debatable. It was unclear whether Moscow was using the 
West's vulnerability in Berlin as a lever to influence or even delay Western 
plans for the formation of a West German government, or whether it was 
trying to win Berlin in an effort to stabilize the Communist regime in the 
Eastern zone. CIA analysts suggested that Soviet actions were primarily the 
result of their recognition that they could no longer prevent the formation of a 
West German government. Consequently, the analysts surmised, the Soviets 
were concentrating their efforts on installing a puppet regime in East 
Germany, which would be embarrassed by the West's presence in Berlin. By 
early April, the CIA had created a blueprint for Soviet action, predicting that 
the consolidation of the Eastern zone required the expulsion of the Western 
powers from Berlin. They deemed that the most propitious method of 
achieving this objective would be to intensify access restrictions to make it 
impracticable for the Western powers to stay on, but judged that such a 
withdrawal would constitute "a  major political defeat with world-wide 
consolation to the boys on the fighting front I can tell you the fifth column in Moscow is 
having a thin time also. "  Smith to Murphy, 13 April, box 1, TS Corr. Murphy, PolAd Berlin, 
RG 84, NA. 
Con/inning the Worst Fears I 83 
repercussions." Importantly, however, recent Soviet behaviour demonstrated 
that such a challenge was no longer purely speculative.32 
Blockade 
The situation, then, was already tense by the time that the Western 
powers decided in early June to reconvene the six-power London Conference 
on Germany, which subsequently agreed on a programme for the 
establishment of a separate West German state and a few weeks later to 
implement long-overdue currency reform in Germany. After debating the 
arguments for and against, the Western powers chose to serve notice that they 
would be instituting currency reform in the Western zones effective on 20 
June. They did, however, specifically exclude the Western sectors of Berlin.33 
Predictably, the Soviets rejected the move and within days the Soviets, 
ostensibly acting to protect the economy of the Eastern zone, closed all access 
by land between the Western zones and Berlin claiming that there were 
" technical difficulties" in the access lanes. 
When the Soviets implemented what Kennan later referred to as "a 
species of  squeeze play" by imposing a full blockade, the 2.3  million residents 
of the Western sectors had food stocks sufficient for thirty-six days and 
enough coal for forty-five .  OMGUS predicted that a relatively small daily 
airlift of 4,500 tons could support West Berlin at sustenance levels or some 
time.:w Accordingly, Clay instituted another airlift, beginning with military 
32 CIA 4-48 "Review of the World Situation," 8 April 1948, box 203, Meetings, NSC, 
Subject, PSF, HSTL; CIA, ORE 29-48 "Possible Program of Future Soviet Moves in Germany," 
28 April 1948, box 2, Estimates of the ORE 1946-50, RG 263, NA. 
33 Clay to Peterson, 9 July 1947, Clay Papers, 1:382-383; Clay to Royall, 8 August 1947, ibid., 
p .398; MemCon, 17  December 1 947, FRUS 1947, 2:819; British MemCon, 17  December 1947, 
FR US 1 947, 2:819; Clay Papers, 2:578; Clay, Decision in Gennany, pp.211-212; Murphy, 
Battleground Berlin, p.54; Jack Bennett, "The German Currency Reform," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 267 (January 1950): 43-54; John H. Backer, Winds of 
History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1983), 
pp.225-227; Royall to Clay, 28 April 1948, FRUS 1 98, 2:897-898 .. See also Eisenberg, Drawing 
the Line, esp. pp.485-493; Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, chap.1 .  
34 Kennan, Memoirs, 1 :420; Clay, Decision in Germany, p.365. 
Con/inning the Worst Fears I 84 
supplies on 21 June and expanding it a few days later to include civilian 
supplies in a programme designated as Operation VITTLES.35 He also imposed 
economic countermeasures by restricting West-East trade. More importantly, 
he told the German press that the United States could not be driven from 
Berlin short of war, a statement that provoked concern from some in 
Washington who were not sure that the United States was in any position to 
offer such a commitment publicly. Still under explicit orders not to use armed 
convoys, Clay sent an American military freight train through the Eastern 
zone to test the blockade, but it was embarrassingly forced to withdraw. 
At the insistence of the British, the four military governors met on 3 
July at the headquarters of the new Soviet military governor, Marshal Vassily 
Sokolovsky. Clay attended reluctantly and was not particularly surprised 
when Sokolovsky gave the first blatant admission of the real reason for the 
blockade. Until this time the Soviets had consistently maintained that so­
called "technical difficulties" had rendered land communications through the 
Eastern zone impossible. Sokolovsky, however, ignored the currency issue 
and said that the "technical difficulties" could not be resolved until the West 
-abandoned its plans for the formation of a West German government. Only 
when the London Programme was on the negotiating table would it no longer 
be necessary to "protect" the Soviet sector's economy. Clay later observed that 
it was evident that Sokolovsky "was enjoying the situation. We were not."36 
35 Clay maintained that the economic counterblockade which was implemented in 
September was one of the most effective weapons that the West wielded during the blockade, 
a claim that is supported by Western intelligence sources in the Eastern zone that indicated 
that the Soviets were unprepared for the effectiveness of an economic counterblockade. The 
Soviet military government had apparently been led to believe that the East could function 
effectively independently of the West, whereas, in fact, restrictions on West-East trade would 
have a profound impact on several key industries . This was particularly evident from a 
detailed report of a meeting Sokolovsky and other Soviet officials had with leading members 
of a German industrial committee at the end of June. Clay, Decision in Germany, pp.388-389; 
Hillenkoetter to Truman, 30 June 1948, box 1, Memos for the President, CIA, NSC, HSTL. See 
also EUCOM Historical Division, "The Berlin Air Lift," Special Studies Series, 1, 5 (1952), box 
27, General 1947-52, ExecSec, RG 466, NA. "Operation VITTLES" was the U.S. designation. The 
British designated the airlift as "Operation PLAINFARE." 
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Truman's Decision 
Despite this evidence of the seriousness of the blockade, the Western 
governments were slow to respond. In Washington, London, and Paris the 
Soviet ambassadors were handed a note on 6 July detailing the juridical rights 
of the occupation powers. The notes further warned that the West could not 
"be induced by threats, pressures or other actions to abandon these rights." In 
essence, the Western presence in Berlin was not open to negotiation. 37 But 
such a position required thorough consideration of how it could be 
supported.  In Washington, the administration was forced to consider the 
question fully at the highest level and to define the national security value of 
Berlin more carefully. Indignant reaffirmations of legal rights were clearly not 
going to be enough. It had become apparent that the situation could 
potentially spark military conflict, certainly not something to be drawn into 
lightly. Since the immediate threat was still not clear, it would be necessary to 
clarify the situation before the United States found itself in a war. The Joint 
Chiefs had dismissed the military value of the token U.S. garrison as 
negligible; in fact, they argued that it was a liability. The CIA argued that the 
blockade had "not seriously interfered with the logistic position of the U.S. 
but rather with its strategic position," and predictably lamented the 
curtailment of intelligence and propaganda activities.38 More influential 
36 Clay, Decision in Gennany, p.362, 367, 369-371; Panyushkin to Marshall, 14 July 1948, 
FRUS 1 948, 2:960-964. 
37 Marshall to Panyushkin, 6 July 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:952. The non-negotiability aspect was 
not a foregone conclusion. A late draft of the 6 July note to the Soviet Union contained several 
paragraphs that were edited out at the last minute. The discarded section included an 
acknowledgement of a link between currency reform and the blockade: "Full communication 
between the United States, United Kingdom and French sectors of Berlin and the Western 
zones for allied and German personnel and freight shall be restored. When this has been 
done, we shall be ready to negotiate on a four power basis for the settlement of any question 
arising out of the administration of Berlin, particularly the question of currency, which may 
be in dispute among the powers." FR US 1 948, 2:951-953, fn.2, 6. 
38 Ironically, these were exactly the activities that the Soviets claimed necessitated the 
blockade but that Western governments persisted in denying. ORE 41-48 "Effect of Soviet 
Restrictions on the U.S. Position in Berlin," 14 June 1948, box 2, Estimates of the ORE 1946-50, 
RG 263, NA. For U.S. intelligence during the blockade, see Murphy, Battleground Berlin, 
chap.3. 
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voices, however, particularly those of Clay and Murphy, rang the alarm bell . 
Rather than taking the narrow view of the Joint Chiefs and CIA, Clay and 
Murphy placed the Berlin problem in the wider context, again emphasizing 
the role that Berlin played in the greater effort of containing Communist 
expansion. Clay expanded on his earlier theme that the line should be drawn 
in Berlin to avert a domino effect sweeping through Europe.39 
Such an argument was well received in Washington, where Truman 
himself was now actively engaged by the problem. With the blockade 
tightening and threatening the viability of the West's presence in Berlin, 
coupled with increasingly strident calls for action from London, Paris, and 
U.S. officials in Frankfurt and Berlin, it had become clear that a decision was 
required of the President. In essence, the question before Truman was 
whether or not Berlin was important enough to U.S. strategic interests to 
justify not only the enormous expenditure of an indefinite airlift, which most 
experts considered unsustainable anyway, but also the real risk of war with 
the USSR. Complicating matters further was the fact that Washington still had 
no functional policy to support a decision to stay. On balance, neither 
withdrawing nor standing appeared viable. The prospects of war were real, 
but experts on Soviet policy such as· Kennan, Bohlen, and Smith recognized 
that Stalin and his Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov had other options 
available to them that could be equally damaging to U.S. interests. As Smith 
now warned, Stalin and Molotov were "sufficiently skilled in pressure 
techniques" to force the West into choosing either an alternative "of 
withdrawing from the city or remaining in a position of such humiliation and 
demonstrated impotence that our loss of prestige might actually be greater 
than that incurred by withdrawal." There was no doubt in Smith's mind that 
if Moscow resolved to force the Western allies from Berlin they could and 
would do so. Consequently, he urged that Washington's policy should be 
39 Bohlen to Lovett, 23 July 1948, box 15, Country and Area, . PPS 1947-53, RG 59, NA; 
MemCon, Sidney W. Souers to Truman, 2 April 1948, box 220, Meetings, NSC, Subject, PSF, 
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directed towards establishing a course of action that would "salvage most" 
from a bad situation. The question Washington faced, he judged, was 
"whether less will be lost by withdrawal on our own initiative and timing or 
by holding on to the bitter end."40 
Washington did not consider the threat in any organized or 
institutional manner. The process of devising a response was strikingly 
improvised. "Where," one observer has asked, "was all the elaborate 
machinery which had been set up to deal with just such situations?" The NSC, 
CIA, and the War Council, were all initially excluded from the decision­
making process.41 Instead, a hastily assembled group consisting primarily of 
Forrestal, Lovett, Royall, Bradley, and General Lauris Norstad met on the 
. afternoon of Sunday 27 June in Royall's Pentagon office. There they attempted 
to improvise a coherent response to the Soviet challenge. Working from the 
basis that the airlift would buy approximately thirty days before the West's 
presence in the city would become untenable, they identified three possible 
courses of action. The first was a concerted withdrawal. As factors in favour 
of such a move, the group concluded that "if we are not prepared to use 
armed force in Berlin, we must withdraw," and that "the humiliation of 
remaining in Berlin under existing circumstances is worse than getting out." 
Prophetically, these officials warned that "even if the present crisis is 
successfully passed, recurrent friction over our exposed position in Berlin will 
certainly continue to occur in the future ."  Accordingly, in some respects it 
appeared wiser for the West to withdraw under its own timetable than wait 
for Moscow to force them out. The disadvantages to such a withdrawal, 
however, were considerable .  Potentially, it could lead to the loss of Western 
Europe. As well, the group decided that if they withdrew at that point, "we 
would never be able to find out whether withdrawal was in fact really 
HSTL; CIA 12-48 "Review of the World Situation," 16 December 1948, box 205, Meetings, 
NSC, Subject, PSF, HSTL. 
40 Smith to Marshall, 19 June 1948, 740.00119, Control (Germany), RG 59, NA. See also, 
Summary of Telegrams, Dept of State, 21 June 1948, box 21, State Dept Briefs, Naval Aide, 
HSTL. 
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necessary." The second option was to use all possible means to stay in Berlin 
while accepting the possibility of war. "If war is inevitable," they said, "this 
was as good an issue as any."  Yet it remained open to question whether the 
advantages to be gained by remaining in Berlin were worth a war. The third 
and final option was to delay the final decision. Other options, such as a long­
term airlift and counterblockade, were dismissed out of hand. Despite calls 
from members of the group to reach a firm decision immediately, the meeting 
adjourned without reaching any firm conclusions on what U.S. policy should 
be. Such a decision was left for further discussion between State, Defense, and 
Congress. The group did, however, decide to sound out Clay and the U.S. 
Ambassador in London, Lewis Douglas, about supplementing American 
strategic bomber strength in Europe. They also decided that Royall, Lovett, 
and Forrestal should present the issues to the President the next day.42 
Despite the reservations of Royall and Leahy, who were both wary of 
getting caught in a situation in which the United States might have to "fight 
our way to Berlin," Truman told this small delegation on 28 June that the 
issue of whether or not the United States would stay in Berlin was not open to 
discussion. While Royall, in particular, remained unconvinced of the necessity 
of staying in Berlin, Forrestal came away from the meeting in little doubt 
where the President stood on the issue. He recorded in his diary: "When the 
specific question was discussed as to what our future policy in Germany was 
to be - namely, were we to stay in Berlin or not? - the President interrupted to 
say that there was no discussion on that point, we were going to stay period." 
With this statement, then, and without spelling out just how far he was 
willing to go to defend this principle, Truman committed the United States to 
maintaining its presence in Berlin irrespective of the consequences. In the 
41 Forrestal Diaries, p.454. 
42 For a detailed memorandum of the discussion, including the advantages and 
disadvantages of each course of action, see "State-National Defense Meeting of 27 June 1948 
Held for the Purpose of Determining the U.S. Position Regarding the Continued Occupation 
of Berlin," n.d., CD 6-2-9, box 27, Numerical 1947-50, Correspondence Control, Admin.Sec., 
RG 330, NA. For Forrestal's diary entry on the meeting, see Forrestal Diaries, pp.452-454. For 
Bradley's recollection, see Bradley, A General 's Life, p.479. 
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process, he halted any official consideration of a "dignified withdrawal." He 
also implicitly authorized the dispatch of two squadrons of B-29s to Germany 
and another two squadrons to Britain as part of a general effort to bolster U.S. 
military readiness. 43 
While there appeared to be little ambiguity, Truman's decision of 28 
June was considered by many top administration officials as an interim 
decision, mainly because they recognized that there was no way of actually 
staying in Berlin short of war. Over the next two weeks, however, it became 
increasingly obvious that early hopes that the situation might be resolved 
quickly were going to be disappointed. It was equally clear that the Soviets 
were not going to back down easily. Their national prestige was directly 
engaged, and as Foster Dulles pointed out, so was the personal and political 
prestige of the Politburo members themselves.44 Consequently, three weeks 
later the issue was again taken to the President who told Marshall and 
Forrestal that the United States would stay in Berlin "come what may." 
According to Truman's personal diary, he had reached this decision ten days 
earlier. By this time he appeared to have accepted that this stance could well 
·lead to armed conflict, but that this prospect should be faced as a calculated 
risk for the sake of U.S. nationaf security. To abandon Berlin, Truman 
reasoned, would tear apart the very fabric of containment. Accordingly, he 
43 Forrestal diary entry, 28 June 1948, box 5, Diary, Forrestal Papers, ML. Throughout the 
blockade Royall continued to press for withdrawal, suggesting that the formation of the 
Federal Republic might offer a satisfactory pretext. See for example Royall to Marshall, 23 
March 1949, CD 6-2-9, box 27, Numerical 1947-50, Correspondence Control, Admin.Sec., RG 
330, NA; Royall to Johnson, 19 January 1949, ibid. For Truman authorization to deploy the B-
29s, see Forrestal Diaries, pp.454-455. In his memoirs General Bradley wrote: "He [Truman] 
approved sending two B-29 squadrons to Germany, but when Lovett casually raised the 
delicate matter of sending two groups of B-29s to England, Truman (perhaps preoccupied 
with other matters) made no comment, which was later assumed to mean approval." Bradley, 
A General 's Life, p.480 .  See also Bradley to Clay, 28 June 1948, box 177, Central Decimal 1948-
50, RG 218, NA 
44 See Caffery to Marshall, 26 June 1948, 740.00119, Control (Germany), RG 59, NA The 
commander in charge of the airlift, Brigadier General Joseph Smith, was originally told that 
the impasse was likely to be resolved quickly by negotiations and to therefore assume that an 
airlift would be required for no more than two or three weeks. Phillip S. Meilinger, Hoyt 5. 
Vandenberg: 17ze Life of a General, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), p.98. For 
Dulles' advice, see MemCon, Dulles, Marshall, Lovett, et al., 19 July 1948, box 35, Dulles 
Papers, ML. 
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told Marshall and Forrestal on 19 July that he intended to maintain the 
American position in Berlin by using "any means that may be necessary," a 
decision conveyed to the administration over the following days. 45 
This then, was the basis upon which the administration was to frame 
its policy. But there were still elements of the administration that offered 
resistance. The JCS, in particular, reluctantly accepted the President's decision 
11  for the present," and continued to emphasize that the airlift could not be 
maintained indefinitely and that, sooner or later, the position would become 
untenable. By injecting deliberately inflammatory language into the 
discussion they hoped to shock the administration into revising its stance.46 
This was counterbalanced by State. As Marshall explained his thinking, 
Moscow had not yet "committed itself so irretrievably to maintain the 
blockade as to preclude the possibility of some face-saving retreat on their 
part." 47 Clay, who had flown in the previous day specifically to brief the NSC, 
enthusiastically endorsed Truman's decision, telling the NSC that the U.S. 
position in Berlin could be maintained indefinitely without war.48 However, 
he still called for a more definite resolution through the use of armed convoys 
-to place the pressure back on Moscow. He suggested dispatching a convoy of 
200 trucks escorted by engineer and rifle troops along the Autobahn, a plan 
the Joint Chiefs deprecatingly referred to as a '"one-shot' ruse" with no 
chance of long-term success.49 
The situation remained tense. During dinner with the President on the 
21 July, Clay placed the odds on war at about one in four and reaffirmed his 
conviction that withdrawal would be /1 a serious if not disastrous blow to the 
45 Truman personal memorandum, 19 July 1948, in Hillman, Mr President, pp.119-120; 
Forrestal Diaries, p.459. 
' 
46 See for example JCS 1907 "US Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in 
Berlin," 19 July 1948, box 177, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA. 
47 Marshall to Douglas, 20 July 1948, FRUS 1 948, 2:971-972. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, 
and Frankfurt. 
4s The Joint Chiefs put emphasis on their disagreement with the term "indefinitely."  An 
airlift, they said, could provide Berlin with minimum requirements for "a considerable time" 
but not "indefinitely." 
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maintenance of freedom in Europe." Clay told Truman that the morale of the 
Berliners - now a political issue in its own right- was "unbelievable" and 
they were clearly prepared to suffer extreme privation in order to avert 
Communist control. More importantly, Clay continued to argue that even if 
war was a consequence of the current crisis, then no amount of appeasement 
would prevent it.50 Smith agreed. Most rational appraisals of the situation 
concluded that Stalin did not want war, although he was presumably 
prepared for it. As Clay told Bradley, he had concluded that "Berlin, in itself 
does not represent a sufficient asset to the USSR to risk war unless it is 
committed to war."51 
Yet Washington was never completely convinced by this argument and 
was weathering a major war scare. During July, when the war scare was at its 
peak, it appeared to many Americans that war could come at almost any 
moment.52 The primary cause was that Soviet intentions remained unclear. To 
assume rationality was recognized as a perilous course. Even the prospect 
49 JCS, "Military Implications of the Dispatch of an Armed Convoy to Berlin," attached to 
JSC 1907, box 177, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA. 
50 Clay, Decision in Gennany, p.368; Forrestal Diaries, p.432; MemCon, NSC Meeting, 23 July 
1948, box 220, PSF, HSTL; Murphy to Marshall, 25 June 1948, 740.00119 Control (Germany), 
RG 59, NA. 
51 Clay to Bradley, 10 July 1948, FRUS 1 948, 2:958. For Smith's evaluations of the likelihood 
of war, see Smith to Marshall, 30 December 1947, FRUS 1 947, 2:908; Smith to Marshall, 19 
June 1948, 740.00119, Control (Germany), RG 59, NA; Smith to Marshall, 22 October 1948, box 
21, State Dept Briefs, Naval Aide, HSTL. The CIA assessed that the Soviets had sufficient 
control of the situation to avoid war. CIA 4-48. 
52 There were several incidents in the air corridors that could have potentially led to 
conflict. See for example Murphy to Marshall, 6 April 1948, FRUS 1 948, 2:890-891; Davison, 
Berlin Blockade, pp.66-68; Douglas to Marshall, 18 June 1948, 740.00119, Control (Germany), 
RG 59, NA. There was, however, leeway in the tolerance threshold for interference with the 
airlift. Several minor incidents were reported of anti-aircraft fire at U.S. planes, and other 
nuisances. At a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 13 April 1948, Senator 
Lodge told the Committee that isolated incidents were not a new phenomenon: "Every night 
when the American train goes through the Russian zone they shoot the headlight out of the 
engine. Russian troops are constantly taking pot shots at that train. That was going on in 
December of '46 ." Record of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Executive Session, 
S.Res.218, 13 April 1948, box 3, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, HSTL. See also 
Riddleberger to Marshall, 23 July 1948, box 1, TS Cables to SecState, PolAd Berlin, RG 84, NA. 
On the war scare more generally, see Forrestal Diaries, p.432; MemCon, NSC Meeting, 23 July 
1948, box 220, PSF, HSTL; Clay, Decision in Germany, pp.354-355, 374-376; Leffler, 
Preponderance of Power, pp.217-223; Forrestal Diaries, p.431; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 
pp.124-125; David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal: Atomic Energy Years, 1 945-
1 950, (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp.382-388. 
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that the Soviets might try to starve the people of West Berlin could not be 
discounted, despite its inevitable adverse effect on Soviet prestige, because, in 
Smith's words, "the Soviets have always been more interested in influencing 
people than winning friends." Smith warned that they may, therefore, be 
willing to sacrifice a little prestige to win tangible political gains. As he saw it, 
Stalin's policy was to consolidate his control over Eastern Europe even at the 
expense of forfeiting any potential gains in Western Europe and the Western 
zones of Germany.53 Although the United States took a more moderate 
position than the British, who had threatened publicly to shoot down any 
Soviet fighters in the corridors, Washington developed contingency plans and 
"fire drills" to cope with an emergency situation. Despite the rational 
appraisals, there was an emotional atmosphere of uncertainty. Nobody could 
be sure of Soviet intentions, and no one could completely control the risks of 
local military incidents with such large military contingents concentrated in 
such a small geographical area. 
-Implementing the Decision 
The fact remained that Truman's decision to stay in Berlin was not 
based on any clear idea of how it was to be followed through. Smith 
advocated diplomatic protests, although he recognized that they would have 
limited effect and were purely "for the record." He cautioned Marshall that 
Washington needed to strengthen its position somehow, saying, "We should 
not be hopeful of important results in the absence of some bargaining 
elements." Yet, within Berlin there were few options available that would 
help to restore even temporarily America's "fast-diminishing prestige." 54 
While some limited options to widen the dispute were available, such as 
exploiting Western naval superiority and control of the Suez and Panama 
canals to interrupt Soviet shipping, these decisions could not be implemented 
53 Smith to Marshall, 29 June 1948, 740.00119, Control (Germany), RG 59, NA 
54 Ibid. 
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without careful study of the problem and coordinated development of policy. 
Moreover, they could not be successfully implemented without British and 
French support.ss 
But although Washington recognized the need for some imaginative 
thinking, the manner in which it was approaching the problem was 
concerning some who believed that if the situation was to explode then it 
should not do so because the United States was complacent. Most notably, 
Kennan voiced his own serious concerns by calling for the mobilization of the 
newly created policymaking machinery. Washington appeared to appreciate 
the significance of Berlin to American national security, he argued, but the 
issue was not being given the degree of careful consideration it deserved. He 
wrote Marshall: 
I think Ambassador Smith is right when he says that the Russians have 
the capability of making us choose between remaining in Berlin on 
conditions of humiliation and demonstrated impotence, or of 
abandoning our position there to the great detriment of our political 
interests in Western Germany. Clearly this is a dilemma of the utmost 
seriousness, and the decisions which' are taken at this juncture should 
be decisions of national policy. Yet, as far as I know, there has been no 
coordinated consideration of this question, in its broader aspects, here 
in Washington; and it has been left largely to General Clay to do what 
he wishes about it. I have no criticism of General Clay's handling of the 
situation to date, which appears to have been excellent within the 
limits of his local competence. But the fact remains that he is acting 
independently and not against a background of considered and 
deliberate national policy.56 
Kennan recommended that the problem be referred immediately to NSC 
consultants who would escalate their proposals to the staff level before the 
preparation of a NSC policy paper. This process, Kennan hoped, would result 
in more thoughtful and flexible policy by minimizing the influence of the 
military' s characteristic attempts to obtain detailed "blueprints" for 
ss Murphy had raised these options earlier. Murphy to Marshall, 1 April 1948, box l, TS 
Cables to SecState 1945-49, PolAd Berlin, RG 84, NA. 
S6 Kennan to Marshall, 25 June 1948, box 15, Country and Area, PPS 1947-53, RG 59, NA; 
Carlisle M. Humelsine, MemCon of Under Secretary's Meeting, 2 May 1949, box 11,  RG 59, 
NA. 
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implementing long-range policies. It would also minimize the risks inherent 
in improvising policy.s7 
At the same time, the administration undertook an extensive campaign 
to "educate" domestic and world opinion on the seriousness of the situation 
and the morality of the Western position. In a controlled manner, U.S. officials 
emphasized the "evil" in the Soviet blockade that, they claimed, was aimed to 
starve the population of the Western sectors into submission. Since Americans 
did not instinctively equate their own security with the defence of Berlin, the 
administration strove to convince the domestic public that although it was 
taking every reasonable course of action open to it, Berlin was the fall-back 
line and that if the city fell to Communism the battle would soon be waged on 
American shores.ss 
Washington's problems were further compounded by the attitudes of 
the British and French. To stay in Berlin the United States clearly needed the 
support of not only these two powers, but also of the whole of Western 
Europe.59 The first problem in devising a j?int strategy with France and Britain 
was, as Smith pointed out, that "combined plans present the lowest common 
denominator of fears of all participants." He had to concede though that in 
the existing circumstances no other sort of planning was possible.60 To 
minimize the lowest-common-denominator effect, Washington generally 
sought to determine its own policy and then present it to the British. The 
French, who at best were only "uneasily going along" with the American 
stance and seemed in a perpetual state of government crisis, were usually 
presented with plans only after Washington and London had already agreed. 
s7 Ibid. 
ss See for example Hillenkoetter to Forrestal, "Berlin Situation," 15 July 1948, box 27, CD 6-
2-9, Numerical 1947-50, Correspondence Control, Admin.Sec., RG 330, NA; Kennan, "Draft 
Statement for SecState," 21 July 1948, box 15, Country and Area, PPS 1947-53, RG 59, NA; 
Bohlen to Lovett, 23 July 1948, ibid. For a recent study that dispels the emotive accounts of the 
Soviets trying to starve the West Berliners, see William Stivers, "The Incomplete Blockade: 
Soviet Zone Supply of West Berlin, 1948-49," Diplomatic Histonj, 21, 4 (Fall 1997) : 569-602. 
59 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 23 July 1948, box 220, PSF, HSTL. 
60 Smith to Marshall, 740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA 
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This process was to alter drastically over the following years as the politics of 
the NATO alliance became more complicated as Europe's power grew.61 
Harbouring a deep-rooted, historical animosity towards the Germans, 
the French saw little merit in "dying for Berlin" and of the three Western 
occupation powers were the most insistent on a negotiated settlement. During 
the blockade, the French frequently expressed concern at what they 
considered to be American adventurism, insisting that Washington rein in an 
apparent propensity to engage in diplomatic and potentially military 
bravado. For its part, Washington distrusted the French; in Clay's view, Paris 
was "not wholly reliable." Washington's confidence in French support was 
periodically shaken by outbursts from Paris that questioned the advisability 
of remaining in Berlin. And Marshall had already pointed to the vulnerability 
of Western solidarity several times during key moments.62 
London's attitude was more conducive to U.S. purposes, but 
nevertheless still acted as a restraining influence on Washington largely 
because of its inconsistency. Although British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin 
had taken an even tougher stand than the United States at the outset, the 
British were against countermeasures that they considered too provocative.63 
61 See for example Marshall to Clay and Murphy, 20 July 1948, box 1 ,  TS Cables to and 
from SecState 1946-49, PolAd Frankfurt, RG 84, NA; Caffery to Marshall, 25 June 1948, 
740.00119 Control (Germany), RG 59, NA. 
62 On France's role during the blockade, see Young, France, the Cold War and the Western 
Alliance, pp.199-204. For U.S. policymakers' distrust of French resolve, see Telecon, Royall, 
Clay, et al., 2 April 1948, PSF, HSTL; Summary of Telegram, Dept of State, 25 June 1948, box 
21, State Dept Briefs, Naval Aide, HSTL; CIA 10-48 "Review of the World Situation," 20 
October 1948, box 205, PSF, HSTL. For an example of Marshall's concern about Soviet 
exploitation the "considerable divergence" of positions on key issues between the French the 
Anglo-American stances. Marshall to Lovett, 13 December 1947, FR US 1 947, 2:770. 
63 On British policy during the blockade, see Shlaim, "Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the 
Cold War"; Robin Edmonds, Setting the Mould: The United States and Britain, 1 945-1950, 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), pp.178-181 . A notable exception to the conservative policies of the 
British were the extreme measures proposed by Winston Churchill, who was not at this time 
acting in any official capacity. In mid-April 1948 Ambassador Douglas reported a 
conversation that he had had with Churchill in which the former Prime Minister had urged 
that the West should pre-empt the Soviet acquisition of an atomic bomb, at which time, he 
said, war was inevitable. Therefore, wrote Douglas : "He believed that now is the time, 
promptly, to tell the Soviets that if they do not retire from Berlin and abandon Eastern 
Germany, withdrawing to the Polish frontier, we will raze their cities. It is further his view 
that we cannot appease, conciliate, or provoke the Soviets; that the only vocabulary they 
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They were equally reluctant to present the Soviets with a counter-ultimatum. 
Moreover, during informal talks the British had seriously questioned the 
value of threatening war to defend their rights in Berlin since, they argued, it 
might not be possible to add the "scorpion's sting" to the threat. Yet there was 
also concurrence with Washington's assessment of the political value of 
Berlin, and in general - particularly in this period during which Bevin was 
anxious to encourage U.S. engagement in Europe while Britain recovered 
from the war - London went along with Washington's plans, although often 
reluctantly.64 
Responding to the Challenge 
But the Europeans were offering little in the way of imaginative 
proposals . Consequently, the onus fell to U.S. policymakers to give the 
President more acceptable options than withdrawal or war. The airlift was 
never designed as a solution to the problem but was rather seen as a stopgap 
measure .  Although Truman and others retrospectively referred to it in 
glowing terms, it was employed to maintain the minimum conditions 
necessary to ensure the viability of the occupation whilst a solution was 
sought by diplomatic or other means. Most experts predicted that it would be 
impossible to meet the basic requirements of the population of the Western 
sectors. Thus, while U.S. officials publicly praised the airlift's 
accomplishments, it was widely recognized privately that it neither solved the 
long-term crisis nor could it counter the impression of Western weakness 
understand is the vocabulary of force; and that if, therefore, we took this position, they would 
yield . . . .  Churchill believes also that if the Soviets try to inconvenience us in Berlin, we should 
retaliate by insisting upon a careful examination of the crews of every one of their ships 
putting into our ports, by annoying their shipping and their use of the Suez and Panama 
canals, and by any other method which appears to be appropriate ." Douglas to Lovett, 17  
April 1948, FR US 1948, 2:895-896. See also Forrestal diary entry, 12 November 1948, Diary, 
Forrestal Papers, ML. 
64 See Murphy to Marshall, 2 April 1948, FRUS 1 948, 2:890; Douglas to Marshall, 28 April 
1948, ibid. ,  p .899; Lovett to Douglas, 22 April 1948, ibid., pp.896-897; Douglas to Lovett, 28 
April 1948, ibid., pp.899-900. 
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being created by the blockade. Even Clay, who was the airlift's most 
optimistic proponent, qualified his endorsement by urging Washington to 
take stronger action. At the same time, however, perhaps recognizing that 
Washington's limited options might lead to a decision to withdraw, Clay 
attempted to convince Washington that the airlift was being productive. He 
confidently boasted of the success of the airlift in increasing American 
prestige and disrupting Moscow's timetable. Moscow's frustration was 
testimony to this. "Two months ago the Russians were cocky and arrogant," 
he told the NSC. "Lately they have been polite and have gone out of their way 
to avoid incidents ."65 However, Clay's optimism was by no means universally 
shared, and many U.S. officials privately agreed with Murphy that it was "an 
expedient and not a solution. It carries with it also a confession of inability or 
unwillingness to enforce a well-earned right of surface passage."66 
Furthermore, there were serious logistical questions. Air Chief of Staff 
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg expressed grave concerns about the viability of a 
long-term airlift. If the need should arise to expand the effort, he warned, it 
would place considerable strains on military resources already seriously 
depleted as a result of postwar demobilization. Potential incidents in the air 
corridors posed further problems. More serious was the vulnerability of 
maintaining such a large concentration of cargo and supply planes in such a 
precarious position. Flying over large expanses of potentially hostile territory 
as they were, these planes were extremely vulnerable to attack. This raised a 
whole range of strategic questions. Vandenberg told the JCS that the 
deployment of the number of aircraft estimated to be necessary to conduct an 
effective long-term airlift would halve the Air Force's global capabilities and, 
furthermore, within a few minutes over eighty percent of the Air Force's 
heavy transport capability could be lost by Soviet attacks on the unprotected 
65 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 23 July 1948, box 220, PSF, HSTL. See also Truman, Years of 
Trial and Hope, p.123; CIA 10-48 "Review of the World Situation," 20 October 1948, box 204, 
PSF, HSTL. 
66 Murphy to Marshall and Lovett, 11 July 1948, box 1,  TS Cables to SecState 1945-49, 
PolAd Berlin, RG 84, NA. 
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air fields housing the planes. Vandenberg bluntly warned Truman that a 
military emergency elsewhere could find American military forces 
dangerously under strength, and the ability to wage war on any significant 
scale would be delayed by at least a month. Truman's response to 
Vandenberg's concerns was to point to the larger picture. In short, the threat 
of losing Berlin was greater than the threat posed by any of the points 
Vandenberg raised. An airlift was the least provocative action available to 
protect U.S. strategic interests and, quite simply, he said, if the airlift failed the 
result would be global war.67 
With the growing recognition that the airlift was an unsatisfactory 
expedient, pressure was mounting for Washington to pursue further, more 
definite action. Lovett noted that opinion within the administration was 
building for the use of armed convoys simply because there was no other 
move available. But such a move held real risks of sparking war. Yet the West 
was faced with overwhelming preponderance of Soviet conventional forces in 
Europe, and Washington knew that in any conflict sparked by the Berlin crisis 
they would be at a serious disadvantage. These factors led to efforts to exploit 
America's atomic monopoly. The idea of deploying B-29s to Britain and 
reinforcing the strategic bomber strength in Germany was first raised at the 
ad hoc meeting on 27 June. Clay's response was to immediately and 
enthusiastically endorse the plan, even informally suggesting that some 
planes be sent to France as well. But his cause for more discretionary 
authority was not helped when he told Forrestal that he "would not hesitate 
to use the atomic bomb and would hit Moscow and Leningrad first." Much to 
Washington's surprise, Bevin was equally enthusiastic because he relished the 
opportunity to show Moscow "we mean business ." 68 
67 The JCS confirmed this assessment. MemCon, NSC Meeting, 15 July 1948, box 220, PSF, 
HSTL; MemCon, NSC Meeting, 23 July 1948, ibid.; NSC 24 "A Report to the NSC by the 
SecDefense on U.S. Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in Berlin," 28 July 
1948, box 3, Policy Papers, RG 273, NA; Meilinger, Vandenberg, p.98; Truman, Years of Trial and 
Hope, pp.125-126; Forrestal Diaries, pp.424-440. 
68 Forrestal diary entry, 13 November 1948, Diary, Forrestal Papers, ML; Clay to Bradley, 
27 June 1948, box 177, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA; Bradley to Clay, 28 June, ibid. ;  
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On the advice of his senior advisers Truman approved the deployment. 
Although Royall had reservations, Marshall, Forrestal, and Stuart Symington 
identified several main points in favour of the move: firstly, it would be an 
unambiguous move that would bring home to the American people and 
America's allies . how seriously Washington viewed the situation; secondly, it 
would provide practical experience for the Air Force in operating foreign 
bases; and thirdly the blockade had opened a window of opportunity for 
these planes to be sent. If the situation deteriorated, this opportunity might 
well be lost. Yet Marshall recognized that the situation had to be treated with 
care. If Washington's actions came across as provocative, it would undermine 
everything towards which they had been working. 69 
At the British Cabinet's request, the deployment was accompanied by 
minimum publicity. Instead, Washington settled for the diplomatic 
convention of explaining that the planes were on 11routine training flights."  
This was accompanied by subtle signals from Washington and London.7o The 
British Cabinet quoted in R.D. Coleridge to Gruenther, 30 June 1948, ibid.; MemCon, Marshall 
and Sir Oliver S. Franks, 14 July 1948, ibid. (for a much briefer memcon of this meeting, see 
FR US 1 948, 2:965) . The British Chiefs of Staff assured a sceptical U.S. JCS that the British 
Cabinet was, in fact, "enthusiastic" about the deployment. MemCon, Leahy, Vandenberg, 
Bradley, Moore, et al., 30 June 1948 (memcon dated 3 July), ibid.  On efforts to exploit the 
atomic monopoly, see especially Leffler, Preponderance of Power, passim; Trachtenberg, 
Constructed Peace, esp. pp.88-91 . Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance argue that the 
deployment of the B-29s "was actually precisely what Bevin had hoped for: an American 
involvement that would preclude second thoughts about the blessings of isolation."  Dawson 
and Rosecrance, "Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance," World Politics, 19, 1 
(October 1966): 26-27. See also Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and 
Atomic EnergtJ, 1 945-1 952, (London: Macmillan, 1974), 2:310-311 ;  MemCon, NSC Meeting, 15 
July 1948, box 220, PSF, HSTL. For Washington's discussions, see Forrestal Diaries, pp.454-458; 
Meilinger, Vandenberg, p.97; Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, pp.367-368; Meni.Con, NSC Meeting, 
15 July 1948, box 220, PSF, HSTL. Royall suggested keeping the B-29s in the U.S. until the 
convoy stage had been reached.  MemCon, NSC Meeting, 15 July 1948, ibid. 
69 Forrestal Diaries, pp.457-458; MemCon, NSC Meeting, 15 July 1948, box 220, PSF, HSTL; 
Record of Action of NSC, 15 July 1948, box 191, PSF, HSTL; MemCon, NSC Meeting, 26 
November 1948, box 220, PSF, HSTL. 
70 Marshall questioned the minimum publicity approach: "Reverting to the question of B-
29' s . . .  I questioned however whether we should announce their departure as merely long 
range exercises since this seemed a cynical explanation and merely a reiteration of the kind of 
Soviet insincerity with which we had been dealing. The movement of these planes would 
undoubtedly be associated in the public mind with the movement of the jet fighters to 
Germany. Mr Lovett explained however that this was a cross flight." MemCon, Marshall, 
Lovett, and Franks, 14 July 1948. On the signals from London and Washington, see Dept of 
State, News Digest no.142, 22 July 1948, box 16, Clark Clifford Papers, HSTL. 
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bombers were never explicitly mentioned in any official diplomatic exchange 
with Moscow, and the NSC decided that it would not flaunt their presence. It 
is difficult, therefore, to gauge the direct impact that this move had on the 
crisis. But their primary value was in the implicit threat that the Eastern bloc 
was within range of the U.S. atomic arsenal. Accordingly, even though the 
bombers were not mentioned in any of the Berlin negotiations and did not 
play a tangible role in either side's stance, their presence demanded that they 
be implicitly accounted for during the course of the crisis.71 
Further diminishing their role in the crisis was the fact that the 
bombers were not at that time "silver-plated"; that is, they were not modified 
to carry atomic payloads. Washington knew that Soviet intelligence would 
quickly determine that this was the case, but hoped that it would nevertheless 
give Moscow reason to pause. Contrary to the assertions of many observers 
over the years, this was less a deliberate bluff than a matter of logistics. Plans 
were, in fact, made for arming the bombers - albeit quietly - but these plans 
suffered by the debilitating indecision on custody and use of atomic weapons 
then raging in Washington. As well, the U.S. atomic stockpile was still 
surprisingly small in July 1948, making atomic bombs and sufficiently trained 
personnel to assemble and use them particularly precious commodities. 72 
71 For the influence of the U.S. atomic monopoly on Stalin's policy more generally, see 
David Holloway, Stalin and tlze Bomb, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), esp. pp.258-
263; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin 's Cold War, pp.40-43; Gaddis, We Now KnO'w, 
pp.85-112. 
72 By the end of 1948 there were three groups operating out of seven bases, but it was not 
until the summer of 1949, when the deployment appeared more permanent, that some 
modified planes were deployed. By mid-1950s they were all modified. But even then they 
were not actually equipped with atomic payloads until mid-1951 . Gowing, Independence and 
Deterrence, p.311; Timothy Botti, The Long Wait: the Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear 
Alliance, 1945-1958, (New York: Greenwood, 1987), pp.37-38. See also Gaddis, We Now Know, 
p.91; Leffler, Preponderance of Power, pp.220-229; Martin J. Sherwin, "The Atomic Bomb and 
the Origins of the Cold War," Origins of the Cold War: An International Histonj, eds Melvyn P. 
Leffler and David S. Painter (London: Routledge, 1994), pp.77-94; Forrestal Diaries, pp.451-530. 
For the limitations of U.S. nuclear capabilities in both material and strategy terms during this 
period, see Williamson and Rearden, The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, pp.49-100; Herken, 
"A Most Deadly Illusion"; Rosenberg, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945-1950"; idem, "The 
Origins of Overkill"; Leffler, Preponderance of Power, esp. pp.221-229; Kaplan, Wizards of 
Armageddon; Ross, American War Plans; Wampler, "NATO St;rategic Planning and Nuclear 
Weapons, 1950-1957," pp.2-3. Forrestal's diary entries concerning the deployment of atomic 
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Administration Planning 
As a corollary to this deployment, the NSC sought more substantive 
ways to influence the situation. As Kennan had pointed out in June, the NSC 
was slow to play an active role in the crisis, and it was not until mid-July, at 
least six weeks after the crisis first erupted, that the NSC began to assume the 
role for which it was established.73 Its first order of business was to re-examine 
the military position in Berlin. Simultaneously, the Joint Chiefs were 
becoming increasingly nervous that they had no clear-cut policy statement on 
which to base their planning.74 In an effort to rectify this, on 28 July 1948 
Forrestal submitted _ a JCS report to the Council designated NSC 24 "US 
Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in Berlin" which 
outlined concerns which were further elaborated upon over coming months.75 
NSC 24 proceeded from the fundamental assumption that it was U.S. policy 
to remain in Berlin. On this basis, the Joint Chiefs recommended an 
immediate decision on the military avenues open to them, arguing that under 
existing circumstances Berlin was a military liability rather than an asset.76 
Pursuing the line expressed by Vandenberg earlier, the Joint Chiefs assessed 
that minimum requirements for supplying Berlin at subsistence level could be 
met by an airlift, but that this would require augmentation "to the greatest 
warheads in Britain were sanitized from the published version. See for example diary entries 
for 16 and 17 September, 15 October, and 13 November 1948. Diary, Forrestal Papers, ML. 
73 Alfred D. Sander, "Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947," Journal of 
American Histonj, 59 (September 1972) : 369-388; Robert Cutler, "The Development of the 
National Security Council," Foreign Affairs, 34, 3 (April 1956) : 441-458. 
74 Bradley, A General's Life, p.481; Condit, JCS and National Policy, pp.117-162. 
75 NSC 24 "A Report to the NSC by the SecDefense on U.S. Military Courses of Action with 
Respect to the Situation in Berlin," 28 July 1948, box 3, Policy Papers, RG 273, NA; Leahy to 
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possible extent," which in turn would significantly reduce the capabilities of 
implementing emergency war plans. Such a situation, they warned bluntly, 
would be detrimental to the basic requirements of U.S. national security. 
Furthermore, there were too many uncertain factors for the Joint Chiefs to 
support the enormous financial outlay that maintaining a prolonged airlift 
would involve. These factors led the JCS to conclude that however valuable it 
might be in providing a "cushion of time," the airlift was not a solution and 
revealed America's military weakness. Consequently, they recommended a 
dramatic and immediate military build-up in order that U.S. military 
capabilities keep abreast of growing responsibilities.77 At the same time, they 
held that in the . absence of satisfactory options the Berlin situation was 
untenable. Thus, since they could see no long-term solution to the problem, 
the Joint Chiefs again tentatively raised the prospect of withdrawal.78 
The Joint Chiefs' caution provoked serious opposition from some 
quarters. Kennan's reaction was to accuse them of not fully appreciating the 
implications of the U.S. position in Berlin. He pointed out that the definite 
decision to stay in Berlin had already been taken by the President and that the 
symbolic significance of Berlin was now so great that withdrawal under any 
circumstances would be dangerous. By now, Kennan argued, the defence of 
Berlin was integral to the entire strategic posture of the United States, and 
therefore Truman could not authorize withdrawal without forfeiting the 
whole of Europe. He continued: 
I believe that a sound evaluation should point out that the probability 
of the eventuality of war will be strongly, and perhaps decisively, 
influenced by such military preparations as we may make. If we 
proceed resolutely with our military dispositions, on the theory that 
77 NSC 24; Leahy to Forrestal, "Military Implications Involved in Continuing and 
Augmenting the Operation of the Airlift to Berlin," 20 October 1948, box 15, Country and 
Area, PPS 1947-53, RG 59, NA; Leahy to Souers, "Report to the NSC by the SecDefense on 
Existing International Commitments Involving the Possible Use of Armed Forces," 17 
November 1948, box 204, PSF, HSTL. 
78 NSC 24; Forrestal to JCS, "Planning for Composite Armed Convoys to Supply Berlin," 
30 July 1948, box 177, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA; Hickerson to Lovett, 3 August 
1948, box 50, State Dept Participation in OCB and NSC, RG 59, NA. 
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we are prepared to fight if necessary, the Russians will know it; and I 
think that their own attitude will be considerably softened. My point is 
that we should regard our military dispositions not just as a reaction to 
an existing situation but as one of the elements through which the 
situation may be influenced.79 
Dissatisfied with the military' s narrow view of the situation, in July 
and August Kennan oversaw studies by the PPS in which he attempted to 
inject a clearer long-term strategic vision. Although Kennan had often 
dismissed the viability of a successful joint occupation with the Soviets of the 
whole of Germany and the administration had gone to considerable effort to 
decouple the threat to Berlin from the settlement of the German question in 
order to undermine the Soviet diplomatic position, the focus of the PPS 
studies was the future of Germany as a whole. Berlin, so far as Kennan and 
his staff saw it, was a symptom of the larger German problem and should be 
treated as such. Assuming that the developing situation was likely to lead to a 
four-power meeting, the PPS prepared its proposals to seize such an 
opportunity to strengthen U.S. national security. This would best be done, 
Kennan now held, by seeking an all-German solution. Arguing that Berlin 
was symptomatic of the USSR' s anxieties about the weakness of its hold over 
Eastern Europe rather than an adventurist tactics to expand its borders, as 
Kennan saw it, then Washington faced a decision of whether to seek an 
ambitious all-German solution or continue along the path of consolidating the 
division of Germany. Kennan recommended pressing for an all-German 
settlement that would entail the vyithdrawal of all military governments and 
the establishment of an independent German government with real power to 
manage its own affairs. But if the United States persisted with the division of 
Europe, Kennan warned, the problem of Berlin could not be solved. And since 
it could not be solved, it was likely to remain as a point of friction. He 
assessed bluntly, "There is no satisfactory solution of the Berlin situation 
under the divided set-up." A broad settlement would solve the Berlin 
79 Kennan to Lovett, 2 August 1948, box 50, State Dept Participation in OCB and NSC, RG 
Con/inning the Worst Fears I 104 
situation, importantly "without loss of prestige," while the Western world 
could be satisfied that they had not abandoned Berliners to the Soviets since 
they too would be leaving. Kennan presented the issue of withdrawal as 
basically a matter of timing since "some day our forces must leave central 
Europe." He argued that the existing crisis offered both a pretext and 
opportunity for this major shift in policy and it was unlikely that there would 
ever be "a future time when this disengagement will be any easier for us than 
it is today." Some months later, after considerable controversy over his 
proposals, Kennan spelled out his ideas of an all-German settlement in the so­
called "Program A." 80 
Diplomatic Options 
Kennan's proposals, however, rested on the assumption that 
negotiations with Moscow could be constructive. This was something that 
U.S. officials came to doubt in light of efforts to reopen the diplomatic 
dialogue in Moscow and Berlin in August and September. The result of these 
efforts was labelled by one observer as a pattern of "fair openings and sour 
endings."81 With both the Ace and the Kommandatura effectively abandoned, 
there remained no formal body through which the four occupation powers 
had regular contact for issues such as Berlin. Consequently, in early August, 
at the insistence of the British and French, the three Western ambassadors in 
Moscow approached Stalin and Molotov directly. The talks initially appeared 
59, NA. 
80 See Kennan, Memoirs, 1 :258; Kennan, "A Letter on Germany," pp.19-21; Wilson D. 
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81 Forrestal Diaries, p.451 . For detailed accounts of the Moscow talks from the U.S. 
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promising. After the first meeting with Stalin, Smith cabled Moscow that the 
Soviets were "undoubtedly anxious for a settlement" and that they were 
clearly /1 feeling the pinch." Within days, however, he reversed his assessment. 
Quadripartite talks in Germany fared no better. CIA analysts saw proof of 
their predictions that the Soviets were trying to create /1 a state of fluid 
uncertainty" to disrupt the London Programme. Marshall was equally 
cynical. 82 
By September, Washington's frustration was acute. In Truman's 
typically blunt appraisal, the Berlin situation was "a mess." After one of his 
own briefing sessions on the Berlin situation, he wrote in his diary, "I have a 
terrible feeling afterward that we are very close to war. I hope not." Even 
publicly, Truman struggled to find anything positive about the situation. 
When reporters asked him whether he had anything "cheering or hopeful or 
optimistic" with regard to Berlin, the President could think of nothing.83 The 
main problem was that Western policy was at a standstill. Military force had 
been effectively ruled out, negotiations were proving fruitless, and by 
succumbing to a prolonged blockade, Washington feared that it was 
damaging its own prestige. But U.S. officials blamed Britain and France as 
much as the USSR for the stalemate. During the time that the blockade had 
been in force, the French government had fallen twice and the British and 
French had both repeatedly demonstrated their unwillingness to "step up, 
define the issues, and if necessary, accept a break in negotiations." Marshall 
and Lovett decided that if the negotiations were about to collapse, as seemed 
likely, then the United States should encourage them to do so in Moscow 
rather than Berlin. Both State and the CIA were requested to prepare studies 
82 Smith to Marshall, 3 August 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:1006-1007; Smith to Marshall, 4 August 
1948, FRUS 1948, 2:1010; Marshall to Smith, 4 August 1948, box 1, TS Cables From SecState 
1946-49, PolAd Berlin, RG 84, NA; MemCon, NSC Meeting, 9 September 1948, box 220, PSF, 
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83 Truman diary entry, 13 September 1948, in Hillman, Mr President, p.121; Public Papers: 
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September 1948, Journals: Atomic Energy Years, 2:406. 
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assuming that the Moscow discussions failed. Simultaneously, the NSC Staff 
was directed to appraise U.S. military preparedness, including a report on 
U.S. policy on atomic warfare.84 The Joint Chiefs continued to insist that the 
situation was completely untenable and raised an unnecessary risk of war, a 
view that was increasingly earning them the ire of several top officials. Lovett 
believed they had "a case of the jitters," while Royall accused them of 
attempting to "pass the buck."8s 
By the end of September, with the Moscow discussions reaping no 
rewards, the NSC turned its attention towards strengthening and augmenting 
America's position. The cushion of time provided by the airlift still did not 
appear likely to result in a political solution to the problem. In a series of 
meetings between mid-September and mid-October, the NSC concerned itself 
with developing contingency plans to counter Soviet interference. 
Simultaneously, State was preparing a "best guess" paper on moves the 
Soviets might take to undermine the U.S. position in Germany as a whole. In 
the discussion of the paper, Lovett reminded the NSC that it was not 
necessarily U.S. policy to remain in Berlin forever, but rather to ensure that 
when they did extricate themselves it would be under more favourable 
conditions.86 
It was difficult to conceive of an end in sight. Despite occasional 
intelligence information that suggested otherwise, the airlift and the 
counterblockade appeared to be having little effect on Moscow even though 
the impressive logistical feats of the airlift received considerable press 
coverage. The Moscow and Berlin talks had clearly failed, and in Berlin the 
only quadripartite agencies still operating were the Berlin Air Safety Centre 
and Spandau Prison, and even these, Clay suggested, were still operating only 
84 MernCon, NSC Meeting, 9 September 1948, box 220, PSF, HSTL; Record of Actions, 7 
September 1948 and 16 September 1948, box 191, PSF, HSTL. 
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because the Soviets were using them to collect intelligence on the airlift.87 In 
this frustrating diplomatic atmosphere, Truman became desperate to force a 
resolution. Initially, he hatched a plan to boost his waning chances of re­
election by emulating the dramatic breakthrough of Harry Hopkins' mission 
to Moscow in 1945. But, in the face of staunch opposition from Marshall, 
Truman abandoned the plan.88 Instead, out of frustration the administration 
opted to pursue the much-discussed but untried UN option. After finally 
coaxing French support for such a move by offering Paris a blunt choice of 
"UN or war," Washington led the West in what it knew would be a slow and 
tedious process.89 
On 26 September, the three Western Powers delivered notes to the 
Soviet Foreign Office charging that the " illegal and coercive blockade" forced 
them to refer the matter to the UN Security Council . A period of diplomatic 
manoeuvring ensued. The Western powers offered to convene a CFM once 
the blockade was lifted, but received little encouragement from Moscow. By 
November, the frustration of the UN negotiations began to show. Although 
the airlift was fairing unexpectedly well and had even provided enough 
supplies for an increase in food rations by twenty percent, Lovett told 
Marshall that the "wait and see period" was drawing to a close; a decision 
would soon be required to either continue with the UN or to implement 
87 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 22 October 1948, box 220, NSC, PSF, HSTL. 
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stronger measures.90 By December, although domestically Truman had won 
an improbable election victory, the international situation appeared to be 
drifting away from Washington's grasp. The division of Germany was on the 
verge of being realized, the Chinese Communist Party were about to win 
control of mainland China, and in the Middle East, only the Arab states' 
recognition of Israel's " immediate preponderance of applicable power" was 
responsible for momentarily calming "the storm center of Israel." 91 
Meanwhile, the situation in Berlin warranted close attention. With 
winter coming on, it was uncertain that the airlift could be continued at full 
capacity. Moreover, there were serious doubts that the Berliners' morale 
would endure the inevitable deprivations. The morale of U.S. personnel 
involved with the airlift added a further element of uncertainty.92 Soviet 
actions in setting up a Communist administration in East Berlin was cited as 
final proof that Moscow had accepted the partition of Germany and was now 
turning its attention to an accelerated programme of consolidating their own 
zone.93 Nevertheless, Royall warned that "the present situation in Berlin 
cannot continue indefinitely without risk both of failure and of impairment of 
American prestige." It was conceivable that the Soviets might maintain the 
blockade for two or three years, a contingency for which the United States 
was not prepared. A long-term solution was needed, he said, and Washington 
should take the lead in seeking it.94 
By the beginning of 1949, the problem of the Berlin blockade had been 
before the UN in various degrees for several months. Though several 
commissions had studied the issue and made recommendations, a resolution 
90 Lovett to Marshall, 1 November 1948, box 1, TS Cables From SecState, PolAd Berlin, RG 
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appeared no closer. Yet, a series of confidential, bilateral talks begun in mid­
March provided unexpected hope. Seizing upon Stalin's failure to mention 
the currency issue in his answers to questions posed by an American 
journalist, Washington pursued private, unofficial talks. It directed Philip C. 
Jessup, an official in the American delegation to the UN, to approach the 
Soviet representative on the Security Council, Jacob Malik. Under the careful 
management of a select group of senior U.S. officials several meetings were 
conducted periodically over the coming weeks. By the end of April 1949, 
Jessup had authority to speak on behalf of the British and French as well.95 
The top secret Jessup-Malik conversations in New York, of which even 
Clay was unaware, finally provided an unexpected settlement.96 In exchange 
for a CFM to convene on 23 May in Paris, Stalin agreed to lift the blockade on 
12 May. In Berlin, the city's administration declared a public holiday and 
sponsored widespread celebrations. But Washington took a more sober line. 
In order not to provoke the Soviets to reimpose the blockade Truman was 
careful not to allow his administration to engage in public triumphalism. In a 
deliberately low-key tone, Truman acknowledged that the lifting of the 
blockade was a source of encouragement, but refused to be drawn out by 
reporters seeking a more publishable statement.97 For his part, Acheson said 
that it should not be portrayed as anything more than a transient matter that 
did not go to the heart of the problem. As he told Congress, the 
administration regarded it as "the first fruits of a policy of firmness" rather 
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96 When the talks were first publicly revealed� Clay expressed his indignation that he had 
not been informed of the Jessup-Malik talks while Murphy had been told. Clay, Decision in 
Germany, p.390. Clay, however, should have been informed, and why he was not remains 
unclear. During a conversation on 19 April, Truman told Acheson that he had instructed 
Secretary Johnson to inform both Bradley and Clay of the talks. In another memorandum, 
Truman instructed specifically that Royall, General Tracy S. Voorhees, Bradley, and Clay be 
informed. L.D. Battle, MemCon, Truman and Acheson, 19 April 1949, box 64, Acheson 
Papers, HSTL; Truman to Leahy, box 187, Foreign Affairs, PSF, HSTL. By mid-April there 
were press rumours that the Soviet Union was extending "feelers" for a diplomatic solution. 
Public Papers: Truman: 1 949, pp.214, 225. 
97 Public Papers: Truman: 1 949, pp.242, 248. Even in his statement releasing Clay from duty 
effective 15 May, the President made no reference to the blockade or airlift. Ibid., p.240. 
Con/inning the Worst Fears I 110  
than a reason to relax vigilance.98 Within a week of the lifting of the blockade, 
Clay had returned to the United States to a hero's welcome.99 
Preparing for a New Blockade 
Thus, Truman's determination appeared to have won out. The 
blockade was lifted, providing what was ostensibly a victory for the United 
States. Yet, it was widely recognized by U.S. officials that if it was a victory at 
all, then it was unconvincing and might well be only a fleeting reprieve. The 
lifting of the blockade brought relief to Washington policymakers because 
they had weathered the immediate storm without sending Americans to die 
for Berlin. But as they prepared to meet with the foreign ministers of the other 
occupation powers in Paris, this relief was marred by suspicion of Stalin's 
motives. The immediate experiences of the Moscow and Berlin discussions, 
compounded by deeper suspicions of Soviet motives more generally, led to 
cynicism that they were on the verge of a final resolution. It appeared 
unreasonable to assume that Stalin had abandoned his plans; it would be 
more in character for him to be seeking another means to pursue them. In the 
words of the British Foreign Office, Stalin was "suing for an armistice in order 
to gain time though not yet for peace."10° Furthermore, the Moscow and 
London CFMs had failed, and there was every reason to believe that this one 
would as well. 
Although they had agreed to discuss the German question at the Paris 
CFM, the Western powers had no intention of jeopardizing their plans for 
West German government, and ensured that the London Programme came to 
fruition prior to the CFM's convening. The result was a self-governing West 
German state with its capital in Bonn. Konrad Adenauer was soon elected as 
its first Chancellor. The Western powers did, though, continue to regard the 
98 MemCon, Acheson and Sir Oliver Franks, 2 May 1949, box 64, Acheson Papers, HSTL. 
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FRG as an interim measure that could be superseded by quadripartite 
agreement, however remote such an agreement might appear. In order not to 
prejudice their occupation rights in Berlin, they also suspended those 
provisions of the FRG' s Basic Law concerning Berlin. The effect was to create 
a situation in which the Western sectors of Berlin remained a special Western 
responsibility administered by American, British, and French military 
authorities. Little over a month earlier, in the culmination of many months of 
transatlantic negotiations underlined by the experience of the blockade, 
twelve signatory nations had signed the North Atlantic Treaty, which 
committed the United States militarily to Western Europe's defence. By late 
July, the U.S. Senate had ratified the treaty.101 
Suspicion of Stalin's motives led U.S. policymakers to expect a reversal 
on the Berlin problem. The lifting of the blockade had done nothing to reduce 
the West's vulnerability in Berlin, and the likelihood that the foreign ministers 
would actually solve the problem seemed remote. The uncertainty led Bevin 
to urge Acheson neither to stop the airlift nor "allow this magnificent 
organisation to deteriorate."102 Regardless of the outcome of the ensuing 
diplomatic dialogue, the Western governments decided to maintain the airlift 
until Berlin was stocked with both civilian and military supplies at least to the 
level they had been in March of the previous year. Preparations were also 
made in Washington, London, and Paris to develop political and military 
contingency plans in order to be able to respond swiftly if the Soviets 
reimposed the blockade. 
The NSC seized the opportunity to take an active role in the 
preparation of contingency measures; thereby hoping to minimize the 
informal and improvised approach that had characterized U.S. policy 
formulation during the crisis. U.S. policy ultimately prevailed, yet Truman's 
100 Foreign Office to State, 2 May 1949, FRUS 1949, 3:863-864, 865, 870-872. 
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reliance on these often conflicting personalities was not conducive to 
developing effective, or even coherent, policy. Consequently, the NSC sought 
to inject a greater degree of formality into the policymaking process. On 13 
May, only a day after the blockade was lifted, Bradley suggested to his fellow 
Joint Chiefs that they prepare recommendations for a military response to a 
reimposed blockade. Before they could act, however, the NSC made its own 
formal request of the JCS. The result was tabled by the new Secretary of 
Defense Louis Johnson less than three weeks later as part of NSC 24/2 and its 
revision NSC 24/3 "Possible U.S. Courses of Action in the Event the USSR 
Reimposes the Berlin Blockade," a report considered by State to be one of the 
best studies the Joint Chiefs had yet submitted.103 Defense and State were 
united in their recommendation that in the event the Soviets reimposed the 
blockade, an airlift essentially the same as the earlier one be implemented and 
a counterblockade be reimposed. Moreover, they again ruled out the use of 
armed force to reopen land access or to probe the blockade. In their detailed 
study of the available m�litary courses of action, the Joint Chiefs warned that 
if the CFM failed, and the Soviets reimposed the blockade, the implications of 
such a decision on the part of the Kremlin would be more serious than the 
earlier blockade, and would raise, /1 perhaps more forcibly, all of the military 
questions with respect to war imminence and war readiness that arose with 
the first blockade." They cautioned against assuming that it would be aimed 
at continuing the nuisance value that it had before, but rather, it would be 
11 dangerously close to an act of war" that was likely to be more a severe and 
calculated effort to either force the West from Berlin or possibly even trigger a 
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war. In the words of the Joint Chiefs: "In the simplest terms it cannot. . .be 
justifiable to place dependence on any assumption that the Soviets in 
resuming the Berlin blockade would merely be bluffing. Further, even a bluff 
should be called only if we are prepared for a showdown." Yet, in the absence 
of a presidential decision to resort to war, the only significant course of action 
that the Joint Chiefs did not rule out was an airlift. Recognizing this as 
"neither a sole nor final solution," they nevertheless saw it as an essential 
immediate step and "the only practicable step short of great risk of hostilities 
or decision to leave Berlin." They emphasized their concerns about employing 
an armed convoy because, they said, "such an attempt would be fraught with 
the gravest military implications, including the risk of war, and would 
probably prove ineffective even if faced only with passive interference." 
Similarly, an unarmed probe was likely to fail and lead only to humiliation 
and the needless risk of minor incidents . Moreover, they insisted that the 
option of evacuating Berlin at some point in the future be kept open, while 
conceding that "there is no assurance that the effects of such a move in 
reducing the threat of war would be lasting."104 
Acheson, in Paris for the CFM, concurred with the report, but stressed 
the significance of a Soviet decision to renew the blockade because it could be 
"without any basis except hostility" and would create a situation "perilously 
close to war." He therefore recommended that the NSC consider weighty 
countermeasures on a global scale over and above the diplomatic and 
economic moves recommended by the Joint Chiefs.105 Acheson also pressed 
for further consideration of employing a military probe in order to gauge 
Soviet intentions, forcing the Joint ChiefS to elaborate on their opposition to 
Condit, Histon1 of the JCS, 2:160-162. For supplemental background documentation prepared 
by the JCS, see the JCS 1907 series in box 178, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA. 
104 NSC 24/3. 
10s Acheson to Webb, 11 June 1949, FRUS 1 949, 3:831; Webb to Acheson, 12 June 1949, ibid.; 
Webb to Souers, 13 June 1949, box 206, NSC, PSF, HSTL; Webb to Acheson, 15 June 1949, 
FR US 1949, 3:833. 
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such a move.106 The Joint Chiefs intended to continue with standard traffic 
until it was physically stopped, an act that would be sufficient in itself to 
demonstrate that the Soviets were serious. Kennan concurred with the plan 
because, he said, " there is always the possibility, as has been proved to be the 
case in the air corridors, that there might be an area of divergence between 
Russian readiness to issue warnings or orders and Russian readiness to 
oppose us by physical force at the risk of loss of life and serious 
complications."107 Murphy, on the other hand, took a harder line by calling for 
an armed convoy to challenge a new blockade, a considerably stronger 
response than the probe Acheson advocated. Murphy insisted that the U.S. 
response to the original blockade was analogous to "a plaintiff with a good 
case failing to prosecute his rights because the defendant might attack him."108 
Yet Acheson argued that the u creeping tactics" that the Soviets were likely to 
use were difficult to meet through the use of armed convoys.109 For his part, 
even Clay now argued that an airlift was the only acceptable response. "While 
at one time I believed movement by surface routes under armed guard would 
be feasible," he told General Alfred M. Gruenther, "I am sure that if there is a 
reimposition of the blockade it is to be expected that an attempt to move into 
Berlin under armed convoy would be met by force . . .  and to my mind there 
is no advantage in making such an attempt."no 
Despite the debate over probes and armed convoys, Truman approved 
the report as NSC 24/3 on 15 June in the form it was originally presented, 
106 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 15 June 1949, box 206, NSC PSF, HSTL; Acheson to Webb, 22 
May 1949, FRUS 1 949, 3:818; Webb to Acheson, 26 May 1949, ibid., p.819; and the series of 
papers prepared by the JCS under the designq.tion JCS 1907 /27 "Possible United States 
Course of Action in the Event the USSR Reimposes the Berlin Blockade/' box 278, Central 
Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA. 
107 Kennan to Acheson, 6 June 1949, box 15, Country and Area, PPS, RG 59, NA. 
108 Murphy, 1 June 1949, FRUS 1949, 3:825-826. 
109 Acheson to Webb, 5 June 1949, FRUS 1 949, 3:826-827. 
110 Clay to Gruenther, 25 May 1949, box 178, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA. As late 
as 31 March 1949, however, Clay was still calling for armed convoys, citing odds of success of 
three to one with British and French participation. Clay cited in Royall to ForrestaL "Blockade 
of Berlin/' 31 March 1949, box 27, CD 6-2-9, Numerical 1947-50, Correspondence ControL 
Admin.Sec., RG 330, NA. When called upon a decade later, Clay again recommended against 
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while recognizing that the options available to strengthen the U.S. position 
were limited. Contrary to his own public statements, as well as those of other 
senior officials that claimed that the airlift had been the linchpin of U.S. 
policy, Truman remained dissatisfied with the airlift as a response to a Soviet 
challenge. Under Secretary Webb's memoranda of his conversations with the 
President regarding NSC 24/3  reveal something of Truman's frustration. 
Webb came away from the discussions with the strong impression that 
"although he agrees with the reinstitution of the airlift is [sic] probably the 
only answer, he would like for someone to come up with a better answer, and 
would not be averse to reconsidering the possibility of breaking the blockade 
if some means of surface transportation showing reasonable possibilities of 
success could be found." Truman directed State to explore every possible 
means of making a new blockade costly to Moscow since, Webb recorded, "he 
is beginning to feel that the Russians are confronted with a serious internal 
situation as well as our own increasing power together with that of our 
allies."  111 
Paris Council of Foreign Ministers 
Truman's confidence, bolstered by the lifting of the blockade, found 
little justification in proceedings in Paris at the Council of Foreign Ministers. 
The adoption of NSC 24/3, however, meant that the United States at least had 
a contingency plan in place if the CFM failed and the Soviets reimposed the 
blockade. Some, most notably Royall, called for new consideration of a 
negotiated withdrawal, because "without change one way or the other, our 
present situation will tend to become more and more ridiculous."112 The Joint 
Chiefs held relatively high expectations of what might be accomplished in 
relying on an airlift on the basis that it would be an act of appeasement rather than defiance. 
McCloy to Merchant, 10 December 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:166-167. 
111 Webb, MemCon, Truman and Webb, 31 May 1949, FRUS 1949, 3:819-820; Webb, 
MemCon, Truman and Webb, 7 June 1949, ibid., p.830. 
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Paris, hoping that Acheson might pursue a formal access agreement in the 
early sessions. State, however, considered this unrealistic. No matter what the 
Soviets agreed to, they argued, it would not withstand the rigours of four­
power implementation. Even Kennan, who had made his own ambitious 
proposal for an all-German solution, had to concede, "It is conceivable that 
after the most tortuous maneuvers and negotiations, we could bring this 
horse to water, but it is hardly probable that we could make him drink."113 It 
was far more likely that it would be all the Western foreign ministers could do 
to avoid compromising the FRG, and Acheson, seeing little hope of an 
agreement but a real propaganda problem with which to deal, was 
particularly concerned that Western optimism for a long-term solution to the 
German problem might become unrealistic.114 
Before finalizing its own position, Washington attempted to gauge 
Soviet intentions. It generally perceived that Moscow was undertaking a 
peace offensive to counter the loss of prestige caused by the lifting of the 
blockade, and that by reopening quadripartite discussions on Germany the 
Soviets were attempting one final time to disrupt the formation of the West 
German government.115 Bevin predicted that the CFM would be far from 
"plain sailing" and urged the " greatest caution and foresight during coming 
weeks" to prevent the Soviets from driving wedges into the developing 
fissures in Western solidarity. Washington too was concerned about such a 
Soviet tactic because, as the CIA warned, the ability of the United States to 
112 Royall to Acheson, 23 March 1949, box 27, CD 6-2-9, Numerical 1947-50, 
Correspondence Controt Admin.Sec., RG 330, NA. ·  
113 Kennan cited in Jacob D .  Beam to Acheson, 6 July 1949, box 50, State Dept Participation 
in OCB and NSC 1947-53, RG 59, NA; Draft PPS Paper, 4 October 1948, box 15, Country and 
Area, PPS 1947-53, RG 59, NA. See also Kennan, Memoirs, 1 :446-448; Acheson, Present at tlze 
Creation, pp.383-396. 
114 Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp.383-396. 
115 FRUS 1 949, 3:863-865, 877-879, 884-885. For a detailed State paper on the predicted 
Soviet approach to the CFM, see ibid., pp.909-913. For indications that the Soviets might 
actually be seeking to normalize the situation, see Acheson to Webb, 28 May 1949, ibid., p.929. 
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successfully pursue its diplomatic agenda "is only as  good as its ability 
concurrently to carry on persuasive talks with its Western Allies."116 
Because of the suspicion of Stalin's motives, Washington's intentions 
for the CFM were limited. Kennan's ambitious proposal for an all-German 
solution that had been developed the previous year had received, in the 
words of Gaddis, "a decidedly tepid response." Although it was designed 
specifically to form the basis of the U.S. position at the CFM, circumstances 
precluded it from being seriously entertained at Paris.117 Acheson himself 
considered the plan unworkable when faced with diplomatic reality and 
prepared his own statement of objectives in which he argued that the 
prospects of any significant agreement on the whole of Germany were 
remote, but that it might be possible to reach a modus vivendi on Berlin and the 
two Germanies. If, as he suspected, resolution of the broader German 
question did not appear immediately possible, Acheson planned to push for 
this more limited objective. This was largely to satisfy JCS and NSC concerns 
that the conference might break down and result in the reimposition of the 
blockade. Whatever the outcome of the conference, Acheson was wary of 
coming away with anything other than a workable plan that "must not be 
predicated upon the necessity for or assumption of Russian goodwill and 
cooperation." 118 
As Acheson anticipated, the foreign ministers failed to reach agreement 
on Germany, although they did make significant progress towards a treaty for 
Austria. After the first week of negotiations stalled, Acheson went ahead with 
his plan, seeking Soviet recognition of Western access rights as well as 
116 CIA 5-49 "Review of the World Situation," 17 May 1949, box 206, NSC, PSF, HSTL. 
117 Gaddis, Strategies of Contaimnent, p.75; Kennan was realistic about the chances of 
"Program A" being used at the CFM. He had originally developed the plan as an ideal 
position that rested on fundamental assumptions that were clearly contradicted by existing 
Western policy and the situation in Europe. See FRUS 1 949, 3:888-890, 867-872, 874-875, 881-
884; Kennan, Memoirs, esp. 1 :442-444. · 
118 For a detailed explanation of JCS hopes for the CFM and their reaction to Kennan's 
programme, see Louis Denfield to Johnson, "Military Considerations in the Conclusion of any 
Agreement with Respect to Germany," 11 May 1949, box 25, Geographic 1948-50, RG 218, 
Confirming the Worst Fears I 118 
resolution to the dispute over the city's suspended quadripartite 
administration. The result was not as strong as Acheson had hoped, but it was 
nevertheless regarded by Washington as a qualified success. The final 
conference communique was a modus vivendi that recognized the four-power 
occupation status of Berlin, reconvened quadripartite administration of the 
city, and reaffirmed the New York agreement of 4 May that lifted the 
blockade. Importantly, the modus vivendi put the Soviets on record as agreeing 
not to reimpose the blockade. While this made another blockade less likely, it 
also meant that it would be more serious because it could be nothing other 
than /1 a calculated act of hostility" that would bring the situation /1 perilously 
close to war." Acheson made a special point of impressing this upon the new 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky.119 
In Washington, analysis of the CFM was mixed. It was the first real 
opportunity that Washington had to gauge the impact of the blockade and 
airlift in the more general context of the Cold War. Kennan told the NSC that 
Soviet behaviour at the conference indicated acknowledgement of their 
weakness in Germany, arguing that the fact that the Soviets made no 
significant proposals and retreated from their declared objectives was 
evidence that Moscow believed that changing the status quo would weaken 
their position . .  Furthermore, the Soviets' relative inactivity on the propaganda 
front led Kennan to conclude that Moscow held little interest in the Paris CFM 
and had adopted their own containment policy for Europe. Their attention, he 
assessed, was likely to be turned towards the more fluid situation in the Far 
NA. For Acheson's objectives for the CFM, see Acheson, " An Approach to the CFM," 11 May 
1949, FRUS 1 949, 3:872-874; ibid., pp.884-885; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp.383-385. 
119 "Communique of the Sixth Session of the CFM," 20 June 1949, FRUS 1 949, 3:1062-1065; 
Beam to Acheson, 6 July 1949, box 50, State Participation in OCB and NSC 1947-53, RG 59, 
NA; Bolte to CINCEUR, 15 June 1949, box 178, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA; 
Voorhees to Bradley, "United States Course of Action in the Event USSR Reimposes Berlin 
Blockade," 9 June 1949, ibid. For Truman's public statement at the conclusion of the 
conference, see Public Papers: Truman: 1949, p.325. 
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East.120 Jacob Beam, from State's Office of German and Austrian Affairs and 
also a delegate to the CFM, concluded that Soviet behaviour at the CFM 
indicated fear on the part of the Soviets that the tensions arising from the 
German dispute might lead them to war. Having witnessed Western 
determination to stay in Berlin, Beam judged, the Kremlin had decided that it 
was losing the initiative and therefore not to force a confrontation at that 
time.121 
Partially reassured by the modus vivendi and the adoption of NSC 24/3, 
in late July the NSC authorized the scaling back of the airlift as the target 
stockpile neared completion. NSC 24/ 4 "Phase-Out of the Berlin Airlift," 
approved by Truman on 28 July, provided for a phase-out of the airlift over a 
three-month period beginning on 1 August. Clay and Robertson, however, 
insisted that the phase-out of the airlift be accompanied by arrangements to 
ensure that a full-scale airlift could be built up within ninety days, a point 
Truman strongly endorsed.122 Acheson, confident that he had impressed upon 
the Soviets the stakes in reimposing the blockade, then recommended that the 
existing operating directions, NSC 24/3 and NSC 24/ 4, were adequate to cope 
with any new emergency over Berlin and that therefore no further action was 
required of the NSC. He did, however, suggest that the United States continue 
120 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 2 June 1949, box 220, NSC, PSF, HSTL. In relation to the Paris 
CFM, the CIA concurred with Kennan's analysis. CIA 7-49 "Review of the World Situation," 
box 251, Intelligence, PSF, HSTL. 
121 Beam to Acheson, 6 July 1949. 
122 NSC 24/ 4 "A Report to the NSC by the Secretary of Defense on Phase-Out of the Berlin 
Airlift," 25 July 1948, box 3, Policy Papers, RG 273, NA; Souers to Johnson, "Continuation of 
Berlin Airlift Through Winter 1949-50," CD 6-2-9, box 27, Numerical 1947-50, Correspondence 
Control, . Admin.Sec., RG 330, NA; Royall to Johnson, "Support of Berlin Throughout an 
Indefinite Period of Blockade," ibid. For JCS planning to meet the ninety-day deadline, see the 
series of documents designated JCS 1907 /38 "Plans for Re-Establishment of the Berlin 
Airlift," box 178, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA; JCS 1 907 / 45 "Plans for Re­
Establishment of the Berlin Airlift"; and also the series JCS 1907 / 40 "Soviet Intentions 
Regarding Interference with a Second Berlin Airlift," ibid. Similar plans were made for 
dealing with a blockade of Vienna. JCS 2000/1 "US Courses of Action in the Event of a Soviet 
Blockade of Vienna," ibid. 
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to place strong emphasis on deterring Soviet action, since if the blockade was 
reimposed it would clearly mean "look out, here it comes."m 
With these plans in place, the administration sought to consolidate its 
position. Although the transfer of responsibility from military to civilian 
authorities had been contemplated for some time, the lifting of the blockade 
finally allowed Clay the opportunity to retire. In the transfer from military to 
civilian control over the following months, John McCloy, formerly of State's 
German desk, headed a new U.S. High Commission.124 But the lifting of the 
blockade also raised its own problems. Since there was no longer a visible 
threat, State became concerned that the determination of both the American 
public and the Republican-controlled Congress to bear the burden of the 
financial and military implications of the administration's European policies 
might falter. Partially in response to this, Acheson determined that U.S. 
foreign policy would seek to create "positions of strength" in order to regain 
momentum. This sentiment underpinned the simultaneous development of 
the administration's Cold War policy blueprint, NSC 68 "United States 
Objectives and Programs for National Security," and Truman's decision to 
develop the Hydrogen bomb.125 
123 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 8 July 1949, box 220, NSC, PSF, HSTL; R.E. Duff to Geoffrey 
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Moves on the Soviet side also appeared to be towards consolidation. 
Although recent scholarship has demonstrated that the relationship between 
Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party was far more sophisticated than 
the master-student characterization by American policymakers at the time, 
the Communist victory in mainland China appeared to Washington to be a 
Moscow-inspired effort.126 It appeared to be in tandem with moves in 
Germany where the Soviets installed their own regime under the Soviet­
trained Walter Ulbricht. And although Stalin carefully avoided recognizing 
the regime formally in order to avoid forfeiting the important propaganda 
appeal of reunification, so far as U.S. officials saw it, the move indicated that 
Stalin had finally abandoned hope of "winning" West Germany.127 
But even if this was the case, American policymakers held few doubts 
that the Soviets still wanted Berlin. And now that the United States had made 
a commitment to the defence of Berlin by its actions during the blockade, U.S. 
prestige and national security were deeply and undeniably engaged. Even 
those in the administration who had continued to suggest withdrawal were 
now silenced. The commitment had been made, and it could not be 
abandoned without causing irreparable damage to the Western cause. But 
more importantly, Washington recognized that its responses to the blockade 
had done little, if anything, to deter the Soviets from again challenging 
America's resolve to stay in Berlin. 
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Chapter Four 
The Berlin-Korea Parallel, 1950-1952 
The Soviet offensive against Berlin has never ceased since 1945; it 
merely waxes and wanes in intensity. For the moment, the pressure 
is low, but there are many reasons to believe that the campaign will 
soon resume with renewed vigor. 
--HICOG, EUCOM,& USCOB, 
"A Review of the Berlin Situation, " 29 August 1950 
The origins of the Korean War were a complex conjunction of Korean, 
Chinese, Soviet, and American influences. In fact, Bruce Cummings, in his 
seminal study of the origins of the Korean War, even went so far as to suggest 
that "Who started the Korean War?" was a question best not asked.1 Yet 
1 Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
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American policymakers in 1950 did need to ask and felt certain they had the 
answer. Seen from Washington, the march of North Korean Communist 
troops on South Korea on 25 June 1950 could be nothing other than 
International Communism's military aggression, carefully orchestrated by 
Moscow.2 
Whether the "Kremlin's Korean venture" was the opening move in a 
global offensive was less certain. What Washington did know was that it could 
signal the start such an offensive. What was more, the military aggression of 
the North Koreans revealed a dangerous new Soviet capability, and for an 
administration increasingly framing policy on Soviet capabilities rather than 
intentions this demanded attention.3 Accordingly, even though Paul Nitze and 
the PPS came up virtually empty-handed in their assessment of Moscow's 
future intentions, the threat was certainly considered real enough to warrant 
considerable study and planning by the highest policymaking bodies in the 
administration, including the revitalized NSC.4 Even Charles Bohlen, who 
believed many in Washington were overreacting, had to concede that "there 
is not sufficient evidence to justify a firm opinion that the Soviet Union will 
not take any one or all of the actions which lie within its military capabilities." 
Having already called for Western vigilance and the creation of "positions of 
strength" earlier in the year, Acheson agreed. In fact, he said, the next crisis 
1-9; Dieter Heinzig, "Stalin, Mao, Kim and the Korean War Origins, 1950," ibid., 8-9 (Winter 
1996-97): 240-242. 
2 Notably, General Douglas Macarthur argued that the Soviets were not necessarily behind 
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might come at any one of a dozen places. Truman himself invoked the 
imagery of falling dominoes when he told Congressional leaders two days 
after the attack, "If we let Korea down, the Soviets will keep right on going 
and swallow up one piece of Asia after another . . . .  If we were to let Asia go, 
the Near East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe."s 
The "Korean Model" in Europe 
Assuming a monolithic and coherent structure of International 
Communism controlled by the Kremlin, Washington feared that Moscow 
might employ in Europe a method of aggression modelled on Korea. The 
North Koreans' invasion had been unexpected for many reasons, not the least 
of which was the assumption, long-held in policymaking circles, that any 
conflict with the Communist world would come as blatant aggression from 
the Soviet Union, and would face Soviet military forces against U.S. military 
forces, an assumption Henry Kissinger identified as "the major flaw" of 
containment.6 In early 1950, however, policymakers were beginning to 
recognize a new threat. In NSC 68, the administration had dismissed global 
war as a Soviet intention. It was considered unlikely, therefore, that Moscow 
would initiate direct military aggression with the risk of uncontrolled 
escalation it entailed. Yet at the same time, NSC 68 warned of the dangers of 
"piecemeal aggression" whereby the Soviets could threaten American 
interests without resorting to direct military confrontation. By exploiting 
Washington's unwillingness to use its atomic weapons unless directly 
attacked, Moscow might pose a military threat by other, more abstruse 
methods, which could potentially throw American defence policy into 
5 Bohlen, "Evaluation of the General Situation," 13 July 1950, FRUS 1 950, 1 :343 (Italics 
original); MemCon, Cabinet Meeting, 14 July 1950, FRUS 1950, 1 :345; Truman quoted in 
Kaplan, The United States and NATO, p.148. 
6 Kissinger, Diplomacy, p.474. GDR documents seized immediately after German 
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invasion of Western Europe. Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Nuclear Weapons and European Security 
During the Cold War," Diplomatic History, 16, 2 (Spring 1992): 279-280. 
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disarray. When North Korean troops marched on South Korea on 25 June, 
Washington believed that it was witnessing a demonstration of this new and 
dangerous capability, one that came to be known as "war-by-proxy." 
Moreover, there seemed no doubt that the Soviets would exploit this new 
capability. Reporting from Moscow, U.S. Ambassador Alan G. Kirk predicted 
that "Korea was only a short step forward," and that it was clear that the 
Soviets had prepared to follow up a complete victory "with either another 
attack where there were adequate prospects for localizing the conflict or for a 
great display of saber rattling at sensitive points."7 
Such warnings reflected that American policymakers viewed the 
situation not so much as a localized insurrection but rather in a global 
context.8 Consequently, they' re-evaluated the threat to other U.S. strategic 
interests. Of all the potential trouble spots where the Soviets might 
conceivably employ the "Korean model," Germany and Berlin appeared the 
most likely. And the threat appeared immediate; if the Soviets could mobilize 
puppet troops in the Far East, they could presumably mobilize those of their 
satellites in Eastern Europe as their surrogates.9 Even Kennan, who was 
critical of policymakers' attempts to see simplistic patterns of aggression in 
Soviet foreign policy, warned of this. At the same time as discounting the 
likelihood of Moscow deliberately provoking global war, he warned 
Washington to anticipate further localized action. Specifically, he predicted 
that the Soviets would continue to build up armed strength in East Germany, 
which would place them in a position to employ the Korean pattern should 
they decide to do so. This would be part of a general effort "to frighten us and 
our friends, to divert our attention, and 'to test our firmness." 10 If the United 
States did not stand up to the Communist aggression in a way that inspired 
Western support, he cautioned, "there will scarcely be any theater of the east-
7 Kirk to Acheson, 11 August 1950, box 2, TS General, HiCom McCloy, RG 466, NA. 
8 Leffler, Preponderance of Pmoer, pp.361-445. 
9 Kaplan, The United States and NATO, pp.145-146. 
10 Kennan, "Possible Further Danger Points in Light of the Korean Situation," 30 June 1950, 
box 24, Kennan Papers, ML. 
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west conflict that will not be adversely affected." Bohlen agreed. Taking up 
Kennan's warning of the possible use of the Korean pattern in Germany, 
Bohlen suggested that the key to gauging Soviet intentions in Europe would 
be the status of formal relations between the GDR, Moscow, and the other 
Soviet satellites. Assuming that the Kremlin did not want general war and 
that any sort of alliance between itself and its satellites would act to widen 
local action, Bohlen suggested watching closely the type of political 
association that developed between East Germany and the rest of the Soviet 
bloc. If Ulbricht and Stalin pursued any sort of military alliance, then Bohlen 
said it would confirm that the Kremlin was not planning to use the East 
Germans in a manner similar to the North Koreans. "If there is none," he 
warned, "then we should really watch out." Insofar as practical measures, 
Kennan recommended that American military commanders in Europe "be 
instructed to show utmost vigilance and firmness in the face of any and all 
Soviet encroachments, however minute or seemingly unimportant." Bohlen 
went so far as to recommend partial mob�lization, and identified Berlin, 
China, Formosa, Iran, Indochina, or Hong Kong as the most likely targets of 
further Soviet action.11 
But within days some of these theatres appeared less threatened as the 
"distraction" scenario became less convincing.12 The situation in Berlin, 
however, offered long-term parallels that concerned Washington. In the 
postwar period, policy towards Korea had often been a contentious issue in 
the East-West relationship. Both Germany and Korea had been occupied 
following the Second World War, albeit with different regimes. Both were 
11 Kennan to Acheson, 26 June 1950� box 24, Kennan Papers, ML. Although the contents of 
this memorandum were overtaken by the pace of events and therefore never sent, Kennan's 
assessment is revealing. He developed this theme further over coming days. Kennan, 
"Possible Further Danger Points in Light of Korean Situation," 30 June 1950, ibid.; Kennan to 
Acheson, 8 August 1950, FRUS 1950, 1 :361 . For Bohlen's assessments, see Bohlen to Kennan, 
22 August 1950, box 28, Country and Area, PPS 1947-53, RG 59, NA; MemCon, 30 June 1950, 
FRUS 1950, 7:258. 
12 Kennan, "Possible Further Danger Points in Light of the Korean Situation," 30 June 1950, 
box 24, Kennan Papers, ML; AmEmbassy Belgrade to Dept of Army, 30 June 1950, box 6, 
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divided into Communist and non-Communist halves. Most importantly, both 
had been initially disarmed. The South Koreans had since partially rearmed, 
the West Germans had not. Consequently, in the immediate postwar period, 
both South Korea and West Germany relied heavily on international forces, 
especially the United States, to guarantee their security. Indeed, the Korean 
War acted to convince many observers that the time was ripe for seeking a 
basic solution to the problem of the defence of Western Europe, an integral 
part of which was arming the Federal Republic.13 The parallels extended to a 
more conceptual level. Korea had already attracted the administration's 
attention for similar reasons to those that Berlin had. In 1946, for instance, 
Truman had been swayed by arguments that Korea was "an ideological 
battleground upon which our entire success in Asia may depend," and that 
the country was 11 the focus of international rivalries" and therefore warranted 
American security guarantees.14 But perhaps most importantly, Washington 
was convinced that the Soviets desperately wanted Berlin. 
As it stood at the outbreak of hostilities in mid-1950, American policy 
to support its commitment to Berlin was relatively simple: a Soviet-imposed 
blockade was the only serious threat to Berlin that the NSC saw, and the one 
toward which its contingency planning in the form of NSC 24/3 was directed. 
This was despite McCloy' s efforts to point out that the Soviets were unlikely 
to undertake a course of action that had already proved a failure.15 Indeed, for 
the remainder of 1949 Berlin re�ained relatively calm. Minor harassment of 
General (Subject) 1949-52, U.S. Secretary, Allied High Commission, HiCom McCloy, RG 466, 
NA. . 
13 Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.99-114, 156-178; Kaplan, The United States and NATO, 
pp.154-175; Schwartz, America's Gennany, pp.124-135; Murphy, Battleground Berlin, pp.79-102; 
LaFeber, "NATO and the Korean War," pp.461-478; idem, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 
pp.109-110; May, "The American Commitment to Germany, 1949-55." See also Hays to 
McCloy, 13 September 1950, box 8, General (Subject) 1949-52, U.S. Secretary, Allied High 
Commission, HiCom McCloy, RG 466, NA; McCloy to Acheson, 3 August 1950, box 28, 
Country and Area, PPS 1947-53, RG 59, NA. For Adenauer's perspective, see Konrad 
Adenauer, Memoirs, 1 945-1953, trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1966), pp.310-328. 
14 See Edwin W. Pauley to Truman, 22 June 1946, FRUS 1946, 8:706-709, 713-714; Truman, 
Years of Trial and Hope, pp.320-321 . Also cited in May, "Lessons" of the Past, pp.56-57. 
15 MemCon, McCloy, Bradley, et al., 30 July 1949, box 25, Geographic 1948-50, RG 218, NA. 
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traffic continued, but never to the extent of a blockade. At almost every point 
of contact during early 1950, however, U.S. officials reported an increased 
militancy and assertiveness on the part of the Soviets. The State Department 
warned that this "aggressive, self-confident, even boastful attitude of recent 
months," suggested "a boldness that is essentially new - and borders on 
recklessness." While an all-out attack remained unlikely, recent moves did 
suggest "a greater willingness than in the past to undertake a course of action, 
including a possible use of force in local areas, which might lead to an 
accidental outbreak of general military conflict."16 This apparent shift in Soviet 
policy led many U.S. officials to think that action was imminent. Yet it 
remained difficult to predict where it might come, with several regions, 
including Berlin, West Germany, Yugoslavia, Iran, Indochina, or Korea, all 
offering promising opportunities to Moscow.17 
This new Soviet aggressiveness was particularly evident in Germany. 
With unemployment in Berlin rising rapidly, offering a strong point for Soviet 
propaganda, and signs of instability in the West German economy, the Soviets 
were making every effort to heighten the Berliners' sense of economic and 
political isolation by compounding an already difficult situation. They had 
persisted with sporadic interference with Berlin's traffic, especially when they 
imposed the so-called "little blockade" in early 1950, which did not go so far 
as a complete restriction on access but did seriously affect business confidence 
and discouraged West German investment.18 Trade also suffered due to the 
uncertainty of transporting raw materials into the city. In the absence of long­
term commercial commitments, and having been deprived of its economic 
hinterland by the Soviet-imposed isolation, the city was surviving on hand-to­
mouth grants from the West. The result was that thirty percent of Berlin's 
labour force was unemployed, and forty-four percent of the population lived 
16 State, "Recent Soviet Moves," 8 February 1950, FR US 1950, 4:1099-1011 and for full text, 
see box 187, PSF, HSTL; CIA 2-50 "Review of the World Situation," 15 February 1950, box 251, 
PSF, HSTL. I 
17 See Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, p.99; Nitze, Hiroshima to Glasnost, p.101; Truman, 
Years of Trial and Hope, pp.420-421 . 
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on subsidies.19 The special relationship between Berlin and West Germany 
also contributed to the uncertainty. Though German administrators in the 
Western sectors had persistently called for the city to become a twelfth Land of 
West Germany in order to strengthen the political and economic status of the 
area, the occupation powers and Bonn were reluctant to compromise the legal 
basis of their postwar agreements with the Soviets.20 To further complicate 
matters, when the Soviets had created the Communist regime in the GDR, 
they had give it its own armed /1 police" force of its own, the Volkspolizei 
Bereitschaften.  Being surrounded by a new /1 police state" played an important 
psychological part in the West Berliners sense of isolation.21 
Despite the relative deterioration of the economy and standard of 
living in the Western sectors of Berlin, the practical short-term use that the 
Soviets might make of the situation was considered limited. U.S. Intelligence 
maintained a close watch but found no sign of an imminent crisis. Believing 
that the peaceful resolution of the blockade crisis had shown Stalin's 
fundamental reluctance to go to war, State's Intelligence Bureau placed its 
faith in a show of Western determination on a global scale to deter Soviet 
aggression in Berlin, a sentiment behind the three Western Foreign Ministers' 
public reaffirmation of their commitment to Berlin when they met in London 
in mid-May. The Bureau argued that if the West made it obvious to the 
1s See JCS 1907 / 42 "Berlin," box 178, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA. 
19 State's Intelligence Bureau estimated that unemployment in Berlin had increased from 
50,000 in June 1948 to 300,000 in May 1950. Foreign aid of nearly one billion DM had 
maintained the standard of living in West Berlin at a higher level than that in the Soviet 
sector, but the economic distress of the unemployed was seen as a vulnerability in the 
Western position and conducive to Soviet objectives. State Office of Intelligence Research, IE-
6 "Berlin," 24 May 1950, box 64, Intelligence Bureau, Office of the Director 1950-59, Misc Lot 
files 1944-59, RG 59, NA; CIA 8-49 "Review of the World Situation," 17 August 1949, box 251, 
PSF, HSTL; CIA 4-50 "Review of the World Situation," 19 April 1950, ibid. For an earlier 
report on the situation by the new U.S. High Commissioner John McCioy, see MemCon, 
McCloy, Bradley, et al., 30 July 1949, box 25, Geographic 1948-50, RG 218, NA. 
20 CIA 4-50; Bradley to Forrestal, "Berlin," 17 April 1950, CD6-2-9, box 27, Numerical 1947-
50, Correspondence Control, Admin. Sec., RG 330, NA. 
21 Norman M. Naimark, "'To Know Everything and to Report Everything Worth 
Knowing' : Building the East German Police State, 1945-1949," CWIHP Working Paper, no.10 
(August 1994); idem, The Russians in Germany, pp.353-397; Murphy, Battleground Berlin, pp.86-
88; David Childs, The GDR: Moscow's German Ally, (London: George, Allen, and Unwin, 1983); 
Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, p.109. 
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Soviets that they intended to defend their positions with force if necessary, 
that short of using Soviet troops, there were no actions the USSR could 
undertake that could coerce the Western powers from the city. "'Such use of 
troops," it assessed, uwould produce situations and circumstances of actual 
combat in the Berlin area and the consequences of the employment of such 
troops would go far beyond mere 'risk' of war- in all probability would lead 
to war itself. Under these conditions, measures of the USSR with respect to 
Berlin will be based on the Soviet over-all evaluations of the international 
situation rather than on any specific ends to be achieved in Berlin itself."22 It 
predicted that a blockade, though perhaps more rigorous than in 1948-1949, 
would meet with no more success even with radio jamming and sabotage, 
and that therefore the USSR would probably continue with its current policy 
of maintaining a constant but moderate pressure in the hope of forcing 
complacency on the part of the West.23 The CIA agreed with State's 
assessment of the relative strength of the West's position but was more 
concerned with the deteriorating economic situation in the Western sectors 
and its effect on the Berliners' morale. It also assessed that the Soviets were 
unlikely to resort to violent tactics due to the inherent risk of escalation. 
Instead, the worsening economic and social climates were likely to make 
Stalin more confident of the success of continued propaganda and localized 
disturbances.24 On the propaganda front, the Soviets were likely to try to 
bolster the prestige of Ulbricht's new GDR government, possibly even going 
so far as a unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany, a move 
which would place the West in an extremely difficult position.25 
Washington's confidence in its understanding of the threat to Berlin, as 
spelled out in NSC 24/3, was dealt a severe blow when North Korean troops 
22 IE-6. 
23 Ibid. 
24 NSC 70 "A Report to the NSC by the SecDefense on May Day and Whitsuntide Youth 
Rallies in Berlin," 28 April 1950, box 178, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA; CIA 4-50. 
2s ORE 2-50 "Possibility of Soviet Troops Withdrawal from East Germany in 1950," 3 
February 1950, box 4, Estimates of the ORE 1946-50, RG 263, NA. 
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marched on South Korea on 25 June 1950.26 The immediate issue was the 
pressure on U.S. military resources involved with the diversion of equipment 
and personnel from Europe to the Far East. The readjustment of forces 
necessitated by the conflict, as aircraft and personnel were diverted to Korea, 
compromised Truman's condition that the Air Force maintain ninety-day 
readiness for a full-scale Berlin airlift. Moreover, it raised serious fears that 
Moscow was engaged in a "trap play" in which it was attempting to see how 
much of America's military resources it could dissipate before its own troops 
were used.27 In July, the JCS initiated a study on U.S. capabilities in light of 
Korea, but before this review was barely underway Acheson conceded to 
McCloy that it was already apparent that uit would be impossible to stage an 
airlift of the same magnitude" as that of 1948-1949.28 Acting Secretary of 
Defense Marshall and Bradley both had to concede that U.S. involvement in 
Korea had diminished the ability of the armed services to deal with a new 
blockade, but insisted that this vulnerability was temporary.29 Despite their 
assurances, there was no escaping the fact that the Korean action 
compromised U.S. strength in Europe, particularly in Berlin, while Soviet 
forces remained uncommitted. Other officials feared that the Soviets might 
move in Europe at the same time that U.S. forces were engaged in the Far 
East, and the JCS, with State's concurrence, warned that it would be 
"militarily unsound under present conditions" to divert large numbers of 
multi-engine aircraft from Europe to the Far East since these aircraft would be 
26 See Cummings, Origins of the Korean War; Stueck, The Korean War. 
27 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p.421 .  
28 Acheson to McCloy, 28 July 1950, box 2,  TS General, HiCom McCloy, RG 466, NA. 
29 Marshall to James Lay, 26 September 1950, box 12, Policy Papers, RG 273, NA; Lovett to 
Lay, 18 November 1950, ibid.; Bradley, Memorandum for the Record, 28 August 1950, box 25, 
Geographic 1948-50, RG 218, NA; W.G. Lalor and L.K. Ladue to JCS, "Redeployment of the 
61st Carrier Group," 19 October 1950, box 176, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA; JCS 
1906/27 "Redeployment of the 615t Troop Carrier Group," 9 November 1950, ibid. See also 
Webb to Lay, 3 May 1950, box 50, State Dept Participation in OCB and NSC, PPS 1947-53, RG 
59, NA; Charles L. Bolte to Geoffrey E. Lewis, 28 July 1950, ibid. 
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needed if the Soviets launched such an attack by threatening either Berlin or 
Vienna.30 
The Korean War and American National Security 
As well as the logistical challenges posed by the need to maintain 
military strength in two separate theatres, the Korean War had a profound 
impact on all aspects of U.S. foreign policy and prompted an urgent 
reappraisal of national security assumptions and priorities. It was, in the 
words of John Lewis Gaddis, "a revelation of unexpected threat." Indeed, the 
reverberations were so strong that Bohlen later suggested that "it was the 
Korean War and not World War II that made us a world military-political 
power."31 Policymakers struggled to place the outbreak of hostilities in Korea 
within the context of Soviet global strategy, since they feared that Korea, as 
McCloy warned, "may only be in the nature of preliminaries."32 Some officials 
feared that it presaged general war, a fear quickly rejected by Kennan and 
Bohlen. Kennan, who's influence had waned since Acheson had succeeded 
Marshall as secretary of state, insisted that "the Soviet Communists did not 
launch the Korean operation as a first step in a world war or as the first of a 
series of local operations designed to drain U.S. strength in peripheral 
theatres. They simply wanted control of South Korea." Bohlen was in 
3° For the general posture of U.S. military forces and assessments of the strength of Soviet 
military forces, see Karber and Combs, "The United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat to 
Western Europe," pp.420-23. Though dearly exceeding the 90-day limit, the JCS argued that 
100 percent of Berlin's long-term requirements - ie. the materials to maintain the city without 
loss of morale - could be met by an airlift after seven months. JCS for JCS Representative to 
the NSC Staff, 20 October 1950, box 12, Policy Papers, RG 273, NA. Acheson also believed that 
it would be unwise to invest too heavily in Korea by using troops from Europe. Robert J. 
Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harn} S. Truman 1 949-1 953, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1982), p.242. . 
31 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p.183; Bohlen, Witness to History, p.304. For general 
discussions of the impact of the Korean War on U.S. policy, see Gaddis, Strategies of 
Containment, pp.89-126; idem, We Nmu Know, pp.70-84; Leffler, Preponderance of Pmuer, pp.361-
445; Stueck, The Korean War; Donovan, Tumultuous Years, pp.241-332; Truman, Years of Trial 
and Hope, pp.331ff; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp.524-552, 577-617, 660-680, 830-838; 
Bohlen, Witness to History, pp.288-305. For Europe specifically, see especially Kaplan, The 
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complete agreement. But, at the same time, both warned that the Soviets 
might attempt further localized action to further their objectives short of the 
threshold of general war. Yet both were also increasingly becoming convinced 
that "the Soviet action in Korea was limited strictly to Korea," a view they put 
forward at several meetings over following months.33 
But as Kennan and Bohlen were revising their views, they were 
diverging from the weight of opinion that was steadily building in the 
policymaking mainstream. Stuart Symington, now the chairman of the 
National Security Resources Board, declared that the Korean War was the 
administration's wake-up call. He reprimanded the NSC for not anticipating 
the attack and insisted that it was necessary to look further than particular 
policy statements on specific problems to the very foundations on which 
American national security policy rested. "First," he said, 
is the now unmasked great and growing combined military strength 
of Soviet Russia, and of its willing and ambitious satellites such as 
China and North Korea; a strength so great that it will be impossible 
for the United States to settle this dispute in this little country of 
Korea for some months. Second is the serious current inadequacy of 
our own military forces, to the point where, even in order to settle 
this Korean incident. . .  we are already being forced to seriously 
weaken the defenses of the United States. As an example, if the 
Russians reimpose the Berlin blockade there are not enough airplanes 
available to handle simultaneously another Berlin airlift, the Korean 
campaign, and the absolute minimum airlift necessary for the 
military defense of the United States. 34 
Concurring with Symington's assessment of the urgency of the 
situation and the need for a fundamental reassessment of the situation, the 
NSC immediately set about trying to come to terms with the conflict's 
32 McCloy to Acheson, 16 August 1950, box 2, TS General, HiCom McCloy, RG 466, NA. 
33 Kennan to Acheson, 8 August 1950, FRUS 1 950, 1 :361 . As Gaddis notes, "Slowly but 
steadily the burden of proof. . .  had shifted from Kennan's critics to Kennan himself." Gaddis, 
Strategies of Containment, p.83; Miscamble, George F. Kennan; Kennan, Memoirs, 1 :462-500; 
David Mayers, George F. Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign PoliClj, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988); Bohlen, Witness to History, p.292; Bohlen to Kennan, 22 August 1950, 
box 28, Country and Area, PPS 1947-53, RG 59, NA; Bohlen, 22 August 1951, FRUS 1 951, 
1 :163-166. 
34 Symington to the NSC, 6 July 1950, FRUS 1 950, 1:338-341 . 
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implications on American security interests on a global scale. The result was 
the series of policy papers designated NSC 73 "Position and Actions of the 
United States with Respect to Possible Soviet Moves in the Light of the 
Korean Situation."35 The NSC saw the Korean scenario as potentially a new 
method in the Soviets' quest for worldwide Communist revolution - a 
method that took Washington by surprise and suggested the significant extent 
to which the USSR held the strategic initiative. It highlighted a new 
vulnerability of the West so clearly that the NSC had to admit that "the 
military capabilities of the United States are not adequate to its current 
commitments and responsibilities," whereas the USSR retained the capability 
to " occupy any country on its periphery, to invade Western Europe and the 
Near and Middle East, to make direct attacks upon the United Kingdom and 
Alaska and upon Western shipping, and to reinforce the Communist military 
effort in the Far East."36 
Because Korea as such was not considered by Washington to be of 
primary strategic value, U.S. officials braced for an assault on the Middle East 
or Europe. The NSC warned that the Moscow's employment of satellite forces 
in Korea "should be regarded not as an isolated phenomenon but as possibly 
as part of a general plan which might involve correlated action in other parts 
of the world." Since the USSR was capable of conducting the Cold War on 
many localized fronts, it could threaten American interests without directly 
engaging American troops. Soviet military forces were strong enough in their 
own right to be employed in Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, or Finland. "In addition to any one or more of these local 
operations," the NSC assessed, "the Soviets would still be capable of 
conducting with surprise important operations simultaneously in Germany 
and Austria, in the Near, Middle, and Far East, and against the United 
35 NSC 73/ 4 "The Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible 
Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation," 25 August 1950, FRUS 1 950, 
1 :375-389. 
36 CIA 9-50 "Review of the World Situation," 20 September 1950, box 251, PSF, HSTL; NSC 
73/4. 
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Kingdom and the North American continent," but "unless the Kremlin is 
willing to accept global war," which in NSC 68 Washington had already 
concluded was unlikely,37 "it will not commit Soviet armed forces to action in 
Germany and Austria." More likely was a course of action patterned on 
Korea.38 The NSC assessed: "The USSR, by provoking insurrections and 
satellite armed actions simultaneously on many fronts, and without openly 
committing its own forces, would confront the United States and its allies 
with the following alternatives: abandoning positions of vital political and 
strategic importance, committing and dissipating available strength on the 
many fronts chosen by the USSR, or undertaking global war." The United 
States was vulnerable, but there was hope. The NSC believed that the 
considerable range of Soviet capabilities could be countered by drawing upon 
the lessons of the past since, it said, "history has shown that Russia can be 
influenced to delay action or retreat from local objectives if strongly 
opposed."39 In its recommendations for coping with specific threats, it advised 
that in the event the USSR reimposed the Berlin blockade, the United States 
should react immediately and decisively. Yet precisely what such a response 
should consist of was subject to further study since a full-scale airlift was 
deemed "militarily unsound" and "impracticable under present conditions." 40 
German Apprehension 
The conflict was thousands of miles away, yet it provoked alarm bells 
m Germany because of the postwar parallels between the two countries. 
Presumably, if Moscow could use Communist puppet-forces in Asia, it could 
just as easily use them in Europe. From the Europeans' perspective, there was 
also a real danger that Korea might divert American attention from Europe to 
37 The NSC did, however, raise the prospect that this assumption was wrong. NSC 73, 
FRUS 1950, 1 :336-337. 
38 NSC 73/4. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Para. 42, ibid. 
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Asia.41 · Yet what disturbed the Germans most was the demonstration of 
American military impotence. It was one thing for policymakers m 
Washington to recognize that the United States did not have the capabilities 
to meet the threat, but the Korean conflict was showing this weakness to the 
world. The implications of this were not lost on Acheson, who observed that 
Europe's initial elation at American intervention in Korea was rapidly being 
replaced by petrified fright. After all, if the United States could not even 
protect South Korea, then what was the value of NATO? Acheson's concerns 
were heightened when McCloy sent him cables describing the increasingly 
acute sensitivity of the Germans to their own defence. "What had been 
nervous glances at East German police forces a month before," Lawrence 
Kaplan writes, "were nightmares of invasion in July." Some business firms 
and wealthy individuals had begun secretly making financial contributions to 
the German Communists in anticipation of soon being under their 
government, because, in McCloy's words, "we are powerless at this time to 
withstand a Soviet invasion of Western Germany and every German on the 
street is fully aware of this fact." Moreover, Washington was receiving similar 
reports from its officials throughout Western Europe.42 
On 8 July, Acheson instructed State's public affairs officers in Germany 
to dilute U.S. responsibility for rece�t reverses in Korea by emphasizing the 
multilateral nature of the UN forces. Above all, he said, since military build­
ups were slow, it was important not to raise false expectations of quick 
results.43 A week later he expressed his concern for the accumulating evidence 
of a worldwide decline in confidence of America's ability to succeed in Korea. 
Although this was perhaps temporary, he said, the fact that it grew out of 
41 Kaplan, The United States and NATO, p.150. 
42 Ibid., p .156; May, "The American Commitment to Germany, 1949-55"; MemCon, 
Cabinet Meeting, 14 July 1950, FRUS 1950, 1 :345; Byroade to McCloy, 4 July 1950, box 2, TS 
General, HiCom McCloy, RG 466, NA. Also, McCloy to Acheson, 16 August 1950, ibid.; 
McCloy to Acheson, 4 August 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:704; LaFeber, "NATO and the Korean 
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High Commission, HiCom McCloy, RG 466, NA; Jones to Page, "McCloy' s Staff Meeting," 29 
June 1950, box 5, Misc Files on Berlin, ExecSec, RG 466, NA. 
The Berlin-Korea Parallel I 137 
military defeats made it particularly urgent that U.S. officials abroad do 
everything possible for put military developments and potentialities in better 
perspective. As he told the U.S. embassies: "Most peoples of the world had 
occasion during World War II to be impressed by U.S. military potential. The 
trouble is that in the deluge of unfavorable news from Korea, they have 
forgotten. It is now one of our paramount tasks to remind them vividly, 
repeatedly, and convincingly."44 A month later Acheson feared that the 
psychological damage that the Korean War was doing to American 
credibility, particularly in Germany, was becoming acute. Whatever remnants 
of memories remained of American military strength demonstrated in the 
Second World War could not dispel "their hopelessness when they feel, and 
perhaps rightly, that their Western civilization could not survive another 
occupation - and this time at the hands of the Soviet Union."45 
Within days of North Korea's invasion, Adenauer, appearing to 
McCloy to be both alarmed and pessimistic, raised the prospect of the 
application of the Korean model in Germany. Seeking Western concurrence 
for his plans to create a West German police force, he emphasized his concern 
that if faced with military aggression from East German paramilitary forces 
the Allies might withdraw their troops to the Rhine or even further west, 
leaving the Federal Republic undefended. He pressed his point to add 
urgency to NATO's consideration of rearming Germany. Although Acheson 
had expected Adenauer to use this gambit, the range and scale of German 
concerns could not be ignored. HICOG was receiving a flurry of reports from 
throughout Germany expressing similar concerns.46 
US officials in Germany looked to Korea for clues as to Soviet plans for 
Europe, which, they feared, were evolving towards an eventual use of the 
44 Acheson to HICOG, 14 July 1950, box 6, General (Subject) 1949-52, U.S. Secretary, Allied 
High Commission, HiCom McCioy, RG 466, NA; Acheson to Douglas, 21 July 1950, box 2, TS 
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46 McCloy to HICOG Frankfurt, 28 June 1950, box 6, General (Subject) 1949-52, U.S. 
Secretary, Allied High Commission, HiCom McCloy, RG 466, NA. 
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GDR in the same manner as the North Koreans were being used.47 Proceeding 
from the basic assumption that the Soviet Union was /1 prepared to go very 
close to precipitating world war in order to win whole of Germany within 
next few years," HICOG speculated on the pattern of Soviet intentions for 
Germany. It seemed to indicate that Moscow would employ a combination of 
11 consolidation of power in East Germany, integration of East Germany within 
[the Soviet] orbit pressure vis-a-vis West Germany, subversion from within 
and preparation for ultimate attack by GDR with East German troops." The 
tempo of the Soviet offensive in Germany might be altered by spectacular 
Soviet success or defeat, but only the outbreak of global war or drastic 
Western actions were likely to alter its direction. The Soviets had made the 
West's position in Berlin expensive and awkward, HICOG said in its report, 
and they could be expected to continue to do so. Of particular concern was 
the recent psychological element of doubt and uncertainty resulting from the 
successful projection of Soviet strength, determination, political 
sophistication, and inevitability of victory.4s 
By September, some of the shrillness had gone from German fears, but 
the depth of concern remained. McCloy was moved to inform Truman 
directly of the Germans' uneasiness: 
The Germans are deeply disturbed about their defense. The direct 
cause is, of course, Korea. They were jolted by the apparent weakness 
of our forces in contrast to their earlier evaluation of our sh·ength 
derived in part from the war and the airlift. They feel keenly the 
analogy between Korea and Germany in view of their own disarmed 
status and the Bereitschaften .  They greatly fear that these units may 
attack in Berlin or West Germany under the claim of liberating it from 
the 'imperialists.'49 
47 Morgan to McCloy, 26 June 1950, box 6, General (Subject) 1949-52, U.S. Secretary, Allied 
High Commission, HiCom McCloy, RG 466, NA; Roy Kimmel to HICOG, 26 June 1950; B. 
Gufler to McCloy, 12 July 1950, ibid.; Byroade to McCloy, 4 July 1950, box 2, TS General 1949-
52, HiCom McCloy, RG 466, NA. 
48 McCloy to Acheson, 22 July 1950, box 6, General (Subject) 1949-52, U.S. Secretary, Allied 
High Commission, HiCom McCloy, RG 466, NA. 
49 McCloy to Truman, "Situation in Germany," 10 September 1950, box 178, PSF, HSTL. 
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Roscoe Hillenkoetter also told the President of his concerns about the 
Bereitschaften. Intelligence reports indicated that the capabilities of the East­
German paramilitary forces were increasing, and Hillenkoetter told Truman 
that West Germans fears could not be ignored: 
The course of events in East Germany, particularly the progress of the 
Bereitschaften, have caused increasing uneasiness in West Germany 
and have aroused fears that the Soviet zone police forces are intended 
ultimately for aggressive use against West Berlin and the Federal 
Republic. Such fears cannot be lightly dismissed because West 
Germany's willingness to contribute to the defense of Western 
Europe will be conditioned by U.S. steps to meet the communist 
threat, not only in Korea but in Germany as well.50 
Reports from defecting East German troops that they had been training for 
action against the Federal Republic further exacerbated Washington's 
concern.51 
By October, however, Intelligence analysts expressed doubt that the 
Soviets would use a "Korean pattern" in Germany, although they 
characteristically heavily qualified their views. Nevertheless, the CIA 
evaluated that "the Soviet Korean venture, a laboratory test in the use of non­
Soviet communist forces to fight a local war of limited objectives, has ended in 
failure. The margin by which the North Korean forces failed to overrun and 
occupy all South Korea was narrow, and the test would have been a 
conspicuous success but for the intervention of UN forces."52 Two months 
later, the Central Intelligence Group, a coordinated analysis body formed as a 
result of the failure of several intelligence agencies to predict the outbreak of 
hostilities in Korea, was even more doubtful that the Korean pattern would be 
used in Germany, judging in its December National Intelligence Estimate that 
"despite repeated communist emphasis on the parallel between Germany and 
so Hillenkoetter to Truman, 21 August 1950; Hillenkoetter to Truman, 7 July 1950, box 1, 
PSF, HSTL. 
s1 Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, p.99. 
s2 CIA 10-50 "Review of the World Situation," 18 October 1950, box 251, PSF, HSTL; NIE-
15 "Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation," 11 December 1950, box 191, PSF, 
HSTL. 
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Korea, it is unlikely in present circumstances that the Soviet Union will repeat 
the Korean pattern in West Germany unless it intends to precipitate general 
war."53 
However, the credibility of the intelligence services had suffered badly 
with the general failure to predict the North Korean offensive, and the NSC 
was not convinced. While NSC 73 / 4 reviewed the global position of the 
United States, the NSC's focus on what appeared to be the new threat to 
Berlin and Germany was spelled out in NSC 89 uus Policy with Respect to 
Berlin and Eastern Germany."54 Fundamentally, Washington understood that 
if the United States was willing and able to justify military intervention in 
Korea, it must also be prepared to risk war in order to defend Berlin. If 
passive and non-aggressive counteraction proved inadequate, the NSC Staff 
argued, "the enormous political importance of Berlin to Europe, an 
importance which is at present at least as great as Korea's significance to Asia, 
would have to be taken into account." 55 By now, U.S. officials in Europe were 
consolidating their warnings into a single voice, and in so doing, were playing 
a more influential role than they had previously. The bulk of NSC 89 
consisted of a condensed version of a lengthy paper jointly drafted by 
HICOG, European Command (EUCOM), and Berlin Command (USCOB) 
completed on 29 August, reviewing the Berlin situation from the perspective 
of European-based officials.56 This influential review began with the 
observation that "the Soviet offensive against Berlin has never ceased since 
1945; it merely waxes and wanes in intensity. For the moment, the pressure is 
53 NIE-15 "Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation," 11 December 1950, box 
191, PSF, HSTL. ' 
54 NSC 89 "US Policy with Respect to Berlin and Eastern Germany," 20 October 1950. For 
sanitised and partial text, see FRUS 1950, 4:867-887, 893-894. For full text, including JCS 
comments, see box 12, Policy Papers, NSC, NA. 
55 NSC Staff, "Policy with Regard to a Possible New Berlin Blockade," 26 March 1951, 
FRUS 1951, 3:1904-11 .  
56 McCloy (HICOG), General Thomas T. Handy (EUCOM), and Major General Maxwell T.  
Taylor (USCOB), "A Review of the Berlin Situation," 29 August 1950. Submitted to the NSC 
by Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews as part of NSC 89 on 20 October 1950, 
FRUS 1 950, 4:867-887. For early draft versions of the report, see box 5, Misc Files on Berlin, 
ExecSec, RG 466, NA. 
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low, but there are many reasons to believe that the campaign will soon 
resume with renewed vigor." It identified the primary threat to Berlin as 
Soviet unilateral recognition of GDR sovereignty after the elections of October 
1950. Moscow would then, the paper predicted, declare that the Western 
Allies were illegally in Germany and transfer all responsibility for access 
controls to the East German regime; precisely the scenario threatened in 
Khrushchev's ultimatum eight years later.57 However, the GDR, the paper 
argued, was primarily a "facade behind which the Soviets can henceforth 
operate." Moreover, Ulbricht' s regime was armed with a de facto army, the 
Bereitschaften, which provided "the force in being for Soviet seizure of Berlin 
without involvement of the USSR or its forces." Despite having been initially 
dismissed by the Intelligence establishment as a serious threat,58 the Korean 
conflict demonstrated how the Soviet Union might use these East German 
troops in a move against Berlin and thereby hope to avert a direct clash of 
Soviet and American forces. This was made more feasible by the West's 
military vulnerability in the region. The commitment of U.S. troops to the 
Korean action had greatly affected Berlin's security. The 10,000 troops that the 
Allies maintained at their token garrisons in the city, even with the support of 
the 11,000 ill-equipped West Berlin police, would soon be overwhelmed by 
the GDR' s multiplying forces, which Intelligence analysts predicted could 
grow rapidly from the 55,000 estimated to be in existence in August 1950, to 
57 The paper foreshadowed the crisis of November 1958 by predicting that the Soviets 
might hand over responsibility for Western access to the GDR. Ibid. 
58 The Bereitsclzaften was the subject of considerable study by U.S. intelligence officials in 
Germany throughout 1950. A detailed report on tJ-le Bereitsclzaften, prepared by HI COG' s 
Office of Intelligence in February 1950, concluded that "military capabilities are at present 
negligible and will remain so for at least eight months." The report also included leaked 
reports of East German self-evaluations of the Bereitschaften that concentrated on inefficiencies 
and shortcomings. HICOG Office of Intelligence, Special Intelligence Report no.1 "Status of 
the Soviet Zone Alert Police," 17 February 1950, box 2, Allied High Commission, U.S. 
Secretariat, RG 466, NA. See also HICOG Office of Intelligence, Special Intelligence Report 
no.4 "Normal Police Activities in the Soviet Zone," 16 June 1950, ibid.; JCS 2124 "Report by 
the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the JCS on Protest to Soviet Government Concerning 
East German Militarized Police," 30 April 1950, box 25, Geographic 1948-50, RG 218, NA; 
Bradley to SecDefense, "Protest to Soviet Government Concerning East German Militarized 
Police," 8 May 1950, ibid. 
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150,000 within six months.59 The fact that no West German paramilitary forces 
had been formed also contributed to making the military defence of the city 
untenable, but provided a particularly strong point for those calling for the 
rearmament of West Germany. The paper ventured into delicate territory 
when it weighed into the vigorous and complicated debate on the rearming of 
Western Germany by recommending that Bonn should ultimately become 
responsible for the security of West Berlin and that to do this it would need its 
own military capabilities. 60 
In Washington, the Joint Chiefs' reaction to the HICOG-EUCOM­
USCOB report was to urge calm and careful planning. They downplayed the 
report's alarmist tone and its calls to rapidly escalate potential hostilities, and 
they recommended that the President and NSC establish specific plans and 
objectives. Until such time that the President had decided that general war 
was unavoidable, the JCS said, only the Berlin garrison augmented by the 
Berlin police of the Western sectors should meet any armed action in the city. 
This, however, was far from shunning America's responsibilities, since they 
also argued that a blockade imposed by the GDR would be far more serious 
than one imposed by the Soviets and could be nothing other than "an act of 
revolt by conquered Germany against the Western Allies." Because of the 
serious repercussions of such a scenario, the JCS judged that "the Western 
Allies are justified in taking bolder action to prevent this occurrence than may 
have been expedient at the time of the blockade." Yet the Joint Chiefs also 
59 American estimates judged that 50,000 North Korean troops had been used in the initial 
campaign, and U.S. officials did not miss this point when examining the capabilities of the 
East German police force of 55,000. By October 1955 the Bereitschaften was judged to consist of 
seven divisions of "involuntary volunteers." Ra'dford, Memorandum for the Record, 22 
October 1955, box 9, Radford, Chairman's Files, RG 218, NA. 
60 Ibid. In February 1951 McCioy reported that in the Western sectors the Berlin police 
force was constituted by approx. 9,000 "police on the beat," 1,000 criminal police, and 2,000 
commando forces - hardly an effective force against 150,000 Soviet-armed East German 
troops. McCioy to SecState, 22 February 1951 . FRUS 1 951,  3:1897-898. MemCon, Acheson, 
Marshall, Harriman, Nitze, et al., 5 October 1950, box 28, Country and Area, PPS 1947-53, RG 
59. For CINCEUR' s " tentative conclusions" on the threat posed by the Bereitschaften in light of 
the Korean conflict, see Handy to Army, 28 August 1950, box 2, TS General, HiCom McCioy, 
RG 466, NA. For U.S. concern at the apparent buildup of other satellite forces, see Karber and 
Combs, "The United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat to Western Europe," pp .416-417. 
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recognized their military vulnerability in the region and hoped that State 
might take more active measures to deter a crisis.61 
Washington's Response 
Having heard detailed assessments of the new threat, the NSC turned 
its attention to deciding how it would deal with it. In a February 1951 draft 
study on policy with regard to a possible new Berlin blockade, the NSC Staff 
divided the possible ways of improving the U.S. position in Berlin into three 
main categories: action designed to prevent or discourage a blockade; action 
to improve the supply and morale of the Berliners during a blockade; and 
actions designed to break or cause the lifting of the blockade. 62 The second 
and third of these were essentially covered under NSC 24/ 3 and NSC 24/ 4. 
The city's stockpile was complete and could provide fuel, food, and medical 
supplies for 150 days without any airlift. 
It was to the first category, namely deterrence, that Washington turned 
its attention. Believing that a stronger and more publicized stance might have 
prevented Soviet action in Korea, and having been vehemently attacked for 
Acheson's speech before the National Press Club on 12 January 1950 during 
which he appeared to some to abandon South Korea,63 the administration 
sought to make perfectly clear its interests. It was determined not to give any 
such green light for Soviet aggression in Europe. In order to convey to the 
Soviets the seriousness with which the U.S. took its commitment to Berlin, 
61 Bradley to SecDefense, 7 February 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:1892-1894. See also the series of 
papers prepared under the designation JCS 1907 / 49 "A Review of the Berlin Situation," box 
179, Central Decimal 1948-50, RG 218, NA. · 
62 Draft NSC Staff Study on Policy With Regard to a Possible New Berlin Blockade, 26 
March 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:1904-1911 .  
63 See Acheson, Present a t  the Creation, pp.467, 476, 534, 880; Smith, Dean Acheson, pp.175-
177; Bohlen, Witness to History, pp.294; Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, pp.477, 530-1; 
LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, p.106. Both Hillenbrand and Bohlen argue that the 
personal attacks against Acheson blaming him for the Korean situation led directly to his 
hawkish positions in the Kennedy administration. Bohlen, Witness to Histonj, p.302; 
Hillenbrand, "Nuclear Crisis Project: Berlin Crisis Working Group with Martin Hillenbrand," 
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Acheson incorporated blunt warnings into his speeches and discussions with 
foreign officials . While this increased emphasis on deterrence was partly to 
prevent the outbreak of hostilities, more importantly, it was because the NSC 
had already determined that it was largely unable to force an end to a 
blockade. Some other plan was needed, therefore, so that the United States 
would not be placed in the difficult situation of tolerating the embarrassment 
of another prolonged blockade, or resorting to armed conflict. 
The culmination of this new thinking was tabled in a report jointly 
drafted by State and Defense entitled NSC 132/1 " U.S. Policy and Courses of 
Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin," 
described by Acheson as "an excellent analysis and a good strong policy" that 
offered America's best hope of remaining in Berlin.64 Although technically it 
sup�rseded NSC 24/3, thematically it proceeded from NSC 89. The report 
began soberly: "As long as Germany remains divided and Berlin is a land 
island in the Soviet zone, the maintenance of our position in the city will not 
be an easy task. On the contrary, it is likely to be as nerve-wracking as it is 
important, and there is no easy way to make it otherwise." Nevertheless, 
abandoning the city would result in a /1 major political reverse" of such 
magnitude that "the Western powers should not voluntarily abandon the city 
under Communist pressure even though the resulting situation may involve 
great risk of general war." Most of all, NSC 132/1 recommended flexibility in 
order to avoid automatically involving the United States in a war with one of 
the Soviet Union's satellites. An overt, direct attack on Berlin by Soviet forces 
was most unlikely the NSC said. Rather, the Kremlin would /1 seek to conduct 
themselves in a way which will
_ 
obscure their own responsibility and place 
11 October 1988, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, in Tlze Berlin 
Crisis, ed. Burr, document no.02945. 
64 For a sanitised version of NSC 132/1, see FRUS 1 952-54, 7(2) :1261-1269. For the full text, 
recently declassified, see NSC 132/1 "US Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible 
Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin," 12 June 1952, box 18, Policy Papers, RG 273, NA 
For Acheson's view, see MemCon, Lay to Truman, 12 June 1952, box 220, PSF, HSTL. For JCS 
supplemental documentation used and created during the drafting, see JCS 1907 /65 "Courses 
of Action in the Event East Germany Imposes a Blockade of Berlin," box 179, Central Decimal 
1948-50, RG 218, NA State's input was directed through the PPS. 
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responsibility on the Western powers," and there was little doubt that they 
would accomplish this by employing East German troops. Though it would 
be made clear to the world that the United States considered the Soviet Union 
accountable for its satellites' actions, "circumstances might arise in which it 
would be desirable to draw a distinction between overt Soviet action and 
overt satellite action." Moreover, the United States would strive to avoid the 
situation that had occurred during the blockade in which neither side could 
afford to back down without appearing to capitulate and thereby damaging 
its prestige. Hence, the report recommended that U.S. determination to 
remain in Berlin be conveyed through informal channels rather than formal 
government statements that might be construed as ultimatums. 
NSC 132/ 1 also looked to a more sophisticated pursuit of deterrence by 
making greater use of the various resources at the administration's disposal. 
These included regular signals from high-ranking U.S. officials during press 
conferences and speeches that would leave Moscow in no doubt that the 
United States would take any measures necessary to defend its position in the 
city. This official signalling would be supported by manipulation of unofficial 
public channels, such as "news 'leaks'" and "black and gray propaganda" 
which, the NSC said, was "designed to buttress the foregoing public 
statements with 'authoritative' information and should be meshed with 
public statements." As well, the report recommended that the United States 
should periodically "brief" West Berlin and West German authorities on the 
determination of the West to support Berlin, with the expectation that such 
information would reach Moscow.65 
Also, covert operations were now considered an increasingly lucrative 
method of furthering U.S. objectives in Berlin. Apart from the obvious 
intelligence advantages of having a window in the Soviet bloc, the NSC 
recognized new operational opportunities beyond influencing local politics . It 
authorized direct covert operations to further specific policy objectives and to 
65 NSC 132/ 1 .  
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convince the Soviets that the basis of their power was unstable. This could be 
accomplished partly by engaging in covert sabotage operations against Soviet 
installations in West Berlin such as the canal that the Soviets were 
constructing to bypass the Western sectors. Such activity was to be confined 
to Germany, however, since it would be difficult to link action elsewhere with 
the situation in Berlin. But the NSC was enthusiastic about the possibilities of 
a well-planned sabotage campaign.66 
The bulk of NSC 132/1 consisted of contingency planning for a number 
of courses of action to be taken in preparation for, or to counteract, Soviet or 
satellite moves against Berlin. These courses of action were divided into 
groups related to hypothetical situations of progressively increasing severity, 
ranging from a situation in which access was not seriously impeded, through 
a blockade, and finally to a military attack from Soviet or satellite forces. The 
NSC further recommended that the United States approach its allies to 
develop international contingency plans to deal with such potentialities, but 
that it refrain from making definite military commitments. Based on the 
experience of the earlier blockade, plans were also put in place to make a new 
airlift and sustenance of the city under siege conditions more efficient.67 The 
report found it "most unlikely" that Moscow would use its own forces against 
the city. Although it was most likely that the Kremlin would use the GDR's 
Bereitschaften, it was safe to assume that the Soviets would not do so "unless 
66 For earlier covert activities in Europe, see Murphy, Battleground Berlin, pp.3-128; idem., 
"Spies in Berlin: A Hidden Key to the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, 77, 4 (July/ August 1998) : 
171-178; Trevor Barnes, "The Secret Cold War (part I) :  The CIA and American Foreign Policy 
in Europe, 1946-56," Historical Journal, 24, 2 (1981), pp.399-415, and "The Secret Cold War 
(part II)," ibid, 25, 3 (1982) : 649-670; Sarah-Jane Corke, "Bridging the Gap: Containment, 
Covert Action and the Search for the Missing Link in American Cold War Policy, 1948-1953," 
Jounzal of Strategic Studies, 20, 4 (December 1997) : 45-65; Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, p.366. 
Specific recommendations for actions against the Soviet canal were not included in the final 
version of NSC 132/ 1 which is now fully declassified, but a late draft of the policy paper, 
dated 13 May 1952, was more specific: "In this connection [covert operations] considerations 
should be given to the feasibility of interfering by sabotage or other means with the 
completion or operation of the canal being built to bypass Western Berlin." PPS, "Statement 
of Policy with Respect to a Possible Soviet Action Against Berlin," 13 May 1952, box 16, 
Country and Area, PPS 1947-53, RG 59, NA; NSC Staff, "Policy with Regard to a Possible 
New Berlin Blockade," 26 March 1951. NSC 89 took a similar line. NSC 89, p.1907. 
67 Ibid. 
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they are prepared to accept the risk of general war."68 Such a prospect, 
however, could not be lightly dismissed. 
NSC 132/1 was very different from the policy papers it superseded. 
Apart from its thoroughness and detail, the new policy paper displayed the 
lessons that Washington was learning from the early Cold War and reflected 
both the conceptual shift and practical experience of the Korean conflict. 
Having had its fears of Soviet expansionism apparently confirmed first by the 
blockade and then Korea, the administration sought specific ways in which it 
could implement containment. Taking both the blockade and Korea as 
demonstrations of Soviet capabilities, Washington incorporated its own 
conclusions from these experiences into its policy to protect its commitments 
and interests.69 
When the Korean War broke out Washington saw both a motive and a 
method whereby the Soviets might threaten American interests in Berlin. That 
they intended to do so appeared certain. The Korean conflict showed a way 
that they could do so in a way that the United States could not easily counter. 
Indeed, NSC 132/1 went far in demonstrating an awareness of the threat, but 
did not go so far in outlining workable plaµs if the United States was actually 
faced with an attack by East German troops. The report did not contain a 
specific decision on the American reaction to such an attack, but it did go far 
in presenting many of the issues and options open to the President should he 
have to make a decision under crisis conditions. 
Thus, as one of the key experiences of the Truman administration, the 
Korean War was fundamental to Washington's understanding of the Cold 
War. Before June 1950, American assessments of the threat to the West's 
position in Berlin were based upon the experiences of blockade. A new 
68 NSC 132/ 1;  John Foster Dulles, NSC Progress Report on the Implementation of NSC 
132/ 1, 10 September 1953. For sanitised text, see FRUS 1952-54, 7(2):1347-1360. For fully 
declassified text, see box 3, Policy Papers, NSC, Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, WHO, DDEL. 
69 For an analysis of some of the pitfalls of applying historical "lessons" to policymaking, 
see May, "Lessons " of the Past. For how these lessons were applied specifically to U.S. 
intervention in Korea, see especially pp.52-86. 
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blockade would be more serious, but would be, nonetheless, a readily 
identifiable challenge. In the Korean conflict, however, Washington believed 
it saw a precedent for a dangerous new Soviet tactic. "War-by-proxy" could 
face the United States with a crisis not easily defined, and therefore difficult to 
counter. At all times the Korean model remained a potential course of Soviet 
action. But this potential, the NSC argued, warranted considerable attention. 
Based directly on what it saw as the "Korean model," the NSC came to regard 
military action by East Germany's paramilitary force, the Volkspolizei 
Bereitschaften, as the primary threat to U.S. interests in Europe. 
Though the blockade had been lifted in May 1949, American 
policymakers, not without justification, continued to expect a Soviet move 
against the city. In Washington's estimation, the Soviets needed to control the 
whole of Berlin to consolidate their hold over East Germany.70 In June 1952 
State's Intelligence Bureau assessed that the likelihood of a surface blockade 
before mid-1953 was less than even,71 but was forced to admit that they now 
saw a considerably expanded range of opportunities open to the Kremlin. In 
1949 the NSC saw only one method by which the Soviets might accomplish it 
objectives, but by 1952, looking at the Berlin problem in the light of Korea, the 
NSC saw a much broader spectrum of Soviet threats and developed more 
sophisticated policies to counter them. By recognizing and preparing policy to 
counter these Soviet capabilities, Washington gained confidence to pursue 
programmes such as the European Defence Community (EDC) and the 
rearming of Germany - moves they knew were likely to provoke the 
Kremlin.72 In this way, at the same time as displaying the vulnerability of the 
West, the experience of Korea had opened Washington's eyes and led to a 
70 See for example "Briefing Paper on Eastern Germany, Its Structure and Recent Political 
and Economic Developments," prepared by the Eastern Affairs Division, Berlin Element, 
HICOG, in September 1952 and circulated in Bonn and Washington on 4 November 1952, and 
again on 16 February 1953, box 2, Misc Files Berlin, ExecSec, RG 466, NA; "Berlin Briefing 
Book for U.S. High Commissioner Donnelly," n.d., box 1, ibid. 
71 SE-30 "Probable Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Berlin Through Mid-1953," 6 
June 1952, box 67, State Dept Participation in OCB and NSC, RG 59, NA. 
72 Riddleberger to Acheson, 10 June 1952, ibid.; W.J. McWilliams to Acheson, 6 June 1952, 
ibid. 
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strengthening of U.S. national security policy. From such "positions of 
strength," American policymakers were able to pursue their own objectives in 
Europe, including restructuring European defence, with some confidence that 
they could face the Soviet threat, at least in Berlin. 
Chapter Five 
Changing Direction, 1953-1954 
The reimposition by the USSR of a blockade or severe harassing 
measures would be a deliberate challenge to the Western powers' 
position in Berlin. Moreover, the prestige of the United States as the 
leader of the free world is deeply committed in Berlin . . . .  If Soviet 
harassment nonetheless continues to threaten Western access to 
Berlin, the security interests of the United States and its Allies will 
require them to take immediate and forceful action to counter the 
Soviet challenge, even though such countermeasures might lead to 
general war. 
--NSC 5404/1 "U.S. Policy on Berlin " 
The first Eisenhower administration did not face a serious crisis over 
Berlin, although policymakers expected one. Other important developments 
demanded their immediate attention, particularly the vigorous and 
complicated debate on the rearming of Germany, the EDC, the Korean War, 
and the growing tensions in the Middle East, but the national security 
establishment was far from dormant in relation to Berlin. During the course of 
late 1953 and early 1954 Eisenhower changed the direction of America's Berlin 
policy that reflected the values and interpretations of Eisenhower and his new 
administration. The new direction was not a reversal, but it was a marked 
150 
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turn in a more confrontational and positive direction. New personnel 
combined with renewed confidence to make America's Berlin policy more 
aggressive. Having inherited Truman's NSC policy papers, the new 
administration drastically revised them to reflect a revived confidence in 
American military strength, as well as the application of the tenets of 
economic and diplomatic rationalism. At his inauguration Eisenhower called 
upon Americans to be prepared to "dare all for our country" - a precept that 
became the underlying sentiment of his administration's Berlin policy when 
he revealed that, unlike Truman, he would not tolerate a prolonged blockade, 
but would rather take positive action to force the issue. As the new Chairman 
of the JCS Admiral Arthur C. Radford explained the administration's "New 
Look" at U.S. Cold War strategy, it was designed for the "long pull; not a 
year-of-crisis." "Recurring local actions - hot-spots - are going to be with us 
for a long time to come," he continued. "Unless we are in a position to handle 
them positively and quickly, these hot-spots will be serious and may be 
frequent." 1 
As the NSC pointed out, things were very different in 1953 than they 
had been in 1948. The United States had rearmed and had joined Western 
Europe in military alliance. Western nations were on the road to economic 
recovery. The Federal Republic had been formed, thereby strengthening the 
ties of West Germany and the West. Most importantly, by January 1953 the 
Cold War had consolidated into easily identifiable antagonists. When 
Eisenhower assumed office the consensus in policymaking circles was that the 
previous five years had demonstrated that the essential elements of Soviet 
foreign policy, as Washington interpreted them - a basic hostility to the 
1 For some important recent additions to the historiography of Eisenhower's national 
security policy, particularly with reference to Europe, see Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, 
pp.146-282; Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace. See also May, "The American Commitment 
to Germany, 1949-1955"; James G. Hershberg, '"Explosion in the Offing': German 
Rearmament and American Diplomacy, 1953-1955," Diplomatic History, 16, 4 (Fall 1992): 511-
549. Radford's comments were made in a speech before the National Press Club, Washington 
D.C., 14 December 1953, box 74, Dulles Papers, ML. 
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"forces of freedom" and aggressive expansionism- were unchangeable.2 Even 
after Stalin's death on 5 March, policymakers saw no particular reason to 
question the continuation of these basic elements, despite conciliatory signals 
emanating from the confusing post-Stalin power struggle as the Kremlin 
launched its "peace offensive."3 Although they had made much political 
mileage during the presidential campaign by highlighting the shortcomings 
of containment and the need for a replacement Cold War strategy, 
Eisenhower and Dulles adapted essential elements to their own conception of 
waging the Cold War. The assessment of Soviet objectives did not 
fundamentally change, nor did the Cold War consensus of the fundamental 
clash of interests between the "forces of freedom" and International 
Communism."4 Yet Eisenhower and Dulles characterized the containment 
policy as dangerously passive, citing the failure of the Truman administration 
to have in place a policy to respond to Stalin's death as typical of an outlook 
that was fundamentally negative of the previous twenty years of Democratic 
administrations.5 Campaigning on the platform of reclaiming the ideological 
and spiritual initiative from Moscow, Eisenhower and Dulles sought to 
reinvent American foreign policy based on opportunism, and in the process 
created perhaps the most important factor in the new look at the Berlin 
problem.6 
2 Raymond L. Garthoff, Assessing the Adversan1: Estimates by the Eisenhmuer Administration of 
Soviet Intentions and Capabilities, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1991), p .5. 
3 Ibid. For recent studies of Soviet foreign policy during this period, see Zubok and 
Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin 's Cold War, pp.138-173; Mark Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin 
Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-External Linkages in 
Soviet Policy Making (Part I)," Journal of Cold War Studies, l, 1 (Winter 1999): 3-55; Ostermann, 
"The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback," pp.2-3; 
James Richter, "Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany During the Beria 
Interregnum," Cold War International History Project, Working Paper no.3 (June 1992) . 
4 On the strategic inheritance of the incoming Eisenhower administration, see Gaddis, 
Strategies of Containment, pp.127-163; Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, pp.11-40; Garthoff, 
Assessing the Adversan1, pp.4-6. 
5 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1990), p .311; Garthoff, Assessing the Adversary, pp.5-6. 
6 For the origins and development of Rollback, see Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 
pp.20-34. 
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Eisenhower's economic rationalism also became an important factor. 
The new President had little patience for economically questionable 
programmes - in particular a sustained Berlin airlift- and struggled against 
residual New Dealers in the foreign policy establishment who believed that 
the best way to guarantee prestige abroad was to throw money around.7 
Furthermore, in view of the Federal Republic of Germany's impressive 
economic revival, Eisenhower tried to scale down American economic aid to 
Berlin without adversely affecting Berliners' morale. As well, and in keeping 
with the pattern of domestic planning, the NSC' s policy papers were now 
appended with careful appraisals of financial implications. In this way, 
financial burden became an important factor in determining national security 
policy.8 
Of course, Eisenhower himself brought unique expertise to the Berlin 
problem, having been a central figure in the city's postwar history. Since 
handing over OMGUS to Clay, he had acted in several capacities in 
Washington, and as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe 
(SACEUR) from January 1951 to May 1952. The new President also brought 
with him a new administration: Foster Dulles, a long-time foreign policy 
adviser to the Republican party, was appointed secretary of state; his brother 
Allen Dulles became the new DCI; Robert Cutler was recruited from Boston to 
reform the NSC9; C. D .  Jackson was appointed to head psychological and 
political warfare and Cold War planning efforts; Radford replaced Bradley in 
August to become the new Chairman of the JCS, and there was a correlated 
rotation of the personnel of the other Joint Chiefs10; Charles Bohlen was again 
7 See for instance, Summary of NSC Meeting, 1 October 1953, box 4, NSC, PSF, DDEL. 
s Trachtenberg, Constrncted Peace, pp.146-200. 
9 For the central role the NSC played in the Eisenhower administration, see Anna Kasten 
Nelson, "The 'Top of Policy Hill' : President Eisenhower and the National Security Council," 
Diplomatic Histon11 7, 3 (Summer 1983) : 307-326; Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, pp.3-96; 
Robert Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council," Foreign Affairs, 34, 3 
(April 1956): 441-458; Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, pp.85-89. 
10 General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr. remained as Commandant of the Marine Corps having 
assumed his post in January 1952. Radford assumed his post on 15 August 1953, as did 
General Matthew B. Ridgway (Chiefs of Staff, Army); Admiral Robert B. Carney (Chief, Naval 
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propelled into the policymaking elite by his appointment as Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union; and Robert Bowie replaced Nitze as head of the Policy 
Planning Staff. In many respects this was the second generation of 
policymakers who were faced with the Cold War, and it was a generation that 
had its own views on how to respond to it.11 
Taking a "New Look" 
For all the efforts during the 1952 presidential election campaign to 
highlight the differences between the foreign policy platforms of the 
Republicans and Democrats, the consensus in policymaking circles was that 
continuity during the presidential transition period was most likely to 
dissuade the Soviets from creating an immediate crisis in Berlin.12 They 
therefore strove to avoid creating the impression that Eisenhower's position 
with relation to Berlin would be any more flexible than Truman's .  It was 
essential that the credibility of the deterrent remained intact and that there 
was no period during which there was any doubt that the United States 
would act decisively to protect its interests. Dulles, during a visit to the 
Federal Republic only a fortnight after the inauguration, told the Germans 
that "we, in the United States are, now as then [1948], vitally interested in the 
welfare and security of this city and we share the determination of the 
Berliners to maintain their liberties."13 The signalling continued. Three days 
Operations) on 17 August; and General Nathan F. Twining (Chief of Staff, Air Force) on 30 
June. 
n Ibid. For an overview of Eisenhower's views on the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. Cold 
War strategy, see Andrew P.N. Erdmann, "'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever' :  
Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution," in Cold War Statesmen Confront 
the Bomb, eds Gaddis, et al., pp.87-119. See also Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace; Gaddis, 
Strategies of Containment, pp.127-197; Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp.236-357; Cook, 
Declassified Eisenhower, p.86. For the administration's views as they related to Europe, see 
Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, esp. pp.146-200; idem, History and Strategy, pp.132-168; 
Wampler, "NATO Strategic Planning and Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1957." 
12 Briefing Book for Eisenhower, n.d., DDE, General, PSF, HSTL. 
13 John Foster Dulles, Statement at Bonn, 6 February 1953, in Dept of State Bulletin, 23 
February 1953, p.302. 
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later, when assuming his new post as U.S. High Commissioner, James B. 
Conant told a German journalist that Berlin must be held in order to maintain 
its position as "the free world's outpost." 14 A week later he went into more 
detail, pledging that "the new administration in Washington will not abandon 
Berlin . . .  We will continue to fulfil our duties and to maintain our rights . . . .  [the 
United States] is determined to keep open the lines of communications with 
Berlin. I can assure you there will be no faltering in our determination."15 
What he did not spell out at the time, but was nevertheless obvious to his 
audience, was that such declarations of intent were as much to reassure the 
Germans as they were to deter Soviet action. 
The Eisenhower administration's initial consideration of the Berlin 
situation stemmed directly from the views expressed during the later stages 
of the Truman administration. The immediate issue was a direct threat to the 
West's position in the city. There was a consensus in Washington that the 
viability of Ulbricht' s regime required the neutralization of the Western 
presence in its proclaimed capital. Yet the question remained whether the 
Soviets would, in fact, risk such action. Most U.S. officials held that they 
would. Charles Bohlen, the new Ambassador to the USSR, expressed what 
many feared when he warned that "Berlin will probably be subject to 
increasing pressures from the Soviets. It is a potentially volatile area and may 
become more so, since military action might start there at almost any time."16 
Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles similarly warned of the potential 
of a rapid deterioration of the situation.17 This acute sensitivity to the 
vulnerability of the American commitment to the city was a clear continuation 
of the anxiety of the Truman administration. However, the Eisenhower 
administration soon began to depart from and revise their previous views of 
the Berlin issue as they began to see it in the new light of opportunism. 
14 James B. Conant, radio interview, 9 February 1953, ibid., p.302. 
1s Conant, radio address on RIAS Berlin, 18 February 1953, ibid., 2 March 1953, p.327. 
16 Bohlen, FRUS 1952-54, 8:99. 
17 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 25 February 1953, box 4, NSC, Whitman, DDEL. 
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Underlying this was the role the common threat played in maintaining 
NA IO unity. Impressed by the unifying effect that the blockade had in 
convincing Western Europe of the merits of collective security that manifested 
itself in the formation of NATO in 1949, Washington sought ways to 
deliberately utilize the ongoing threat to Berlin to stimulate unity on matters 
of European defence. With the EDC Treaty having been signed but not yet 
ratified, just such a common threat was seen as important and useful 
pressure, particularly to secure French participation. Accordingly, 
Washington again hoped to manipulate the Berlin issue to accelerate moves 
towards a common European defence. So that they might be in a position to 
capitalize most effectively on this, the issue was under constant review by an 
interdepartmental body consisting of representatives from State, Defense, the 
CIA, the National Security Resources Board, the Ad Hoc Committee on Berlin, 
and later the NSC' s Operations Coordinating Board (OCB).18 This emphasis 
became an integral part of Washington's consideration of the Berlin issue. 
Eisenhower and his advisers, recognizing the potential of the issue to coax 
reluctant elements of the Western alliance, put in motion plans to cultivate the 
Berlin situation to their advantage. If the United States could use the threat to 
Berlin to consolidate the Western alliance, they would take a small yet 
important step in transforming a liability into an opportunity.19 
More importantly, the Eisenhower administration began to develop the 
rhetoric of its own peace offensive by giving greater official currency to terms 
such as "showplace of freedom," "window to the West," and "beacon of 
hope" - terms that by Kennedy's administration had become synonymous 
with Berlin. Hitherto, Truman, in keeping with his administration's 
conception of containment, had treated Berlin in a defensive context. In all of 
18 See NSC Progress Report by the SecState on the Implementation of NSC 132/L 10 
September 1953, box 3,  Policy Papers, NSC, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 
WHO, DDEL. 
19 NSC 173 "Report to the NSC by the NSC Planning Board on U.S. Policy and Courses of 
Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Courses of Action Against Berlin," 1 December 
1953, box 26, Policy Papers, RG 273, NA. 
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his public statements he had emphasized that Berlin was the fall-back line 
beyond which the United States would never retreat. Thus, it was a 
demonstration of American resolve not to retreat in the face of Soviet 
aggression. From the beginning of his time in office Eisenhower took this 
concept and reshaped it in a more positive vein. This was not an accidental 
process, but rather one well planned and calculated. One small, but important 
part of this process was the creation of an informal "Berlin Desk" in State, 
· heq.ded by Eleanor Lansing Dulles. Charged with exploiting the U.S. 
commitment to the city and directing Washington's contribution to Berlin's 
inspiring reconstruction, this full-time, centralized conduit played an 
important role in consolidating the Washington-Berlin relationship.20 
Eisenhower had come to office espousing the vague notion that Soviet 
political control over Eastern Europe could be undermined by eroding the 
popular appeal of Communism to the peoples of those nations. While the 
retraction of Soviet power through political means was not a new idea ­
Kennan, in particular, championed the cause during 1948, and NSC 68 had 
similarly espoused such a notion- the Eisenhower administration escalated 
this objective in Washington's priorities. As it emerged from the election 
campaign with the labels "Rollback" and "Liberation," it rested on the notion 
that the United States would put greater emphasis on psychological warfare 
to take the moral and spiritual offensive in the Cold War. As Dulles, then 
acting as Eisenhower's foreign policy adviser, declared prior to the election, 
"we will abandon the policy of mere containment, and will actively develop 
hope and a resistance spirit within the captive peoples which, in my opinion, 
is the only alternative to a general war." It was imperative to create a 
"dynamic spirit," he said. The Soviets had long since recognized, he 
continued, "that they can get further with ideas than with bombs." The 
Truman administration's containment, which was pinned on military might, 
was useless when the Soviets were "using ideas as a principal missile." As 
20 See Dulles, Chances of a Lifetime, pp.241-256. 
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Eisenhower himself explained it, the objective was to implement "a dynamic 
program of penetration . . .  to bring freedom to those who want it, and lasting 
peace to a troubled world."21 
At the time of Eisenhower's inauguration this policy appeared 
ideologically sound, but under-developed in its practical aspects, a flaw that 
remained throughout the time that the policy was pursued. It soon became 
apparent that Rollback would not be as easy to practice as it was to preach. 
The NSC promptly conceded that the detachment of any major European 
satellite from the Soviet bloc was not feasible except by war.22 The precedent 
set by Tito in Yugoslavia, however, encouraged the administration, and it 
continued to examine options for exploiting the situations behind the Iron 
Curtain. Yet, with several policymaking bodies engaged in planning the 
psychological offensive against Communism, Bohlen highlighted a serious 
problem in publicly declaring the liberation of the Eastern satellites as a 
national objective. Everyone wanted Eastern Europe free, he said, but to 
declare it publicly as official policy would saddle the United States with a 
commitment that it was unlikely to be able to meet.23 As if to justify Bohlen' s 
fears, Conant warned Washington in February not to expect "that even if 
called upon to do so, the East Germans would be willing and capable of 
carrying out a revolution unless such a call coincided with a declaration of 
war and/ or assurance of Western military support." Moreover, there was 
nothing to suggest that the GDR government could not control any outbreak 
21 For Kennan's advocacy of the "retraction of Soviet power," see Leffler, Preponderance of 
Power, pp.235-237. For Dulles's comments, see Neiv York Times, 9 and 12 August 1952; Dulles's 
address before the World Affairs Forum of the Foreign Policy Association of Pittsburgh, 15  
May 1952, box 63, Dulles Papers, ML. For Eisenhower's comments, see Eisenhower to 
Jackson, 8 May 1952, box 65, Jackson Papers, DDEL. See also Bowie and Immerman, Waging 
Peace, pp.41-80; Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections: 1 952-1 960, (New 
York: Franklin Watts, 1974), pp.25-85; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp.127-129; Ambrose, 
Eisenlzower: 1890-1952, pp.552-572. 
22 NSC 174 "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe," 11 December 
1953, FRUS 1 952-54, 8:113. 
23 Bohlen' s testimony before the President's Committee on International Information 
Activities, 24 February 1953, FRUS 1 952-54, 8:54. 
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of public dissent.24 Bohlen' s warnings, however, went unheeded, and the 
Eisenhower administration continued to pursue the policy. In fact, under the 
zealous direction of psychological warrior C.D. Jackson as Special Assistant to 
the President for Cold War planning - a post which gained him direct access 
to the President and a seat at nearly all top-level policy discussions - and with 
the replacement in September 1953 of Truman's PSB with the OCB, which had 
a broader mandate and increased powers, Rollback became central to the way 
· the Eisenhower administration perceived and waged the Cold War.25 
The Berlin situation obviously lent itself to such a policy, and 
Washington displayed a growing awareness of the psychological and political 
implications of its commitment. While this political offensive was not 
confined only to Berlin, the city, as a 11 show-place of freedom," offered 
unparalleled opportunities to highlight the stark contrast between East and 
West. Whereas Truman and Acheson had primarily been concerned with 
using Berlin publicly as a defensive mechanism to strengthen and 
demonstrate Western resolve, Eisenhower and Dulles recognized that Berlin 
offered unique propaganda and political opportunities that they hoped they 
could use to loosen the Kremlin's hold over Eastern Europe. When it came to 
Berlin, there was a dual target audience. On the one hand, it was perfectly 
suited as a 11 show-window of freedom" where the United States had the 
opportunity to present its concept of freedom and right and democracy to an 
audience of over three million participants at the front line of the Cold War. 
On the other hand, it gave them an almost ideal post to observe the political 
24 Conant to Dulles, 3 February 1953; Conant to Dulles, 2 June 1953, both quoted in 
Ostermann, "The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of 
Rollback," pp.8-9. 
2s See Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1 945-
1961, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). For C.D. Jackson's role in the formulation of 
policy, see H.W. Brands, Jr., Cold Warriors: Eisenlwwer's Generation and American Foreign Policy, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp.117-137; Valur Ingimundarson, "Containing 
the Offensive: The "Chief of the Cold War" and the Eisenhower Administration's German 
Policy," Presidential Studies Quarterly, 27, 3 (Summer 1997) : 480-495; Blanche Wiesen Cook, 
"First Comes the Lie: C.D. Jackson and Political Warfare," Radical Histon; Review, 31 
(December 1984) . 
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dynamics of the Soviet satellite states and a base from which to disseminate 
the West's message.26 Consequently, the CIA' s anti-Soviet operations directed 
at Eastern Europe were centred in Berlin, with a massive influx of funds and 
responsibilities anticipated as part of Rollback.27 As the CIA described it, its 
role was to /1 create and exp�oit troublesome problems for International 
Communism," /1 discredit the prestige and ideology of International 
Communism," /1 reduce International Communist control over any areas of the 
· world," and /1 develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and 
guerrilla operations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of 
war." By not only maintaining a intelligence-gathering base in Berlin, but also 
by actively cultivating voices of dissent, the CIA hoped to make its 
contribution towards destabilizing Ulbricht' s regime.28 
The objectives of the propaganda campaign, as defined by the NSC, 
were to demonstrate determination to stay in Berlin, to increase the influence 
of Berlin as a western outpost, and to reduce communist capabilities. The NSC 
and the administration's psychological warfare think-tank, the PSB, were 
committed to taking every safe propaganda opportunity afforded them; but 
action was strictly limited to situations that fitted criteria that ensured 
minimal risks. In Germany the programmes conducted under the 
administration's auspices included broadcasting into the Eastern satel lites and 
the Soviet Union with Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio in the American 
Sector (RIAS), as well as encouragement of pro-Western German you th, 
political, and other interest groups, the publication of newspapers and 
leaflets, and other propaganda activities, for none of which the United States 
26 Briefing book for U.S. High Commissioner Donnelly, box 1, ExecSec, Misc Files on 
Berlin, RG 466, NA. For the intelligence aspects of the Berlin occupation, see Murphy, 
Battleground Berlin. 
27 See James G. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Haroard to Hiroshima and the Making of the 
Nuclear Age, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p.653. 
2s NSC 5412 "NSC Directive on Covert Operations," 15 March 1954, box 10, Policy Papers, 
NSC, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, WHO, DDEL. See also Murphy, 
Battleground Berlin, pp.103-284. 
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claimed direct responsibility.29 More radical proposals were also made. 
Jackson, after returning from the Berlin Conference of 1954, even suggested to 
the NSC that they should kick-start Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" 
programme by building a state-of-the-art nuclear reactor in the city. Jackson's 
reasoning was simple. Conceding that the reactors were impractical, but 
showing little concern for logistics, he displayed his characteristic single­
mindedness, telling Nelson Rockefeller, "I know the damn reactors won't 
· produce enough electricity to light a town, but I assure you it doesn't make 
any difference, if they will just light one electric light bulb, or turn one 
irrigation wheel." He further justified his proposal with the dubious logic that 
a nuclear reactor could supply Berlin with electric power during a reimposed 
blockade. Though it was obviously never implemented, his proposal did get 
as far as feasibility studies by the OCB.3o 
Rollback in Action 
There was no question of the ideological appeal of Rollback, but events 
in June 1953 demonstrated that it was not realistic, or as historian Christian F. 
Ostermann put it, the East German uprising demonstrated "the limits of 
Rollback."31 Each of the administration's propaganda initiatives was chosen 
and designed so that if it failed it would not backfire on the United States. 
29 For RFE and RIAS, see Robert T. Holt, Radio Free Europe, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1958) . At one point Jackson made an informal suggestion to use the 
propaganda of RFE and RIAS as a bargaining chip in attempts to get the Soviets to stop their 
jamming. Jackson to Rockefeller, 26 April 1955, box 91, Jackson Papers, DDEL. 
30 Jackson to Rockefeller, 26 April 1955, box 91, Jackson Papers, DDEL; OCB, "Study on 
Berlin Reactor Proposal," 30 March 1954, box 8, OCB Central File, NSC Staff, WHO, DDEL; 
Wallace Irwin, Jr. to Cecil B. Lyon, "Study for OCB on Berlin Reactor Proposal," 25 March 
1954, ibid.; "Excerpt of a Report by C.D. Jackson upon his return from the Berlin conference/' 
ibid.; Jackson, "Psychological Aspects of the Berlin Conference/' n.d., box 33, Jackson Papers, 
DDEL; NSC Progress Report on NSC 5404/ 1 by OCB, 30 April 1954, box 8, Policy Papers, 
NSC Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, WHO, DDEL. H.W. Brands observes that 
Jackson "possessed one of Washington's lowest batting averages, in terms of ideas accepted 
and put into practice, but he seldom let failure discourage him from swinging away his next 
time up." Brands, Cold Warriors, p.117. 
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Psychological warfare was waged only so long as the United States retained a 
degree of plausible deniability. Essentially, Eisenhower and Dulles revealed 
that they were anxious to instil a desire for evolutionary change in the Eastern 
bloc but baulked at supporting revolutionan1 movements. In June 1953 this 
reluctance to commit to action that might result in anything less than 
complete success earned the administration many critics, including Senator 
Joseph McCarthy, at that time at the peak of his powers, who accused it of 
· hypocrisy and abandoning the people whose hopes they had been so 
deliberately building and exploiting.32 
When East German workers began a wave of rioting that spread from 
East Berlin on 16 and 17 June 1953, ostensibly over production quotas, several 
senior policymakers shared a sense of guilt that they had unrealistically built 
up the hopes of the workers for U.S. support. Although Dulles flatly denied 
this, many in the administration went so far as to attribute responsibility for 
the riots to the U.S.-sponsored radio broadcasts over RIAS and RFE, a fear 
that recent scholarship appears to validate.33 Accordingly, the decision was 
31 Ostermann, "The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of 
Rollback." 
32 For McCarthy's attacks on HI COG, see Hershberg, James B. Conant, pp.656-657. 
McCarthy's interest was piqued by RIAS and rumours that "all Americans were communists 
that were employed there." Memoranda of Telephone Conversations, Dulles and McCloy, 23 
June 1953, Dulles and Riddleberger, 9 July 1953, Dulles and Jackson, 9 July 1953, Dulles and 
John Taber, 9 July 1 953, all in box 1, Telephone Calls, John Foster Dulles Papers, DDEL. 
33 For traditional interpretations of the uprising, see Arnulf Baring, Uprising in East 
Germany: June 1 7, 1 953, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); Rainer Hildebrandt, Tlze 
Explosion: The Uprising Behind the Iron Curtain, (New York: Little, Brown, 1955); Willy Brandt, 
My Road to Berlin, as told to Leo Lania (London: Peter Davies, 1960), pp.227-239. For recent 
studies of the June uprising, particularly using Soviet and East German documents, see 
Christian F. Ostermann, '"Keeping the Pot Simmering' : The United States and the East 
German Uprising of 1953," Gennan Studies Review, (February 1996) :  61-89; idem, "The United 
States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback"; idem, "New 
Documents on the East German Uprising of 1953," CWIHP Bulletin, 5 (Spring 1995) :  10-21; 
Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Successionist Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central 
Europe," pp.40-55. See also Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949-
1989, (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.177-187; Murphy, Battleground Berlin, 
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relationship between the careful handling of RFE in the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the 
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taken in Washington not to allow RIAS to broadcast anything that might stir 
up the Germans in the Eastern zone. The Intelligence establishment saw the 
problem as more fundamental. Since Stalin's death, Allen Dulles told the 
NSC, Molotov had JI softened" policy towards the Soviet satellites in an effort 
to divide the Western allies as the central thrust of Moscow's JI peace 
offensive." This had backfired and the peoples of the satellite countries had 
spontaneously seized the opportunity to voice their discontent. As such, he 
said, it demonstrated the weakness of Ulbricht' s regime to the extent that he 
believed could lead to it being ousted by the Soviets and replaced with one 
more capable.34 
On the surface it appeared an opportunity ripe for exploitation, but 
Eisenhower, Dulles, and even Jackson were unsure of how to respond to the 
uprising, although Eisenhower did take the opportunity to announce an 
additional $50 million grant for West Berlin's industries.35 Ultimately they 
refrained from endorsing the riots or open revolt, instead taking a cautious 
line by only going so far as supporting passive resistance, despite Adenauer 
and Brandt's pleas for American intervention.36 Their silence was based on the 
logic that the Communists' control in the GDR was too comprehensive for the 
uprising to have any realistic chance of success. Without strong political 
experiences of 1953, see Memorandum, "Radio Free Europe," box 7, Alpha, Subject, Staff 
Secretary, WHO, DDEL. 
34 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 19 June 1953; Allen Dulles, MemCon, NSC Meeting, 19 June 
1953; MemCon, NSC Meeting, 25 June 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 8:66. Despite Dulles's predictions, 
the ultimate suppression of the uprising led to a strengthening of Ulbricht' s regime. Arnulf 
Baring has suggested that, paradoxically, the very riots that revealed Ulbricht' s weakness also 
guaranteed his power in that Moscow could not take the risk of replacing him and appearing 
to make concessions. Baring, Uprising in East Germany, p.109-110. Some have argued that 
Lavrenti Beria' s removal resulting from his "failures" in relation to the uprising was the more 
important factor in strengthening Ulbricht's position. Gaddis, We Now Know, p.150; Murphy, 
Battleground Berlin, pp.141, 174-178. See also Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession and 
Upheavals in East-Central Europe," pp.40-55. 
35 "Statement by the President Regarding a Grant of Additional Aid to West Berlin," 18 
June 1953, Public Papers: Eisenhower: 1 953, pp.445-446. 
36 Adenauer to Eisenhower, 21 June 195.3, FRUS 1952-54, 7(2) :1591; Eisenhower to 
Adenauer, 25 June 1953, ibid., p.1593; Brandt, My Road to Berlin, pp.235-239. See also 
Eisenhower press conference, 1 July 1953, Public Papers: Eisenlzmver: 1 953, pp.126-127; 
Eisenhower to Adenauer, 25 July 1953, ibid., pp.516-520. 
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leadership such as had been provided by Tito in Yugoslavia, Eisenhower and 
his senior advisers considered the East German uprising as symptomatic of a 
general weakening in the Kremlin's control over its satellite states, but not in 
itself presenting an immediate crisis that might topple the Soviet regime. The 
United States could fan the flames of discontent but, as Jackson told the NSC, 
if they did so, heads would roll. In short, U.S. intervention could result in 
nothing other than a net loss. As much as Jackson would have liked to take 
· the opportunity presented to the American propaganda machine by the East 
German riots, even with the resources of the PSB at his disposal he could not 
develop a strong plan for tangible action meeting with the President's 
approval.37 Eisenhower, while wanting to cause the Soviets every possible 
difficulty, said that he did not wish to kill America's friends by encouraging 
them to risk their lives in a doomed venture. As Eleanor Dulles noted, "We 
had no moral right to ask people to risk their lives for a cause which in all 
probability was doomed to complete failure." In the face of almost half a 
million well trained, fully armed Soviet troops, it would only lead to their 
slaughter.38 If the revolts became more serious and widespread, threatening 
the Soviet Union itself, or even China, Eisenhower believed the United States 
would then be justified to intervene. Until that time though, he judged that 
overt American intervention faced a strong probability of backfiring and a 
significant loss of American prestige and European confidence. It was not yet 
time, he said, to "roll them out for keeps."39 
37 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 19 June 1953; MemCon, NSC Meeting, 25 June 1953. Jackson, 
MemCon of Telephone Conversation with Dulles, 17 June 1953, box 10, Telephone Calls, John 
Foster Dulles Papers, DDEL. The NSC did, however, approve a PSB report titled PSB D-45 
"Interim U.S. Psychological Strategy Plan for Exploitation of Unrest in Satellite Europe,' 
which it designated as NSC 158, but the action it envisaged remained limited. It was further 
refined for the NSC meeting the following week, but still did not meet the expectations of 
Eisenhower and Dulles. PSB D-45, 22 June 1953 and revised version 29 June 1953, box 6, PSB 
Working Papers 1951-53, RG 59, NA. 
38 Eleanor Lansing Dulles recorded interview by John T. Mason, Jr., 27 September 1964, 
OHP, DDEL. 
39 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 1 9 June 1953; MemCon, Meeting, 26 June 1953. 
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While not openly endorsing the riots, Eisenhower, Dulles, and Jackson 
believed that the uprising had dealt a blow to the legitimacy of the Soviet 
position, and quietly relished the irony that the workers of the GDR - dubbed 
the "workers' paradise" by Communist propaganda -were protesting against 
their working conditions. They believed that without a moral mandate the 
Soviets could not consent to a four-power conference to deal with the issue of 
Germany and Berlin, and that effectively the East Berliners had "pulled out 
· the rug from under the Kremlin."40 Eisenhower, who had repeatedly 
expressed his refusal to attend a four-power meeting until significant progress 
had been made, hoped to use the East German riots as an pretext to quell his 
own allies' calls, especially Churchill's, for just such a meeting.41 Dulles, 
though, was careful to avoid accepting the public perception of the riots as the 
first steps in the disintegration of the Eastern European satellites and, like his 
brother, saw the "softening" of control by the Soviets more as a deliberate 
tactic to step up the pace of their diplomatic "peace" campaign.42 But the riots 
did strengthen American propaganda calling for general elections in the 
whole of Germany. More importantly, Dulles believed that the riots had 
presented a sharp dilemma for the Soviets in that they forced Moscow to take 
either a more lenient or a tougher line. Either way, though, the West could 
expect imminent action. It was hard to predict what that move might be, 
possibly involving a proposal to remove all foreign forces from Germany or a 
renewal of calls for the neutralization and unification of Germany, but recent 
Soviet actions, including an apparent desire for an armistice in Korea and 
recalling twenty top Soviet officials from East Germany, seemed to indicate 
that some action was indeed imminent. Dulles also believed that the disorder 
had made any latent possibilities of eventual attack on Berlin by East German 
paramilitary forces even more remote, although HICOG raised the prospect 
that the uprising may have been a carefully fabricated disturbance to offer the 
40 Jackson, MemCon, NSC Meeting, 19 June 1953. 
41 Ibid. 
Changing Direction f 166 
Soviets the pretext of either sealing off East Berlin or for militarily taking over 
the entire city.43 Generally, U.S. officials hoped that the inability of Ulbricht's 
regime to quell the uprisings without Soviet tanks had convinced the Kremlin 
that Soviet control over East Germany could be assured only by the presence 
of Soviet troops and that East Germany would be unreliable in the event of 
war. Such an assessment, Washington concluded, would prevent a Soviet 
withdrawal from Eastern Germany and the consequent challenge to U.S. 
national security it would pose.44 
In the wake of the riots, U.S. officials continued to watch the Eastern 
satellites closely for any signs of significant change, while at the same time re­
evaluating the place of Rollback in U.S. national security policy. 
Simultaneously, the administration had to fend off accusations directed 
towards both itself and Adenauer of depraved indifference. Jackson worried 
that "the very thing that was so gratifying, i.e. that these German 
developments were spontaneous and not engineered from the outside, is now 
about to boomerang because we have not moved in." 45 In response, the 
administration sought means, short of actual intervention, to display its 
support for the people of Berlin and East Germany. At Adenauer's 
suggestion, a highly successful food programme was jointly initiated in early 
July by the Federal Republic and the United States.46 As well, other 
-i2 Dulles to Embassy Czechoslovakia, 6 July 1953, FRUS 1 952-54, 8:69. 
43 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 3 July 1953, box 4, Summaries of Discussion, NSC, PSF, DDEL. 
"NSC Progress Report by the SecState on the Implementation of NSC 132/1," 10 September 
1953, box 3, Policy Papers, NSC, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, WHO, DDEL; 
HICOG, "Alternative Courses of Developments Arising Out of June 16 Uprisings in East 
Germany," 25 June 1953, FRUS 1 952-54, 7(2) :1595-1596. 
44 NSC 160/1 .  See also Allen Dulles's comments to the NSC as recorded in MemCon, NSC 
Meeting, 9 July 1953, box 4, NSC, Whitman, DDEL. 
45 Jackson to Eisenhower, "East Germany," 3 July 1953, FRUS 1 952-54, 7(2) :1608. 
46 Conant to Dulles, 2 July 1953, FRUS 1 952-54, 7(2):1600-1602; Riddleberger to Smith, 
"Food for East Germany," 7 July 1953, ibid., pp.1611-1613, 1614ff. Original estimates had been 
to supply one million food parcels per month to residents of the Soviet zone. However, in the 
first two days of the programme over 200,000 Soviet zone residents collected parcels from 
West Berlin. Debate ensued amongst the Western allies on the correct level of publicity to 
give the programme without provoking the Kremlin. MemCons, Informal PSB Meetings, 8 
July 1953 and 15 July 1953, box 7, PSB Working Papers 1951-53, RG 59, NA; Merchant to 
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programmes to exploit the propaganda aspects of the Berlin situation were 
initiated in the form of " information activities" such as free exhibits, including 
a spectacularly popular exhibit on the "Atoms for Peace" programme, 
scholarship funds for some East German students to attend Berlin's Free 
University, and encouraging commemoration of the June riots. 
Accordingly, in the short-term, the experience of the June riots taught 
U.S. policymakers the high risks of Rollback - risks which were again 
demonstrated in 1956 in Hungary. Bohlen's warnings about the problems of 
publicly declaring " liberation" an objective of U.S. foreign policy appeared to 
be warranted, and were strongly supported by some in Washington, 
including Robert Bowie, and by the American ambassadors in Western 
Europe, especially Conant, who took the opportunity of a meeting in 
September 1953 to voice strong criticism of what they held was the 
disproportionate and dangerous influence of Washington's psychological 
warriors.47 Yet, as John Ausland, who later headed Kennedy's Berlin Task 
force but in 1953 was assigned to State's Bureau of German Affairs, remarked, 
"the uprising had a lasting influence on our thinking." In fact, he said, "it can 
even be said that much of our planning was directed toward preparing for a 
repetition of those events."48 The uprising appeared to offer some evidence 
that not only were organized underground movements in existence, but they 
could also be effective in the GDR and potentially in other parts of Eastern 
Europe.49 Some even speculated that the riots indicated a window of 
opportunity for Washington's German policy by demonstrating that Soviet 
control over the GDR was weaker than at any time since 1948. In October 1953 
Ausland assessed the long-term impact of the riots: 
The demonstrations in Soviet Occupied Germany in June indicate 
that it is possible to defy Soviet power. Unfortunately, however, they 
Under Secretary, "Proposal to Extend Offer of Food Supplies to Eastern European Satellites," 
14 July 1953, box 8, ibid.; Phillips to Under Secretary, 15 July 1953, ibid. 
47 See Hershberg, James B. Conant, pp.662-663. 
48 Ausland, Kennedy, Khruslzclzev, and the Berlin-�uba Crisis, p.109. 
49 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 9 July 1953, box 4, NSC, Whitman, DDEL. 
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also showed (as has been generally recognized all along) that 
successful revolt against a communist regime backed up by Soviet 
armed forces is not possible without support from the outside. Even 
within these limits, the June events indicated that we are in a position 
to influence significantly - under certain circumstances - what 
happens in Soviet Occupied Germany . . . .  The right program at the 
right time can redound to our benefit. In other words, the Soviet 
position in Germany is by no means impregnable, and western 
actions can take advantage of its weaknesses.so 
Over the course of the following years the lessons of the riots were 
. incorporated into official policy. In an amendment to NSC 160/1, the official 
policy paper for U.S. objectives for Germany, the NSC resolved to encourage 
the East German people to resist Ulbricht' s regime passively, but avoid 
incitements to violence or to action because these would result in a net loss, 
or, as Conant put it "to keep the pot simmering but not bring it to a boil."51 
Berlin was still a potent symbol of the Free World, but one that had to be 
treated a little more carefully. The administration would support passive 
moves such as defection and peaceful demonstrations, but would go to 
considerable effort to avoid the impression that the United States was issuing 
blanket support for anti-Soviet demonstrations. 
New Contingency Planning 
In the aftermath of the June riots the Eisenhower administration 
undertook a fundamental review of its policy to cope with a potential 
challenge to its commitment to the city. This constituted the second path of 
the first Eisenhower administration's consideration of the Berlin problem and 
was prompted partly by recognition that further internal disturbances might 
provoke the Soviets to clamp down on the GDR. 
so Ausland to Morris, 27 October 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 7(2) :1665. 
s1 Annex to NSC 160/1 "Supplementary Statement of Policy by the NSC on U.S. Policy 
Toward East Germany," 12 September 1956, box 6, Policy Papers, NSC, Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, WHO, DDEL; Conant quoted in Hershberg, James B. Conant, p.660. 
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Truman had, albeit reluctantly, based Berlin policy on the assumption 
that a long-term airlift was the keystone to a successful Berlin policy. If, 
during his remaining time in office the Soviets reimposed the blockade, he 
planned to wait them out as he had done in 1948-1949. However, in late 1953 
and early 1954 Washington rejected this approach. Eisenhower saw the issue 
as more urgent, expressing serious doubts about the long-term effectiveness 
of the airlift. In the first instance his objections were on the basis of 
expediency, because an airlift, he maintained, would not force the Soviets to 
lift the blockade. Furthermore, an ongoing airlift would create the impression 
that the United States had accepted the imposition of a blockade and its 
inability to do anything about it; it would be a de facto recognition of defeat. 
Additionally, the Korean War had demonstrated the logistical difficulties of 
maintaining the military capabilities required to implement the undertaking. 
Consequently, Eisenhower's Berlin policy, as it was eventually spelled out in 
NSC 5404/1 "U.S. Policy on Berlin," rested on the basis that in the event of a 
new blockade the United States would act quickly and decisively, with an 
airlift planned only to supplement other, more positive measures. A new 
challenge, the administration believed, required a new, more positive 
approach. 
The key period for this revision of contingency policy came in late 
1953. In the course of two meetings spread over a three-month period, the 
NSC comprehensively re-wrote its contingency policy. This was not so much 
prompted by predictions of an imminent crisis as it was by the 
administration's efforts to protect against Soviet capabilities rather than 
intentions.52 Most observers, including Bohlen, believed that the new leaders in 
the Kremlin would be more rational and flexible than Stalin, and saw no 
blockade of Berlin on Moscow's agenda. At the same time, they also 
recognized that the situation should be watched closely. The United States 
could not afford to be caught unprepared largely because the value of the 
52 See particularly Garthoff, Assessing tlze AdversanJ. 
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American presence in the city had by no means lessened - if anything it had 
increased through American efforts to take advantage of the situation.53 
The review of Berlin policy was sparked by discussions associated 
with the formulation of German policy as a whole. As the administration 
sought ways to secure the ratification of EDC from the French and German 
governments and struggled with the perennial problem of German 
reunification, the issue of Berlin was again raised in the NSC. NSC 132/1 
specified that "the Western powers should avoid the use of force unless and 
until necessity dictates." While technically the Eisenhower administration still 
subscribed to this basic principle, it soon began to lower the threshold of what 
it saw as "necessity." 
Although drafted only twelve months previously, NSC 132/1 rested on 
assumptions that were not shared by the Eisenhower administration. As part 
of a general review process, on 1 October 1953 Dulles presented to the NSC a 
progress report on the implementation of NSC 132/1 .  He reported that 
substantial progress had been made in decreasing Berlin's vulnerability to a 
blockade, mainly through stockpiling and preparations. Plans had been 
developed by military authorities for both a token and a full-scale airlift. 
Politico-military planning with the British, French, and West Germans had 
been progressing well, but was hampered particularly by a reluctance on the 
part of the British and French to commit in advance to countermeasures or 
specific reprisals. A venues were also being discussed to simplify the Allied 
command structure by making all Western Allied forces in Berlin subject to a 
single chain of command in the event of an emergency. Furthermore, West 
Berlin's police now numbered 15,000.54 Yet, despite the impressive economic 
revitalization of the Federal Republic, economic conditions within Berlin, 
53 Bohlen, MemCon, NSC Meeting, 1 October 1953, box 4, Summaries of Meetings, NSC, 
PSF, DDEL. 
54 Interestingly, this "police" force was trained in the use of mortars and bazookas. In June 
1950 the Americans supplied them with tear gas as well. Jones (HICOG Berlin) to HICOG 
Frankfurt, 8 June 1950, box 5, General (Subject) 1949-52, U.S. Sec., Allied High Command, U.S. 
HICOG, RG 466, NA. 
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although improving, remained difficult, a situation the Soviets appeared 
intent on aggravating.55 A quarter of the city's labour force was unemployed, 
and exports from the city covered only two-thirds of the value of imports, 
meaning that the city was in constant need of external aid. A constant stream 
of refugees, peaking at over 2,000 per day in March, or 30,000 a month, added 
to the ranks of the unemployed and homeless, and placed further strain on 
the resources of the Western sectors .56 This again raised the ever-present 
problem of maintaining the Berliners' morale. At the same time, the 
administration was looking for ways to rationalize and reduce its financial 
outlay for the city. This made it particularly urgent to reassure Berlin's 
55 HICOG Berlin reported in June 1950 that over the previous 3 months there had been a 
reduction of over 30,000 in West Berlin's unemployed but that it still remained at almost 24 
percent. The reduction was attributed primarily to an emergency public works programme 
initiated in mid-April. Jones (HICOG Berlin) to HICOG Frankfurt, 12 June 1950, box 5, 
General Records (Subject), U.S. Secretary, Allied High Commission, U.S. HICOG, RG 466, 
NA. For the reduction in unemployment in the FRG, see McCloy to Acheson, 6 June 1950, box 
5, General (Subject) 1949-52, U.S. Sec, Allied High Commission, U.S. HICOG, RG 466, NA. For 
the Western allies' complaints that the Soviets were further isolating the Western sectors, see 
Gaugain to Secretary General Allied General Secretariat, "General Situation in West Berlin," 
23 March 1953, box 1, Misc Files on Berlin, ExecSec, RG 466, NA. 
56 For a detailed breakdown of the numbers of refugees in March and April 1953, see 
Gaugain to Secretary General Allied General Secretariat, "The Berlin Refugee Problem," 23 
March 1953, box 1, Misc Files on Berlin, ExecSec, RG 466, NA; E.B. Maguire to HICOG, 
. "Refugee Figures for West Berlin," 28 April 1953, box 7, ibid.; Lyon to Conant, 23 March 1953, 
ibid. For an even earlier influential and comprehensive discussion of the problem, see 
McAuliffe, "The Refugee Problem in Berlin," July 1950, box 7, Misc Files on Berlin, ExecSec, 
RG 466, NA. The problems of dealing with these refugees remained an issue until August 
1961 when the city was sealed. Most of these refugees were evacuated to the Federal Republic 
but many thousands remained in the city as "non-recognized" refugees. The problem was not 
so much one of finance as it was of space and Berlin morale. The U.S. administration was 
aware that existing policies were not enough and that a suitable solution had to be found. 
Several attempts at financing construction of accommodation were partially successful but 
did not provide long-term relief and risked souring the hopes of the satellite peoples. During 
a June 1953 NSC meeting Eisenhower made the curious suggestion of transporting them, at 
U.S. expense, to Brazil, Argentina, or Uruguay, all of which, he said, needed people. 
MemCon, NSC Meeting, 25 June 1953. Generally the exodus of people from the Soviet zone 
was seen in the West as positive. Conversely, in early 1956, Jacob Kaiser, the Federal 
Republic's Minister for All-German Affairs, told Herbert Hoover, Jr., U.S. Under Secretary of 
State, that he was disturbed by the refugee problem in that he would have preferred that anti­
communists stay in the Soviet zone and maintain some sort of resistance to the Pankow 
regime. MemCon, Hoover, Kaiser, Conant, et al, 5 February 1956, FRUS 1 955-57, 26:413. See 
also FRUS 1 952-54, 7:1307-1309, 1316-1317; Hershberg, "'Explosion in the Offing'," pp.520; 
Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs, 1945-53, trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1965), pp.446-447; Robert M. Macy to Cutler, 19 May 1953, box 6, NSC, SA for 
NSAff, WHO, DDEL. 
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population of the continued interest of the United States in their security and 
welfare and to emphasize the relatively favourable support they received in 
comparison to other countries.57 
Eisenhower's reaction to Dulles's report was that while NSC 132/1 was 
strong policy it simply did not go far enough. He believed that a reimposition 
of the blockade by the Soviets would be a slap in the face that would call for 
war. In view of this he was concerned that there were too many preliminary 
steps before the issue of resorting to general war was plainly faced. If they 
· were to pursue the steps currently planned, he said, it would make the United 
States appear to be the aggressor, a particularly dangerous problem in view of 
what he perceived as a decline in U.S. prestige abroad. Although he saw no 
visible dark cloud on the Berlin horizon, he could never be sure that what the 
Soviets had done once they would not do again, and that it was his view that 
if the United States acquiesced to a new blockade it would sacrifice its 
leadership of the Free World. Jackson also voiced strong objections to NSC 
132/1 for the same reasons, while Dulles doubted that the Kremlin would 
order another blockade if the United States made its position perfectly clear in 
advance. Radford said that the only meeting of the NSC he had attended prior 
to his appointment was a meeting at which Clay had been personally 
reported on the first Soviet blockade. At that time Clay had recommended 
breaking the blockade with military force. Radford said that, quite bluntly, he 
believed Clay's course had been the right one then, and it would be the right 
one now.5s 
In view of these stronger opinions the President directed the NSC' s 
Planning Board to review NSC 132/1 .  Precisely two months later, the review, 
in which State's influence was clearly evident, was submitted to the NSC as 
NSC 173 uu.s. Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or 
57 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 1 October 1953. For the heavily sanitized memcon, see FRUS 
1952-54, 7(2):1364-1365. For the recently declassified full text, see box 4, Summaries of 
Meetings, NSC, PSF, DDEL. 
58 Ibid. 
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Satellite Courses of Action Against Berlin." It essentially refined some of the 
points of NSC 132/ l, again calling for a four-stage reaction where military 
force was not recommended until the fourth stage, when the Western position 
in Berlin had become untenable or was about to become untenable, and only 
after all other options had been exhausted. There were, however, several 
refinements reflecting the changed situation during the twelve months since 
NSC 132/1 was drafted. The review saw a less immediate threat of military 
action against Berlin and more of a threat of the Soviets giving the East 
· Germans the "juridical semblance of autonomy." The report also placed more 
emphasis on global reprisals such as coordinated covert operations.s9 
Yet NSC 173 was almost identical in both wording and sentiment as 
the paper it was designed to replace, and it was immediately rejected by the 
President and the Joint Chiefs as being too weak - a rejection the NSC' s 
executive secretary, Robert Cutler, blamed on inadequate guidance. The basis 
of their criticism was that the measures of gradual escalation recommended in 
the report were likely to lead the military to "inconclusive actions under 
conditions likely to result only in embarrassment to the Allies and 
vulnerability to charges of vacillation or outright weakness." Buoyed by 
confidence of the recent process of rearming, the Joint Chiefs said that a new 
blockade should be viewed in a different light from that of 1948-1949. The 
military posture of the Allies then had been too weak to assert their rights of 
access, a weakness that they considered had since been rectified. There could 
be no doubt, the Joint Chiefs asserted, that the Western powers were in a 
stronger military position relative to the Soviet bloc than in 1949. Although 
the airlift of 1948-1949 had been widely regarded as a political and 
psychological victory for the West, "the acceptance by the Allies of such a 
situation now would not only constitute a political setback of considerable 
proportions but would undoubtedly be widely interpreted as a sign of 
weakness vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc, with consequent injurious effects upon 
59 NSC 173. 
Changing Direction I 174 
United States prestige and leadership world-wide, and upon the 
determination of free peoples everywhere to resist Soviet domination." 
Furthermore, they said, Soviet advances in technology and contingency 
planning meant that an airlift would be unlikely to force the Soviets to lift the 
blockade. Radford therefore pushed for immediate agreement that they could 
not and should not duplicate the airlift of 1948. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs 
recommended that rather than being the fourth and last stage of response, 
limited military force should now be their first reaction.60 The President 
disclosed that he had independently come to the same conclusion, and 
revealed that, in his view, Clay had been right in 1948 when he recommended 
an armed convoy to test the blockade and to re-establish ground access to the 
city, a position which, interestingly, Clay had long since abandoned.61 They 
should not fall into the trap, Eisenhower said, of spending money and 
resources on airlifts and other countermeasures before undertaking to probe 
and find out the true intent of the Soviets in initiating a new blockade. The 
expectation that the United States could afford to wait ride out a new 
blockade for anywhere from six months to two years, Eisenhower held, was 
quite simply unacceptable.62 They must take a much stiffer attitude and call 
Moscow's hand as soon as possible because, as the Joint Chiefs said, "any 
60 Radford to SecDefense, "NSC 173," 9 December 1953, box 8, Policy Papers, NSC, Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, WHO, DDEL. Though signed by Radford and issued 
as the views of the JCS, the Joint Chiefs had not actually written this memorandum since they 
were "too busy with other things," but it did accurately represent a partial and mild version 
of their views that were more fully explained in the succeeding weeks. See Radford to 
SecDefense, 19 January 1954, box 8, Policy Papers, Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, WHO, DDEL. A curious exchange took place between Cutler and Dulles at the NSC 
meeting on 11 December 1953 during which Cutler tried several times, unsuccessfully, to 
explain to Dulles the difference between the two views on employing limited military force _ 
that NSC 173 and NSC 132/ 1 had recommended it only as a fourth stage of the West's 
reaction while the President and the Joint Chiefs now suggested that it should be employed 
before any other response. Dulles failed to see any difference between the two plans. 
MemCon, NSC Meeting, 11 December 1953. For the heavily sanitized MemCon where only 
the financial appendix of NSC 5404/1 is discussed, see FRUS 1 952-54. For the recently 
declassified full text see box 5, Summaries of Meetings, NSC, PSF, DDEL. 
61 For another, later explicit expression of this view, see MemCon, Eisenhower, Brandt, et 
al., 11 February 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:19. Eisenhower's position is curious considering that he 
had been present at the 1948 meeting during which Clay's plan was rejected. 
62 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 11 December 1953. 
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wavering or hesitancy to take positive action might well encourage the 
Soviets to intensifying [sic] their harassing measures and to solidify their 
position, possibly leading to a miscalculation which might well increase the 
chances of the situation evolving into general war." 63 What was more, 
Eisenhower warned, a prolonged Berlin crisis would greatly increase the risk 
of the United States shouldering the blame for any war that might eventuate. 
Consequently, he ordered the NSC to prepare a policy paper that provided 
everything in readiness in advance, but one which left the ultimate decision as 
· to what was actually done taken in light of circumstances which existed at the 
time, since it was impossible to foresee how the situation would shape up. 
Although reluctant to place a definite time limit on the supply of Berlin in the 
event of crisis, planning proceeded on the basis that such a situation would be 
allowed to exist for no more than three months. 64 
The re-written policy paper was submitted in January 1954 as NSC 
5404/1 "U.S. Policy on Berlin." Although a few years later the President was 
to caution the Joint Chiefs against misunderstanding the military' s role in U.S. 
foreign policy, in that it was a tool and not a policymaking body,65 the Joint 
Chiefs had been the primary influence in the drafting of NSC 5404/1 .  It 
reflected the more aggressive attitude previously expressed by Radford, with 
strong recommendations that the United States respond to any new Berlin 
crisis "vigorously," "quickly," "forcefully," and "promptly." In essence, the 
report said that the United States could not afford to sit back and allow the 
Soviets to maintain the initiative. It continued by pointing out that things had 
changed since 1949. The military readiness of the Western Allies in Europe 
had been considerably improved, the Kremlin had been put on notice that any 
action against Berlin would be met with a determined resistance, the stockpile 
had been built up making the city less immediately vulnerable, the Soviets 
had taken measures to minimize the effect of a counterblockade, and Soviet 
63 Radford to SecDefense, 19 January 1954. 
64 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 11 December 1953. 
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technological capabilities, particularly in the field of electromagnetic warfare, 
cast in doubt the long-term effectiveness of an airlift. All of these factors 
meant that while an airlift could probably sustain Berlin for a considerable 
period of time, it was unlikely to force the Soviets to lift the blockade and 
would lead to a de facto recognition of America's inability to do anything 
about it. The NSC recognized that the airlift of 1948-1949 had pinned U.S. 
prestige as "leader of the free world" on their ability and determination to 
remain in Berlin. Therefore, a withdrawal at this point would be even more 
·costly than it would have been in 1948-1949. Because of this, the Joint Chiefs 
saw that "the period between initiation of aggressive actions and the 'show 
down' is likely to be short" requiring diplomatic, military, and mobilization 
actions to be accelerated. The report also placed a greater emphasis on the use 
of "limited military force," a term later defined by Defense as "sufficient to 
determine definitely Soviet intentions by drawing Soviet fire or by otherwise 
compelling the Soviets to choose between permitting or resisting with force 
the passage of the U.S. forces along the Autobahn."66 
Insofar as specific measures to strengthen the West's position in the 
city, NSC 5404/1 initiated an intensified Berlin programme which included 
improving the relationship with the local authorities, reviewing stockpiling 
procedures to place less dependence on an airlift, providing limited economic 
aid with the aim of bolstering the city's morale and reducing unemployment, 
and perfecting both unilateral and multilateral contingency plans. As well as 
these essentially defensive measures the NSC looked to take advantage of the 
situation by exploiting the "unrivalled propaganda advantages" by allocating 
funds for special projects designed to influence the people of the Soviet zone 
65 Eisenhower quoted in Cook, Declassified Eisenhower, p.210. 
66 NSC 5404/1 " U.S. Policy on Berlin," 25 January 1954, box 8, Policy Papers, NSC, Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, WHO, DDEL. The specific force required to achieve 
this objective was deemed to be one motorized rifle platoon to accompany motor convoys 
from Berlin or from Berlin and Helmstadt, and one reinforced rifle platoon on each train. R.B. 
Anderson to Dulles, 25 May 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 26:384-385. 
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and sector, intensifying intelligence activities, and consolidating British and 
French support.67 
The most troublesome aspects of the Berlin problem were those to do 
with the British and French. Existing policy required a united effort from the 
Allies, but despite their initial enthusiasm in the immediate postwar years for 
U.S. intervention in Europe, the British and French had consistently restrained 
the United States in 1948-1949, a vulnerability that the Soviets could 
conceivably exploit. London and Paris had repeatedly displayed their 
reluctance to support the United States in courses of action which could 
potentially lead to war without ample evidence that all other options had 
been exhausted. 68 This was, by definition, a time-consuming process and 
conflicted with the urgency of the situation as the NSC now saw it. 
Furthermore, the French were deeply distracted by their ongoing difficulties 
in Indochina. Consequently, the NSC determined that although Allied 
cooperation would remain desirable u the United States must be prepared to 
act alone if this will serve its best interests." 69 In the event that the Soviets or 
East Germans imposed a blockade, U.S. policymakers hoped for British and 
French support but did not count on it. They were prepared to act 
unilaterally. If the Soviets did in fact impose a blockade, the United States 
would issue an ultimatum threatening the use of force if the blockade were 
not lifted and send through an armed probe to assess Soviet intentions. They 
would also initiate mobilization with the dual purpose of persuading the 
Kremlin of the seriousness of the situation as well as to be ready in the event 
of war.7o If war did eventuate they recognized that Berlin was ultimately 
indefensible and they therefore resolved not to send any more troops there 
but would rather mobilize for general war. 
67 NSC 5404/1 .  As with many other policy papers of the time, attached to NSC 5404/ 1 was 
a financial appendix that detailed the economic implications of the American Berlin policy. 
68 See Murphy, Battleground Berlin, pp.82-84. 
69 Ibid. 
70 "Boggs Diary Entry of 265th NSC Meeting," 19 November 1955, box 8, Policy Papers, 
NSC, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, WHO, DDEL. 
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However, implementing NSC 5404/1 was more difficult. The 
stockpiling and propaganda programmes proceeded well, but the 
international aspects of the policy proved far more troublesome. The British 
and French continued to support trilateral expressions of support for Berlin, 
but baulked at the prickly issue of " limited military force." Fully aware of 
their allies' sensitivity to this issue, U.S. policymakers and diplomats were 
concerned that initiating discussions on the use of force might jeopardize 
other negotiations, and therefore repeatedly delayed raising the issue. 
Nevertheless, the administration considered it important to initiate tripartite 
consultations on course of action to deal with a challenge, although the final 
decision would be made in light of prevailing circumstances. Yet, difficulties 
in such an approach were anticipated, with strong indications being that 
London considered an airlift as the only proper response to a reimposed 
blockade. American policymakers hoped to inform London and Paris of their 
new position after the Geneva Conference scheduled for early 1954 and after 
securing French ratification of the EDC. Until such time as they could broach 
the subject, however, the changes to America's Berlin policy were to be a 
closely guarded secret.71 However, the Geneva Conference, as the Berlin CFM 
a few months earlier had been, was undermined by ongoing conflict in the Far 
East, problems that offered little hope of a short-term solution. With France 
and Britain both preoccupied with prospects of widespread challenges to 
their colonial authority, the changes to Washington's Berlin contingency 
planning were never raised. Moreover, Washington recognized that the 
British were increasingly disinclined to risk war for Berlin, while the French 
were increasingly insistent on maintaining their independence of action and 
therefore resisted moves towards pre-arranged contingency plans.72 
Yet, by May 1954 the pressure to raise the changes with the British and 
French was mounting. Airlift planning and the stockpile programmes were 
71 OCB, "Progress Report on NSC 5404/1," 30 April 1954. 
72 Burr, " Avoiding the Slippery Slope," pp.182. 
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nearing the final stages of completion, and the modifications that were called 
for under NSC 5404/1 had to be made almost immediately. It seemed 
doubtful that these modifications could be made without clearly revealing 
that U.S. policy on Berlin had changed or, at minimum, arousing suspicions. 
Then it would be impossible to explain the modifications to the British and 
French without disclosing the new policy.73 Nevertheless, the administration 
did its best to develop ways in which the new policy could be implemented 
secretly, without arousing the suspicions of the British or French, and 
continued to prepare for a unilateral defence of its interests.74 
With NSC 5404/1 in place, reflecting a tougher stand on Berlin 
contingency planning, Eisenhower was confident that he could deter, or at 
least cope with any new crisis over Berlin.75 But events forced a re-evaluation 
of American policy towards Europe more generally. The most important 
episode was the collapse of the EDC. In August 1954, two years after the EDC 
treaty had been signed, the French legislature finally rejected it.76 The United 
States had pinned much on the ratification of the treaty, and its rejection 
dispelled any hopes Eisenhower held for meaningful reductions to the 
American military and financial commitment to Europe. It forced Washington 
to rely on policies that, though in place, it had hoped would become 
redundant with the implementation of the EDC. Many argued that the failure 
of the EDC demonstrated that the United States should shed any lingering 
73 In fact, during meetings on 11 and 12 May 1955 with the British and French 
ambassadors, both representatives asked whether the United States had any specific plans for 
and definition of "limited use of force." The United States responded that there were no 
specific ideas but merely a desire for agreement in principle to planning such action. The 
same report claimed that Defense had prepared plans for unilaterally employing such use of 
force. OCB, "Progress Report on NSC 5404/ 1," 31 July 1955, FRUS 1 955-57, 26:394. 
74 OCB, Progress Report on NSC 5404/1, 30 April 1954. 
75 The Joint Chiefs advised on 29 December 1954 that they had implemented the military 
aspects of NSC 5404/1 in actions designated JCS 1907 /112. See B.L. Austin to Radford, 31 July 
1957, box 9, Radford, Chairman's File, RG 218, NA. 
76 See Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.120-125; Rolf Steininger, "John Foster Dulles, the 
European Defense Community, and the German Question," in John Foster Dulles and tlze 
Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. Immerman, pp.79-108; Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, 
pp.90-108; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, (London: Heinemann, 1963), pp.398-
404. 
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dependency on British or French timely participation in Cold War actions, 
and it became increasingly clear that America's policy towards Berlin needed 
to be unilateral and self-sufficient until such time as its "educational work" in 
convincing London and Paris of the value of West Berlin came to fruition.77 
Moreover, Radford and Allen Dulles warned the NSC that Berlin would be a 
trouble spot in the near future as the Kremlin moved to exploit the differences 
between Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn that the EDC debate had 
exposed. With tension again rising in the Soviet zone, and further harassment 
· and restrictions on access to Berlin appearing likely, several in Washington 
'
expressed fears that another blockade was imminent. In such circumstances 
the strained Western alliance could become a dangerous liability. The British 
and French had dragged their feet long enough, Radford said, and, allies or 
not, if they could not be coaxed to toe the line the NSC should review its 
existing policy to make it even less dependent on British and French 
participation.78 
Through 1955 the NSC continued to direct considerable effort towards 
trying to undermine Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Having had the 
limitations of Rollback clearly demonstrated in June 1953, the stated objective 
of American political warfare efforts became not so much to cause a dramatic 
collapse of the Soviet bloc as to influence the choices that the Soviet leaders 
made, and to push them towards some sort of detente. Washington 
recognized that a direct confrontation would be counter-productive, and that 
77 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 26 February 1954, box 5, NSC, Whitman, DDEL; "German 
Policy Paper," 4 August 1953. Attached to Lay to NSC, 10 August 1953, box 6, Policy Papers, 
NSC, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, WHO, DDEL; NSC 5433/1 "Immediate 
U.S. Policy Toward Europe," 16 September 1954, box 13, Policy Papers, NSC, Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, WHO, DDEL; OCB, "Progress Report on NSC 
5404/1," 14 September 1955; Radford to SecDefense, 8 May 1956, box 8, Policy Papers, NSC, 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, WHO, DDEL. See Trachtenberg, Constrncted 
Peace, pp.125-200. For the British perspective, see Saki Dockrill, "Retreat from the Continent? 
Britain's Motives for Troop Reductions in West Germany, 1 955-1958," Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 20, 3 (September 1997): 45-70. 
78 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 10 November 1955, FRUS 1 955-57, 26:399-400. The issue of 
combined military planning was actually on Dulles's agenda for discussions with Macmillan 
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U.S. possibilities for action, particularly in East Germany, remained limited 
until such time as there was a basic change in Soviet policy. If the Western 
nations were to have a positive impact on Soviet policy they should maintain 
a dialogue in which alternative courses of action could be suggested. "Making 
a bad situation look worse," the NSC concluded, "will not affect behavior 
(choices) unless the subject sees something it can do about it."79 Nevertheless, 
the NSC determined to maintain pressure on the Eastern satellites by using 
Berlin as the lure. For if the East German people were unlikely in the long­
term to accept the Communist regime imposed upon them, as was often 
claimed in NSC policy papers and discussions, then they might eventually be 
expected to be enticed by Berlin's symbolism to shake off Ulbricht' s regime. 
On the one hand, Berlin could be used as evidence of the strength of Western 
support for eventual reunification in order to reassure the German people, 
while on the other, it could be used to hamper Soviet exploitation of East 
Germany and prevent the consolidation of the regime. Berlin was therefore to 
be maintained "as an example of Western accomplishments and as an island 
of resistance."80 Since diplomatic efforts such as the Geneva Summit of 1955 
demonstrated that diplomacy was still a long way from providing for the 
reunification of Germany, by sustaining West Berlin as a means of contact 
with the Western world Washington kept alive in East Germany the hope for 
an escape from Soviet domination.81 The objectives and methods of 
psychological warfare, then, were scaled back. But Berlin's newly enhanced 
symbolism was already firmly entrenched into Cold War rhetoric, and 
became increasingly so over the next decade. 
and Pinay in Geneva, but he chose again to delay raising the matter. Dulles to State, 12 
November 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 26:401 . 
79 NSC 5505/ 1 "Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities," 18 January 
1955, box 14, Policy Papers, NSC, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, WHO, 
DDEL; Lay to NSC, "Supplement to NSC 160/1 :  Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy Toward 
East Germany," 7 August 1956, box 17, Policy Papers, NSC, Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs, WHO, DDEL; NSC 5608/1 "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in 
Eastern Europe," 18 July 1956, ibid. 
so Supplement to NSC 160/1, 7 August 1956. 
s1 NSC 5608/1 .  
Chapter Six 
Meeting Khrushchev's Challenge, 
1958-1960 
Our position, then, is this: we will not retreat one inch from our 
duty. We shall continue to exercise our right of peaceful passage to 
and from West Berlin. We will not be the first to breach the peace; it 
is the Soviets who threaten the use of force to interfere with such 
free passage. We are ready to participate fully in every sincere effort 
at negotiation that will respect the existing rights of all and their 
opportunity to live in peace. 
--Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1 6  March 1 959 
When the Federal Republic joined NATO in May 1955 shortly after 
attaining its own sovereignty, it marked Bonn's "coming of age" in many 
respects, and ushered in a new period of West Germany's relations with both 
East and West.1 But more importantly, in 1954 NATO had committed itself to 
Berlin's defence. This commitment, reaffirmed in December 1957, formally 
placed West Berlin under NATO's nuclear umbrella.2 Accordingly, Bonn 
1 See Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, esp. pp.231-238. 
2 See especially Trachtenberg, Histon; and Strategy, pp.153-168. 
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secured an institutional guarantee of the West's commitment to Berlin that 
existed in tandem with the continued direct promises of Washington. With 
this formal acknowledgement of Western security interests in the city, the 
pressure to incorporate West Berlin into the Federal Republic temporarily 
subsided. 
Meanwhile, the material situation in Berlin was improving. Though 
still lagging behind many of the other cities of Western Europe, and most 
particularly those of the FRG, the economy of the Western sectors of Berlin 
_ was improving markedly, thanks largely to the vigorous efforts of Bonn and 
Washington.3 Between 1954 and 1956, unemployment halved, commercial 
confidence improved, demand was increased for Berlin's manufactured 
products, and American propaganda programmes continued to receive 
enthusiastic receptions. This general improvement in living conditions, 
however, posed its own problems. It was feared that the improvement of 
Berlin's economy might in fact be detrimental to U.S. interests in that it 
"'dulled somewhat the West Berliners' spirit of militancy and defiance 
characteristic of their attitude during periods of real crisis." It was 
questionable whether the people of Berlin, now relatively prosperous -at 
least comparable to their situation in the immediate postwar years - would be 
willing to tolerate the sacrifices they had in 1948-1949. West Berliners 
appeared to be displaying complacency towards the Communist threat, a 
trend that could potentially confront the Allies with another difficult problem 
by undermining the political justification for the remaining military presence. 
The effect of this was further complicated by Washington's reduction m 
financial aid for the city.4 
3 Smith, Defense of Berlin, pp.131-150; Dulles, Chances of a Lifetime, pp.241-256; Brandt, My 
Road to Berlin, pp.247-263. 
4 OCB "Progress Report on NSC 5404/1," 17 May i956, FRUS 1 955-57, 26:423-430; OCB 
"Progress Report on NSC 5404/1," 31 July 1955, ibid., pp.390-392; "Current Policy on Berlin 
Access," 10 December 1958, box 8, Briefing Notes, NSC, SA for NSAff, WHO, DDEL. See also 
Adenauer to Dulles, 11 December 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:181 . 
Meeting Khrushchev's Challenge I 184 
But more alarming to U.S. officials was the increasingly wide 
recognition that a new threat to Berlin lay less in the prospect of another 
blockade or military attack against the Berlin garrison, than it did in a gradual 
political effort to increase the legitimacy of the GDR. As early as mid-1950, 
U.S. officials had recognized the potential for the Soviets to cause difficulties 
by unilaterally conferring upon the GDR a greater degree of sovereignty.s 
Indeed, Moscow had threatened to do as much as early as 1948. But initially 
the threat appeared less urgent than a reimposed blockade or an attack from 
t�e Volkspolizei Bereitschaften.  In 1954, however, the Soviets announced that 
they regarded the GDR as a sovereign nation. This raised a whole range of 
new factors. Since the United States, urged on by Adenauer, steadfastly 
refused to recognize the GDR, it had to find some line at which it regarded the 
political stability breached. For instance, in the absence of Soviet officials, 
should Western personnel be prepared to identify themselves to GDR 
officials? And if so, then at what point beyond that should the line be drawn? 
Would allowing East Germans to stamp transit documents be any more 
significant than simply inspecting them? In fact, since 1954, Western 
personnel in Germany had instructed to accept GDR officials as Soviet agents, 
albeit under protest.6 By late 1955, however, U.S. officials began to take more 
seriously the political threat that the Soviets might attempt to cede their 
responsibilities to the GDR. Although the Feder.al Republic maintained 
technical contacts with the GDR, Adenauer insisted that recognition of GDR 
officials would be interpreted by the West German electorate as condoning 
the division of Germany and thereby spell his own political death and 
threaten the Western orientation of the FRG. And, since Eisenhower accepted 
s NSC 89 "US Policy with Respect to Berlin and East Germany," 20 October 1950, FRUS 
1950, 4:867-887; OCB "Progress Report on NSC 5404/1," 30 April 1954, box 8, Policy Papers, 
NSC, SA for NSAff, WHO, DDEL; OCB "Progress Report on NSC 5404/1," 29 December 1954, 
ibid. 
6 This had been decided at an Ambassadorial level, and Eisenhower was surprised to learn 
of the this practice in December 1958. He feared that it had set a dangerous precedent upon 
which it was possible Khrushchev was basing his actions. Bruce to Dulles, 9 January 1958, 
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the notion that Adenauer was the linchpin of the pro-Western inclination of 
the FRG, it gave the German chancellor considerable leverage over U.S. 
foreign policy towards Germany.7 As a consequence of this influence, 
Eisenhower assumed the politically difficult position of appearing to be 
unreasonable in his anti-GDR stance, and he was forced to manoeuvre 
between the softer line of the British and the hard line of Adenauer who had 
"developed almost a psychopathic fear of what he considers to be 'British 
weakness. '"s 
The Eisenhower administration generally held that Moscow had 
resigned itself to the division of Germany and that the Soviets were 
concentrating their efforts on stabilizing the GDR regime. Indications of as 
much were becoming increasingly prevalent. Conant became alarmed at 
Soviet officials' references to the GDR as the "master of the roads" in its 
territory. They were also applying pressure to Berlin's trade and 
communications by imposing greater toll charges, moves possibly in 
preparation for a blockade. Conant was moved to express his concern at these 
measures to Dulles. It was all too probable, he held, that the British and the 
French might find the idea of recognizing the GDR acceptable.  But to do so, 
he charged, would not only endorse the division of Germany but would 
imperil the economic life of West Berlin. It was therefore imperative that 
Washington not allow the Soviets to cede responsibility for Western access to 
GDR officials. "In my humble opinion," he wrote, "the day we do that we 
might as well leave Berlin and not many months later we might as well retire 
from Europe too."9 
FRUS 1958-60, 8: 1; MemCon, 11 December 1958, ibid., pp.175-176; Findley Burns, Jr .  to 
Dulles, 12 November 1958, ibid. ,  p.50. 
7 Trachtenberg, History and Strategij, p.178. 
s Eisenhower diary, 27 May 1959, box 41, DDE Diary, Whitman, DDEL. 
9 Conant to Dulles, 21 May 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 26:377; Conant to Merchant, 5 December 
1955, ibid., p.406; Parkman to Conant, 2 April 1955, FR US 1 955-57, 26:353-354; Dulles to 
Conant, 5 April 1955, ibid., pp.354-355; Conant to Dulles, 6 April 1955, ibid., pp.356-358; 
Conant to Dulles, 12 April 1955, ibid., pp.359-362; Conant to Dulles, 18 April 1955, ibid., p .363; 
Parkman to Dulles, 1 May 1955, ibid., pp.367-368; Bruce to Dulles, 9 January 1958, FRUS 1958-
60, 8:1-3. 
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Through 1954 to 1956, American prestige was engaged in places other 
than Berlin. In the crisis over the seemingly insignificant Quemoy and Matsu 
islands just off the coast of mainland China, U.S. policymakers determined 
that- as in the case of Berlin - wider matters were involved. The result of the 
crisis was that it became conceivable that the United States could use nuclear 
weapons to prevent a domino-like effect from Taiwan down through 
Southeast Asia. This led to the peculiar situation where the defence of these 
two tiny islands came to be considered even more significant than U.S. 
policymakers in 1949 had apparently judged the "loss" of the entire mainland 
China. Demonstrating that such a posture was not an aberration, Washington 
assumed a similar stance when the islands were again contested in 1958. This 
time, Dulles openly described the situation as analogous to West Berlin.10 
In 1956, however, the administration's attention was diverted to other, 
more conventional contests. The failed Hungarian uprising, which was 
dramatically quashed by Soviet tanks, again demonstrated the limits of 
Rollback and prompted further re-evaluation of the gap between ideology 
and practice. While in the Middle East, the Suez crisis not only resulted in 
serious tensions in NATO, but also illustrated the difficulties of acting 
without full NATO approval. The type of pressure that the United States had 
brought to bear on the British and French over Suez might conceivably be 
directed at the United States itself if it attempted unilateral action in Berlin. 
This was one of the important elements of a gradual process of re-evaluating 
the need for British and French support for contingency plans. The confidence 
in unilateral action that the Joint Chiefs had expressed in 1953-1954 was being 
considerably - although by no means completely - revised by 1958. 
10 Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis," pp.6-7; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 
pp.169-170; May, "America's Berlin," p.155. For East German fears that the West would 
launch an offensive against Germany once they had dealt with the situation in the Far East, 
see Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose,"' p.15. 
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Massive Retaliation 
As the Eisenhower administration's deterrence posture of Massive 
Retaliation applied to Europe, and the Berlin situation in particular, strategic 
nuclear weapons played an exaggerated part. Inasmuch as it was ever 
possible to wage a " limited war" - something Massive Retaliation regarded as 
remote- Eisenhower held that it would be especially impossible in the 
European context. The administration might conceivably employ sub­
strategic, or tactical nuclear weapons in the Far East, but Europe was 
different. Moreover, if the United States used these weapons in Europe, it 
would turn the continent into a battlefield, alienate the NATO alliances, and 
subsequently isolate the United States. Clearly, there was nothing "limited" 
about such a scenario.11 
If a European deterrent existed, however, it would be a different 
matter. It would make victory no more likely, but if the major Western 
European nations formed the backbone of a "third great power bloc," some of 
the burden for the defence of Europe would shift from the United States to 
London, Paris, and presumably Bonn. Then, the United States could provide 
the nuclear shield for Berlin's defence, while the Western Europeans 
maintained the bulk of NATO's conventional forces. American support for 
the ill-fated EDC was founded on this premise.12 But the ultimate defence of 
Berlin, Eisenhower held, hinged on the U.S. strategic arsenal. NSC 5404/1 was 
based on this notion. "Limited military force" was never intended to involve a 
limited ground war in Europe. It was designed to test Soviet intentions and 
place a bluntly nuclear choice before Moscow. If the Soviets continued 
regardless, U.S. forces would fall back and prepare for general war. Yet, at the 
same time, the use of these weapons would signal that the situation had 
advanced beyond a question of the defence of Berlin as such to a matter of 
11 See especially Trachtenberg, Constrncted Peace, pp.146-200; Kori Naomi Schake, "The 
Case Against Flexible Response: Berlin Policy and Planning in the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
Administrations," (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1996), pp.58-98. 
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survival. As Eisenhower conceded publicly, nuclear weapons could not "free" 
West Berlin because "destruction is not a good police force." But he also 
affirmed that he would, if necessary, use them.B 
In this belief that the nuclear deterrent held the key to the Berlin 
situation, Eisenhower rarely wavered, even when those around him 
questioned the policy.14 Moreover, it was more than hollow rhetoric. The 
record of an NSC meeting in May 1958 reveals much about the President's 
view of the issue as well as about the relative roles of Eisenhower and Dulles. 
In the course of this meeting, Dulles explored other options and expressed 
doubts about the sincerity of the ritualized statement that the United States 
would continue to consider an attack upon West Berlin as an attack upon 
itself. Although he was quite prepared to continue with the recital of such 
statements, he was sceptical of the existing policy of resorting to nuclear war 
as soon as there was a Soviet military attack on Berlin. Dulles was confident 
that Eisenhower would use nuclear missiles if required, but he had little faith 
that his successor in the White House would. Was it really not possible, 
Dulles asked, to fight with conventional forces to Berlin? Eisenhower 
expressed surprise, responding forcefully that if the United States did not 
respond in this fashion to a Soviet attack on Berlin, it would first lose the city 
itself, and shortly after, all of Western Europe. If the United States was to 
survive such a sequence of events at all, he said, then it would be reduced to a 
garrison state. So far as the use of nuclear weapons, he judged it to be the only 
viable option. Since U.S. and NATO conventional forces were inadequate to 
12 For important studies of Eisenhower's defence strategy for Europe, see Trachtenberg, 
Constmcted Peace, pp.146-200; idem, Histon; and Strategi;, pp.153-215. 
13 Eisenhower quoted in Nezu York Times, 26 February 1959; New York Times, 13 March 1959. 
14 On Eisenhower's views on the usability of nuclear weapons, see Erdmann, 11'War No 
Longer Has Any Logic Whatever"' ; Bundy, Danger and Suroival, pp.236-318; Gaddis, Strategies 
of Containment, pp.127-197; Saki Dockrill, Eisenlzmuer's New-Look National Security Policy, 1 953-
61, (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp.191-209. 
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· free Europe, it might be possible to bluff their way to Berlin, but it would be 
impossible to fight their way.is 
Khrushchev's Challenge 
When Nikita Khrushchev emerged from the Kremlin power-struggle 
as the clear leader of the USSR's political hierarchy, it allowed Washington to 
once again personalize U.S.-USSR relations. As Eisenhower and Dulles got 
more first-hand experience of dealing with the Soviet premier, they sensed 
none of Stalin's prestige and questioned his longevity and lasting influence. In 
Eisenhower's view, the new Soviet premier's personality posed major 
obstacles to peace. Not only did Eisenhower consider Khrushchev to be prone 
to change his mind overnight, but as he told congressional leaders at one 
point, he considered him u stupid in some ways and yet exceedingly shrewd, 
and most certainly ruthless." He was clearly a dangerous adversary.16 
Through the beginning of 1958, U.S. officials in Europe were 
increasingly calling on Washington to synchronise its contingency policies 
with London and Paris. By late January, Under Secretary of State Christian 
Herter feared that the West would soon be faced with a choice of either 
acceding to Soviet demands about stamping of travel documents or facing 
unilateral suspension of travel rights. In such a situation the United States 
could potentially be without British and French support.17 So far as how U.S. 
policy stood at the time to deal with such a scenario, Dulles was prepared for 
U.S. officials to show papers to GDR officials on the autobahn and rail 
:heckpoints, but would not allow GDR participation at the Berlin Air Safety 
15 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 1 May 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 3:89-90. See also Gaddis, Strategies 
f Containment, pp.167-168. 
16 For Eisenhower's and Dulles's views of Khrushchev, see Sherman Adams, First-Hand 
�eport: The Inside Story of the Eisenlwwer Administration, (London: Hutchinson, 1961), pp.143-
44. For Soviet politics of the period, see Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside tlze Kremlin 's Cold War, 
>p.174-209. For Eisenhower quote, see MemCon, 6 March 1959, (10:30 A.M.), FRUS 1 958-60, 
, :431. 
17 Herter to Bruce, 31 January 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8: 9. 
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Centre. It was difficult to draw the line procedurally, he said, because of the 
wide range of scenarios that might arise. But the guiding principle would be 
that "we stand to lose more by dramatizing the situation and later acquiescing 
than by adjusting to the situation at the beginning." Moreover, since 1948 he 
had warned against "putting the cart before the horse" insofar as military 
responses to a challenge in Berlin.18 Dulles, therefore, was clearly prepared to 
be flexible. 
In early February 1958, the NSC reaffirmed the principles of NSC 
5404/1 by incorporating it almost verbatim into its new statement of policy 
towards Germany, NSC 5803.19 But increasingly, an overt military attack on 
the city was not considered to be the primary risk. By September, as the OCB 
conducted its regular reviews of the NSC' s policy towards Berlin, it was 
widely recognized that the Soviet bloc's interests in East Germany were 
coming under increasing strain. Not only were refugees still fleeing through 
West Berlin, but also the economic revitalization of the Western sectors was 
increasingly showing the stark contrasts between the material conditions in 
the Eastern and Western sectors. In response, the Soviets appeared to be 
moving towards bolstering the prestige and economy of the GDR rather than 
measures directed primarily at undermining the Western position in the city 
and thereby forcing a confrontation with the West. This accorded with other 
assessments generated within the administration that judged that if 
Khrushchev acted, it would be for defensive rather than offensive reasons.20 
In November 1958, Western fears that the USSR might move to confer 
greater sovereignty on the GDR were realized. During a speech in Moscow on 
10 November, Khrushchev floated, in Llewellyn Thompson's phrase, his "trial 
1s Dulles to Bruce, FRUS 1958-60, 8:10-15; Dulles quoted in Bowie and Immerman, Waging 
Peace, p.60. 
19 For the general provisions of NSC 5803 "Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Germany," see 
FRUS 1 958-60, 9:631-644. For Supplement I concerning Berlin, see box 23, Policy Papers, NSC, 
SA for NSAff, WHO, DDEL. See also Supplement I to NSC 5727, 13 December 1957, FRUS 
1955-57, 26:521-525. 
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balloon."21 He accused the West of violating the Potsdam Protocol by creating 
a /1 state within a state" from which they were engaging in subversive activity 
towards the Warsaw Pact. Claiming that the situation in Berlin was beneficial 
" to the Western powers and to none but the Western powers," he said that the 
time had come to end the occupation regime in Berlin in order that the GDR 
might have stability. In order to do this, he announced, he was preparing to 
hand over to Ulbricht' s regime the functions in Berlin that were exercised by 
Soviet agencies. To underline his point, he declared that any attack against 
East Germany would constitute an attack against the whole Warsaw Pact and 
would be resisted by the full forces at its disposal.22 
Although the general nature of such a threat had long been recognized, 
the intensity with which it finally came acted, in Hillenbrand' s words, "like a 
bolt out of the blue."23 It sparked an intense period of administration scrutiny 
of the problem. By the time Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn had 
formulated their "Western Peace Proposal" the following April, policy on 
both an administration and international level had essentially been developed 
and Khrushchev's ultimatum had been temporarily rescinded. The Geneva 
summit, Khrushchev's visit to the United States, and the abortive summit of 
May 1960 were important, but their effect on Washington's Berlin policy was 
minimal. Consequently, it is this period from November 1958 to April 1959 
which is most revealing about Washington's perception of the problem. 
Washington's public response to the speech was subdued, partly 
because many officials hoped that it was merely political rhetoric. But more 
importantly it was because the decision had been taken at the highest levels to 
prevent the over-dramatization of the situation. Publicly, officials appeared 
calm and pointed out that the Communists made frequent threats to West 
20 OCB "Report on Germany (Berlin)," 3 September 1958, box 23, SA for NSAff, WHO, 
DDEL; Elmer B. Staats to Lay, " Updating Supplement to the OCB Reports on Germany," 9 
September 1958, box 23, SA for NSAff, WHO, DDEL. 
21 Thompson to Dulles, 11 November 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:47. 
22 Text of Khrushchev's speech is reprinted in Nezv York Times, 11 November 1958. 
23 Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp.121, 124. 
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Berlin but never carried through with them. Based on the public demeanour 
of Washington officials, the New York Times judged that the administration 
did not consider Khrushchev's speech to be particularly serious.24 As if to 
confirm such a conclusion, Dulles indulged in legal semantics by pointing out 
that Soviet responsibilities to guarantee Western access derived not from the 
Potsdam Protocol, as Khrushchev claimed, but from the modus vivendi reached 
in Paris in June 1949 just after the blockade was lifted. 
Washington was impressed by the Berliners' cool response to 
Khrushchev's speech. Although newspapers carried the story in banner 
headlines, the press and population generally refrained from hysteria. Yet 
West German press and public sentiment came out emphatically in support of 
a strong stand. There remained serious doubts, however, firstly about the 
lengths to which the United States would go in order to maintain its non­
recognition of the GDR, and secondly about the ability of Western forces to 
reopen the access routes militarily.25 
Washington was less impressed with the behaviour of its allies. The 
French were sending mixed signals, taking a hard line at some times and 
agreeing with the British at others. The West Germans urged Washington to 
take a firm stand. Adenauer was intransigent in pointing out the gravity of 
the situation and observed that if the West yielded on this issue "the fear will 
arise that an initial concession will not be the last. In the historic world-wide 
conflict between communism and the free world the Soviet Union would thus 
easily win the first and perhaps decisive battle." West German Foreign 
Minister Heinrich von Brentano told U.S. Ambassador to the FRG David 
Bruce that concessions to the GDR would start an avalanche that would have 
catastrophic consequences for Europe. At the first sign of any weakening of 
24 Herter to Eisenhower, "A Status Report on Berlin in the Light of the Khrushchev 
Statement of November 10," 13 November 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:61-62; Herter to 
AmEmbassies, 13 November 1958, ibid., pp.57-58; New York Times, 13 November 1958. 
2s Bruce to Dulles, 30 November 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:143; Bruce to Dulles, 2 December 
1958, ibid ., pp.147-148. 
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resolve /1 the West will have lost the first bloodless blow of the third world 
war," he warned.26 
It was the British who caused Washington most concern. They had 
made it clear that they did not intend to die for Berlin and that they preferred 
accepting GDR sovereignty to provoking another blockade, because a 
blockade, they argued, would lead inexorably towards military conflict. Their 
attempts to elaborate on this view provoked the indignation of American 
officials in an episode reminiscent of that in late 1947 when U.S. officials had 
become incensed over the British suggestion to make a dignified pre-emptive 
withdrawal from the city. In a memorandum circulated to the Americans and 
French on 17 November 1958, the British Foreign Office suggested that it was 
"inevitable" that the West's position in Berlin would become untenable. 
Khrushchev's ultimatum, London posited, was the beginning of a "slippery 
slope" that could lead only to war or capitulation, since there was little that 
the West could do to prevent him from carrying out his threat. The only 
alternative, they held, was to accept the handing over by the Soviets of control 
to the GDR as inevitable, and therefore attempt to salvage most from a bad 
situation.27 As it had in 1947, Washington reacted vigorously. The British 
memorandum was variously labelled as "defeatist" and "appeasement." 
When confronted by U.S. Ambassador to London John Hay Whitney, British 
Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd gave the impression that the Foreign Office 
had "loosed a premature rocket" and quickly backed away from the contents 
of the memorandum. Its only purpose, he said, was to stimulate further 
discussion. However, he did outline differences in the British and American 
positions. The fundamental variance, he said, was that the British contended 
that recognition of the GDR would be the bottom of the "slippery slope," 
whereas the Americans believed that such a move was only the beginning. It 
26 Adenauer to Dulles, 20 November 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:111; "Briefing on Status of 
Berlin Crisis," 25 November 1958, box 37, DDE Diary, Whitman, DDEL; Von Brentano quoted 
in Bruce to Dulles, 21 November 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:104. 
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was "absurd," he said, that Adenauer refused to deal with the East Germans 
even when the Western powers offered guarantees of their intention to stay in 
Berlin. It was equally absurd, he argued, to go to war over recognizing the 
GDR.28 
Although the British backed away from the opinions expressed in the 
"slippery slope" memorandum, the episode engendered considerable 
suspicion in Washington and Paris of British resolve to maintain the position. 
The more level-headed analyses of the situation conceded that the dispute 
was not over whether or not the West should abandon its position in Berlin, 
but rather whether recognition of the GDR would affect the Allied 
occupation. As Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy later pointed out, the 
difference was not in military positions - despite their differences, these were 
relatively similar amongst the Western allies - it was the political position that 
needed further coordinating. And since it would be political decisions that 
would unleash the military aspects, it was here that the crux of the issue lay.29 
It was towards resolving these issues that the bulk of the 
administration's efforts were directed. Contrary to the public stance, U.S. 
officials were frantically trying to come to terms with the new threat. After 
Khrushchev's speech, the State Department had immediately "swept into 
interpretive [sic] action." Khrushchev's motives remained unclear, but he had 
posed a direct challenge to Western interests.3o Sifting through the numerous 
assessments offered on Khrushchev's motivation that ranged anywhere from 
domestic political manoeuvring, seeking leverage to prevent the arming of the 
27 Dulles to Bonn, 17 November 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:82-83; Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our 
Time, pp.123-124; Burr, JI Avoiding the Slippery Slope," pp.187-188.  
28 Whitney to Dulles, 19 November 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:86-88. 
29 MemCon, Eisenhower, Nixon, Herter, Fulbright, Vinson, et al. (members of the Foreign 
Affairs committees), 6 March 1959 (5 P.M.), box 39, DDE Diaries, Whitman, DDEL. In order 
not to attract undue publicity, Eisenhower divided these congressional briefings into small 
groups. For a similar meeting held earlier in the day, see MemCon, Eisenhower, Herter, 
Johnson, et al., 6 March 1959 (10:30 A.M.), FRUS 1 958-60, 8:428-437. 
30 Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, p.121; Burr, JI Avoiding the Slippery Slope," p.184; 
Dulles's news conference, 26 November 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:121-127. For State's efforts to 
minimize the political fall-out of this statement, see Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, 
pp.122-123. 
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Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, or seeking to tip the psychological 
advantage to the USSR' s favour, State remained unsure where Khrushchev's 
priorities lay. At times they placed less emphasis on the Eisenhower 
administration's policy of nuclear-sharing and more on the long history of 
Soviet efforts to force the Western powers into de facto recognition of the 
GDR regime. At other times, Dulles identified the nuclear-arming of the 
Bundeswehr as a primary stimulus.31 
Writing from Moscow, Thompson identified a range of motives that 
might be behind Khrushchev's speech. But the most immediate objective, he 
suggested, was to bolster the prestige of the East German regime before the 
rearmament of West Germany was completed. Once the FRG possessed 
nuclear weapons, Thompson held, If the position of the East German regime 
will become even more precarious and he fears that West German 
intervention in an East German revolt under such circumstances might face 
the Soviet Union with the choice of almost certain world war or the loss of 
East Germany and subsequently of most or all of his satellite empire."32 He 
judged that the Kre�in was unlikely to push the United States to armed 
conflict, but that once it handed control over to the GDR it was unlikely to 
back down without taking great risks. Because of this, he suggested, it would 
be prudent for Washington to make it clear that it recognized the difficult 
situation that Moscow had created for itself with respect to the GDR regime, 
and that it make equally clear that some arrangement could be reached that 
could take this into account.33 In his telegram, which was circulated to U.S. 
officials in Germany, he implicitly accused the British of being melodramatic, 
31 Herter, "A Status Report on Berlin in the Light of the Khrushchev Statement of 
November 1 0," ibid., pp.61-62; Herter to AmEmbassies, 13 November 1958, ibid., pp.57-60. 
For a range of other views, see Thompson to Dulles, 14 November 1958, ibid., pp.62-63; 
Thompson to Dulles, 11 November 1958, ibid., pp.47-48; Dulles to Bruce, 17 November 1958, 
ibid., pp.82-83. 
32 Thompson to Dulles, 11 November 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:47-48. For State's assessment 
of Khrushchev's motives, see Herter, "A Status Report on Berlin in the Light of the 
Khrushchev Statement of November 10," ibid., pp.61-62; Herter to AmEmbassies, 13 
November 1958, ibid., pp.57-60. 
33 Thompson to Dulles, 12 November 1958, cited in ibid., p.48 n.5. 
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declaring, "We will never have a better opportunity of taking a stand than we 
do at the present time."34 A few hours later he despatched a shorter "eyes 
only" cable to Dulles. Predicting imminent Soviet action, he suggested that if 
the British refused to accept the use of force then Washington should 
approach London and Paris to agree secretly on a military bluff. If this was 
called, Thompson said, then they should call for a top level meeting with the 
Soviets at which they should try to "salvage what we could from the 
situation." While recognizing the danger in such a bluff, he said that it placed 
the West in no more peril than did the weak British position.35 
Since Khrushchev's speech had not been delivered directly to Western 
officials, it was difficult to know if it should be treated as an " announcement" 
or a "proposal." And although Khrushchev's speech had couched the threat 
in equivocal terms and the theme was not new, as U.S. officials in Berlin 
pointed out, once Khrushchev had committed himself personally to it, it was 
necessary to presume that the "Soviets have moved close to, and if not all the 
way to, a decision to implement it." During another speech on 14 November, 
Khrushchev promised that a document elaborating on his proposal for West 
Berlin was forthcoming. U.S. officials in Berlin judged that Khrushchev 
apparently hoped that by applying a "slow but steady screw" the Western 
po_wers might become convinced that their presence was untenable. So long 
as the Soviets themselves never presented a point which might constitute a 
cnsus belli, it would remain difficult for the Western governments to secure 
public support for vigorous countermeasures. Short of a self-imposed 
blockade, there would be little that the West could do.36 
34 Thompson to Dulles, 21 November 1958 (2 P.M.), ibid., pp.96-97. 
35 Thompson to Dulles, 11 November 1958, ibid., pp.47-48; Thompson to Dulles, 21 
November 1958 (6 P.M.), ibid., p.98. 
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The Dilemma of Political vs. Military Responses 
Faced with the Khrushchev's  political challenge, the administration 
began to reassess the relevance of its contingency plans. Without British and 
French support, the confrontational spirit of NSC 5404/ 1 would clearly be 
difficult to implement. And without the logistical support offered by these 
countries, the effectiveness of the contingency plans was cast into doubt. But 
more important were the views of Dulles. He had played a relatively marginal 
role in the development of NSC 5404/ 1, but he now began to confront the 
issue directly.  He now held that the best course was to pursue diplomatic 
options. NSC 5404/ 1 was sound so far as it went, Dulles argued, but it did not 
constitute an appropriate response to the existing crisis. Responding to a 
political threat with military force would alienate NATO and also the 
American public. And, in turn, it would accomplish little in altering the 
situation. 
Events in mid-November forced Washington to deal with this question 
directly. Sporadic harassment of traffic to Berlin was fuelling wide public 
debate on the implementation of another airlift. Such conjecture irritated 
Dulles and the Joint Chiefs who argued that public speculation that the West 
would reinstitute an airlift could lead the Soviets to miscalculate.37 In order to 
clarify the situation, Norstad requested authorization to invoke the 
administration's contingency plans when a convoy was detained by Soviet 
officials in mid-November 1958. He planned to extricate "by minimum force 
necessary" any convoys that were detained. N orstad' s request was denied, 
but it sparked a review of contingency planning.38 Chairman of the JCS 
General Nathan F. Twining supported the move and pressed for an 
aggressive response. If a showdown was to come, he said, then it was better 
36 Findley Burns, Jr. to Dulles, 12 November 1958, ibid. ,  p.50; Burns to Dulles, 13 
November 1958, ibid., p.55; Burns to Dulles, 15 November 1958, ibid., p.71 .  
37 MemTeleCon, Dulles and Herter, 1 3  November 1958, box 9, Telephone Calls, Dulles 
Papers, DDEL; MemCon, Murphy, Twining, LeMay, et al., 21 November 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 
8:99-100. 
Meeting Khrushchev's Challenge I 198 
for it to come while the United States held the advantage in strategic power. 
And it would be to a considerable advantage that it came on an issue like 
Berlin where the United States could feel confident that it was morally 
justified.39 But Eisenhower was becoming increasingly swayed by Dulles's 
argument that the existing crisis was political in nature and therefore required 
a political response. In unambiguous terms he reminded the military that it 
was a tool and not a policymaking body. Moreover, he planned to reduce U.S. 
military forces.4o 
But even once it was accepted that a political response was the most 
appropriate, this still left a wide range of fundamental issues. The most 
pressing was what degree of recognition it was safe to give East German 
officials. Dulles himself remained ambivalent about the dealings with GDR 
officials. He pointed out that the United States dealt with Chinese 
Communists when the need arose, but to do so m no way implied 
recognition. 41 If Eisenhower and Dulles had been allowed to frame U.S. policy 
independently from Adenauer, they would probably have been willing to 
deal with East German officials on at least a de facto basis. Adenauer, 
h.owever, took a stronger line and eventually had a strong influence on 
Washington's stance. As West German Ambassador to the United States 
Wilhelm Grewe pointed out, for many years the West German people had 
)een told that to have any dealings with the GDR implied recognition. To 
mddenly contradict this raised serious difficulties. And if the West even 
tppeared to renounce the ultimate objective of reunification- irrespective of 
38 Burr, "Avoiding the Slippery Slope," pp.184-185; Schake, "The Case Against Flexible 
'.esponse," pp.185-193. 
39 MemCon, State-Defense Meeting, 13 December 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:501; Trachtenberg, 
:onstructed Peace, pp.257-258. 
40 Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.256-258; Cook, Declassified Eisenhower, p.210. 
41 On Eisenhower's and Dulles's comparisons with the situation in China, see also 
1emCon, Eisenhower, Nixon, Herter, Taylor, et al., 11 December 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:173. 
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whether or not it was actually doing so - it would gravely undermine public 
pro-Western support and hand the Communists a great victory.42 
Nevertheless, during a press conference on 26 November Dulles made 
it clear that the United States would not accept the unilateral relinquishment 
of these rights by the USSR but also suggested that it might be prepared to 
deal with East German officials so long as it did not constitute the transfer of 
Soviet responsibilities to the GDR. This public exposition of the so-called 
11 agency theory" reflected not so much a considered position by State, as 
Dulles "thinking out loud." But it had come out of considerable study behind 
the scenes in Washington. Moreover, the Western powers had agreed at 
ambassadorial level as early as 1954 that they would in practice treat GDR 
officials as agents of the USSR. This had been reaffirmed in 1957.43 But 
Dulles's public statement provoked intense opposition from the FRG since it 
was widely interpreted as stating a position agreed amongst the three 
Western occupation powers and Bonn. As State raced to control the 
:iiplomatic damage, the response from West Germany was swift and violent 
:ind led to a considerably more hard-line stance from the other Western 
Jowers generally.44 Dulles, whilst insisting that his comments had been 
�xaggerated and misunderstood, quickly backed away publicly from any 
lotion of treating GDR officials as /1 agents" of the Soviet Union. Yet, this was 
mly temporary and the absolute terms of its public rejection were not 
·eflected privately. The British, considering the outright rejection of any 
iegree of contact with the GDR extreme, made it clear that they would not go 
o war simply because it was East German and not Soviet officials who 
tamped transit papers. Even Washington recognized the absurdity of the 
>osition and therefore, as Hillenbrand points out, the agency theory 
42 MemCon, Dulles, Grewe, Hillenbrand, et al., 17 November 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:78-79; 
1emTeleCon, Eisenhower and Dulles, 24 November 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:118; Dulles to 
.denauer, 24 November 1958, ibid., pp.119-120. 
43 Berlin Crisis, p.34. 
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11 continued over the years to exercise a certain desperate attraction for 
Western planners as an ultimate fallback position."45 
Thus, by mid-November, Washington was braced for a crisis. The 
Soviets had not yet provided a timetable for their programme, but on 20 
November Washington began hearing high-level rumours that predicted 
imminent action.46 As he had promised, Khrushchev presented the West with 
a formal expression of his views on Berlin and a German peace treaty. Even 
before a translation was available, Eisenhower knew that it was going to pose 
a serious problem. Although on vacation, Eisenhower telephoned Dulles and 
toid him that he had been worrying late into the night about the fate of Berlin. 
He had held misgivings about the situation in 1945, he said, and everything 
. 
he feared had come to pass. 47 
Once the lengthy note was translated, Eisenhower found his fears 
warranted. While restating the main themes of his speech, Khrushchev went 
further. He again accused the Western occupation of dishonouring vital 
elements of the Potsdam Agreement. While the West insisted on the joint 
occupation of Berlin, he charged, they flagrantly violated the terms of the 
agreement dealing with the demilitarization of Germany. He claimed that 
such actions were not only destabilizing the Cold War but were also 
violations of GDR sovereignty. His proposal was to make West Berlin a "free 
city," which would become essentially an independent political entity. He 
insisted on the withdrawal of Western troops, but was willing to allow UN 
supervision. If �is proposal proved unacceptable to the West, he declared, 
then "there will no longer remain any topic for negotiation between the 
former occupying powers on the Berlin question." "Half a year" would be 
44 Bruce diary entry, 26 November 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:128; Bernard Gufler to Dulles, 28 
November 1958, ibid., pp.138-140; Dulles to Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, 28 November 
1958, ibid., pp.140-141; Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp.122-123. 
45 Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, p.123; Burr, "Avoiding the Slippery Slope," pp.189-
192. 
46 Thompson to Dulles, 21 November 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:98; Adenauer to Dulles, ibid., 
pp.110-111.  
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allowed for negotiations and arrangements. In the absence of any substantial 
progress within that time, he said, he would sign a peace treaty with the 
GDR.48 
This was the first time Khrushchev had set a specific date. Since it was 
delivered on 27 November, Western officials interpreted the deadline to be 27 
May 1959. The tone of Khrushchev's note seemed to allow little leeway. There 
was no doubt that this was an "announcement" rather than a "proposal." In 
Eisenhower's words, Khrushchev turned the Berlin issue into "a tinderbox." 
Nevertheless, Eisenhower also played down his own alarm at the situation by 
stating that he and Dulles "put less credibility in Khrushchev's threat to move 
in the following May than he possibly expected." 49 But these words, written in 
his memoirs, were largely self-serving. Indeed, publicly Eisenhower refused 
to treat the issue as a crisis, preferring to portray it as a logical part of 
occupation power relations. Publicly, he all but ignored the ultimatum in the 
belief that by addressing it he risked forcing both sides to take irreconcilable 
positions. Instead, he preferred to play down the importance of the deadline 
lest the situation gather momentum of its own and spiral out of control. 
Privately, however, it was a different matter. As he himself had told 
Dulles the same day as Khrushchev presented his ultimatum, Berlin was of 
utmost concern; it had even been keeping him awake at nights. It was 
exasperating, he said, that political issues forced Washington to assume 
military positions which were "wholly illogical."50 As others have noted, 
"There was something ludicrous about going to war over whether East 
Germans would be permitted to stamp documents that the Soviets were 
47 MemTeleCon, Eisenhower and Dulles, 27 November 1958, box 37, DDE Diaries, 
Whitman, DDEL. See also Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp.332-324; FRUS 1958-60, 8:134. 
4s For the text of Khrushchev's note, see Dept of State Bulletin, (19 January 1959): 81-89. Just 
prior to delivery the Khrushchev's note, the Western Allies had briefly entertained the idea of 
they themselves pre-emptively calling for four-power negotiations on the issue. See MemCon, 
Grewe, Merchant, Lampson, 21 November 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:108. On USSR-GDR 
consultation on the ultimatum, see Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose,"' pp.8-21 . 
49 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp.329, 337. 
so Dulles, MemCon, Dulles and Eisenhower, 30 November 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:142-143; 
MemCon, Eisenhower and Dulles, 18 November 1958, ibid., pp.84-85. 
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already stamping or whether the Communist authorities would be allowed to 
'peep' inside military trucks."51 And Eisenhower and Dulles repeatedly 
showed that they recognized the absurdity of the situation. Yet the entire 
system pivoted on projecting confidence that this "wholly illogical" posture 
was, in fact, logical. Eisenhower claimed to have counselled Roosevelt against 
accepting the Berlin situation in 1945 - that the United States made an error in 
attempting to control Germany from Berlin - but that a commitment had since 
been made from which there was simply no escape. The problem in 
presenting their case, as Eisenhower saw it, was treading the delicate path in 
which "we could leave no doubt in the Soviets' minds of our intentions, yet 
we could not be provocative."52 
Washington's diplomatic response was delayed and non-committal. As 
Dulles noted, despite the hostile tone of the Soviet note, it did not require a 
prompt reply. Far more conducive to Washington's interests would be a 
strong and considered response with the solid backing of its European allies. 
He hoped to use the NATO meeting scheduled to meet in Paris in mid­
December to bring NATO into line as far as possible with U.S. thinking. In the 
meantime, he wanted to take the opportunity to review the German problem 
as a whole. The reply to the Soviet ultimatum that he envisaged would be 
more constructive than merely a rejection of Khrushchev's proposals; it 
should have some constructive proposals of its own.53 But in the context of 
NATO relations, this was ambitious. As it happened, State's reply was that 
while the concept of a "free city" that included the whole of Berlin would be 
closely examined, so long as the Soviet proposal applied only to West Berlin it 
remained unacceptable. So far as counterproposals went, State reverted to the 
position taken at the 1955 Geneva Conference by calling for free elections 
throughout the whole of Germany. 
51 Trachtenberg, HistonJ and Strategij, p.192. 
52 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.337. 
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More important were the administration's efforts to convey to the 
Soviets and West Germans that it would resort to war if it became necessary. 
Although Dulles had initially favoured taking a new look at the whole 
German question, the key to bolstering the credibility of the commitment to 
Berlin, Eisenhower and Dulles now contended with Adenauer's complete 
agreement, was in decoupling the issues of Berlin and the unification of 
Germany. To treat them together could potentially cede to the Soviets the 
initiative for German reunification. This decision was also taken on the basis 
that the Berlin issue in isolation offered the West the greatest advantage since 
Khrushchev had allowed himself little room to manoeuvre.54 
But to implement this strategy required the full cooperation of the West 
Germans. Adenauer was clearly against any form of recognition. He was also 
strongly against the idea of any sort of "free city" that would involve the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops. He held that the U.S. military presence was the 
only thing preventing the city from becoming engulfed by Communist 
forces.ss However, Willy Brandt, the newly elected Social Democrat governing 
mayor of the Western sectors, remained largely an unknown quantity. Over 
coming weeks, however, he seemed to be moving towards a position that 
threatened to undermine Adenauer's firm stand by appearing to propose the 
internationalization of the communication lines between West Germany and 
West Berlin and the freedom of Berlin guaranteed by the UN.s6 
S3 Dulles, MemCon, Eisenhower, Dulles, 30 November 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:142-143. On 
the NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting, see U.S. Delegation to State, 17 December 1958, FRUS 
1958-60, 8:212; Bruce diary entry, 19 December 1958, ibid.; Marks, Power and Peace, p.142. 
54 MemCon, 6 March 1959 (10:30 a.m.), FRUS 1958-60, 8 :431; Adenauer to Dulles, 11 
December 1958, ibid., p.182; MemCon, Eisenhower, Dulles, et  al., ibid., p.192. 
ss MemTeleCon, Eisenhower and Dulles, 13 January 1959, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:249. 
S6 For Brandt's immediate reaction as reported to Washington, see Bruce to Dulles, 30 
November 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:143-145. For administration doubts about Brandt, see 
Dulles, MemCon, Eisenhower, Dulles, Herter, et al., 12 December 1958, box 7, WH 
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Meanwhile, Khrushchev kept the pressure up. He made it clear that he 
was not intimidated by military threats but was more interested in waging 
economic war. But he said he failed to see any reason for the United States to 
maintain its military presence in the city. West Berlin, Khrushchev said, was a 
"'thorn" and "'a bone in my throat." But, significantly, he also invited the 
United States to make its own counterproposal. Khrushchev's dismissal of the 
significance of the Federal Republic's membership of NATO and his strong 
emphasis on defending East Germany led Thompson to assess that the 
"'principal immediate explanation of Soviet action is the desire to remove an 
impediment to further development of Communism and East Germany." As 
the Soviet bloc continued its trend of orthodoxy, he said, it was important for 
t11e Soviets to eliminate the escape hatch for refugees .  The flight of doctors 
and intellectuals through West Berlin had demonstrated the difficulties in 
stabilizing East Germany so long as the Berlin escape route remained open. 
He predicted that any proposal that left this escape hatch open would remain 
unacceptable to the Soviets.s7 
Washington's Response 
Washington's policymakers immediately scrutinized the problem. 
Their aims were firstly to devise what U.S. policy should ideally be if the 
Soviets followed through with their threat, and secondly to determine what 
could be sold to the Allies in the way of action on an international basis .58 
From December 1958 to April 1959, Washington developed its policy. It was 
the international aspects that were still the most uncertain. Facing 
parliamentary elections, Macmillan appeared more concerned to appear as a 
Grewe, 11 December 1958, ibid., pp.188-190; MernCon, Eisenhower, Nixon, Herter, Fulbright, 
Vinson, et al., 6 March 1959 (5 P.M.), box 39, DDE Diaries, Whitman, DDEL. See also Burr, 
"Avoiding the Slippery Slope," p.186 .  
57 See particularly MemCon, Khrushchev and Hubert Humphrey, 1 December 1958, 
quoted in Thompson to Dulles, 3 November 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:148-152. 
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conduit to East-West negotiations than in falling into line with the other 
Allies. In Eisenhower's view, this created the impression that the British 
Foreign Office was confused. De Gaulle remained difficult, and Eisenhower 
warned his advisers that the French president was capable of the most 
extraordinary actions. And, as Conant put it, Adenauer's initial reaction to 
any new proposals that even hinted at a softening line was "apt to be over-
conservative." 59 
Thus, it was apparent that Washington needed to devise its policy 
independently. And the main issue of contention within the administration 
was whether the U.S. response should emphasize military or political 
measures. Thus, the situation developed along two parallel courses, military 
and political. To grapple with this issue, Eisenhower mobilized the NSC. 
Despite the well-worn references to occupation responsibility, he said, 
Khrushchev was right when he said that the occupation regime was 
redundant. Therefore, he said, the United States must adjust to the new 
circumstances. Personally, he considered the whole situation a mistake from 
the beginning, but pledges had been made and there was no option but to 
stay.60 The key issue at this point, he said, was the recognition of the GDR. The 
compromise "agency theory," which had been developed as a response to 
Khrushchev's 10 December speech, had effectively been superseded by both 
Khrushchev's note of 27 November and also by the violent opposition of 
Adenauer. This left only flat refusal to deal directly with the East Germans, 
even on something as ostensibly innocuous as "paper stamping." But this 
position was difficult to sell. It opened, in Eisenhower's words, a "can of 
worms." And existing U.S. contingency planning did not accurately reflect 
_ 58 For Dulles's elaboration on this -problem, see MemCon, 29 January 1959, FRUS 1 958-60, 
8:299-309. 
59 MemCon, Eisenhower, Dulles, Herter, et al., 12 December 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:192; 
Conant to Dulles, 10 December 1958, ibid., p.170. 
60 MemCon, Eisenhower and Dulles, 18 November 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:84-85. 
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existing NATO thinking. Quite simply, he said, to invoke the plans already 
developed would split the alliance.61 
Khrushchev's note made his motives no clearer. Thompson continued 
to express his conviction that the Soviets were being primarily defensive. It 
was probable, he reported, that Khrushchev would allow West Berlin to 
function as an independent city so long as the refugee problem eased and 
Western intelligence and subversive activities there were scaled down. Part of 
Thompson's assessment was based on his sense that others in the Kremlin 
were restraining Khrushchev from going to the brink of war, an assessment of 
internal Kremlin politics that Thompson made several times during his 
service. But Thompson also warned that there was a real possibility drifting 
into a situation that could get out of control. Herter agreed that Khrushchev 
was acting to consolidate the GDR. Others, such as Vice President Richard 
Nixon and Allen Dulles, pointed to analogies between the Berlin and the 
trouble over Quemoy and judged that Khrushchev might be looking for a 
conference and to arrest a generally good situation for the West. Because of 
this uncertainty as to Khrushchev's ambitions, Eisenhower said, it should be 
the primary task of the administration to reach Khrushchev, find out what he 
wanted, and proceed from there.62 
But in the meantime, the administration had to prepare for the worst. 
Although the crisis was essentially political in nature, military preparations 
were essential . Eisenhower and Dulles continued to base their policy on the 
assumption that general war was unlikely; yet it was still possible. And 
paradoxically, to maintain this unlikelihood, it was necessary for the 
administration maintain the illusion that it was possible, even logical. It was 
imperative, Eisenhower said, to convince the Soviets that Acheson, Taylor, 
and Massive Retaliation's other critics did not speak authoritatively for the 
government. He warned that there could be no doubt in Moscow that there 
61 MemCon, Eisenhower, Herter, Taylor, et al., 11 December 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:172-177. 
62 Thompson to Dulles, 9 March 1959, box 6, International, SS, WHO, DDEL; J .S. 
Eisenhower, MemCon, Eisenhower, Herter, et al., 11 December 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 8:172-177. 
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would be no graduated response and that "our whole stack is in this play." 
Accordingly, he agreed with the Joint Chiefs that an airlift should be regarded 
as defeat. Even token forces, he said, should constitute a resolute and 
convincing response that demonstrated to the Soviets the immediate and 
serious risk that a next move could lead to uncontrolled escalation. If this 
deterrent failed, Eisenhower warned as he had on many occasions, there 
should be no illusion in Washington that military action sparked by Berlin 
could be contained locally. 63 
This was one of the reasons why he now emphasized the flaws in the 
effectiveness of "limited military force," or "paragraph D" as it became 
known. Any Soviet action, he said, would constitute a failure of the deterrent. 
And since the British and French still refused to support limited military force 
in advance, the credibility of Washington's threats to respond with force was 
greatly diminished. And without the British and French, he continued, U.S. 
forces would have no communication and no logistical support. Even 
Adenauer, Eisenhower judged, might not go along with a "Berlin or bust" 
action. In sum, he could not see how the United States could act unilaterally if 
France and Britain were against them. In response, the Joint Chiefs argued 
that in the last analysis the defence of Berlin must rest on a decision by 
Washington, not on a "lowest common denominator" of the Washington­
London-Paris-Bonn axis. 64 
But there were other, non-military flaws to resorting to military action 
at an early stage. On political grounds, Dulles argued that world opinion was 
63 J.S. Eisenhower, MemCon, Eisenhower, Herter, et al., 11 December 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 
8:172-177. 
64 MemCon, 29 January 1959, ibid., pp.299-309; MemCon, Special Meeting of the NSC, 5 
March 1959, ibid., pp.424; "Current Policy on Berlin Access," 10 December 1958, box 8, 
Briefing Notes, NSC, SA for NSAff, WHO, DDEL; MemCon, 29 January 1959, FRUS 1 958-60, 
8:299-309. For the U.S. courses of action designated as points A through D, see Herter to 
Bruce, 11 December 1958, FRUS 1 958-60, pp.179-180; Twining to McElroy, "Berlin Situation," 
13 January 1959, box 6, International, SS, WHO, DDEL; McElroy to Dulles, "Berlin Situation," 
n.d., ibid., "Appendix B: Concept for Test by Application of Limited Force," n.d., box 8, 
ExecSec, Subject, NSF Staff, WHO, DDEL. See also Burr, "Avoiding the Slippery Slope," 
pp.197-200. 
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not yet ready for military intervention over Berlin and that diplomatic 
avenues must be given a chance to work. When he had addressed NATO's 
foreign ministers in mid-December in Paris, he had tried to impress upon 
them that American strategic power vastly overwhelmed that of the USSR 
and that therefore they need not fear Soviet threats of general war. His 
performance had been enthusiastically praised, but Dulles was under no 
illusion that this indicated unqualified NATO support for U.S. policy towards 
Berlin, especially policies that might potentially lead to hostilities. He could 
not see the wisdom in resorting immediately to armed force, and only the 
firm and explicit support of the European allies for such a course would 
convince him otherwise. Irrespective of what had been agreed insofar as 
existing contingency planning, the first obstruction, in his view, did not justify 
a military response. Public and international opinion would simply not 
support such a course. As Eisenhower pointed out, "The United States would 
like to think that public opinion pushes us into war," but that under the 
existing circumstances he was /1 not so sure that they would even follow us into 
war."65 
Thus, Eisenhower and Dulles had identified serious flaws in the 
military options and challenged the Pentagon to account for them. But the 
political options were also underdeveloped. Adenauer continued to push the 
administration to adopt postures on German issues that it would not have 
taken of its own choosing.66 After completing a whirlwind visit to Western 
Europe where sentiment was building for negotiations with the Soviets, 
Dulles put forward an interim solution that attempted to compromise 
between the competing views. Calling it a /1 double-barrelled approach," 
65 MemCon, Dulles and Lloyd, 5 February 1959, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:319-320; MemCon, 29 
January 1959, ibid., pp.299-305. Emphasis original. On Dulles's performance at the NATO 
Foreign Ministers' meeting, see U.S. Delegation to State, 17 December 1958, ibid., p.212; Bruce 
diary entry, 19  December 1958, ibid., p.220; Marks, Pozuer and Peace, p.142; Burr, "Avoiding 
the Slippery Slope," pp.194-196. 
66 For Eisenhower's growing frustration with Adenauer's negativity, see MemCon, 
Eisenhower and Adenauer, 27 August 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 9:22-23; MemCon, Eisenhower, 
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Dulles stressed that the use of force should not be automatic. There were a 
whole range of reasons for this, he said, not the least of which was that 
London would not support it. Instead, if the Soviets attempted to hand over 
their responsibilities to the East Germans, he proposed taking the issue 
immediately to the UN at the same time as proceeding with military 
preparations. It would also involve a "wait-and-see" period between the use 
of a probe to test Soviet intentions and an effort to reopen the access lanes by 
force. As a corollary, he said, moves should be taken to dispel the widely held 
notion that an airlift provided one avenue of success.67 
If the Soviets replaced their own border officials with East Germans, 
Dulles suggested, then U.S. officials should refuse to acquiesce in such a move 
while Washington began military preparations on a scale large enough to be 
detected by Soviet intelligence but not so large as to create public alarm. By 
doing so, the opportunity would be created for Khrushchev to modify his 
position without publicly losing face. If transit was restricted after the 
deadline of 27 May had passed, then a probe convoy with armed escorts 
would be sent. At this point, the issue would be directly deferred to the 
President for his decision on how to proceed. Eisenhower was mindful that 
11 possibly we were risking the very fate of civilization on the premise that the 
Soviets would back down from the deadline when confronted by force." Yet 
he also believed that /1 if we were not willing to take this risk, we would be 
certain to lose."  68 
But this plan still rested on the basis of the global deterrent. State, 
however, became concerned about a significant "psychological gap between 
Macmillan, Herter, Lloyd, 29 August 1959, ibid., pp.26-27. See also Kohler to Herter, "Some 
Basic Factors in the German Situation," 21 August 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 9:5-7. 
67 MemCon, 29 January 1959, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:299-305. For Hillenbrand's account of 
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Berlin and our global deterrent. "  If the Soviets used "salami tactics," as 
Acheson and State's experts predicted, it would be difficult for the United 
States to convince the rest of the world that U.S. vital interests were engaged. 
Moreover, in such a case, neutral countries might well come to consider the 
Soviet idea of a "free city" as an acceptable compromise. Part of this gap 
might be bridged, State judged, by employing more credible measures such as 
a peaceful counterblockade supplemented by naval reprisals. This appealed 
firstly because a peaceful counterblockade was deemed a reprisal rather than 
an act of war, and secondly, because it meant that the West could counter the 
threat at sea where it held the advantage. It was attractively flexible and could 
involve several degrees of escalation. Despite State's enthusiasm for this 
course, though, Eisenhower judged that it was grossly unsatisfactory in that 
the Soviets could presumably withstand a blockade for twelve months or 
more, while West Berlin could be choked off within two weeks. The challenge 
to the West, therefore, was to make the issues sufficiently clear that world 
opinion would, if not accept, then at least understand why a break had 
occurred. 69 
However, explaining publicly this reliance on the global deterrent 
remained problematic. On a number of occasions, Acheson publicly criticized 
the government's reliance on Massive Retaliation to defend its interests in 
Berlin. Since Berlin was the linchpin in America's European policy, he said, 
the credibility of the deterrent needed to be bolstered. As he had done since 
1949, Acheson warned that Soviet moves against the city were likely to be in 
the form of "salami tactics" rather than a clearly identifiable attack. It was 
simply not plausible, he warned, that the United States would react with 
strategic weapons to such incremental moves. "To respond to a blockade of 
Berlin with nuclear strategic attack would be fatally unwise," he warned. "To 
69 Herter to Eisenhower, "Berlin Contingency Planning," 4 March 1959, box 6, 
International, SS, WHO, DDEL; State, "Berlin Contingency Planning: Pacific 
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threaten this attack would be even more unwise." Therefore, he argued that 
the administration's range of non-nuclear options needed to be considerably 
widened to project greater credibility that armed conflict could result from 
Soviet moves, however incremental.7° In this, he had the support of General 
Maxwell Taylor who was becoming increasingly frustrated with the 
administration's reliance on nuclear deterrence at the expense of conventional 
forces. Eisenhower rarely allowed himself to be drawn into the public debate, 
but when he did he made his case forcefully. He ruled out any possibility of a 
ground war in Europe. But he would not comment further except to say that 
plans existed for defending Berlin and, if it came to it, that he would use 
nuclear weapons.71 
Towards Negotiations 
But the general tone of Soviet diplomacy as it evolved through early 
1959, with some notable exceptions, seemed to be easing. By late January, 
Khrushchev appeared to be backing away from the fixed deadline. Earlier in 
the month, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan had arrived in 
United States for an unofficial visit to discuss trade relations. Inevitably, 
Berlin was raised. Although Mikoyan made no promises whilst in the United 
States, upon his return to Moscow he hinted that the "six month" deadline 
was not necessarily to be taken literally.72 It was the beginning of a gradual 
relaxation of the 27 May deadline. As Eisenhower recorded in his memoirs, 
"So skillful and subtle was each step backward that its significance was 
hardly noticed and for this reason the retreat, although absolute, caused 
23, Policy Papers, NSC, SA for NSAff, WHO, DDEL; MemCon, Special Meeting of the NSC, 5 
March 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 8 :420. 
70 Schick, 11ze Berlin Crisis, pp.49-51; Dean Acheson, "Wishing Won't Hold Berlin," 
Saturday Evening Post, (7 March 1959) : 86. 
71 New York Times, 26 February 1959; New York Times, 13 March 1959. 
72 See MemCon, Mikoyan, Dulles, Menshikov, Thompson, et al., 5 January 1959, FRUS 
1 958-60, 8:233-239. On Mikoyan's visit, see Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis," pp.9-
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scarcely any loss in Khrushchev's public standing."73 Washington, however, 
was initially reluctant to take Khrushchev's apparently conciliatory behaviour 
at face value, since, as Eisenhower observed, it was entirely possible that the 
Soviet premier would "say something else tomorrow."74 Nevertheless, 
Eisenhower recognized that Khrushchev had left himself little room to 
manoeuvre. On 10 January, the Soviets had presented a draft peace treaty and 
a proposal for negotiations on the basis of these draft. Although recognizing 
that the Soviets were attempting to extricate themselves from a difficult 
situation by opening up the whole German question, Eisenhower preferred to 
allow Khrushchev the opportunity to modify his position. To this end, the 
administration recommended that the Foreign Ministers' meeting be brought 
forward to April to allow Khrushchev a forum in which to moderate and 
negotiate his position "without losing face." If this failed, Eisenhower 
suggested that an invitation for the Soviet premier to visit Washington was 
potentially an " ace in the hole."75 
Thus, Eisenhower sensed that Moscow was in a mood to enter into 
negotiations under more reasonable terms than the duress of a strict deadline. 
In late January and early February, Dulles strove to consolidate the Western 
position by visiting London, Paris, and Bonn. Macmillan, he found, was 
generally disposed to accept negotiations before the deadline. Faced with an 
election, the Prime Minister strove to be seen to be taking the diplomatic 
initiative himself, and had recently announced his intention to visit Moscow 
to explore bilateral talks with the Soviets. This announcement caused 
considerable concern in Washington, Paris, and Bonn. De Gaulle and 
Adenauer took a hardline stance of refusing to consider negotiations until 
73 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.342. 
74 MemCon, Special Meeting of the NSC, 5 March 1959, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:421; MemCon, 6 
March 1959, (10:30 A.M.), FRUS 1 958-60, 8:431 . 
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after the deadline had passed, fearing that any talks before 27 May would be 
de facto capitulation. 
With the suspicions of Washington, Paris, and Bonn still aroused by 
the "slippery-slope" episode, Macmillan ventured to Moscow. But his visit 
did not make the dramatic breakthrough that he had hoped. Instead, 
Khrushchev's antics made the visit politically uncomfortable. Desiring to talk 
as much about arms limitation in Europe as about the Berlin problem, 
Macmillan came away without significant progress on either. Washington's 
assessment of Macmillan's visit was not favourable.76 Macmillan seemed to 
have convinced the Soviets to repeal the strict 27 May deadline, but in doing 
so he had demonstrated that NATO did not always act as one and appeared 
to have given Khrushchev some hope that further pressure might be effective 
against NATO. Moreover, his vague statement with Khrushchev that 
appeared to threaten arms limitation angered de Gaulle and Adenauer. 
Couched in such terms, Adenauer's and de Gaulle's opposition to recognition 
of the GDR regime became even more rigid. And Macmillan had become 
convinced that only through a heads-of-state summit could the problem be 
solved, a position clearly at odds to Eisenhower's refusal to attend such a 
summit until substantial progress had been made at the level of foreign 
ministers. As a compromise, a meeting of foreign ministers was scheduled for 
early May in Geneva. It was not Washington's ideal situation, but it was 
positive. The prospect of negotiations with the Soviets offered the Western 
powers - or at least London and Washington - some hope that they might be 
able to exert diplomatic counterpressure on Moscow. Moreover, although 
prepared for military conflict, Eisenhower and Dulles recognized that 
although the chances of solving the problem through diplomacy might be 
"slight," negotiations bought time, and through time the crisis might be 
effectively defused. 
76 Robert Slusser argues that Macmillan's visit was responsible for defusing the crisis. 
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Thus, though not entirely driving the Western alliance on the issue, 
Washington was moving closer towards negotiations. But a considerable 
source of strength in any negotiations would be the willingness to accept a 
break if the Western position appeared threatened. Consequently, behind 
closed doors the administration was preparing for the possibility of war. But 
publicly, Eisenhower continued to downplay the threat. He repeatedly 
emphasized the need to see the current tension not in terms of six months, but 
rather of thirty or forty years. This present threat, he insisted, should not be 
regarded as a "Berlin crisis" as such but rather as a small part in what could 
well turn out to be another two or three decades of tension on the issue. There 
was good reason to believe that the Kremlin did not want war, largely 
because they seemed to believe that they could accomplish their objectives 
short of war. Consequently, U.S. strategy should be based on long-term 
planning, not on reactions to short-term manufactured crises. It was 
dangerous to boost defence expenditure or partially mobilize, he warned, 
because to do so would drain U.S. strength, alienate the NATO allies, and 
ultimately reduce the United States to a /1 garrison state." The President told 
the Cabinet that they should not regard the present crisis as the beginning of 
the end, nor should they think it possible to resolve the problem by walking 
away from it. The Soviets would continually attempt to throw the West off­
balance, he said. They would raise the pressure in Berlin, then they might turn 
their attention to Iran or Iraq. It was on these terms that Eisenhower advised 
Washington to approach the problem.77 
But while Eisenhower and Dulles were resisting calls for a large-scale 
build-up of conventional forces, they were also implementing more subtle 
military preparations to signal U.S. intent to Moscow. Small increases in the 
number of personnel in and around Berlin and increases in alert readiness 
77 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 13 March 1959, box 39, DDE Diaries, Whitman, DDEL. See 
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were measures designed to be detected by Soviet intelligence but were too 
subtle to fan the crisis atmosphere publicly. So too were the acceleration of the 
nuclear stockpile programme for U.S. forces in the Federal Republic and 
placing the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean on alert. Simultaneously, 
the Pentagon was directing intense efforts in attempting to synchronize Allied 
policy.78 
By March, public criticism of the administration's apparent inaction 
was building. In response, Eisenhower took the unusual move of publicly 
announcing that he had called a special meeting of the NSC on 5 March to 
deal with the problem.79 He followed this up less than a fortnight later by 
addressing the American people on the subjects of Berlin and the national 
defence posture. He told them that he was determined /1 not to retreat one inch 
from our duty," but would not be the first to breach the peace. In the Berlin 
situation, he said, "both free people and principle are at stake." He framed the 
problem in terms of three choices before the United States. The first was to 
abdicate its rights in the city and withdraw its military forces. But such a 
course, he warned, /1 would mean the end of all hopes for a Germany under 
government of German choosing. It would raise, among our friends, the most 
serious doubts about the validity of all the international agreements and 
commitments we have made with them in every quarter of the globe. One 
result would be to undermine the mutual confidence upon which our entire 
system of collective security is founded." The second choice was the 
possibility of war. Appeasement would not work, he warned, and the best 
chance of success was a firm stance: "War would become more likely if we 
gave way and encouraged a rule of terrorism rather than a rule of law and 
order." The third and final choice was negotiations. He affirmed that "the 
MemCon, Eisenhower, Twining, Goodpaster, J.S.D. Eisenhower, 9 March 1959, box 39, DDE 
Diaries, Whitman, DDEL. 
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United States and its allies stand ready to talk with Soviet representatives at 
any time and under any circumstances which offer prospects of worth-while 
results." The thing they must consider above all else, he told the American 
people, was that "we cannot try to purchase peace by forsaking two million 
free people of Berlin." He then went on to outline the nation's defence 
strategy. In his plans for a long-haul defence posture, he said, he was 
authorizing the transition from bombers to missiles as the backbone of the 
U.S. retaliatory force.so 
Meanwhile, the NSC was reaching the culmination of its development 
of Berlin policy. The special meeting of the NSC on 5 March had proved 
largely unsatisfactory in that little of substance was decided. And although 
the meeting seemed to cast in doubt the effectiveness of trying to devise 
policy in such a formal manner, with Dulles in hospital, Eisenhower 
determined that he wanted the NSC to deal with the problems of Berlin and 
Germany, but only after greater preparation. Once he and the NSC settled on 
their policy, he told the NSC's Executive Secretary Gordon Gray, he expected 
that each week the DCI would simply indicate material changes in the 
situation. Through early March, members of the NSC Staff, Defense, and State 
met repeatedly to refine their approach to contingency planning. They 
presented their results to the President on 17 March, at which time 
Eisenhower ordered further study of both military and non-military 
countermeasures. Meanwhile, Intelligence sources suggested that the Soviet 
and East Germans were stepping up their programme in Berlin. s1 
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Retaining Options 
While still assuming that general war was unlikely, in early March 
Eisenhower met with congressional leaders in order to prepare them for the 
possibility of war. By doing so, he not only hoped to secure support for his 
own judgement and policies, but to add to the credibility of the deterrent. 
Holding small meetings so as not to attract publicity, he adhered to the 
general line that this was a problem they were likely to have to live with for 
years. There was little sense in getting thrown off balance and becoming 
hysterical. Consequently, he said, the last thing that he wanted was a 
congressional resolution on the use of military force as this would undermine 
his entire position. To mobilize, he held, would constitute a victory for 
Moscow. But at the same time, Eisenhower told them that a ground battle was 
not feasible. If military force was required, it would be all-out war. 
Eisenhower found many of the vocal participants in these meeting 
surprisingly willing to accept this possibility. But at what point would this 
become reality? In response to Senator Fulbright's probing as to what degree 
of provocation would be crossing the Rubicon-for instance, was it blowing 
up bridges? Or shooting rifles at engineers sent to rebuild those bridges? ­
Eisenhower conceded that the course of escalation was not entirely clear. 
What the United States did, he said, would depend on the actual events as 
they occurred. But he pointed out that if such a contingency came about, it 
would have progressed beyond the point at which diplomacy had any hope 
of succeeding. If such a situation arose, he warned, then they should probably 
all retire to the Shenandoah Valley from where he would recommend to 
Congress that it declare general war. As he had told the NSC the previous 
day, once any military action was opened to force access to Berlin could be 
considered the opening of general war. And even though war was a real 
39, DDE Diary, Whitman, DDEL; "Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the 
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possibility, victory was not. "YOU may as well go out an shoot everyone you 
see and then shoot yourself," he said.s2 
Its allies' vacillation continued to concern Washington. While the 
British position remained somewhat unclear, Eisenhower assured 
congressional leaders that de Gaulle would stand with the United States, as 
would Adenauer.83 Yet privately, policymakers were becoming frustrated. The 
four-power Working Group in Paris had been rendered unproductive. Von 
Brentano did not appear to have the confidence of the German delegation, the 
French delegation were unsure whether de Gaulle would support their 
positions, and the British were waiting until after Macmillan's visit to the 
United States before committing themselves. Herter and Eisenhower hoped 
that the situation might be rectified when the delegates arrived in Washington 
for the Foreign Ministers' meeting.84 
But in mid-March the pressure began to show in Washington. A 
fundamental difference of opinion had developed between State and Defense 
on the issue of "paper stamping." The Defense Department had reversed its 
support for the plan to refuse to allow East German officials to stamp 
identification papers. Having been swayed by London's arguments that this 
was not the place to draw the line, the Pentagon argued that such a position 
reflected a preoccupation with legal issues rather than recognition of 
fundamental interests and held that such a stance was not conducive to 
maintaining the support of domestic and world opinion. State, however, 
continued to insist that /1 paper stamping" was, in Murphy's words, /1 the thin 
edge of the wedge." Although it may not immediately threaten Western 
82 MemCon, Eisenhower, Nixon, Herter, Fulbright, Vinson, et al., 6 March 1959 (5 P.M.), 
box 39, DDE Diaries, Whitman, DDEL; MemCon, "Special Meeting After Regular NSC 
Meeting," 5 March 1959, box 39, DDE Diaries, Whitman, DDEL. For a more formal memcon 
of this meeting, see FRUS 1 958-60, 8:419-425. Eisenhower quoted in Cook, Declassified 
Eisenlzozuer, p.211.  For elaboration on Eisenhower's views on the prospects of victory in 
nuclear war, see Erdmann, '"War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever."' 
83 MemCon, Eisenhower, Nixon, Herter, Fulbright, Vinson, et al., 6 March 1959 (5 P.M.), 
box 39, DDE Diaries, Whitman, DDEL. 
84 MemCon, 26 March 1959, FRUS 1 958-60, 8:534. 
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access to Berlin, any retreat from the absolute non-recognition could spell the 
political death of Adenauer and Washington's European policies. 85 
Thus, despite all the talk of global deterrents and general nuclear war, 
Washington still had to face the problem at more specific, local level. There 
still remained a considerable psychological gap between the stamping of 
travel documents and nuclear retaliation. Since the challenge was likely come 
in an ambiguous form, graduated responses were becoming increasingly 
desirable. Accordingly, in mid-March, Eisenhower directed further study on 
the issue of both military and non-military countermeasures. In a process 
coordinated by Murphy, two groups developed their planning. While State 
and CIA developed the non-military paper, State, Defense, CIA, and the JCS 
pursued military measures. Both groups, in their reports submitted in mid­
April, argued that the effectiveness of countermeasures, whether they were 
military or non-military in nature, rested on "how clearly the USSR saw 
beyond them the risks of general war." Consequently, Murphy recommended 
that convincing preparatory !11-easures, including at least partial mobilization 
and increasing alert postures, were essential preconditions. Both groups also 
considered it difficult to secure the support of NATO and neutrals unless the 
issues were clear-cut. If the Soviets appeared only to be taking actions 
designed to enforce technical requirements for GDR supervision rather than 
to directly threaten Western access, Britain and France, in particular, would 
not support serious countermeasures. Therefore, both groups called for an 
immediate campaign to prepare the way for justifying Western 
countermeasures. Non-military countermeasures available to the U.S. alone 
remained limited, but when they were combined with the capabilities of the 
other NATO powers they were considerably expanded. They included 
85 McElroy and Herter to Eisenhower, "Berlin Contingency Planning," 17 March 1959, box 
6, International, SS, WHO, DDEL. Although this memorandum is included in FRUS 1 958-60, 
8:500-502, all references to the State-Defense disagreement remained classified at the time the 
volume was compiled. The document has since been fully declassified. See also J.S. 
Eisenhower to Goodpaster, "Comments on State-Defense Memorandum," 19 March 1959, box 
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hindering Soviet bloc shipping in Western ports as well as restricting traffic in 
the Kiel Canal and Dardenelles. So far as military countermeasures went, the 
study divided the threat into four likely scenarios ranging from local action to 
reopen ground access to general war. Yet, all of the contemplated 
countermeasures assumed that the United States, United Kingdom, France, 
and the FRG were acting in unison and had reached agreement in advance on 
what kind of situation justified what level of military response.86 
In April 1959, SACEUR General Lauris Norstad supervised the 
establishment of a tripartite body charged with exploring military 
contingency planning to reopen access to West Berlin. The studies and plans 
. generated by LIVE OAK, as this group was codenamed, did not have automatic 
sanction from Washington, London, and Paris. While the bulk of the LIVE OAK 
papers remain classified, those that are available suggest that under N orstad' s 
direction much of the planning reflected American thinking on the use of 
force in a Berlin crisis as it had been originally spelled out in NC 5404/1 .  The 
British, in particular, argued that the plans contemplated by LIVE OAK put the 
West in the position of being undisguised aggressors. Privately, Macmillan 
regarded them "absurd." Moreover, the logical outcome of many of LIVE 
OAK's plans was ultimately thermonuclear war. But while this was a premise 
clearly unacceptable to the British, London remained relativ�ly comfortable so 
long as the plans could not be implemented without its specific consent. 
Therefore, so far as Macmillan was concerned, tripartite contingency plans 
6, International, SS, WHO, DDEL. MemCon, Eisenhower, Herter, Murphy, et al., 17 March 
1959, FRUS 1958-60, 8:493. 
86 Murphy to Eisenhower, "Studies in Military and Non-Military Countermeasures in the 
Berlin Crisis," 18 April 1959, box 8, Subject, ExecSec, NSC Staff, WHO, DDEL; Twining to 
Goodpaster, "Submission of Berlin Analyses to the President," 16 April 1959, ibid.; Douglas 
Dillon to Eisenhower, 16 June 1959, ibid.; CIA, "Soviet and Other Reactions to Various U.S. 
Courses of Action in the Berlin Crisis," 27 March 1959, ibid; "Analysis of Non-Military 
Measures to Induce the Soviet Union to Remove Obstructions to Western Access to Berlin," 
11 April 1959, box 7, Administration, Whitman, DDEL. 
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remained an " academic exercise." With this proviso, London was even willing 
to allow LIVE OAK to explore " any likely contingency."s7 
Delaying the Crisis 
London was also comforted by the general trend towards negotiations. 
During March and April, diplomats from the United States, Britain, France, 
and the Federal Republic were engaged in intense efforts to formulate a 
Western negotiating package. Much of this effort aimed at drafting proposals 
on the wider German question, and the Berlin problem was approached in 
this context. The result, the so-called "Western Peace Plan," became the 
foundation of the West's negotiation position for the duration of the Geneva 
Foreign Ministers' Conference which first convened in May 1959. Insofar as 
this plan dealt with Berlin, Western diplomats sought a modus vivendi that 
would defuse the current crisis as the first stage in a four phase plan designed 
to be implemented over a thirty month period and finally resulting in the 
reunification of Germany and a peace treaty. But the conference accomplished 
little, despite being spread over a three-month period and attracting intense 
press interest. The Soviets expressed little in the way of serious interest in the 
Western Peace Plan as a basis for negotiation and continued to press their 
proposal for making West Berlin a free city. The only positive of the 
conference, Hillenbrand suggests, was that it postponed the Berlin deadline 
and convinced the Soviets that there was a need for continuing discussions. 
As well, "advisers" from both East and West Germany had been given the 
opportunity to speak.ss 
s7 The LIVE OAK papers will remain classified until at least 2005. Because the primary 
source material remains highly classified, the secondary literature on LIVE OAK remains 
sparse. For brief synopses of what is revealed by that documentation which is available in 
American and British archives, see Berlin Crisis, pp.35-36; Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, 
p.264; Burr, "Avoiding the Slippery Slope," pp.202-203. For Macmillan's views, see Harold 
Macmillan, Pointing tlze Way, 1 959-1961, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p.389. 
ss Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp.145-146. For some of the voluminous 
documentation from the conference, see FRUS 1 958-60, 8:687-1116. 
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Despite reports from U.S. officials in Germany that suggested an 
extremely negative outlook of West Berlin's political leadership to the 
negotiations, when Secretary of State Herter visited the city in late July, he 
received an enthusiastic reception from the Berliners themselves. In the wake 
of the conference, and in response to indications from Moscow that 
Khrushchev wanted to talk directly with Eisenhower, the President moved to 
play his /1 ace in the hole" by inviting Khrushchev to visit. But before he met 
with Khrushchev, he visited his Western European allies to reassure them that 
they would not be compromised by the bilateral discussions, and he 
continued to use the euphemism /1 exploratory" to describe the nature of his 
upcoming talks with the Soviet premier. Since the Western position had by 
this time been thoroughly studied by all four governments, discussion of the 
Berlin problem during Eisenhower's European visit generally reaffirmed 
what had already been decided.89 
When Khrushchev arrived m the United States he was feted by 
politicians and the press alike. U.S. policymakers, who were treating 
Khrushchev's visit as an experiment in diplomacy, were encouraged by his 
amicable demeanour as he too.red the country.90 But when he arrived for the 
first of two days of talks with Eisenhower at Camp David beginning on 26 
September, neither leader had a major initiative to propose for the resolution 
of the Berlin problem. Eisenhower conceded that the situation was 
11 abnormal" but that recognition of this in no way diminished his 
determination to defend U.S. interests until such time as responsibility was 
transferred to the Germans themselves. But neither did the United States 
intend to maintain its presence in the city in perpetuity. If some acceptable 
way could be found to withdraw that commitment in consonance with U.S. 
responsibilities or honour, then he would do so. Similarly, he would have no 
objection to a USSR-GDR treaty so long as U.S. interests were not threatened. 
89 Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, p.154. 
90 MemCon, Murphy, Grewe, Hillenbrand, et al., 17 September 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 9:31 . 
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Moreover, if progress could be made on Berlin, it would pave the way 
towards detente. He was willing to pursue such detente by engaging in a 
summit, but only if it was made clear that it was not under the duress of an 
ultimatum. For his part, Khrushchev finally withdrew the six-month deadline. 
In the formal communique issued at the conclusion of the meetings stated 
both parties' willingness to pursue a solution through further negotiations.91 
Over the following months, Eisenhower convinced de Gaulle to 
participate in and even host a summit. But when the U-2 incident derailed the 
Paris summit in May 1960, it became clear that little progress would be 
possible until a new administration entered the White House the following 
January. For his part, Khrushchev claimed that he would wait six to eight 
months until a new administration took office. In the meantime, at 
Eisenhower's direction, State and Defense pursued marginal issues that might 
improve the Berlin issue in some small way, but for the most part, the 
substance of Washington's policy towards Berlin remained as it had 
developed by April 1959. After that period, though, the Eisenhower moved 
increasingly towards negotiations and defusing the crisis through time. 
Eisenhower had effectively delayed a showdown until at least the end of his 
presidency. 92 
91 For documentation from the Camp David talks, see FRUS 1 958-60, 9:35-52. See also "U.S. 
Objectives in Khrushchev Visit and Suggested Tactics for Conversation With Him," 11 
September 1959, box 52, International, Whitman, DDEL. For Khrushchev's objectives at the 
meeting, see Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin 's Cold War, pp.200-201 . On the question 
of staying in Berlin in "perpetuity," see MemCon, Eisenhower and Herter, 21 August 1959, 
FRUS 1958-60, 9:5; MemCon, Eisenhower, Macmillan, Herter, Lloyd, 29 August 1959, ibid., 28. 
92 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 24 May 1960, FRUS 1 958-60, 9:513. The OCB assessed: "Despite 
the dramatic attention in received, the German situation, and American interests in Germany, 
remained very much the same in its basic respects. There were, however, qualitative changes 
resulting from the prolonged division of the country and the continuation of the various 
trends within the Federal Republic, Berlin, and the Soviet Zone described in earlier reports. In 
addition, the possibility of a nuclear 'standoff' has introduced a new factor into the German 
problem." OCB, Report on NSC 5803, 2 November 1960, box 23, Policy Papers, NSC, SA for 
NSAff, WHO, DDEL. On Soviet and East German activity during the postponement, see 
Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis," pp.12-13; Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 
'Rose,"' pp.22-27. 
Chapter Seven 
Preparing for the Sho-wdo-wn, 1961 
The issue over Berlin . . .  is far more than an issue over that city. It is 
broader and deeper than even the German question as a whole. It 
has become an issue of resolution between the USA and the USSR, 
the outcome of which will go far to determine the confidence of 
Europe - indeed, of the world- in the United States. It is not too 
much to say that the whole position of the United States is in the 
balance. 
-- Dean Acheson, 27 June 1 961 
During the 1960 election campaign, both leading presidential hopefuls 
were briefed a number of times on the most likely trouble spots they would 
face if elected. Neither Kennedy nor his opponent Vice President Richard 
Nixon needed convincing that Berlin would be central; their own experience 
and sense of foreign policy priorities told them that much. For the previous 
two years, Eisenhower had effectively delayed a showdown, but the issue 
was still not solved. It was apparent that Khrushchev would resume the 
dialogue with the new administration; the NSC Staff judged that it would not 
224 
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take more than six months for Khrushchev to "heat up" the problem again.1 
Khrushchev promised as much on several occasions, declaring that the 
problem must be settled in 1961 . Thus, Kennedy came to office anticipating 
difficult decisions on Berlin. As his national security adviser McGeorge Bundy 
judged the situation at the beginning of the administration, "there was need 
both for further action and for a reestablishment of confidence" because the 
situation had been allowed to drift since Khrushchev dropped his deadline 
after the 1959 Camp David talks.2 
Looking for a Fresh Approach 
When Kennedy entered the White House, he represented for many 
Americans a "new generatio-n." But insofar as the administration's foreign 
policy was concerned, Kennedy relied heavily upon long-serving advisers 
who had played central roles under the Truman administration. Unlike 
Eisenhower, who relied heavily on bureaucratic machinery to frame policy, 
Kennedy came to rely on a small group of key advisers. No longer forced to 
sit on the policymaking fringes and resort to increasingly strident public 
criticism of the administration's foreign and defence policies, Dean Acheson 
returned to Washington in the capacity of a special adviser on NATO and 
then Berlin. He had only limited direct access to the White House, but from 
his State Department office he profoundly affected the Kennedy 
administration's perception of the Berlin problem. Paul Nitze returned to 
Washington to accept a senior position in the Pentagon. During some of the 
most heated moments of the crisis, the President called on Lucius Clay. Dean 
Rusk, a senior State official in the Truman administration, was persuaded to 
accept the position of secretary of state after Robert Lovett declined the post. 
1 For one of the more comprehensive briefings the candidates received from the CIA 
immediately prior to the election, see Huntingdon D. Sheldon to Goodpaster, "Briefing of 
Presidential Candidates," 1 November 1960, box 8, Alpha, Subject, SS, WHO, DDEL; NSC 
Staff, "Key National Security Problems," 10 February 1961, box 318, NSF, JFKL. 
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John McCloy enjoyed privileged access to the President, and Charles Bohlen 
and Llewellyn Thompson continued to play important roles. Livingston 
Merchant was replaced by Foy Kohler, an expert on Soviet policy who later 
became ambassador to the USSR. But as well as these experienced officials, 
Kennedy recruited from academia's brightest: McGeorge Bundy became his 
special adviser for national security and Henry Kissinger was summoned 
from Harvard for a short, but important stint as an adviser on the Berlin and 
German issues. The White House contingent also consisted of Theodore 
Sorensen and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. On the whole, despite the rhetoric of 
a unew frontier," the most experienced of these advisers recognized that 
many of the issues they faced were old problems. Specifically, it was clear that 
"the issues arising from the division of Germany remain, as they have for 15 
years, the most critical in the whole confrontation between East and West," as 
the CIA put it for the benefit of the incoming administration.3 
Kennedy expected a showdown on the Berlin issue. But the showdown 
that he directed his administration to prepare for was not a military conflict, 
but rather a diplomatic one. Kennedy brought with him a determination that 
he could solve the Berlin issue through a combination of a stronger 
negotiating position and imaginative diplomacy.4 While the Eisenhower 
administration had apparently resigned itself to long-term tension over 
Berlin, Kennedy aimed to negotiate recognition of the status quo that would 
end the perennial atmosphere of crisis clouding the Berlin issue. By doing so, 
Kennedy hoped not to withdraw from Berlin, but to secure Soviet recognition 
of America's right to be there. In doing so, he would bolster at once the 
administration's prestige and American national security. It would also 
presumably lead to detente. But the means to this end would be to greatly 
2 McGeorge Bundy, "The Presidency and the Peace," Foreign Affairs, 42, 3 (April 1964), 
pp.353-365. 
3 SNIE 11-4-60 " Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1960-1965," box 25, 
Bohlen Papers, RG59, NA. 
4 Former Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin argues that Moscow 
overlooked Kennedy's willingness to negotiate on Berlin and in doing so unnecessarily 
prolonged the conflict. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, (New York: Times, 1995), p.61 .  
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increase U.S. negotiating leverage through military preparedness and a 
stronger deterrent. The United States would negotiate; but it would do so 
from a position of strength. At the same time, Kennedy was careful not to 
convey the impression that his hope for some form of modus vivendi lessened 
his determination to protect U.S. interests in the city. Irrespective of whether 
the United States was overcommitted globally, the U.S. commitment to West 
Berlin had to be maintained. For what Kennedy feared most, as one observer 
put it, was /1 the threat of embarrassment, of humiliation, of appearing to be 
weak."5 Consequently, the new administration declared its intent in 
unequivocal terms: "We are strongly committed to the freedom of West 
Berlin. We are strongly committed to the freedom of the people in that city, 
and we expect to sustain our own position in that city as we look into the 
future."6 Such an attitude reflected another fundamental perception of the 
problem that contrasted with the Eisenhower administration. The new 
administration judged that Khrushchev's challenge was motivated less by 
defensive reasons than it was a deliberate and calculated challenge to U.S. 
interests. As Acheson, one of the most vocal promoters of such a view 
characterized it, Berlin was the /1 the hardest test of the West's will and 
determination" since the Korean War.7 It was this tone that the new 
administration adopted. 
Another important factor in the differing approaches of the Eisenhower 
and Kennedy administrations was in relations with Adenauer, the aging 
chancellor of the Federal Republic. Under the Kennedy administration U.S.­
FRG relations were considerably cooler than they had been under the 
Eisenhower administration. This was partly because the new administration 
had no one who had developed a rapport with the chancellor equal to that 
Dulles had. But more importantly, many in the Kennedy administration had 
come to the conclusion that Adenauer exerted a disproportionate influence 
5 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p.212. 
6 Rusk news conference, 9 March 1961, in Department of State Bulletin, 27 March 1961, 
p.432. 
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over U.S. foreign policy. Arguing that Eisenhower had inflated Adenauer's 
significance, they judged that the result had often been more in Adenauer's 
interests than Washington's. Consequently, the new administration sought to 
reassert its own interests and was less susceptible to Adenauer's leverage. The 
key issue for Kennedy became not so much recognition of the GDR regime or 
even disruption of civilian traffic as the presence of U.S. troops in the city and 
the viability of that presence. He even hinted that he might be prepared to 
recognize the GDR in three to five years, a position clearly at odds with 
Adenauer.s 
Anticipating an imminent challenge, one of the administration's first 
priorities was to have a fresh look at the Berlin problem. In the process, it 
found many of the central elements of Berlin policy inescapable. In early 
January, Martin Hillenbrand, then director of State's European desk, 
produced a lengthy memorandum outlining the options available to the 
incoming administration. Explaining Soviet objectives as a combination of 
using Berlin as a lever to achieve consolidation of the Soviet bloc and of 
removing an irritant to the East, Hillenbrand wrote that the United States 
faced a quandary: "We can live with the status quo in Berlin but can take no 
real initiative to change it for the better. To a greater or lesser degree, the 
Soviets and East Germans can, whenever they are willing to assume the 
political consequences, change it for the worse." Since this was an 
uncomfortable situation for the West, he continued, it inevitably provoked a 
desire for some fresh approach. Yet his examination of several of the 
prominent "solutions" then being floated in Washington led Hillenbrand to 
conclude that much of the hope of solving the problem was misguided. 
"However impelling the urge to find some new approach to the problem," 
Hillenbrand said, "'the ineluctable facts of the situation strictly limit the 
practical courses of action open to the West." He saw little reason for thinking 
7 Acheson, "Wishing Won't Hold Berlin," pp.33, 86. 
s See particularly Frank A. Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy: A Study in German-American 
Relations, 1 961-1963, (London: Macmillan, 1996).  
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that a mutually satisfying settlement could be reached. Nevertheless, he 
encouraged the administration to keep its options open and argued that the 
credibility of the deterrent should be bolstered by introducing measures to 
assist incremental escalation. It was even possible to conceive of a withdrawal 
from the city, Hillenbrand said, and it "might even have a galvanizing effect 
on NATO." Nevertheless, he warned, "the risks of a loss of Berlin, regardless 
of the circumstances, cannot . . .  be exaggerated."9 
Hillenbrand developed his thinking further m a memorandum two 
months later. "The problem of Berlin is one of the gravest and most difficult 
with which United States policy must cope," he wrote, and it was one that 
would only be solved with the reunification of Germany. And despite the 
considerable effort being expended in determining Khrushchev's motives, he 
warned that basing U.S. policy on an assessment of Soviet motivations was 
counterproductive, since "there is no reason to believe that the Soviets are not 
in deadly earnest about Berlin, whatever the reasons which have impelled 
them to postpone their so frequently threatened unilateral action."10 For the 
moment, Hillenbrand' s remained the Kennedy administration's most 
thorough assessment of the Berlin situation. But by April, several members of 
the government and other advisers had begun widespread and often diffuse 
studies of the Berlin problem. Acheson and Kissinger were both studying the 
problem, and the Pentagon had instigated a "crash operation" to re-examine 
the military phases of existing contingency planning. Internationally, non­
military options were being explored with the British, French, and West 
Germans.11 
9 Hillenbrand, "The Berlin Problem in 1961," 10 January 1961, box 81, NSF, JFKL. For 
summary, see FRUS 1961-63, 14:33-34. See also Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, p.170. 
10 Hillenbrand, "The Problem of Berlin," 23 March 1961, box 81, NSF, JFKL. 
11 For a synopsis of the administration's studies then underway, see Hillenbrand to Kohler, 
"Work Related to Berlin Now in Progress," 27 April 1961, in Berlin Crisis, document no.02037. 
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Flexible Response and Berlin 
The administration regarded a revision of U.S. deterrence doctrine as 
the key to a more successful foreign policy, particularly in relation to Berlin. 
Consequently, this became an urgent priority. Several of the administration's 
leading figures had been the most vocal critics of Eisenhower's doctrine of 
Massive Retaliation. On many occasions, Acheson and Maxwell Taylor in 
particular had publicly attacked the doctrine. In his book on the issue, The 
Uncertain Trumpet, Taylor argued that Massive Retaliation had reached a 
"dead end" and needed to be replaced urgently with a more flexible 
alternative - what subsequently became known as Flexible Response.12 
Kennedy agreed. Increases in both the quality and quantity of nuclear missiles 
by both sides appeared to have led to diminishing returns in terms of 
deterrence value. And no one, Kennedy contended, could take seriously an 
American threat to resort to disproportionate retaliation for Soviet "salami 
tactics." Flexible Response, insofar as it was a single coherent strategy, rested 
on the basis of keeping options available to respond in proportion to the 
challenge. Although defence planners by no means intended to rule out the 
use of strategic weapons, they hoped to make the threat to use them more 
credible. As Rusk explained, "The problems which are likely to arise and have 
arisen in the past are problems which require great flexibility of means." By 
having a wide range of conventional military capabilities to respond to such 
moves Kennedy hoped to create a greater chance for incremental and 
controlled escalation. As the President later explained the rationale behind 
12 Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, (London: Stevens and Sons, 1960); Taylor, 
Swords and Ploioshares, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), pp.204-215. For an example of 
Acheson's public criticism, see Acheson, "Wishing Won't Hold Berlin," pp.32-33, 86. For a 
small selection of discussions on Flexible Response, see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 
pp.198-273; John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO ' s  Conventional Force Posture, 
(Palo Alto, Cal. : Stanford University Press, 1995); Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question: 
The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979); Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.283-402 (esp. pp.286-289). On the logistical 
challenges of Flexible Response, see ibid., pp. 297-321; Francis J. Gavin, "The Myth of Flexible 
Response: Kennedy, McNamara, and American Strategy in Europe," Paper presented at the 
25th Annual SHAFR Conference, Princeton University, 25 June 1999. On the difficulty of 
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increases in conventional military strength: "We intend to have a wider choice 
than humiliation or all-out nuclear action."13 
Since Berlin was one of the greatest tests of deterrence, it became one of 
the main hypothetical test cases that planners employed. One observer has 
recently argued that because of Berlin's unique situation- specifically its 
vulnerability and isolation- it became the best case against Flexible 
Response.14 But for many of Massive Retaliation's early critics, it remained the 
best reason to embrace a wider range of conventional options. It was unlikely 
that the threat would come in the form of an easily identifiable threat for 
which there was a clear response. The notion that the Soviet Union would 
suddenly mobilize its twenty-five divisions in Europe to attack the 11,000 
Western troops in West Berlin had long since been discredited. More likely 
was a "creeping blockade" or gradual political and economic strangulation.15 
By the time that Kennedy entered office he knew that the so-called 
"missile-gap," upon which he had been campaigning, did not exist. Rather, 
aerial surveillance from the U-2s and detailed information on Soviet military 
forces given by Soviet Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, clearly indicated that 
imbalance was, in fact, tipped in America's favour, although for the moment 
this remained a closely guarded secret. Knowledge of American strategic 
superiority was a factor in the way Washington handled the Berlin issue, not 
because it made a nuclear exchange any more thinkable or feasible, but by 
defining Flexible Response with any precision, see Andrew P.N. Erdmann, "The Intellectual 
and Bureaucratic Origins of Flexible Response: The Policy Planning Staff, 1953-1961," ibid. 
13 Bundy, "The Presidency and the Peace," p.355; Rusk interview, 3 March 1961, 
Department of State Bulletin, 27 March 1961; Radio and television broadcast to the nation on 
the Berlin crisis, 25 July 1961, Public Papers: Kennedy - 1 961, p.535. 
14 Schake, "The Case Against Flexible Response." 
15 In a December 1960 National Intelligence Estimate the CIA marvelled that Moscow's 
"growing recognition of the incalculable disaster that would be visited upon both sides in a 
general nuclear war" was so deep-rooted that it had even led "to reformulations of Marxist­
Leninist doctrine providing an appropriate theoretical justification for excluding war as an 
instrument of policy." But the flipside, the CIA warned, was that the lack of progress through 
peaceful coexistence "may have given some of the Soviet leadership a nostalgia for Stalin's 
less complicated methods." NIE 11-4-60, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 
1960-1965," box 25, Bohlen Papers, RG 59, NA. 
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altering the mind-set in which the administration approached the prospect of 
negotiations and in receiving an ultimatum from Moscow.16 
But however reasonable Flexible Response appeared to Washington, 
the Europeans saw things differently. Whereas Eisenhower had tried to share 
the defence with Western Europe by aiding them to build up their own 
. military forces, Kennedy placed less faith in Western Europe's ability to be 
responsible for its own defence. The policy of nuclear-sharing was rescinded, 
and the United States changed its military forces to a more balanced system 
involving both shield and sword. The new approach was not well received in 
Western Europe. Adenauer and de Gaulle had initially argued against 
Massive Retaliation, partly on the basis that it required their own large 
commitment to supply conventional forces, and partly because it could 
potentially turn central Europe into a nuclear battleground. Nevertheless, and 
much to Kennedy's frustration, while the United States was arguing that 
Flexible Response added to the credibility of the deterrent, the Western 
European powers were arguing that it detracted from that credibility. They 
remained outwardly unconvinced that Flexible Response demonstrated 
anything other than an attempt by the United States to distance itself from the 
chances of war over West Berlin, and they insisted that for all Massive 
Retaliation's flaws, it was better than denouncing the effectiveness of strategic 
weapons. Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration put the objections of its 
European allies down to misunderstanding rather than any fundamental flaw 
in the strategy, and it proceeded apace with the development of sub-nuclear 
capabilities. 
16 The information supplied by Penkovsky may not have been so crucial as some have 
suggested, but it did act in tandem with U.S. aerial surveillance to contribute to Washington's 
confidence in its assessment of Soviet nuclear capabilities. On Penkovsky, see Oleg 
Penkovsky, The Penkovsky Papers, trans. Peter S. Deriabin (London: Collins, 1965); Jerrold L. 
Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, The Spy vVho Saved the World, (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1992). Transcripts of several of Penkovsky' s debriefings are available in Berlin Crisis. For 
U.S. aerial surveillance, see particularly Robert Smith Hopkins, "U.S. Strategic Aerial 
Reconnaissance and the Cold War, 1945-1961," (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1998). For 
the effect this had on the administration's attitude towards the ultimatum, see Hillenbrand, 
"Berlin Crisis Working Group." 
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Vienna Summit 
Events in the first months of Kennedy's presidency gave Berlin an 
exaggerated importance in terms of prestige. Particularly in the context of the 
ill-fated Bay of Pigs operation, Kennedy's sensitivity to matters of prestige ­
both personal and national - was heightened.17 But this was not entirely 
illusory, and nor was he alone in his assessment that his blunder in Cuba had 
endangered U.S. interests in other theatres. "Those of use laboring in the 
vineyard of Berlin affairs," writes Hillenbrand, "had ample reason to think 
that our overall position had been weakened."1s In this atmosphere of acute 
sensitivity to national prestige the administration prepared for Kennedy's trip 
to Europe in June 1961 where he would meet directly with the Soviet premier 
for two days of talks. 
The Vienna summit was the defining moment in Kennedy's 
understanding of his adversary. Kennedy claimed to be going with low 
expectations of substantive progress. But there are also indications that he 
privately held considerable hope that some breakthrough might be achieved. 
Indeed, as has recently been pointed out, both leaders had been led to expect 
that the other would offer concessions.19 But more importantly, Kennedy 
hoped to repair some of the damage that he had done with the Bay of Pigs. If 
Khrushchev framed his assessment of the new administration on that episode, 
Kennedy held, then he would grossly miscalculate American determination 
and capabilities. "In my lifetime I [have] been present, alive, during three 
world wars [WWI, WWII, and Korea]," he told reporters in Paris prior to the 
conference, " and it is impossible to study the origins of each of these struggles 
17 For a recently released report on the failure of the operation by the CIA' s Inspector 
General that concluded that the operation was "beyond Agency responsibility as well as 
Agency capability," see Lyman Kirkpatrick, "CIA Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban 
Operations," October 1961, in Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of 
Cuba, ed. Peter Kornbluh (New York: New Press, 1998), p .99. 
1s Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, p.170. 
19 Gaddis, We Nmu Know, p.145; Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose'," p.37. 
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without realizing the serious miscalculations which were made by the leaders 
on both sides."20 
State had little doubt that the primary reason that Khrushchev had 
agreed to the meeting was to raise the issues of Berlin and Germany. Since 
issuing his ultimatum over two years earlier he had tried to engage 
. Eisenhower and then Kennedy directly on the issue. Talks with Ambassador 
Thompson, Walter Lippmann, and recent Communist press articles and 
speeches confirmed as much.21 And, on 17 February, Khrushchev had given 
Adenauer an aide memoire in which he asserted that the USSR did not rule out 
an interim settlement on West Berlin pending conclusion of a peace treaty 
with Germany. However, there must, he said, be a strictly specified time limit 
agreed in advance. 
The meetings began badly when Kennedy allowed himself to be drawn 
into an ideological discussion. When the discussion turned to more specific 
matters several issues were discussed, but on Berlin Khrushchev was 
unrelenting. Both leaders presented their case aggressively. Neither position 
was particularly new. Khrushchev insisted that a line be drawn under World 
War II. He would welcome U.S. participation in the process of negotiating a 
peace treaty with the two Germanies, but in the absence of that participation 
he would proceed unilaterally. Berlin would be made a free city and all rights 
deriving from Germany's surrender sixteen years earlier would become 
invalid. The President responded by explaining that U.S. national security 
was directly engaged because to withdraw from West Berlin would render 
U.S. commitments "a mere scrap of paper." The situation in Berlin was "not a 
20 Salinger, With Kennedy, p.228; Press luncheon in Paris, 2 June 1961, in The Kennedy 
Presidential Press Conferences, ed. George W. Johnson (New York: Earl M. Coleman, 1978), 
p.105. The next day the President raised the issue of "miscalculation" directly with 
Khrushchev. This brought a brusque reply: "Miscalculation! All I ever hear from your people 
and you news correspondents and your friends in Europe and every place else is that 
damned word . . .  We don't make mistakes . . .  We will not make war by mistake." Quoted in 
Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin 's Cold War, pp.245-246. See also MemCon, Vienna 
Meeting, 3 June 1961 (12:45 P.M.), box 126, POF, JFKL. 
21 Briefing Book for the President's Meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna, 25 May 1961, box 
27, Bohlen Papers, RG 59, NA. 
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satisfactory one," he said. But there were many unsatisfactory situations in 
the world and this did not necessarily make it the right time to rectify it. At 
the last of the meetings, Kennedy warned Khrushchev that it was going to be 
"a cold winter," and the Soviet premier handed the President an aide memoire 
on Berlin. 22 
Kennedy emerged from the talks visibly shaken. Unaccustomed to 
seeing John Kennedy intimidated by anyone, the President's aides interpreted 
this meeting with the Soviet premier as excessively confrontational. 23 Zubok 
and Pleshakov characterize the meeting as /1 a prima donna meeting a first­
time starlet." Khrushchev was certainly turning up the heat on Berlin, but it 
remains open to conjecture whether part of the moment's drama was simply 
because Kennedy was due more to Khrushchev's manner than the content of 
his threats. As Hillenbrand points out, Kennedy /1 temperamentally was 
bound to react somewhat differently than the vastly more experienced 
22 MemCon, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 4 June 1961 (10:15 A.M.), FRUS 1 961-63, 14:87-96; 
MemCon, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 4 June 1961 (3:15 P.M.), ibid., 96-98. 
23 Salinger, With Kennedy, p.227; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp.324-339; Sorensen, 
Kennedy, pp.543-50. Veteren Neiu York Times correspondent James Reston, who met the 
President in the American embassy immediately after the last of the meetings, recalled: "He 
[Kennedy] arrived at the embassy over an hour late, shaken and angry. He was wearing a hat 
- unusual for him - and he pushed it down over his forehead, sat down on the couch beside 
me, and sighed. I said it must have been a rough session. Much rougher than he had 
expected, he said." James Reston, Deadline: A Memoir, (New York: Times, 1992), pp.298-299. 
There were some notable exceptions to this generally negative assessment of the conference's 
proceedings. Thompson, for example, repeatedly told Kennedy that Khrushchev had been 
impressed by him at Vienna. It is possible, however, that this was partially prompted by the 
President teasing Thompson for being responsible for convincing him to go to Vienna. See for 
example Meeting Recording, Kennedy and Thompson, 8 August 1962, tape 8, Presidential 
Recordings, JFKL; Thompson recorded interview by Elizabeth Donahue, 25 March 1964, 
OHP, JFKL; Thompson recorded interview by Joseph E. O'Connor, 27 April 1966, ibid. 
Schlesinger suggests that both Bohlen and Thompson believed that Kennedy overreacted 
during the Vienna conference in the first place. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p.374. In a later 
interview, however, Thompson explicitly said that this was a misrepresentation of his views 
and that, in fact, apart from being drawn into a ideological discussion Kennedy handled 
himself "exceedingly well." Thompson interview, 27 April 1966. In his memoirs Bohlen is 
even more circumspect. Bohlen, Witness to HistonJ, 482. Others in State also thought that 
Khrushchev had been impressed by the President. See for example Matthews to Rusk, 6 June 
1961, box 260, Conference Files, ExecSec, RG 59, NA. Soviet sources seem to confirm that 
Khrushchev was deliberately provocative. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p.44. Zubok and 
Pleshakov reveal that Khrushchev told the Politburo on the eve of the crisis that he intended 
to be tough with the new President in the expectation that this would win concessions. Zubok 
and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, pp.236, 242-243. 
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President Eisenhower."  He continues: "There was certainly high drama 
involved at Vienna, and the fact that the president had brought with him to 
Washington a group of highly intelligent but also highly excitable young men 
from Cambridge, Massachusetts, guaranteed an almost immediate effusion of 
evocative description and instant opinion."24 There was certainly no shortage 
of warnings. When Thompson had initially suggested a face-to-face meeting, 
he had repeatedly warned that Khrushchev was a difficult person with whom 
to deal. Even after the meetings he had told Kennedy that such behaviour was 
"par for the course."  The briefing book that State prepared for the President 
for the Vienna summit contained a detailed warning that Khrushchev's 
manner could be disconcerting to the uninitiated. It warned: "Not 
infrequently he paints the picture he wants his audience to see with a very 
broad brush - sometimes it seems with his foot - in order to get his point 
across forcefully, often doing the utmost violence to the details." More 
pointedly, State warned the President: "Khrushchev would be less than 
human if Laos, Cuba, and Yuriy Gagarin have not reinforced his normal self­
confidence to the point where overboldness and possible miscalculation could 
constitute a grave potential menace to the whole world . . . .  In such a mood, 
Berlin must offer a temptation that may very well be too strong to resist." 25 
Certainly, Kennedy interpreted the situation as a significant setback 
and a deliberate attempt to heat up the Cold War. Again, Washington had 
allowed a long-anticipated challenge to become a "bolt out of the blue." 
Secretary of State Rusk suggested that the best indication of how seriously the 
24 Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, p.175. 
25 It continued: "By any standards, Khrushchev is an extraordinary person. He is 
simultaneously a handshaking, backslapping, grass-roots politician who could draw a good 
vote in any democracy, and a shrewd and ruthless manipulator of power in the best 
totalitarian tradition . . . .  Capable of extraordinary frankness, and in his own eyes no doubt 
unusually honest, Khrushchev can also on occasion be a gambler and a dissembler expert in 
calculated bluffing. It is often hard to distinguish when Khrushchev is in his own eyes voicing 
real conviction and when he is dissembling. The boundary line between truth and stratagem, 
between the pursuance of real conviction and of tactical advantage, is in any even much less 
clear in the Russian communist mind than in ours. Even when Khrushchev does not mean to 
deceive, he can be misleading." "Position Paper for the President's Meeting with Khrushchev, 
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Soviets were taking their demands was whether or not they published the text 
of the aide memoire. If it was kept secret then he considered it to be a basis for 
further negotiations. But if they published it, he said, the West could assume 
that the Kremlin had launched another offensive. Khrushchev published the 
text on 10 June, prompting urgent policy preparation in State " to get all our 
ducks in a row with respect to German planning" in Foy Kohler's words. 26 
Th� personal confrontation with the Soviet premier had obviously had 
a profound impact on Kennedy. When addressing the nation, Kennedy 
described the talks as "a very sober two days." He detailed open 
disagreements with the Soviet premier on issue such as Laos and the nuclear 
test ban talks. "But our most somber talks," Kennedy said, "were on the 
subject of Germany and Berlin." He said he had told Khrushchev that the 
United States "could not abandon our obligations to the people of West 
Berlin."27 It was in this mood that the administration intensified its study of 
the issue. 
The post-Vienna period saw intense activity in the administration on 
Berlin as it struggled to come to terms with the implications of Khrushchev's 
aide memoire. Immediately, State examined the implications of the document. 
In some respects earlier demands were softened in the new proposals. The 
Soviets no longer required West Germany to immediately relinquish 
membership of NATO. Instead, they said, "both German States could for a 
certain period, even after the conclusion of a peace treaty, remain in the 
military alliances to which they now belong." Nor did the new proposals 
require the recognition of the governments of East or West Germany by all the 
parties to the treaty. This would be up to each government's discretion. But 
the tone of the aide memoire was clearly that of an ultimatum.28 
Vienna, June 3-4, 1961," 25 May 1961, box 27, Bohlen Papers, RG 59, NA. For Thompson's 
assessment, see Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p.365; Thompson interview, 27 April 1966. 
26 Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, p.122; Kohler quoted in ibid., p.123. 
27 Public Papers: Kennedy: 1961, pp.442-444. 
28 Department of State Bulletin, 7 August 1961, pp.231-233. 
Preparing for the Showdown I 238 
Although the President hoped to respond swiftly to the aide memoire, 
State's efforts to draft a diplomatic response fell victim to bureaucratic 
inefficiency, not State's complacency as some have charged.29 The U.S. reply 
was not finally ready until 17 July. It refuted the Soviets' demands, but made 
little in the way its own proposals of substance. While State was drafting the 
diplomatic response, Kennedy had mobilized the NSC to review existing 
policy and contingency planning for Berlin. On an international basis this 
proved difficult. Although Kennedy had made efforts to confer personally 
with London and Paris immediately prior to and after meeting with 
Khrushchev in Vienna, the Vienna summit exacerbated Allied disarray. To de 
Gaulle it confirmed the futility, even danger, of engaging in any sorts of talks 
with Khrushchev. To the British, it further highlighted the precariousness of 
the peace and the danger of escalation through miscalculation. Finding such 
allied disarray perilous to U.S. interests, Bundy called on the President to take 
the lead on Berlin. Finding rare common ground with influential columnists 
Joe Alsop and Walter Lippmann, Bundy held that the President should take 
"immediate, personal, and continuous command of this enormous question." 
"This is true," he continued, 
because whatever course you determine upon will require a much 
higher level of understanding and support from the American people 
than we can now be sure of. It is true also because only your lead can 
provide the necessary degree of common direction to the West. Four­
power parleys will almost surely produce uncertain postures. If you 
wish to be wholly unbending, you will have to confront the British 
with your own decision that this is how it must be. If you want to 
explore a new arrangement, you will have to find ways of making 
Adenauer accept your decision.3o 
Consequently, he said, the United States could no longer sit back and wait for 
the Berlin crisis to unfurl; it must actively direct proceedings. In so doing, the 
29 For a detailed account of this convoluted process, see Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our 
Time, pp.176-178. 
30 Bundy to Kennedy, "Berlin," 10 June 1961, FRUS 1961 -63, 14:107-108. 
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President should encourage State to take a fresh look at the whole problem 
IF as if by men from Mars."31 
But for all the administration's efforts to take a fresh look at the 
problem, as Hillenbrand had forecast in January and March, each effort 
reached essentially familiar conclusions. There were certainly different 
subtleties of emphasis, but never a radical and practicable solution. Although 
international planning was deadlocked, the administration's own internal 
activity was decidedly more productive. Prominent individuals offered their 
interpretations of the problem. Although conceding that it was difficult to 
discern Khrushchev's priorities, Thompson continued to assess that the 
Soviets' primary purposes were defensive. Contrary to the weight of 
administration opinion, Thompson judged that damaging U.S. prestige was 
relatively low of the Kremlin's priorities.32 The administration's intelligence 
bodies also reviewed the situation. The CIA prepared a Special National 
Intelligence Estimate dealing with a possible Berlin crisis. While hoping that 
U.S. behaviour for the previous two and a half years had led the Soviets to 
increase their estimate of the importance that Washington attached to the U.S. 
presence in West Berlin, the analysts acknowledged that on both sides much 
remained uncertain when assessing the opposite' s intentions. The most 
important aspect of this was assessing the adversary's willingness to resort to 
armed conflict. The overall principle to which Soviet policy would adhere, the 
CIA assessed, was to make the issues unclear.33 State's Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research suggested that the airlift be reconsidered as an option that 
retained considerable control over escalation. One official even raised the 
31 Bundy to Kennedy, "Berlin," 10 June 1961, ibid. 
32 Thompson to Rusk, 19 June 1961, box 81, NSF, JFKL. Thompson qualified the last 
objective by pointing to the Free City proposal, which Thompson said was designed to 
accomplish Soviet objectives while saving face for the United States. He wrote: "I  believe that 
Khrushchev was surprised and disappointed at our reaction to his proposal." 
33 SNIE 2-60, "Soviet and Other Reactions to Various Courses of Action Regarding Berlin," 
13 June 1961, box 4, NIE, RG 263, NA. 
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prospect that Khrushchev may have been using the Berlin question to gain 
concessions in Southeast Asia.34 
But while intelligence analysts and the administration's 
Kremlinologists sought to umavel Soviet motivations, Hemy Kissinger, who 
had been commissioned to study the Berlin and German problems, agreed 
with Hillenbrand' s earlier dismissal of such efforts as a moot point. "Soviet 
motivations," he wrote in a memorandum to the President, "are essentially 
irrelevant to our policies. . . . Our proposals should depend not on Soviet 
purposes but our own." Furthermore: 
It is not necessary to choose in the abstract between the school of 
thought that claims that the issue of Berlin is primarily a device to force 
us into negotiations, or that which sees in it a Soviet device to stabilize 
its hold on Eastern Germany. Our proposals should depend not on 
Soviet purposes by on our own. Soviet intentions are irrelevant to the 
negotiability of certain proposals and not to their merits. The limits of 
the negotiable are set basically by the requirements of Berlin's 
freedom.35 
Bundy, describing Kissinger's memorandum as "a powerful document," 
advocated a position akin to that of Kissinger and columnist Joe Alsop in that 
the United States should- take a strong and essentially unyielding position on 
Berlin.36 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William 
Fulbright expressed his own views in a lengthy memorandum. Taking a 
. ;imilar line to the one Lippmann had recently taken, Fulbright called for 
1egotiations that would result in stabilization of the status quo in Germany. 
ro keep insisting that reunification of Germany was the ultimate objective 
,yas to blatantly disregard the situation as it existed. Even if there were 
Jractical reasons why such recognition of the division of Germany could not 
>e publicly accepted, he said, it was necessary that U.S. policy be based on 
34 This idea was raised by Arleigh Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations. Burke to Bundy, 
9 June 1961, box 81, NSF, JFKL; Burke to JCS, "Berlin," 19 June 1961, ibid. 
35 Kissinger to Kennedy, n.d., box 261, Conference Files, ExecSec, RG 59, NA. 
36 Bundy to Kennedy, "Berlin," 10 June 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:107-08. 
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this fact. It should not be forgotten, he warned, that the Berlin situation was a 
u strategic nightmare." Legal semantics did little to improve the situation 
primarily because "the problem of a divided Berlin within a divided Germany 
is not fundamentally a legal problem but a political problem at the very core 
of a world-wide struggle for power."37 
Meanwhile, Kennedy was taking every opportunity to impress upon 
the Soviets his determination to protect U.S. interests. After Moscow had 
released the text of the aide memoire publicly on 10 June, it was followed by a 
number of statements that a settlement was required before the end of the 
year. On 17 June, he met alone with the new Soviet ambassador to 
. Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Drawing the line in unequivocal terms, he 
conceded that the moral overtones he had been adopting publicly were only 
secondary. He told Dobrynin that the primary interest the United States had 
in maintaining its commitment was credibility. "If we, the United States, 
agree to leave West Berlin, then no one is going to trust Washington's word 
anymore, and all our obligations toward other countries will turn into a 
worthless piece of paper. If we are forced out of Berlin in any way, all our 
guarantees to Western Europe will lose any sense. And this affects our basic 
interests, for the alliance with Western nations is the keystone of American 
foreign policy." 38 
Defining the Casus Belli 
In the wake of the Vienna summit, Acheson updated his original report 
on the Berlin situation, which had been first presented in early April, and 
submitted it as a second report in late June. Essentially, Acheson called for an 
intense campaign to prepare Washington for a Berlin crisis. Acheson argued 
that the Eisenhower administration had underestimated the challenge to 
37 Fulbright, "Memorandum on Berlin," 7 June 1961, box 261, Conference, ExecSec, RG 59, 
\JA. 
38 Kennedy quoted in Dobrynin, In Confidence, p.66. 
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American national security. Khrushchev was not looking to /1 get himself of 
the hook," but had posed a deliberate and calculated challenge. Such a clear 
challenge, Acheson insisted, required a strong response. 39 Lest there was any 
doubt about the seriousness of the problem as he saw it, Acheson spelled it 
out. The Berlin problem, he declared, had assumed significance "broader and 
deeper than even the German question as a whole." Putting in bluntly: "It is 
not too much to say that the whole position of the United States is in the 
balance." He continued: 
It is plain that, if carried to its conclusion, the Berlin offensive strikes 
at the power and world position of the United States. Even its more 
limited purposes are gravely damaging to the United States and the 
Western Alliance. This is the nature of the crisis which confronts us; 
not the fate of a city, or of its two and one-half million people, or even 
the integrity of our pledged word. So long as issues of the magnitude 
outlined are sought by the USSR, and believed by them to be within 
their grasp, real negotiation is impossible. Only by winning the test of 
will can we change the Soviets' purpose. Only thus can we 
demonstrate that what they want to do is not possible.40 
Having established the significance of the situation as he saw it, 
Acheson put forward his detailed proposals for pursuing the national interest. 
He minced no words in his opposition to the Eisenhower's administration 
drift towards a negotiated settlement. In existing circumstances, Acheson 
argued, negotiations were the wrong course. The immediate cause of crisis, 
Acheson argued, was not the future of Berlin; rather, it was Khrushchev's 
attempt to test the American will . "Until this conflict of wills is resolved," he 
said, "an attempt to solve the Berlin issue by negotiations is worse than a 
waste of time and energy. It is dangerous." A crisis was clearly imminent. 
Therefore, he warned, the United States needed to begin urgent 
preparations.41 
39 Acheson, "Wishing Won't Hold Berlin," pp.33, 86; Acheson, "The Berlin Crisis: 
Preliminary Draft," 27 June 1961, FRUS 1 961-63, 14:138-39. In FRUS the report is dated 28 
June. This, however, was the date that Acheson sent it to the White House. The actual report 
was completed on and dated 27 June. 
40 Acheson, "The Berlin Crisis." 
41 Ibid. 
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Acheson argued that the Eisenhower administration's actions over the 
previous two years had devalued the deterrent and had weakened the U.S. 
position. The greatest threat to U.S. national security, Acheson argued, was 
Moscow's disbelief that the United States would resort to war over Berlin. But 
the damage done by Massive Retaliation was not irreparable. The key, he said, 
lay in revaluing this deterrent. Since Khrushchev had continued to threaten 
the United States regardless of Massive Retaliation, Acheson claimed that it 
demonstrated that "nuclear weapons are not the last and most powerful 
weapons in the hierarchy of violence to be employed to protect Berlin." 
Therefore, the United States needed to mobilize all of the military, economic, 
. and political resources at its disposal. As specific immediate measures, he 
recommended increasing both conventional and nuclear military 
preparedness, improving reserve readiness and logistical processes, increasing 
stocks of ammunition, tightening SACEUR' s control over nuclear warheads in 
Europe, and placing the Strategic Air Command on prolonged alert. But he 
. emphasized that this process must be the result of genuine commitment 
because "the phoney is easily recognized and almost surely will be 
disastrous."  No attempt should be made to conceal such preparations, he 
argued, but neither should it be done in such a way that might engage 
Khrushchev's personal prestige.42 
In Acheson's judgement, from such a position of strength the United 
States would be in a much more advantageous position to face Khrushchev's 
challenge. If the Soviets went ahead and signed a treaty with East Germany, 
Acheson posited, then the United States should regard the treaty "as an 
exercise in diplomatic ventriloquism - an act without meaning or validity." If 
Western access was blocked then they should begin with a sizeable probe of 
approximately battalion strength to establish the fact that access to Berlin was 
physically blocked. Then they should resort to substantial non-nuclear force. 
"The purpose of this operation," he said, "would not be the military one of 
42 Ibid. 
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defeating all the Soviet forces which might oppose our forces; this would not 
be feasible. It would be the political purpose of moving the Soviets to negotiate 
a resumption of access by giving the most convincing demonstration of which 
the West was capable that the Western Allies were not prepared to submit to 
Soviet demands and would use whatever force was necessary, up to and 
including general war, in resisting them." Finally, Acheson offered a 
disclaimer. It was always conceivable, he said, that Moscow might refuse to be 
deterred.43 
After Acheson's report was submitted to the NSC on 29 June it 
provoked a great deal of debate within the administration. Indeed, 
Hillenbrand has noted that "You can't underestimate the impact of Acheson's 
two reports on the White House."44 But its reception outside of the White 
House was less equivocal. Despite the widespread support for the notion of 
maintaining a flexible response, many elements of the administration resisted 
the generally alarmist tone of Acheson's calls for military preparedness and 
the urgent need for at least partial mobilization. Kissinger described Acheson's 
proposal as essentially "a modified version of the status quo," and he 
recommended that more options be placed before the President. He warned 
that diplomatic options should not be forgotten in the clamour to increase 
military preparedness.4s But he did concur with the thrust of Acheson's 
comments on the necessity for the President to make an early decision on his 
willingness to resort to nuclear war for West Berlin. "None of our plans with 
respect to ground access - even Mr. Acheson's proposal, make sense unless we 
are prepared to face the risks of nuclear war," he warned. But this phrase had 
never been satisfactorily defined, and Kissinger did not believe that the 
President should be forced to make a decision about going to nuclear war in 
the abstract. Consequently, he argued, it was essential that the nature of U.S. 
nuclear options be defined immediately. Schlesinger offered his own detailed 
43 Ibid. 
44 Hillenbrand, "Berlin Crisis Working Group." 
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critique of Acheson's report. Although seeing some merit in it, he outlined 
several major deficiencies that Acheson should be asked to address. 46 
Acheson's report essentially defined Washington's debate. Kennedy 
ordered Defense and State to prepare studies on the implications of increasing 
military readiness, the results to be ready by 13 July.47 On that date, Kennedy 
convened firstly a full NSC meeting on Berlin to discuss the general position 
and then a smaller session to discuss a memorandum that Bundy presented 
on military options. There was near unanimous agreement that the United 
States needed to bolster its negotiating position by increasing its military 
resources. The issue debated was not whether there was merit in increasing 
. military readiness but in how this should be done. Some argued that the 
situation called for a rapid and dramatic mobilization including declaring a 
national emergency, abandoning negotiations, and placing the armed forces 
on alert. But the weight of opinion was for a steady yet calm build-up. There 
was little, if any, support for the position that the existing state of U.S. 
military forces was adequate for the situation.48 It was decided that Kennedy 
should address the nation on the crisis. The intention was not only to explain 
the measures the administration was taking to face the challenge, but also to 
define the framework for discussion.49 
With Washington rapidly moving towards creating a position of 
strength through rearmament, State sought to define more precisely U.S. vital 
interests in West Berlin. At the NSC meeting on 13 July, Kennedy and Rusk 
agreed that there were two things that mattered: "our presence in Berlin, and 
45 Kissinger to Bundy, 14 July 1961, box 81, NSF, JFKL; Kissinger to Bundy, "Acheson 
Memoranda," 11 August 1961, box 82, ibid. 
46 Kissinger to Bundy, 7 July 1961, box 81, ibid.; Schlesinger to Kennedy, 7 July 1961, FRUS 
1961-63, 14:173-176. 
47 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 29 June 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:160-162; NSAM 58, 30 June 
1961, ibid., pp.161-165. 
48 MemCon, NSC Meeting, 13 July 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:192-194; Bundy, "Military 
Choices in Berlin Planning," n.d., box 81, NSF, JFKL; Lemnitzer, Notes on NSC Meeting, 13 
July 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:194-196. For a good synopsis of the views of various senior 
officials, see Sorensen to Kennedy, "The Decision on Berlin," 17 July 1961, box 116A, 
Countries, POF, JFKL. 
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our access to Berlin."50 State prepared its own study on this basis that spelled 
out America's vital interests in Berlin in clear terms. It assessed those interests 
as: "1 .  Presence and security of Western forces in West Berlin; 2. The · security 
and viability of West Berlin; 3.  Physical access to West Berlin; 4. The security 
of the Federal Republic of Germany against attacks from the East." There 
were other aspects of the problem "which are not politically acceptable." 
These included the de facto recognition of the division of Germany and the 
absorption of East Germany into the GDR. But such scenarios, the report said, 
"are not the occasion for a resort to force by the West."51 
Prior to his televised address, Kennedy informed London, Paris, and 
Bonn of the measures he planned to announce. Pointing to Khrushchev's 
announcement less than a fortnight earlier that he was halting the planned 
reduction of Soviet armed forces, Kennedy told his NATO allies that the crisis 
must be faced with greater military preparations. Khrushchev must be 
impressed firstly by Western determination to defend Berlin and secondly the 
danger of embarking on an arms race with the United States.52 
On 25 July, Kennedy addressed the nation. He told the American 
people that the administration was clear about what it needed to do. Setting 
the Berlin problem in the context of a world-wide struggle, he called on 
Americans for "calm determination and steady nerves." In perhaps the 
frankest assessment of U.S. interests in the city, Kennedy told the nation: 
West Berlin - lying exposed 110 miles inside East Germany, 
surrounded by Soviet troops and close to Soviet supply lines, has 
many roles. It is more than a showcase of liberty, a symbol, an island of 
freedom in a Communist sea. It is even more than a link with the Free 
49 Kissinger to Bundy, "Some Rough Thoughts on the President's TV Speech," 21 July 
1961, box 81, NSF, JFKL. 
5o MemCon, NSC Meeting, 13 July 1961, FRUS 1 961-63, 14:194. 
51 Rusk, "Outline on Germany and Berlin/' 17 July 1961, FRUS 1 961-63, 14:207-208; 
Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp.182-183. 
52 Recent historiography suggests that Khrushchev's decision to halt military cutbacks 
probably did not reflect a "panic" situation from the Soviet premier. More likely was that it 
was related to Soviet relations with the Chinese, Albanians, and East Germans. Therefore, the 
cancellation of the reductions was probably aimed less at the United States as it was at 
appeasing Moscow's allies. See Gaddis, We Now Knmu, pp.146-147. 
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World, a beacon of hope behind the Iron Curtain, an escape hatch for 
refugees. West Berlin is all of that. But above all it has now become - as 
never before - the great testing place of Western courage and will, a 
focal point where our solemn commitments stretching back over the 
years since 1945, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic 
confrontation. 
It would be a mistake, he warned bluntly, for the Soviets to doubt his resolve 
to defend Berlin. NATO's nuclear shield extended over Berlin, and he would 
regard an attack on the city as an attack on the Western hemisphere. "We do 
not want to fight," he said, "but we have fought before." But the central point 
he was trying to convey was that "we cannot separate its safety from our 
own." Consequently, he was requesting a substantial increase in military 
appropriations, an intense civil defence programme, and moves to increase 
military readiness. But despite these drastic measures, he said, 11 if war begins, 
it will have begun in Moscow and not Berlin."53 Kennedy was unmistakably 
sounding the tocsin. The tone of the speech was the antithesis of Eisenhower's 
public approach. There could be no doubt that the administration considered 
the existing situation a "crisis." The nation rallied quickly behind the President 
and Congress had little hesitation in acceding to all Kennedy's requests for 
increased military appropriations. 
Thus, by late July the United States had begun a rapid and dramatic 
military build-up and there was an inescapable atmosphere of crisis in 
Washington. But at the same time as announcing the build-up, the 
administration had carefully and quietly defined the casus belli with greater 
precision. The key point, as Kennedy saw it, was the presence of U.S. troops in 
West Berlin. Soviet actions in their own sector were already defined as a less 
than vital to U.S. interests, and Washington had hinted to its NATO allies that 
its fall-back position even went so far as dealing with East German officials. 
The first chance to gauge first-hand the Europeans' reaction to the 
President's speech and the U.S. military build-up came during a meeting of 
53 Kennedy address to the nation on the Berlin crisis, 25 July 1961, Public Papers: Kennedy: 
1961, pp.533-534. 
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NATO foreign ministers in meeting in Paris in early August. Its primary item 
on the agenda was Berlin. Von Brentano reported that the GDR appeared to 
be preparing the first stages of a programme of harassment of intersector 
Berlin traffic . Fearing riots similar to those of 1953, Rusk argued that any 
attempt by the either Khrushchev or Ulbricht to stem the steady flow of 
refugees through West Berlin-a  move which was appearing increasingly 
likely - would increase pressure in East Germany which might precipitate the 
crisis sooner than expected.54 Rusk revealed what his government had 
concluded were its vital interests in Berlin and defined the casu s  belli as the 
United States saw it: the presence of Western forces in the city; the ability of 
West Berlin to live as a city; and the maintenance of its physical access to the 
Federal Republic and the rest of the world. He urged the foreign ministers to 
adopt the same position, telling them that "we must make Khrushchev fully 
understand that we will defend our vital interests regardless of that cost," and 
thereby confront the Kremlin with a nuclear choice.ss Rusk then outlined a 
three-stage programme that Washington had developed to face a crisis over 
Berlin. Firstly, he reassured the Europeans that Kennedy was resolved to 
exhaust all non-military measures first- including an economic embargo, an 
air lift, and a "roaring debate" in the UN - before resorting to armed force. 
Much to the relief of the British, Rusk also said that the administration had 
decided that an armed probe would accomplish little and therefore had 
abandoned such a plan. Instead, it would institute an airlift. If the Soviets shot 
down an airlift then the United States would move to the second stage which 
involved engaging East German and Soviet forces with significant Allied 
conventional forces to confront Khrushchev with the decision on escalation. If 
this failed, then the third stage was general nuclear war.s6 
54 MemCon, Ministerial Consultations on Berlin, 5 August 1961, FRUS 1 961-63, 14:281-282. 
ss Ibid., pp.286-287. 
S6 MemCon, Ministerial Consultations on Berlin, 6 August 1961, FRUS 1 961-63, 14:301-302. 
For Defense's idea of what LIVE OAK's instructions should be, see Defense, Talking Paper, 
"Second US Military Paper - Draft Instructions for LIVE OAK," n.d., box 261, Conference Files, 
ExecSec, RG 59, NA. 
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Much of this programme was designed to be undertaken unilaterally, 
but a contribution from Western Europe would strengthen the deterrent 
considerably. Rusk urged NATO's foreign ministers to take the political 
decision to support this programme. But despite his efforts, Rusk found the 
British reluctant to divert forces from elsewhere, and the French preoccupied 
with their troubles in Algeria. Thus the conference adjourned without Rusk 
having secured such a decision, but with the understanding that the foreign 
ministers would reconvene in mid-September to resume discussions on the 
issue. And although the French continued to resist negotiations, tentative 
agreement was reached that formal negotiations with Moscow should be 
possible in October or early November. Through the course of the conference 
Rusk became convinced that Kennedy's initiative was /1 undoubtedly the right 
exercise in leadership insofar as Europe is concerned."57 
Washington was not altogether surprised at the Europeans' reluctance 
to commit to the military programme. As Paul Nitze wrote McNamara on the 
eve of the conference, /1 Our Allies have not yet confronted the root issues 
which the U.S. has been intensively examining since before Vienna." Their 
position rested on the assumption that the issue could be resolved before 
military conflict became imminent, whereas U.S. policy had this as the 
objective "but does not bank on it." It was imperative that Washington 
impress upon NATO the true nature of the decisions it would face if the 
military probes were repelled. But this would not be an easy task since "the 
U.S. has been analyzing those semifinal and final implications latent in the 
Berlin situation, while our Allies have not." The dilemma for the United 
States, as Nitze put it, was that "the educational process takes time, and time 
is short. If the U.S. presses too rapidly, the Allies may still lack understanding 
and faith in our approach. If too much time is allowed for them to catch up, 
events may overtake us all ." Nevertheless, since U.S. military planning was 
designed to pursue what he believed to be sound political objectives - to 
57 Rusk to Kennedy, 6 August 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:309; Rusk to Kennedy, 6 August 
1961, ibid., p.311 .  
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forestall a crisis and to advance Allied interests if a crisis did occur - Nitze 
hoped that NATO would eventually see the light.ss 
On 8 August, Rusk met privately with de Gaulle in Paris. The French 
President criticized American impatience with the Berlin issue, telling Rusk 
that the United States was both far away and in a hurry with respect to Berlin. 
He told Rusk: "You are naturally very concerned about Berlin, but not as 
immediately nor as directly as we are. We here in Europe are much more 
directly concerned." American efforts to establish a bilateral dialogue with the 
Soviets through Thompson and John McCloy were futile, he said, but they 
were welcome to try. In reply, Rusk emphasized that there was nothing 
tentative about the U.S. commitment to West Berlin. It would not be a 
question of Americans going to Europe to die, but tens of millions would die 
in the United States for Berlin "as you will die in Europe over Berlin." 
Consequently, he held, the United States was not about to be rash. Rather, the 
West needed a schedule or matters could be delayed indefinitely and NATO 
might be faced with a Berlin crisis without having any plan.s9 When Rusk met 
with Italian Prime Minister Fanfani the next day, Fanfani told him that 
Khrushchev had interpreted Kennedy's speech as an ultimatum and in his 
typically blunt language had threatened to respond with military measures of 
his own. Rusk assured Fanfani that the United State was not acting rashly; 
West Berlin was at the heart of the East-West conflict and a potential turning 
point in history. Only a strong stand, he said, would serve their interests.60 
By the time the President left Washington for a weekend at 
Hyannisport on 11 August, the administration was subjecting the Berlin issue 
to intense scrutiny. Bundy included some weighty documents in the 
ss Nitze to McNamara, n.d. (approx. 4 August), box 261, Conference Files, ExecSec, RG 59, 
NA. 
59 MemCon, Rusk and de Gaulle, 8 August 1961, FRUS 1961 -63, 14:312-316. 
60 Fanfani thought it interesting to note that in the Soviet premier's speech, which had 
been presented the previous day, Khrushchev had said that he might take the military 
measures outlined, rather than that he had taken them. MemCon, Rusk and Fanfani, 9 August 
1961, box 260, Conference Files, ExecSec, RG 59, NA. For a similar discussion see MemCon, 
NAC Meeting, 8 August 1961, ibid. See also MemCon, Ministerial Consultations on Berlin, 6 
August 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:301 . 
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President's weekend reading because, in his words, /1 there is increasing 
evidence on all sides that we now need to get down to the bedrock of 
deciding on a negotiating position." Despite holding out limited hopes for 
NATO's willingness to commit to the U.S. programme, he had been 
disappointed with the result of Rusk's European trip. He wrote Kennedy that 
since NATO /1 did not get out of the rut of our 1959 position" it was plain that 
the avenue of four power discussions had been exhausted. Yet, as he saw it, 
the Berlin issue was "the most important problem in foreign policy" facing 
U.S. national security and should therefore immediately be studied by a select 
group of senior officials. He advocated that the United States firmly seize 
. leadership of the issue and shift the U.S. position from the overly legalistic 
basis of occupation rights to the more psychologically appealing slogan of 
self-determination. 61 
Bundy's recommendations had been reinforced by an important 
meeting he had attended on 11 August with · Taylor, Rostow, Kissinger, and 
Henry Owen from State. Convening to discuss Berlin, they concluded that 
several other potential avenues that had not been covered in Acheson's report 
needed further study. These included alterations to West Berlin's 
jurisdictional status, parallel peace treaties with East and West Germany, as 
well as more radical positions designed to be /1 something of a shock to the 
Soviets and might help persuade them that crisis-mongering can be counter­
productive." They did, however, again reject Khrushchev's proposal to place 
West Berlin under some for of UN jurisdiction. 62 
Thus, several of the President's most senior advisers, in looking for a 
viable way out of the impasse, were beginning to move toward a willingness 
to discuss with the East Germans modalities of access after East German 
61 Bundy recommended that a special group be established quite apart from the steering 
and coordinating groups to study the issue. He suggested specifically Rusk, Kohler, 
Kissinger, Bohlen, Taylor, Sorensen, and Henry Own. Bundy to Kennedy, "Berlin Negotiating 
Papers for Hyannisport," 11 August 1961, box 82, NSF, JFKL. 
62 MemCon, Bundy, Taylor, Rostow, Kissinger, and Owen, 11 August 1961; Kissinger to 
Bundy, "Negotiations with the GDR," 11 August 1961; Bundy to Taylor, Rostow, Kissinger, 
and Owen, "Berlin Plans," 10 August 1961, box 82, NSF, JFKL. 
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recognition of Western rights of access. As Hillenbrand had said earlier in the 
year, the administration should not confuse what was conceivable with what 
was desirable. Kissinger now pointed out that the distinction depended on the 
context: 
If we have been purposeful and clear, if there is confidence in our 
leadership, many things are possible that in other circumstances are 
resisted as starting us down a slippery slope . . . .  The impact of a de 
facto recognition as outlined here depends on the context in which it 
is made, and specifically on what alternative seem available. If 
nuclear war seems imminent it may prove more attractive than if 
discussed in isolation. Thus, while I generally do not favor fall-back 
positions very different from the starting point, this particular 
proposal seems to me one which is best kept in reserve for moments 
of crisis and then put forward as a compromise scheme.63 
Rusk had already told NATO that the United States would not go to war over 
the issue of talking to the East Germans. Nevertheless, Kissinger warned, once 
started down this road it was next to impossible to stop short of full 
recognition because " if it does not make sense to fight a war on the issue of 
talking to the East Germans, it will seem to make even less sense to fight a 
war over the level at which negotiations should take place."64 
The Wall 
Since the beginning of the Eisenhower administration, Washington had 
watched closely the refugee situation in Germany. And the legacy of Rollback 
was clearly evident in Western exploitation of the situation. East Germans 
"voting with their feet" and fleeing the "workers' paradise" provided potent 
grist for the U.S. propaganda mill. By mid-1961, it was widely recognized that 
the situation was intensifying; German press and U.S.-sponsored radio 
broadcasts in Germany carried almost daily news stories about the increasing 
flow of refugees. But Washington had long recognized that the refugee 
63 Kissinger to Bundy, "Negotiations with the GDR," 11 August 1961, box 82, NSF, JFKL. 
64 Ibid. 
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problem was a double-edged sword. For all of its propaganda appeal, the 
situation threatened to rapidly deteriorate into rioting similar to that in June 
1953. And, as in 1953, the Western Allies judged that it was best not to push 
the situation to breaking point. 65 
This approach spilled over into contingency planning and led to what 
the administration's critics later charged to be complacency. Despite the 
sporadic efforts by the GDR to curb the flow of refugees, no serious attempt 
was made by Washington to develop contingency plans to cope with the GDR 
sealing East Berlin.66 But this did not mean that Washington was unaware that 
the deteriorating economy of East Germany resulting from the exodus could 
not be tolerated by the Eastern bloc for much longer. Several government 
bodies recognized that Khrushchev would have to do something soon, but 
stopped short of detailed analyses of the options the Soviet leader had open to 
him. On the eve of the sealing of East Berlin, the Four-Power Working Group 
concluded that the refugee flow was the most pressing problem for the 
Soviets in East Berlin and that they would therefore have to seal off Berlin. 
During a television interview on 20 July, William Fulbright remarked: "I don't 
understand why the East Germans don't close their border because I think 
they have the right to close it." Whether or not this was a White House 
sanctioned signal to the Kremlin, Fulbright's statement provoked 
considerable controversy.67 Kennedy himself recognized that sealing East 
65 Edward R. Murrow to Kennedy, "USIA Exploitation of Current Exodus from East 
Germany," 20 July 1961, box 81, NSF, JFKL. The FRG suggested exploiting the discontent by 
encouraging would-be refugees to remain in East Germany in order to keep elements there 
sympathetic to the West and aggravate the situation. MemCon, Ministerial Consultations on 
Berlin, 5 August 1961, FRUS 1 961-63, 14:282. For a formal decision not to exploit the situation, 
see "Report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin as Revised in Light of 
Ministerial Consultations," n.d., pox 261, Conference Files, RG 59, NA. 
66 In a 1988 discussion, Hillenbrand said: "There had been no prediction on either the 
intelligence or diplomatic side as to what they did do. It was basically an intelligence failure. 
In other words, the United States was not prepared to take military action. We had 
contingency plans - dozens and hundreds of them - for everything imaginable but the 
sealing of the border of East Berlin." Hillenbrand, "Berlin Crisis Working Group." 
67 Fulbright quoted in Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p.256. Fulbright's comments provoked 
considerable controversy both at home and abroad, and when news of the sealing of East 
Berlin reached Washington on 12 August Fulbright reversed his position, saying: "It has been 
my understanding that free transit between the two parts of Berlin was guaranteed under 
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Berlin was one of the options available to the Soviets and that if they did so, 
the United States would be powerless to do anything about. As Kennedy told 
Walt Rostow, "I can get the [NATO] alliance to move if he tries to do anything 
about West Berlin but not if he just does something about East Berlin."68 The 
Four-Power Working group concluded that there was no sign of an imminent 
explosion, but that nevertheless, the West should be on guard lest the 
situation "undergo relatively rapid and serious deterioration if very harsh 
measures are undertaken by the Soviets and the East Germans with respect to 
sealing off Berlin, and if the current economic crisis in East Germany 
deteriorates at the same time as possibilities of escape to the West are 
drastically reduced."69 Thus, it was widely recognized that the Soviets would 
have to act. Adenauer reported widespread unrest in East Germany. 
Speculation that there may be uprisings similar to those in 1953 was 
encouraged by reports of food shortages in East Germany and interference in 
domestic traffic in Berlin. Rusk was aware of the possibility "that the doors 
will close," but told reporters that he considered it more likely "the continued 
exodus will build up if anything."70 
In the early morning of 13 August, U.S. officials in Berlin began 
sending to Washington preliminary reports indicating that the East Germans 
were sealing the sector boundary between East and West Berlin 71 Kennedy, in 
Four-Power pact. If this agreement is being broken by unilateral action it could lead to serious 
consequences." Nezv York Times, 13 August 1961. For the controversy surrounding Fulbright's 
comments, see Randall Bennett Woods, J. William Fulbright, Vietnam, and the Searclz for a Cold 
War Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.50-51 . Fulbright's 
comment has been reb·ospectively interpreted by some observers as a sign of administration 
collusion with Moscow. Murphy, Kondrashev, and Bailey imply in their recent book, 
Battleground Berlin, that Fulbright's statement was part of U.S. government effort to signal to 
the Kremlin that access to East Berlin was not a vital interest. When interviewed by journalist 
Seymour Hersh, Murphy went further and said that the comment could not have been made 
without Kennedy's approval. Murphy, Battleground Berlin, p.376; Seymour Hersh, The Dark 
Side of Camelot, (New York: Harper Collins, 1998), p.259. 
68 Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p.394. 
69 "Report of the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin as Revised in Light 
of Ministerial Consultations," n.d., box 261, Conference Files, RG 59, NA. 
70 Rusk interview, 23 July 1961, Department of State Bulletin, pp.282-87. 
71 For background on the decision to seal the sector boundary see Harrison, "Ulbricht and 
the Concrete 'Rose"'; Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962"; Zubok and 
Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin 's Cold War, p.251; Murphy, Battleground Berlin. For Khrushchev's 
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Hyannisport for the weekend, was informed whilst out sailing. Overseas, 
several of NATO's leaders were also vacationing. In the absence of 
instructions from Washington, Berlin Commandant General Albert Watson 
and U.S. Ambassador to the FRG Walter C. Dowling were forced to observe 
and wait. Initial reports were sketchy. Barbed wire was laid and concrete 
roadblocks used to create obstacles. These were supported by East German 
and Soviet tank divisions. By the time that the East Berlin populace began to 
wake, the measures were in place. Allan Lightner, now the Minister and 
Deputy Chief of Mission in Berlin, reported that the West Berliners appeared 
"resigned to passive observation of the events taking place."72 During the day, 
Willy Brandt called for calm and restraint on the part of Berlin's population 
but expressed his view that "mere protests should not suffice." Calling on the 
East Germans and East Berliners not to give way to bitterness, indignation, 
and despair he assured them that West Berlin and the Federal Republic would 
never accept the division of the city.73 
Significantly, Western military officers were not being restricted in 
their access to East Berlin. As the reports flowed to Washington, it became 
apparent that the Soviets and East Germans were carefully avoiding a 
showdown with the West.74 As well, Washington noted with great interest 
that the move was not executed by the East German regime unilaterally. 
Although the barbed wire and roadblocks were laid by East German troops, 
Soviet troops remained in the background but nevertheless present. Due to 
the manner with which it was being executed, the immediate interpretation of 
the moves was that it was clearly designed to halt the stream of refugees. To 
this end, the moves were obviously successful, with only 30 refugees reported 
on 16 August as opposed to almost 3,000 on 13 August. The Moscow embassy 
explanation of the move as a "surgical action," see Klzrushclzev Remembers: Tlze Glasnost Tapes, 
ed. Jerrold L. Schecter and Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), p.170. 
72 Lightner to Rusk, 13 August 1961 (received 10:28 A.M.), box 91, NSF, JFKL; Lightner to 
Rusk, 13 August 1961 (received 7:17 A.M.), ibid. 
73 Lightner to Rusk, 13 August 1961 (received 7:17 P.M.), ibid. 
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judged that Khrushchev had been pushed to accept the damaging political 
implications of sealing the border "when the refugee flow started to reach 
flood proportions." The move, the embassy speculated, might have been seen 
by the Kremlin as a way to end the refugee problem without bringing the 
matter to a head with the West. By essentially doing an about-face and 
accepting the status quo, it was possible that Khrushchev had calculated that 
it would make it easier to reach a mutually acceptable agreement with the 
West. 75 
Over the following days, Washington received reports that the 
temporary roadblocks were being replaced by more permanent barriers. 
Western inaction, Lightner reported, had led to "increased cockiness, 
smugness, and jubilation" of East zone officials and police, resulting in 
"insulting, sarcastic, insufferable" propaganda which taunted West Berliners 
for their "misplaced confidence" in the West. Lightner reported that "this 
irksome propaganda [was] not without effect in West Berlin" by exacerbating 
Berlin�rs' own conclusions. Their immediate reaction of passiveness and 
curiosity was giving way to agitation and anger in the absence of tangible 
counteraction by the West. Lightner reported that the prevailing mood of the 
large crowds gathering- some of 200,000 or more - was "skepticism 
bordering on hostility" towards the Western powers and he feared that West 
74 The documentation of the immediate reaction is sparse. See, for example, FRUS 1961-6, 
14:325. However, the Kennedy Library has recently released Lightner's voluminous 
correspondence with Washington. See box 91, NSF, JFKL. 
7s Lightner to Rusk, 13 August 1961 (received 10:37 A.M.), ibid.; Lightner to Rusk, 13 
August 1961 (received 7:17  P.M.), ibid; Lightner to Rusk, 16 August 1961 (received 9:37 P.M.), 
ibid. McSweeney, in Moscow, believed that fact that the Warsaw Pact was the agency 
responsible reflected Soviet "nervousness about letting the GDR take measures of this kind 
on its own." McSweeney also reported the reaction of Moscow's citizens: "Fragmentary 
reactions of the man-in-the-street, as Embassy has been able to gather them so far, indicate 
that ordinary citizens are well aware that the measures are aimed at stopping the refugee 
flow and are surprise to learn (by inference from language employed in documents 
themselves and Soviet press treatment) how large the flow must have been." Mcsweeney to 
Rusk, 15 August 1961, box 91, NSF, JFKL. 
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Berliners "had lost part of their faith in the ability of the Free World to help 
preserve their freedom."76 
Several interpretations of the move flowed into Washington from the 
overseas embassies. From West Berlin, Lightner outlined two plausible 
interpretations. It could be that by "tearing asunder the residual web of one­
city fabric" once and for all, the Kremlin was putting itself in a better 
bargaining position for negotiations. The alternative was that this was a test 
case on what they could "get away with," and having been successful the 
Soviets were likely to be encouraged to undertake more drastic action; as 
Lightner put it: "Having taken such a big slice of salami and successfully 
digested it, with no hindrance, they may be expected to snatch further pieces 
greedily."77 If this interpretation was correct, and he suspected that it was, "it 
means we have now entered the phase of actual practical confrontation with 
Soviets on Berlin, and that we have moved out of the phase of confrontation 
by words and threats into the phase of deeds," and therefore "it is highly 
doubtful whether it can possibly suffice to reply to deeds with words of 
protestation."78 Ambassadors Bruce in London and Dowling in Bonn saw 
things differently.  They doubted that this was a probe and that other 
measures were planned, arguing that the sealing of the Eastern sectors was a 
short-term fix and essentially defensive.79 
The administration's response to the building of the Wall has evoked 
strong criticism from the administration's critics. Some have argued that it 
was "almost as if the American government welcomed the East German 
move."8o In essence, there is an element of truth in this. Rusk said that it made 
settlement easier, and apart from that it was not clear what else they could 
76 Lightner to Rusk, 16 August 1961 (received 9:37 P.M.), ibid.; Lightner to Rusk, 16 August 
1961 (received 4:59 P.M.), ibid .. For a synopsis of the German press reaction see Dowling to 
Rusk, 16 August 1961 (received 4:17 P.M.), ibid. 
77 Lightner to Rusk, 16 August 1961 (received 3:54 P.M.), ibid. 
78 Lightner to Rusk, 16 August 1961, (received 4:19 P.M.), ibid. 
79 Bruce to Rusk, 16 August 1961 (received 3:18 P.M.), ibid. 
80 Smith, Defense of Berlin, p.272. 
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do.s1 From Berlin, Lightner called for a strong reaction because, he argued, "to 
have a deterrent effect, countermeasures must not be calculated to fit the 
violation, but must to a certain extent overshoot the mark."s2 From London, 
Bruce conceded that diplomatic protests were a "seriously depreciated 
currency," but counselled that "we cannot afford to expend our meager store 
of countermeasures prematurely." He argued that most of the 
countermeasures available to the West were either too extreme, not 
sufficiently relevant, likely to evoke undesirable counteraction, or incapable of 
being applied universally. He therefore recommended a vigorous propaganda 
campaign and the calling of a foreign ministers' conference.s3 
In the wake of the crisis, the absence of a forthright action in response 
to the Wall became a politically and emotionally charged issue. There were 
three fundamental reasons that the United States declined to use force. Firstly, 
as deplorable as the move was, quite simply no one in a responsible position 
in government- either m the United States or Europe - seriously 
recommended that military force was a viable option. Even General Clay and 
Acheson, two of Kennedy's most hawkish advisers, recognized that tearing 
down the Wall was not a viable action. Responsible observers recognized that 
in the absence of an overt move against Western access, a U.S. move to use 
tanks against the barricades would construed as unjustifiable aggression and 
inevitably lead to the condemnation of world public qpinion. Secondly, the 
West's military presence in Berlin, never more than a token force, was not 
strong enough to knock down the barriers even if the decision was made to 
do so. Thirdly, and most importantly, as Bohlen told Brandt, Dowling, and 
Lightner in Berlin, this was not considered by Washington to be the "real" 
Berlin crisis; that would come only when Western access were interfered with. 
Over the previous few months the administration had painstaking! y defined 
its vital interests in Berlin with precision. And quite simply, that process had 
BI Minutes of Meeting of Berlin Steering Group, 15 August 1961, FRUS 1 961-63, 14:333-334. 
82 Lightner to Rusk, 16 August 1961, (received 4:19 P.M.), box 91, NSF, JFKL. 
83 Bruce to Rusk, 16 August 1961 (received 3:18 P.M.), ibid. 
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identified communication with East Berlin as secondary. Although some 
advisers, notably Walt Rostow and Henry Kissinger, identified pitfalls in 
taking "too narrow and mechanical a view" for fear of dissociating the United 
States from German sentiment for reunification, the general inclination in 
Washington was for preserving serious countermeasures for the "real" crisis.84 
Kennedy recognized that he faced a serious dilemma. As he put it, "We 
seem to be caught between two unsatisfactory alternatives. If we respond 
vigorously to Khrushchev's pressure we are regarded as belligerent and 
sabre-rattling and we lose support. If we attempt to work out our difficulties 
by negotiation, as in Laos, we are regarded as weak an on the decline." His 
government had already reviewed most of the available countermeasures and 
the consensus had emerged that there was no significant response they could 
take that would not be either counterproductive or lead to a reimposition of 
the blockade. Consequently, the Allied response was limited to diplomatic 
protests. On 15 August, the Western Commandants sent a protest note to the 
Soviet Commandant labelling the barricades "a flagrant violation of the four­
power agreements."85 Two days later, on 17 August, Thompson delivered a 
similar note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry protesting against the barricades as 
"a flagrant, and particularly serious, violation of the quadripartite status of 
Berlin," and repeating US claims that the border sector between the Soviet 
sector and the Western sectors was not a state frontier.86 But the "paper 
84 Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, p.33; MemCon, Bohlen, Brandt, Dowling, 
Lightner, et al., "Berlin Situation," 20 August 1961, Berlin Crisis, document no.02370; Lucius 
D. Clay recorded interview by Richard M. Scammon, 1 July 1964, OHP, JFKL; Dean Acheson 
recorded interview by Lucius D. Battle, 27 April 1964, OHP, JFKL. During his interview 
Acheson added: "If we had acted vigorously on August 13 we might have been able to 
accomplish something - I didn't know, I wasn't asked and I wasn't doing a Monday morning 
quarterback job on it." For Rostow's and Kissinger's assessments, see Rostow to Bundy, 
"Berlin and German Reunification: A Problem of Balance and Timing," 16 August 1961, box 
82, NSF, JFKL; Kissinger to Bundy, "German Policy," 18 August 1961, box 82, NSF, JFKL. 
When Washington heard Johnson's report of the disillusionment of the Berlin population, it 
provoked many officials to fear that the Wall was revealing the distance between U.S. and 
German interests. See Bundy, MemCon, "Vice President Johnson's report on his visit to 
Berlin, August 21, 1961," 5 September 1961, box 317, NSF, JFKL. 
85 Western Commandants to Soviet Commandant, 15 August 1961, Department of State 
Bulletin, (4 September 1961) :  395. 
86 U.S. note to USSR, 17 August 1961, ibid., p.397. 
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protest" had little effect in reassuring the West Berliners. To make matters 
worse, the Soviets were deliberately flaunting their fait accompli and taking 
the opportunity to fill their propaganda with calls for the West Berliners to 
give up their futile hope because the West had already forsaken them. 
Lightner reported that /1 it is our observation that this irksome propaganda is 
not without effect."87 
Faced with a public relations disaster in Germany, the administration 
mobilized for damage control. The newly formed Berlin Task Force, designed 
to coordinate interdepartmental planning and chaired by Foy Kohler, had 
begun meeting daily. At a higher level, the Washington Ambassadorial Group 
began to meet just as frequently. Also chaired by Foy Kohler, this group 
consisted of the ambassadors from Britain, France, and the Federal Republic. 
Both groups reached the same conclusion that the rest of the administration 
had: the Soviet move did not violate U.S. vital interests as the administration 
had recently defined them. Consequently, Kennedy shifted his attention to 
reassurance. Robert Kennedy complained that the U.S. propaganda reaction 
was deficient, complaining to the President that /1 we have been handed a 
propaganda victory of tremendous dimensions on a silver platter and we are 
just not taking advantage of it." His several attempts to create a formal 
psychological warfare post resulted in failure. The best that could be 
accomplished was to encourage talk that the Wall was, in Bundy's phrase, a 
.(/confession of Communist bankruptcy." Rusk began moves to place the issue 
before the UN. Although conceding that the situation was "not satisfactory," 
Kennedy admitted that there was at least some communication between East 
and West Berlin: "It is limited - it is not, in our opinion, in accordance with 
the agreements; but it does exist."ss 
87 Lightner to Rusk, n.d., box 91, NSF, JFKL. 
88 For a synopsis of the view from the Berlin Task Force, see Ausland, Kennedy, Klzruslzchev, 
and tlze Berlin-Cuba Crisis, pp.13-28. On propaganda efforts, see Robert Kennedy to Kennedy, 
17 August 1961, box 82, NSF, JFKL. See also U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, with 
Jef Olivarius McAllister (Englewood Cliffs, N.J . :  Prentice-Halt 1984), pp.341-343. For Bundy's 
phrase, see Bundy, "The Presidency and the Peace/' p.359. On the UN programme, see Rusk 
interview, 23 July 1961, Department of State Bulletin, 14 August 1961, pp.282-287. For 
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The repeated calls from officials in West Germany and West German 
political leaders for some tangible response evinced Kennedy to send Vice 
President Lyndon B. Johnson to the city accompanied by General Clay who 
would remain temporarily in the city as the President's personal 
representative. The value in Clay's presence was in its symbolism. As Johnson 
put it, it was well known that Clay would never advocate retreat.89 As a 
corollary measure, it was decided to make the symbolic gesture of sending a 
battle group along the autobahn. While the Pentagon regarded it unwise to 
place additional troops in an indefensible area and thereby reduce the forces 
immediately available to SACEUR, State argued that the move would have a 
powerful political and psychological effect in Berlin. The political arguments 
overshadowed the Pentagon's reservations and Kennedy decided to send the 
troops. In order to capitalize on this move it was further decided that Johnson 
would meet them when they arrived in Berlin. They were despatched on 19 
August and arrived the next day. As he waited to see what the Soviet reaction 
to the probe would be, the President told Salinger that he thought the 
likelihood of igniting World War III was " one in five."90 
The New vs. the Old 
Clay was sent to Berlin to bolster the morale of the Berliners. But Clay's 
relatively uncomplicated view of East-West relations contrasted vividly with 
the flexibility and increasingly complicated view of the Kennedy 
administration.91 From the outset there was controversy. Clay interpreted 
Kennedy's request, rightly or wrongly, as indicating that he would have 
direct authority. The President's advisers, however, quickly diluted Clay's 
Kennedy's statement, see press conference, 30 August 1961, The Kennedy Presidential Press 
Conferences, p.144. 
89 MemCon, Johnson, Adenauer, Brandt, Clay, et al., 19 August 1961, in Berlin Crisis, 
document no.02364. 
90 Salinger, Witlz Kennedy, p.245. 
91 For a discussion of the conflicting approaches of Kennedy and Clay to the Berlin 
problem, see Ausland, Kennedy, Klzruslzclzev, and tlze Berlin-Cuba Crisis, pp.29-41 . 
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mandate and applied a tight leash. Bundy immediately forecast potential 
difficulties and went so far as to recommend John McCloy as more 
appropriate choice. The first set of issues was the problem of command 
structure. Just who would answer to who in Berlin? The second set of issues 
was more subtle. Bundy warned Kennedy that the potential was there for 
"another MacArthur-Truman affair." Clay could become a burden and "right 
now you have great freedom of maneuver on Berlin, here at home; you don't 
want to give anyone a mortgage on that freedom.92 Accordingly, with State's 
collusion Bundy diluted Clay's instructions. He would be the President's 
personal representative, but would not have authority to act. 
As Bundy predicted, Clay took a more belligerent line than the 
administration was willing to support. Rusk tried to impress upon Clay the 
administration's approach, telling him that "we have been trying to define 
with more precision than in the past the vital interests of the U.S. in the Berlin 
situation about which this country would be prepared to go to war." This had 
highlighted a "certain gray area." He agreed with Clay that so far as non-vital 
interests were concerned it was important for the United States to stand firm, 
but emphasized that it should be done without involving any real danger of 
escalation. Moreover, Washington was prepared to be flexible insofar as 
dealing with East German officials. He told Clay: "I  entirely agree our 
willingness ultimately to accept such a transfer under specified conditions 
should not govern our actions now. Indeed, we should make every effort to 
mask what is in effect our fall-back position on this point, and should 
acquiesce in the increase in East German police authority beyond that already 
exercised until transfer actually occurs."93 
During November, Clay's frustration became acute. In a series of 
lengthy telegrams he called on Washington to act unilaterally to defend its 
interests. The daily meeting of the Berlin commandants, he charged, was 
92 Bundy to Kennedy, "Issues to be Settled with General Clay," 28 August 1961, box 82, 
NSF, JFKL. 
93 Rusk to Clay, 3 October 1961, box 86, NSF, JFKL. 
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11 about as unnecessary a waste of time as I can imagine" because the 
independent authority of all the commandants /1 could be placed in a thimble 
without running over." As he interpreted the U.S. position from recent 
telegrams, "I feel a distinct deterioration in our position and I can not help but 
feel that we are more interested in having a negotiation than we are in 
winning it, and that Allied agreement is more important than a position from 
which we might win." Little more than a week later he wrote: "The Soviets 
and East Germans stop at nothing so why should we. I also dislike the 
philosophy that any such action might make the Russians and East Germans 
angry. In my opinion, it is time now to meet fire with fire and that this is the 
way to stop and not create incidents."94 In December, Clay offered his 
resignation, telling Rusk that U.S. policy "is so flexible that it becomes undue 
caution" and that 11I see no way to peace that avoids taking the risk of war," a 
view Washington clearly did not share. 
As Bundy had predicted, the conflict between Washington and Clay 
threatened to undermine Washington's objectives. Several newspaper and 
television reports publicised the rift.95 A Pentagon review of Clay's mission 
suggested that the cable traffic to and from Clay "reflects a virtually unbroken 
series of differences between him and the [Defense] Department; in fact, it 
reflects little else."96 The fundamental problem, as Bundy told Kennedy, was 
that Clay " does not in his heart accept the critical distinction . . .  between vital 
rights and other rights. Thus he likes to react just as strongly with respect to 
interference with access to the Eastern sector as he would to any provocation 
on the Autobahn. In Washington, these are regarded as two sharply different 
kinds of things." Thus, Bundy's prediction of difficulties with Clay's mission 
94 Clay to Rusk, 17 November 1961, ibid.; Clay to Rusk, 27 November 1961, ibid. 
95 See Clay to Rusk, 6 November 1961; Lightner to Rusk, 8 November 1961, ibid.; Bundy to 
Kennedy, 9 November 1961, ibid.; Kohler to Lightner, 9 November 1961, ibid. In fact, Bundy 
telephoned Clay on behalf of the President and temporarily smoothed over the differences. 
See also Clay to Rusk, 2 December 1961, ibid.; Kennedy to Clay, 13 December 1961, ibid.; Clay 
to Rusk, 13 December 1961, ibid.; Bundy to Kennedy, "General Clay's Problems," 6 January 
1962, ibid. 
96 Legere to Taylor, "Reason's for General Clay's Discontent," 12 December 1961, ibid. 
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was realized. Clay remained for the moment in Berlin, but became 
increasingly disillusioned with his role.97 
Clay's mission revealed much about Washington's perception of the 
problem. In 1948, the Truman administration had restrained some of Clay's 
belligerency, but had accepted much of his assessment of the situation. 
Indeed, Clay's frequent cables before and during the blockade were 
fundamental to developing Washington's perception of the problem. But by 
1961 the situation had changed. For the Truman administration the Berlin 
problem was, relatively speaking, fairly simple, even though a solution 
remained elusive. But by the time the Kennedy administration took office, the 
Berlin problem had been subjected to intense scrutiny for over a decade. 
During that time, Washington's perception of the problem had advanced far. 
When it was juxtaposed with the views of Clay, who, while not necessarily 
representative of Truman administration policies in specifics nevertheless 
represented them in sentiment, the contrast was jarring. Set in this context, the 
famous tank confrontation of October 1961 in which Soviet and American 
tanks faced each other across the boundary between East and West Berlin for 
a tense sixteen hour period, confirmed for Washington that which it already 
knew: that drawing a distinction between /I' vital" and IF other" interests in its 
commitment to Berlin was the best way to preserve American national 
security and the peace. 
Towards Negotiations 
In early September, Khrushchev broke an eight-month informal 
moratorium on nuclear testing. His move prompted many in Washington to 
97 Bundy to Kennedy, "General Clay's Problems," 6 January 1962, ibid. See also Legere to 
Taylor, "Reasons for General Clay's Discontent," 12 December 1961, ibid. Legere added: "The 
Clay Mission would have worked if General Clay had proved willing to act as a benevolent 
symbol, holding himself aloof from daily or weekly flaps, interpreting and explaining U.S. 
agreed policy to Berlin. A retired diplomat or politician might have filled such a role, but not 
a high-principled, uncomplicated, rather inflexible, Old War Horse." In a subsequent oral 
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assess that the tests were designed to exert political pressure on the Berlin 
issue. State's Intelligence Bureau assessed that although the USSR had sound 
military-technical grounds for resuming testing, it appeared "the primary 
reason for deciding to test at this time is to serve Soviet political aims 
regarding Berlin - a priority that was the Kremlin's highest political priority." 
The Bureau assessed that through demonstrating Soviet nuclear technology, 
Khrushchev was probably attempting to bolster his negotiating position. But, 
the Bureau said, "we do not share the opinion expressed in some circles that 
the primary Soviet aim has been, or has become, to force the West to approach 
and then back down from an all-out confrontation." Although the Soviets 
would undoubtedly welcome a weakening of U.S. prestige, their primary 
purpose was stabilizing the GDR through negotiations held against the 
backdrop of the threat of unilateral action.98 In London, Ambassador Bruce 
agreed. He saw it as unlikely that the Soviet military leadership would have 
chosen this time to resume testing; it "must be related to current war of 
nerves. Soviets may have concluded there is more to be gained with world 
opinion at present time by shock treatment than by conciliatory approach." 
More menacingly: "The Soviet Government is thus building up their position 
of strength in demonstrating their readiness to go to the brink in support of 
their proposals on Germany and Berlin. Soviet tactics indeed appear to be 
entering a more militant phase."99 
Against this international situation the Western foreign ministers met 
in Washington. The substance of these talks illustrated how little influence the 
history interviews Clay softened his criticism of the Kennedy administration. See Clay 
recorded interview by Richard M. Scammon, 1 July 1964, OHP, JFKL. 
98 State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Assessment of Current Soviet Intentions in 
the Berlin Crisis: August 28 - September 4," 4 September 1961, box 261, Conference Files, 
ExecSec, RG 59, NA. 
99 Bruce to Rusk, 2 September 1961, ibid. De Gaulle saw it as further evidence that it would 
be a grave mistake for the West to pursue negotiations. Gavin to Rusk, 2 September 1961, 
ibid. In fact, Thompson had suggest in June a reverse of the situation as it was eventually 
played out: "Since the Soviets presented us at Vienna with proposals on both the Berlin 
problem and that of atomic testing, the early resumption of testing might help convince them 
that we are serious in our attitude on the Berlin problem." Thompson to Rusk, 19 June 1961, 
box 81, NSF, JFKL. 
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Wall had in influencing Western strategy. Inasmuch as it had any effect, it 
was to confirm the need for negitiations. But Washington was still concerned 
about the large gap that existed between its own views and those of its allies. 
Yet it still held hope that this could be overcome. Secretary McNamara told 
Kennedy that it was essentially a problem of understanding the full 
implications of the problem, something that the United States must look to 
redress. He told Kennedy: 
I believe our allies have not yet faced the realities of the choice at the 
end of the road. Either they think the choice will never actually 
confront them, or they have not recognized what that choice means in 
terms of their national survival. We are trying to show them how real 
this choice may become before many weeks have passed. We are 
stressing the importance of trying all possibly productive steps before 
taking the final nuclear action. 
With remarkable assurance, McNamara judged that "if they will look the 
problem in the eye . . .  they will come to the conclusions we have reached."100 
Indeed, Washington's contingency planning rested on as much. During 
September and October, Washington reviewed its military procedures to cope 
with a challenge. This culminated in a succinct outline of a four-stage 
escalation, NSAM 109 "U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict," or 
what commonly became known as "POODLE BLANKET."101 It rested more 
heavily on Allied agreement on military actions than did NSC 5404/1 .  Stage 
one would be invoked if Western access was interfered with. Tripartitely 
agreed probes consisting of a platoon or smaller force would be dispatched to 
determine the seriousness of the restrictions. If this failed to resolve the issue, 
stage two involved NATO non-military countermeasures including an 
economic embargo, martime harassment, and UN action. Stage three 
100 McNamara to Kennedy, "Status of Berlin Planning and Build-up," 25 August 1961, box 
82, NSF, JFKL. 
io1 For the text, see NSAM 109 "U.S. Policy on Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict," 20 
October 1961, in Ausland, Kennedy, Klzruslzclzev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis, pp.142-145. Ausland 
explains the peculiar designation: "This document was the result of an effort by some officials 
to prepare a much more elaborate document, referred to as a horse blanket. Being a much 
more modest documenC NSAM 109 was commonly referred to as the Poodle Blanket." p.141. 
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consisted of a non-nuclear air campaign, advances into GDR territory, and 
international naval action. If, despite all these measures, the Soviets still 
encroached upon U.S. vital interests, then stage four included nuclear strikes 
ranging from selective demonstration attacks to general nuclear war.102 
With these procedures in place, Washington again moved towards 
negotiations. Publicly, de Gaulle continued to argue against negotiations but 
privately encouraged the United States to undertake bilateral talks in order to 
convince Khrushchev of the seriousness of Western determination.103 Bundy 
called for a presidential decision on the issue of negotiations, telling Kennedy 
that it was a complex subject, /1 and the most important one you have." Bundy 
outlined divisions /1 in your tight little working group." Rusk's position, as 
Bundy interpreted it, was that both sides would make proposals that the other 
could not accept, and that then it would result in at least tacit agreement on 
the status quo. This may lead to the Soviets signing a peace treaty while the 
West allowed East German personnel to replace the Soviets along the access 
routes, but so long as the West remained tough enough about it, the Soviets 
probably would not test the West's will on access. Bundy, Thompson, 
Acheson, and Kissinger argued that this was not good enough: "We think that 
no all-German or all-Berlin proposal will get anything but a flat NO from the 
Soviets, and we think we'll look pretty silly if we push very hard or long for 
what we know is unattainable." In short, this /1 is only a prologue for 
negotiations - it is not a real negotiating position." The problem was, Bundy 
told Kennedy, that /1 only you can decide the negotiating position of the 
United States, and so far you have no basis for decision." In the meantime, he 
preferred bilateral discussions through Thompson and keeping NATO 
informed of their progress.104 
102 Ibid. 
103 MemCon, Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, Home, de Murville, and von Brentano, 15 
September 1961, box 261, Conference Files, ExecSec, RG 59, NA; MemCon, Rusk and Home, 
17 September 1961, ibid. 
iw Bundy to Kennedy, "Issues on Berlin Negotiations," 28 August 1961, box 82, NSF, JFKL. 
See also State, " A Berlin/Germany Negotiating Package," 31 August 1961, ibid. Rusk told the 
NATO foreign ministers that the West should open discussions with the Soviets with a 
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These combination of a clear escalation process in the even of a direct 
challenge and negotiating through a position of strength continued to be the 
strategy that the Kennedy administration pursued as its first year ended. The 
year had brought some the most dramatic moments of the Berlin issue, yet the 
administration still believed that the greatest test was to come. The 
administration had sought to create a position of strength from which to 
negotiate but had found that the challenges presented by the Soviets rarely 
came in the form that Washington anticipated. 
proposal for the reunification of Germany, but that this would be quickly rejected. Then, he 
said, they should seek real agreement on the Berlin status quo. State, "Background Paper: 
Attitudes of NATO Allies re: Negotiations with the USSR on Berlin," September 1961, box 
261, Conference Files, ExecSec, RG 59, NA. 
Chapter Eight 
The Berlin-Cuba Nexus, 1962-1963 
What's basic to them is Berlin . . .  There isn't any doubt. In every 
conversation we've had with the Russians, that's what . . .  Even last 
night we [Gromyko and I] talked about Cuba for a while, but 
Berlin - that's what Khrushchev's committed himself to personally. 
They don't give a damn about Cuba. But they do care about Berlin 
and about their own security. 
--John F. Kennedy, ExComm Meeting, 19 October 1 962 
By 1962 it had become an article of faith in Washington that the Cold 
War could be won or lost in Berlin. There were many who had their 
differences with Clay's methods, but most agreed with him when he said in 
the October 1962 issue of Foreign Affairs, "No one in the West can afford to 
forget that the abandonment of Berlin might well lead to the permanent 
eclipse of democracy in Europe."1 And by now, most of the influential 
policymakers and advisers had, at one point or another, worked intimately on 
the problem. The cumulative effect of this acted to reinforce Kennedy's own 
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convictions. These factors came together most dramatically in Kennedy's 
perception of the threat when, in October 1962, he was faced with a direct 
challenge to U.S. national security. When American aerial surveillance 
revealed that the Soviets were installing nuclear missiles in Cuba, from where 
they could reach the continental United States within a few minutes of launch, 
it sparked what is often regarded as the most intense crisis of the Cold War.2 
But the decisions made in these thirteen days of crisis were not made 
independently of U.S. interests in other parts of the world. From the 
President's perspective, Soviet moves in Cuba were directly related to the 
situation in Europe. While establishing a direct relationship between the 
President's decisions during the missile crisis and his concern for the Berlin 
commitment, the weight of evidence is compelling. While Berlin was not the 
only concern of the President during the crisis - the risk of war, either 
through provocation or miscalculation, certainly caused serious 
apprehension- the American commitment to Berlin was a central element in 
the decision-making process during the fortnight of the missile crisis. If they 
1 Lucius D. Clay, "Berlin," Foreign Affairs, 41, 1 (October 1962): 58. 
2 The literature on the Cuban missile crisis is extensive. McGeorge Bundy's comment that 
"forests have been felled to print the reflections and conclusions of participants, observers, 
and scholars" is not without an element of literal truth, especially in the period since Bundy 
wrote. For a selection of the leading works shaping current historiography of the crisis, see 
May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes; Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow, Essence of 
Decision, 2nd edn, (New York: Longman, 1999) Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One 
Hell of a Gamble": Klzruslzclzev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1 958-1964, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); 
Gaddis, We Now Know, pp.260-280; Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, rev.ed., (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989); James G. Blight and David A. 
Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1989); Garthoff, "Some Observations on Using the Soviet Archives," pp.243-258; 
Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenlwwer, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1 957-1963, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Mark J. White, The Cuban Missile 
Crisis, (London: Macmillan, 1996); idem, "The Cuban Imbroglio: From the Bay of Pigs to the 
Missile Crisis and Beyond," in idem, Kennedy, pp.63-90; James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and 
David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink, (New York: Pantheon, 1993); James A. Nathan, ed., The 
Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) . For some important 
accounts by participants in the crisis, see Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1971); Dean Acheson, "Dean Acheson's View of Robert Kennedy's Version of the 
Cuban Missile Affair: Homage to Plain Dumb Luck," Esquire, (February 1969) : 76-146; Bundy, 
Danger and Survival, pp.391-462; Roger Hilsman, The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle Over 
Policy, (Westport: Praeger, 1996); George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1982), pp.286-309; Nitze, Hiroshima to Glasnost, pp.214-238; Schlesinger, 
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allowed Khrushchev to move the venue to Berlin, then U.S. policymakers 
judged they would be faced with a more serious crisis where, as Schlesinger 
evaluated, " the stake was greater than Cuba and our position weaker."3 
In fact, recently declassified records reveal that Kennedy perceived the 
Cuban missile crisis as less a "Cuban" or "missile" crisis than another Berlin 
crisis. _ The American commitment to West Berlin placed strict constraints on 
Kennedy's options in Cuba. Yet when Kennedy told Brandt less than a 
fortnight before Soviet missile installations were detected in Cuba that if it 
were not for Berlin he. could be free to take action in Cuba, it was not a 
complaint. While he hoped for a negotiated settlement, he also made it clear 
that the United States would honour its commitment to the people of West 
Berlin, even at the risk of general nuclear war. It is this factor that greatly 
complicated the decision-making during the missile crisis. As the President 
told his advisers at the height of the crisis, "Our problem is not merely Cuba 
but it is also Berlin. And when we recognize the importance of Berlin to 
Europe, and recognize the importance of our allies to us, that's what's made 
this thing be a dilemma for 3 days. Otherwise, our answer would be quite 
easy." 4 
The Berlin-Cuba Link 
There were several reasons behind Washington's perception of a 
Berlin-Cuba nexus. On a fundamental level it was a question of strategic 
credibility. If the United States would not go to war over Cuba, only ninety 
miles from Florida, it would seriously undermine the credibility of going to 
war for West Berlin. And an obvious and logical riposte open to the Soviets 
was to threaten Berlin - a move Washington recognized would result in 
Thousand Days, pp.794-819; Sorensen, Kennedy, pp.667-718; Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and 
Plowslzares, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), pp.261-281; Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp.71-95. 
3 Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p.804. See also Dobrynin, In Confidence, p.80; Trachtenberg, 
Constructed Peace, p.353. 
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considerable disarray within NATO. Yet the link ran deeper. Firstly, 
Kennedy, along with the rest of his administration, was predisposed to accept 
a Berlin-Cuba link because he expected a crisis in Berlin. Indeed, his 
administration greatly contributed to the crisis atmosphere in September and 
October 1962, and shared heavy responsibility for heightening tensions on the 
issue. Essentially, such activity was prompted by Washington's anticipation 
that Soviet moves during 1961, including the Wall, were in preparation for a 
renewed effort to force the Western powers from the city. Khrushchev himself 
had been the most important contributor in creating this impression during 
1962, with his apparent growing impatience with the Berlin situation and 
repeated threats to reopen the issue after the U.S. Congressional elections. At 
that time, Khrushchev said, he would visit New York to address the United 
Nations, clearly implying that he expected to speak directly with Kennedy 
again. There was little doubt in Washington that what Khrushchev most 
wanted to talk about on such an occasion was West Berlin. 
Secondly, once the missiles were revealed, and while he and his 
advisers were trying to devise a strategy to remove them, Kennedy tried to 
discern Khrushchev's motives. The answers that he received from his most 
trusted advisers often included Berlin. Basing much of his understanding of 
Khrushchev's behaviour and tactics on the experiences of June to August the 
previous year, Kennedy never doubted that placing missiles in Cuba was a 
carefully calculated move by Khrushchev. Although, in retrospect it now 
seems clear that the Soviets were not prepared to have their actions revealed 
prematurely, Kennedy had to assume that Moscow had prepared a range of 
responses to any move that the United States made. The Soviet leader, in 
Kennedy's view, had recently been cautious and appeared to be striving to 
achieve "peaceful coexistence." Indeed, Kennedy himself had told the NSC 
that the Soviets did not want war - an assumption that nearly all of the 
administration's national security policy, including Flexible Response, rested 
4 MemCon, Kennedy and Brandt, 5 October 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:347; May and Zelikow, 
Kennedy Tapes, pp.143-144, 183. 
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upon. Nevertheless, this did not preclude a radical shift in the Kremlin's 
position or miscalculation by the Soviet leadership. These risks alone were 
perceived to be real enough to warrant heightened vigilance.s 
The first reaction of most members of the Executive Committee of the 
NSC (ExComm) to the detection of the missile sites was that it was an effort 
by Khrushchev to redress the strategic imbalance. However, this became less 
convincing to the President as the crisis progressed. As McNamara argued, 
and Kennedy later agreed, a limited number of Soviet missiles in Cuba, 
although within striking distance of American cities, did not greatly alter the 
strategic balance any more than did U.S. missiles in Turkey that were now 
considered redundant and earmarked for removal because, as Kennedy 
himself had told the NSC in January, the United States possessed "a 
preponderance of strategic power."6 And Khrushchev must have known, 
Kennedy reasoned, that Washington would not and could not tolerate Soviet 
missiles in Cuba and would inevitably demand their removal. Therefore, the 
Soviet leader must have been trying to to use the situation as a diplomatic 
lever by presenting the world with a fait accompli at the same time as 
reopening the Berlin question. Realizing recent rumours of a Cuba-for-Berlin 
trade, some apparently inspired by the Soviets themselves, he would then say 
that the Soviets would withdraw their missiles from Cuba if the Americans 
withdrew their forces from West Berlin. More ominously perhaps, 
Khrushchev could be attempting to win West Berlin by following the 
s Kennedy to Clay, 1 March 1962, box 86, NSF, JFKL. 
6 It should be noted, however, that McNamara expressly contradicted the Joint Chiefs on 
this issue. May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp.89. For an important study of the U.S. missiles 
based in Turkey, see Nash, The Other Missiles of October. U.S. intelligence surveillance had not 
detected the tactical nuclear weapons that the Soviets were installing. See Raymond L. 
Garthoff, "New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Khrushchev, Nuclear Weapons, and 
the Cuban Missile Crisis," CWIHP Bulletin, 11 (Winter 1998) : 251-262; Fursenko and Naftali, 
One Hell of Gamble, pp.216-217; Garthoff, "Some Observations on Using the Soviet Archives," 
pp.250-252; Mark Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis," CWIHP Bulletin, 3 (Fall 1993) :  40. The President, however, warned 
against complacency, telling the NSC: "If there were to be any such war, we must know what 
it is for, and know what other steps we can take before such war comes." Bundy, "Outline for 
Talk to NSC, January 18, 1962," 17 January 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 8:238; Summary of 
President's Remarks to NSC, 18 January 1962, ibid., pp.238-242. 
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historical precedent set in 1956 when the Suez crisis had distracted the West 
whilst Khrushchev used his tanks to suppress the Hungarian uprising. In 
Kennedy's view these were the most plausible explanations for Khrushchev's 
move.7 
Underlying all of these factors was U.S. policymakers' understanding 
of what sort of crisis in geo-strategic terms they were faced with. The 
preoccupation of both John and Robert Kennedy with finding a "solution" to 
the Cuban problem by "removing" Fidel Castro in the wake of the Bay of Pigs 
debacle has been well documented.s But, quite simply, Kennedy did not see 
the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba as part of the "Cuban problem." 
Rather, he saw the missile crisis in the global terms of the Cold War conflict. 
The previous year he had warned the nation that West Berlin "is not an 
isolated problem. The threat is worldwide. Our effort must be equally wide 
and strong and not be obsessed by any single manufactured crisis."9 Now, in 
October 1962, when confronted with Soviet missile installations in Cuba, he 
told his military advisers, "the problem is not really so much war against 
Cuba. But the problem is part of this worldwide struggle with the Soviet 
Communists, particularly, as I say, over Berlin. And with the loss of Berlin, 
the effect of that and the responsibility we would bear."10 Consequently, 
Washington never considered Castro to be a major player in the decision to 
install the missiles. There could be no doubting that this was a Soviet move 
orchestrated to serve Soviet interests. So far as Kennedy was concerned, the 
7 For Kennedy's fears of a repeat of the "Suez-Hungary ploy," see May and Zelikow, 
Kennedy Tapes, pp.17, 175, 183. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow have recently divided the 
Berlin-Cuba link into "win, trade, or trap" hypotheses. Allison and Zelikow, Essence of 
Decision, pp.99-100. 
s The Kennedy brothers' "obsession" with Castro has provided much ammunition for 
their critics. See for example Thomas G. Paterson, "Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, 
Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Castro," in Paterson, ed., Kennedy's Quest for Victory: 
American Foreign Policy, 1 961-1963, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.123-155; 
Robert Smith Thompson, I7ze Missiles of October: T1ze Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and tlze 
Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). Also see William B. Breuer, 
Vendetta!: Fidel Castro and the Kennedy Brothers, (New York: John Wiley, 1997); Kornbluh, Bay 
of Pigs Declassified, pp.15-16. 
9 Kennedy, "Report to the Nation on the Berlin Crisis," 25 July 1961, Public Papers: Kennedy: 
1 961, p.534. 
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fact that it occurred in Cuba was a coincidence of geography and Castro's 
political orientation. Kennedy himself told the ExComm, "They don't give a 
damn about Cuba. But they do care about Berlin and about their own 
security."11 All of these factors combined to convince Kennedy that a Soviet 
move in Berlin was imminent as a corollary to the installation of the missiles 
in Cuba. And in Berlin the stakes were even higher. As Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Paul Nitze observed immediately after the missile crisis, action in 
Berlin would be even "closer to the jugular."12 
While the dichotomy between Kennedy's public statements and his 
private views has often been the subject of his critics, there was a less 
conspiratorial division between how he portrayed the Cuban missile crisis 
publicly and how he perceived it privately .  Needing a groundswell of world 
opinion in support of any action that he decided to take, he employed strong 
rhetoric to describe the threat in the starkest possible terms. Accordingly, the 
subversive installation of nuclear weapons in Cuba could be nothing other 
than an act of "flagrant and deliberate defiance" and " a clandestine, reckless, 
and provocative threat to world peace" that justified prompt and forceful 
action.B Yet, privately Kennedy displayed an awareness of the subtleties of 
the situation, at times marvelling at Khrushchev's ingenuity. He told his 
friend, the British Ambassador in Washington, David Ormsby-Gore: 
He could not help admiring the Soviet sh·ategy. They offered this 
deliberate and provocative challenge to the United States in the 
knowledge that if the Americans reacted violently to it, the Russians 
would be given an ideal opportunity to move against West Berlin. If, on 
the other hand, he did nothing, the Latin Americans and the United 
States' other Allies would feel that the Americans had no real will to resist 
the encroachments of Communism and would hedge their bets 
accordingly.14 
10 May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p.183. Punctuation original. 
11 Ibid., p.175. 
12 NSC Subcommittee on Berlin, "Berlin in Light of Cuba," n.d., FRUS 1 961-63, 15:417. 
13 Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms 
Buildup in Cuba," 22 October 1962, Public Papers: Kennedy: 1962, pp.806-809. 
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Repeatedly during the crisis Kennedy displayed a keen awareness of the 
potential pitfalls of his dilemma. Although Khrushchev's action was 
fundamentally aggressive and overt, it confronted the United States with a 
complex challenge. In Kennedy's words, it was "a rather dangerous but rather 
useful play of theirs." He added, "We do nothing; they have a missile base 
there with all the pressure that brings to bear on the United States and 
damage to our prestige . . . .  If we attack Cuban missiles, or Cuba, in any way, 
it gives them a clear line to take Berlin. . . . I must say I think it's a very 
satisfactory position from their point of view."15 
As well, Washington's perception of a Berlin-Cuba link rested on a 
basic assumption concerning the general nature of Khrushchev's foreign 
policy. Several senior policymakers assumed that at a fundamental level he 
subscribed to some form of linkage between issues.16 Certainly, Washington 
itself was not opposed to exploiting such connections. Earlier in 1962 the 
administration had tried to induce Soviet agreement by linking the issues of 
non-diffusion of nuclear weapons with recognition of the Berlin status quo 
when it had drafted a proposal for a modus vivendi. But Bundy suggested 
transforming this linkage into a more overtly coercive move by exploiting 
Soviet fears that the West might arm West Germany or West Berlin with 
nuclear weapons. He suggested telling Moscow that "in the absence of a 
workable agreement on Berlin we can see little hope of preventing the spread 
of nuclear weapons to the Germans."17 Additionally, Washington had already 
14 Lord Harlech (Ormsby-Gore) recorded interview by Richard Neustadt, 12 March 1965, 
OHP, JFKL. (Quote also reprinted in May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p.207.) 
15 Ibid., pp.175-176. 
16 In preparation for Kennedy's meeting with Khrushchev at the Vienna summit in June 
1961, State prepared a briefing book for the President that included a lengthy assessment of 
Khrushchev's manner, capabilities, and policy. This assessment included the observation: 
"Although it is true to a degree of almost all leaders, it is especially true of Khrushchev that 
he attempts to relate the various pieces of policy that he envisages to each other. Periodically 
he seems to take inventory of his most important problems and his most important 
opportunities, put them in a blender, and come up with a synthetic solution which is meant 
to deal with them all." "Briefing Book for the President's Meeting with Khrushchev, Vienna, 
June 3-4, 1961," 25 May 1961, box 27, Bohlen Papers, RG 59, NA. 
17 Bundy to Kennedy, 15 January 1962, box 84, NSF, JFKL. American policymakers often 
raised the prospect of exploiting Khrushchev's sensitivity on this matter. For example, in July 
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contemplated its own potential use of a link between Berlin and Cuba. Since 
America's options to respond in kind to Soviet harassment of Berlin air traffic 
were limited, harassment of Eastern bloc air routes to Cuba was briefly 
floated as a viable countermeasure.1s 
Therefore, several in the administration demonstrated their own 
willingness to link issues and assumed that the Kremlin thought the same 
way. Yet not everyone agreed. Twice President Kennedy called former 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower to inform him of progress on the missile 
crisis - once on the morning of 22 October and again on the 28 October - and 
said that he anticipated correlated action in Berlin. But Eisenhower disputed 
Kennedy's interpretation. When Kennedy told him on the 28 October that he 
thought that although the current crisis seemed to have passed he expected to 
be "toe-to-toe on Berlin" by the end of November, Eisenhower responded 
forcefully, telling Kennedy: "These people do not equate, and I think it's a 
mistake to equate, Berlin with Cuba or anything else. They take any spot in 
the world. They don't care where it is. It's just a question [of] 'Are you in such 
a place that you either can't or won't resist?"'19 The Joint Chiefs concurred: 
The pattern of Soviet aggression, be it threats, the creation of tension, 
subversion, infiltration, indirect or overt aggression is and has been 
clearly discernible as one of expediency. At present, it may be expedient 
to create tension in Berlin and employ subversion and covert aggression 
l961 NSC Staff member Robert Komer had suggested that the United States retain all options 
if the Berlin crisis escalated: "Khrushchev might turn green if we threatened to give nuclear 
weapons to the Germans. I'd be no happier about this than anyone else. But at a late stage in 
the Berlin crisis, why not tell Khrushchev discreetly that if faced with such a crucial threat to 
our whole position in Western Europe we would feel compelled to provide our allies with 
whatever means were necessary to defend their vital interests?" Komer to Bundy, "Nuclear 
Weapons and Berlin," 20 July 1961, box 81, NSF, JFKL. Interestingly, during the height of the 
Cuban missile crisis, Robert Kennedy similarly suggested that the United States might exploit 
this Soviet sensitivity by offering nuclear weapons to the West Germans or by installing U.S. 
missiles in West Berlin, but the idea apparently went no further than the ExComm meeting at 
which it was raised. Minutes, NSC Meeting, 20 October 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 11:126-136; 
Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p.803. For the diplomatic background to the search for a modus 
vivendi, see Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.343-344. 
is Kohler to Rusk, "Review of Berlin Task Force Work, February 15-25, 1962," n.d., box 88, 
NSF, JFKL. 
19 Telephone Conversation, Kennedy and Eisenhower, 28 October 1962 (12:08 P.M.), 
cassette L, Presidential Recordings, JFKL. See also Telephone Conversation, Kennedy and 
Eisenhower, 22 October 1962 (10:45 A.M.), ibid. 
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in Southeast Asia; tomorrow it may be expedient to create similar tension 
in Greece, Turkey, or Iran.20 
But the advice of the former President and the Pentagon, which Kennedy 
knew was partially intended to discourage complacency, did not convince the 
President, and he continued to see a connection between diplomatic 
problems. 
Building Tension 
Compared with the heated atmosphere surrounding the Berlin issue in 
1961, early 1962 appeared slightly milder.21 By the end of 1961 the 
administration was engaging in bilateral "exploratory talks" with Moscow. 
During early 1962, the Berlin dialogue was resumed in Moscow, with 
Ambassador Thompson meeting with Gromyko. While talks continued 
unabated, there was also no significant progress on substantive issues. State's 
Intelligence Bureau feared that the Soviets were using the Thompson­
Gromyko talks as a "holding pattern" in order to "smoke out Western 
intentions."  Nevertheless, although the Soviets did not seem to be committed 
to reaching an agreement, they did seem committed to continuing the talks. 
Since the current situation was relatively stable - as one official put it the 
status quo was "more potentially than presently dangerous"22 - Kennedy and 
Rusk were content to continue talking. There was evidence, however, that the 
East Germans were preparing for a variety of possible moves by tightening 
their control over sector and zonal boundaries, laying propaganda 
groundwork, and generally isolating the city as much as possible.23 
20 "Position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Draft NSC Record of Action dated 13 January 
1962 (Guidelines for the Military Aid Program)/' box 313, NSF, JFKL. 
21 McGeorge Bundy, "The Presidency and the Peace," Foreign Affairs, 42, 3 (April 1964): 
359. 
22 Jorden, "Report on the Viability of West Berlin," 13 February 1962, box 84, NSF, JFKL. 
23 State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, RSB-3.21 "Assessment of Soviet Intentions in 
the Berlin Crisis, February 1-7, 1962," 7 February 1962, box 84, NSF, JFKL. See also Schick, 
"American Diplomacy and the Berlin Negotiations." 
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Bundy displayed more frustration, assessing that Gromyko's behaviour 
indicated they were still far from an agreement. But he recognized that the 
Western Allies must accept a certain degree of responsibility for this since 
"we have not yet given them either carrots or sticks that would induce a more 
serious attitude." To rectify the situation he suggested "we need to do some 
pretty frank talking about their Germans and our Germans, their prestige and 
our prestige, their power and our power, in a way that only really private 
talks would permit," recommending a private channel be established between 
the new Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, and 
either Charles Bohlen or Jacob Beam from State. This would ostensibly avoid 
the need to manoeuvre between the hard line of the French and West 
Germans and the softer line of the British. This was especially desirable in 
light of the fact that the administration was beginning to moderate its views 
on Khrushchev's threat to sign a separate peace treaty. As Bundy said, some 
senior officials -himself above all - were beginning to conclude that this 
would not be as devastating to Western interests as was commonly held. He 
told the President that "we can buy more of this than we have yet let on - and 
so can the [West] Germans if they have to."24 Indeed, the previous September 
Rusk had told the NATO foreign ministers as much. In short, it would 
certainly not warrant war. 
When the Thompson-Gromyko channel seemed to be reaching a dead 
end in February, Rusk ventured to Geneva to talk directly with Gromyko. The 
talks made no significant breakthrough but were useful in determining the 
Soviet willingness to negotiate. Rusk returned to Washington with the 
impression that the Soviets did not intend to provoke an immediate crisis and 
were more interested in keeping the talks going. He reported to the NSC that 
although they were no nearer the substance of an agreement on Berlin, there 
was "a change in tune." Certain parts of the discussions appeared to be 
promising as the basis for future talks but, Rusk warned, "we must match the 
24 Bundy to Kennedy, 15 January 1962, box 84, NSF, JFKL. 
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Soviets in patience and persistence in these discussions. They were quite 
willing to play their long-playing record over and over again, and we should 
be ready to do the same thing." While acknowledging that he "could be 
wrong within twenty-four hours" he assessed that the Geneva talks had 
demonstrated that Moscow did not wish to move towards either a crisis or a 
diplomatic impasse and that consequently there remained some hope for 
agreement.25 Thompson agreed, assessing that although Soviet objectives 
, threatened U.S. interests, their underlying motives were primarily defensive.26 
Difficulties in the air corridors to Berlin during early March 
momentarily raised the temperature in Berlin. They also provoked a serious 
disagreement between Norstad and Clay that further highlighted the 
differences of opinion between the administration and Clay. Clay advocated 
taking the opportunity presented by Soviet harassment to challenge the 10,000 
feet limit to the air corridors. N orstad, "leaning over backward to try to reflect 
a NATO viewpoint rather than an American viewpoint," as Clay later put it, 
strongly disagreed.27 Ultimately, Kennedy, believing Clay's proposals to be 
unnecessarily belligerent, sided with Norstad. But the internal conflict caused 
considerable consternation to the President and added an extra task for Taylor 
to undertake during his trip to Europe the next month.28 Clay's frustration 
was not soothed, however, and in the lull of early April, claiming his 
25 Minutes of NSC Meeting, 28 March 1962, box 312, NSF, JFKL; Rusk to Clay, 6 April 1962, 
box 86, NSF, JFKL. 
26 Thompson compiled a list of what he regarded Soviet priorities in the talks to be and 
read his list to the Washington Ambassadorial Group: 1. To prepare for eventual recognition 
of GDR sovereignty; 2. To prepare for an eventual takeover of West Berlin; 3. To obtain 
formal recognition of the present external boundaries of Germany; 4. To get an agreement on 
non-diffusion of nuclear weapons, especially to the FRG; 5. To end "Cold War operations" 
[i.e. espionage and propaganda] in Berlin; 6. To prepare for a separate peace treaty with the 
GDR; 7. To get some sort of NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty; and 8. To weaken 
confidence in the Western Allies among themselves, particularly between the Federal 
Republic and the rest of NATO. MemCon, "Review of Geneva Talks on Berlin for 
Quadripartite Ambassadorial Meeting," 29 March 1962, box 84, NSF, JFKL. 
27 Lucius D. Clay recorded interview by Richard M. Scammon, 1 July 1964, OHP, JFKL. 
28 For Kennedy's concerns over the Norstad-Clay rift, see the meeting between Kennedy 
and Eisenhower on 10 September 1962, tape 21, Presidential Recordings, JFKL. Bundy told 
Kennedy in January that Clay's animosity towards Norstad "may well be . . .  the strongest 
personal resentment he has," and it had interfered with policy several times. Bundy to 
Kennedy, "General Clay's Problem," 6 January 1962, box 86, NSF, JFKL. 
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usefulness to have expired, he reported that his mission was accomplished 
and tendered his resignation. He declared victory, claiming that "the 
immediate crisis in Berlin created by the wall is over and that we have won 
this round." So far as what the future held, he expected the Soviets not to 
force a crisis but to continue talks in a less oppressive atmosphere.29 
For the next few months Clay's prediction seemed to be essentially 
correct. Despite ongoing minor difficulties on the issue of access procedures, 
the status quo remained stable, and there was a lull on the Berlin problem. 
Khrushchev held lengthy talks with Kennedy's press secretary Pierre 
Salinger, which left Salinger with the impression that the Soviet premier "had 
two fixations - Berlin and Soviet agriculture." The talks confirmed the Soviet 
leader's interest in Berlin, but also suggested that it might be resolved 
peacefully.3o By July, however, the Berlin issue seemed to be resurfacing. The 
British were the first to detect what they believed were ominous signs, telling 
a hastily convened meeting of the Ambassadorial Group in London that 
"Khrushchev's patience was wearing a little bit thin." There seemed to be 
several indications that the Soviets might be looking to provoke a crisis in 
Berlin in the near future: as Foy Kohler observed it had "not been a good year 
for Khrushchev"; the GDR was presumably still applying pressure for 
action31; and during a speech on 10 July and when speaking to British 
diplomats recently in Moscow the Soviet Premier had revealed a "tough, 
impatient" line on Berlin. There were, however, countervailing points: the 
GDR seemed politically and economically unstable, making it vulnerable in a 
crisis; the West had quite clearly signalled its determination to remain in West 
Berlin; there seemed to be divergences within the East bloc with several 
governments hinting that they were "not anxious to die for Berlin"; and, most 
29 Clay to Rusk, 6 April 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 15:98-99. 
30 For Salinger's account of his visit to Moscow, see Salinger, With Kennedy, pp.225-237. 
31 Zubok argues that Ulbricht' s enthusiasm for a USSR-GDR treaty in fact cooled as soon 
as Khrushchev told him that he expected that the signing of a treaty would result in a more 
:-conomicaIIy independent East Germany and that no longer needed to be subsidized by the 
USSR. Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962," p.14-15. See also Harrison, 
'Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose'," esp.  pp.51-55, and appendixes. 
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importantly, Khrushchev appeared to expect negotiations to lead to Western 
concessions. The Ambassadorial Group concluded, therefore, that for the next 
few months there would be "harassment rather than crisis."32 
Thompson detected a much tougher line during conversations with 
Khrushchev a few weeks later in Moscow. Though Thompson did not entirely 
comprehend the conversations at the time, Khrushchev offered to delay the 
Berlin issue until after the Congressional elections scheduled for early 
November. Recognizing from past experience that he was unlikely to get 
results by issuing an ultimatum, he then went on to say that it was not 
necessary to hold any fixed date and that it was not even essential that the 
matter be settled before the end of the year. Though Khrushchev specifically 
asked to bypass State, Thompson did, in fact, cable to Rusk the Soviet 
premier's offer.33 But it was only later, when the U-2 photographs revealed the 
Soviet missile installations in Cuba, that Thompson fully comprehended 
Khrushchev's proposal to delay action. On the morning of 18 October, 
Thompson told the ExComm: "Seems to me that one of the points of this -
he's not a fool - I was always curious as to why he said he would defer this 
[the Berlin issue] until after the election. It seems to me it is all related to 
this."34 But in July Khrushchev's motives remained unclear. Over the next few 
days, however, Khrushchev took a much stronger line by renewing his threat 
to sign a peace treaty. 3s 
By August, the administration was bracing for a crisis. The first 
anniversary of the building of the Berlin Wall prompted widespread 
disturbances in Berlin and an increase in the number of escape attempts, 
several of which graced the front pages of the West's newspapers. The most 
alarming of these were the shooting a Peter Fechter, a young East German 
gunned down whilst trying to escape into West Berlin, as well as several other 
32 Minutes of Meeting of Ambassadorial Group on Berlin and Germany, 11 July 1962, box 
84, NSF, JFKL. 
33 Thompson to Rusk, 25 July 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 15:252-253 
34 May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp.139, 236. 
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instances in which Western troops and medical officers watched helplessly as 
would-be escapees bled to death after being shot by East German border 
guards. As well, the Soviets moved to unilaterally withdraw from East Berlin 
by abolishing their Kommandatura office in Berlin and replaced it with an East 
German commandant. By taking these gradual steps in the direction of 
greater GDR sovereignty, he apparently hoped to pressure the West. Director 
of the Policy Planning Council, Walt Rostow, speculated that recent events 
indicated that "Khrushchev may feel under strong compulsion to achieve at 
least one success to which he can point, and may be prepared to step up the 
risk rate over Berlin."36 Bundy told Theodore Sorensen that "the Berlin crisis 
has warmed up a lot in recent weeks and looks as if it is getting worse."  
Although there had been neither an explicit declaration of a new deadline nor 
any hard intelligence on Soviet intentions, the Kremlin seemed to be changing 
its official position on Berlin. "The most notable phenomenon to me in recent 
weeks," he told Sorensen, "has been the constant increase in Soviet noises and 
the lack of any correspondingly angry public statement on our side. This owes 
much to the President's own temper, and much also to the fact that the 
Soviets have been crying wolf since 1958." Therefore, he urged Sorensen to 
convey, in his upcoming meeting with Dobrynin, /1 clearly and emphatically . .  
. �hat it would be a most dangerous business to confuse our calmness and 
good manners with any weakening of determination whatsoever."37 
During September, Khrushchev often repeated publicly what he had 
told Thompson privately in July; that he would not act to resolve the Berlin 
crisis until after the Congressional elections. His reason, so he told Kennedy 
in a letter in the /1 pen-pal series," was that /1 in the course of the election 
struggle they [the U.S. leadership] forget, carried away by passions, about 
common sense and begin playing with fire, competing in saying more and 
35 Thompson to Rusk, 26 July 1962; Thompson to Rusk, 28 July 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 15:253-
255. 
36 MemCon, Policy Planning Council Meeting of 28 August 1962, 31 August 1962, box 212, 
PPS Staff 1962, RG 59, NA. 
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louder absurd things that sow danger of world war." But, he said, "it would 
be necessary in our opinion to continue the dialogue" in November.3s On 6 
September, in a meeting with Secretary of the Interior Stuart L. Udall, 
Khrushchev reminded the Americans that his undertaking not to act until 
after the elections did not mean he would not act at all since the German 
situation was "intolerable" and "a treaty will inevitably be signed." But at the 
same time he recognized the inherent danger in the situation. The Soviets held 
the advantage, he said, because if the Americans wished to do something they 
would have to resort to war, but "sensible people won't start a war."39 
Khrushchev's statements, his hints that he wanted a summit during his 
promised trip to New York in November to speak before the UN (which was 
increasingly being interpreted by Washington as another ultimatum), the 
recent abolition of the Soviet Kommandatura, and heightened security 
preparations by the East German authorities, led State's Intelligence Bureau to 
assess that a significant move against West Berlin was imminent. This might 
come in the form of a call for a summit meeting or might even involve the 
long-threatened signing of a peace treaty with the GDR. More menacingly, 
East German and Soviet preparations would "give them the most 
advantageous jumping off point for more drastic unilateral action" in taking 
more tangible moves towards evicting the Western powers.4o Such 
assessments confirmed for Kennedy the conclusions that he had already 
reached. Despite the detection of increasing quantities of conventional arms 
shipments arriving in Cuba, the President agreed with State's assessment. "If 
37 Bundy to Sorensen, 23 August 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:284-85. For Dobrynin's 
recollection of the meeting, see Dobrynin, In Confidence, p.68. 
38 Khrushchev to Kennedy, n.d., FRUS 1 961 -63, 15:337-338. On 6 October Rusk threw 
down the gauntlet to Gromyko by saying that there was no need to wait for the elections 
since the United States was prepared to discuss the situation at any time. MemCon, Rusk and 
Gromyko, 6 October 1962, ibid., p.349. 
39 MemCon, Khrushchev and Udall, 6 September 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 15:308-310; 
Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, pp.208-209. 
40 State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Soviet Intentions on Berlin in the Light of 
Their Recent Statements and Moves," 6 September 1962; Hilsman to Rusk, "Soviet Intentions 
on Berlin in the Light of Recent Private Remarks by Khrushchev," 20 September 1962, box 85, 
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we solve the Berlin problem without war," he told Sorensen, "Cuba will look 
pretty small. And if there is a war, Cuba won't matter much either."41 
In September and early October, senior American officials played their 
own important part in aggravating the crisis atmosphere by stepping up a 
publicity campaign that kept Berlin on the front pages of the Western 
newspapers. Though opinion was by no means unanimous on what 
Khrushchev's intentions were even within the administration, the President, 
Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Robert Kennedy, and other highly placed officials 
sought to discourage Soviet action by repeatedly raising the issue in speeches 
and press conferences. By publicly preparing for an expected Berlin crisis in 
November, the basic objective was to signal to the Kremlin American 
determination to stand fast. But the programme also had ancillary benefits of 
preparing the Western alliance for a crisis and cultivating domestic and world 
opinion, while casting responsibility for a crisis on Khrushchev. 
It was also designed to instil a sense of urgency in the Wes tern Allies to 
review contingency planning. Britain, France, and West Germany publicly 
dismissed American claims of an imminent crisis and their own domestic 
political problems rendered them unreliable allies under pressure. Earlier in 
the year Kennedy had complained to Rusk that "we are unable to talk frankly 
to the Russians, and yet we cannot really pull our Allies into a position of 
responsible participation." 42 He believed that contingency policy representing 
"the lowest common denominator" was eroding the credibility of the West's 
position in Berlin. He had long been frustrated by the cumbersome 
bureaucracy inherent in dealing with three other governments, and was 
concerned that existing quadripartite contingency plans did not go far 
enough. A recent report by General Taylor had stated that mobilization 
would take sixty days to accomplish and that even to send a military probe 
down the autobahn if access were interfered with would take at least four 
NSF, JFKL. Berlin and Cuba were also both being frequently discussed in the Bolshakov back 
channel. Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, esp. pp.193-194, 200-203. 
41 Sorensen, Kennedy, p.669. 
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days to organize. Kennedy believed that this was far too long, arguing that 
any reaction should be taken within twenty-four hours. By raising the 
temperature over Berlin, Washington hoped to pressure Britain, France, and 
the FRG into committing to specific courses of action. 43 The lack of prior 
commitment from America's allies meant that the burden was increasingly 
falling upon the United States to act unilaterally to defend its interests. But 
Washington did not rule out Allied support and continued to pursue it. 
NATO was, as Deputy National Security Adviser Carl Kaysen put it, 
"imperfectly aligned,"44 but U.S. officials continued to press for more 
responsible participation. During meetings with the ambassadors of Britain 
and France, Rusk stressed that a crisis seemed imminent and that it seemed as 
though it might involve both Berlin and Cuba, telling the French Ambassador 
that the build-up of conventional weapons in Cuba was possibly an indicator 
of a hardening of intentions for Berlin.45 
The administration's publicity campaign began in earnest in late 
September, partially in response to a statement by the Soviet information 
agency TASS on 11 September that hinted at a link between the situations in 
Berlin and Cuba.46 It was not hyperbole when, during a visit to West Berlin on 
25 September, Bundy reiterated what had become the standard declaration of 
support by telling Willy Brandt that the city was the most important place in 
the world.47 Days later he warned an audience at the Atlantic Treaty 
Association in Copenhagen that Europe might be facing "a winter of renewed 
42 Kennedy to Rusk, 15 January 1962, FRUS 1961 -63, 14:759-760. 
43 Memorandum for the Chairman of the JCS, "Berlin Contingency Planning," 15 October 
1962, box 85, NSF, JFKL; David Klein to Bundy, "Review of Berlin Contingency Planning and 
Reorganization of the Planning Machinery," 18 October 1962, ibid. ,  pp.387-88; William R. 
Tyler to Rusk, "Review of Berlin Contingency Planning," ibid., pp.388-391; Ausland, Kennedy, 
Khrushchev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis, pp.69-70. The review of contingency planning was 
temporarily halted during the missile crisis in order to avoid confusion amongst the Allies. 
44 Kaysen, "Thoughts on Berlin," 22 August 1961, box 320, NSF, JFKL; "Status of 
Contingency Planning and Machinery for Execution," 11 October 1962, box 85, NSF, JFKL. 
45 MemCon, Rusk and Alphand, 7 September 1962, FRUS 1961 -63, 15:311-313. 
46 See Hilsman to Rusk, "Moscow Warns U.S. on Cuba; Dampens Pressure on Berlin," 11 
September 1962, in Burr, Berlin Crisis, document no. 2855. 
47 MemCon, Bundy and Brandt, 25 September 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:329-334. 
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Soviet threats to Berlin."48 On 29 September, Rusk met again with Brandt, this 
time in New York. Prompted by a spate of recent criticism of the United States 
in German newspapers, Brandt urged Rusk to publicly consolidate and clarify 
the U.S. position.49 
The developing situations in both Cuba and Berlin prompted the 
administration to head off speculation that they were somehow linked.  
During a television interview with John Scali broadcast on 30 September, in 
words that would often be quoted over the coming weeks, Rusk dismissed 
rumours of a Berlin-for-Cuba trade because "you cannot support freedom in 
one place by surrendering freedom in another."so In another television 
interview the same day, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs Edwin M. Martin carefully distinguished between U.S. intermediate 
range missiles in Turkey and hypothetical Soviet intermediate-range missiles 
in Cuba. They would not be comparable, he said, and they could not be 
traded.51 On 5 October, Kennedy met with Brandt. West Berlin's Governing 
Mayor reported that the economy was solid and morale had recovered from 
the building of the Wall. For his part, Kennedy reiterated his commitment to 
the city. If access was threatened, he said, he would institute an airlift. If that 
were interfered with it would mean war. The importance of Berlin to the 
United States, he stated, was that "our actions were our assurances." 
Consequently, he was prepared to accept that it restricted America's freedom 
to act in other areas vital to U.S. interests such as Cuba.52 The next day Rusk 
met with Gromyko in New York and they devoted the meeting - at four and a 
half hours the longest of Gromyko's visit - to Berlin. Nevertheless, no 
48 Bundy, "Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons from the Past," 27 September 
1962, Dept of State Bulletin, 22 October 1962, p.604. 
49 Rusk to State, 29 September 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:339-343. Rusk expressed interest in 
but not his approval for the idea of a plebiscite. A few days later Kennedy revealed himself to 
be in favour of a plebiscite but insisted that the timing would be crucial. MemCon, Kennedy 
md Brandt, 5 October 1962, ibid., p.346. 
so Rusk interview with John Scali, 29 September 1962, Dept of State Bulletin, 22 October 
t962, p .598. 
si Washington Post, 1 October 1962. 
sz MemCon, Kennedy and Brandt, 5 October 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:347. 
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significant progress was made. On 9 October, Chalmers M. Roberts, writing 
for the Washington Post, reported that the administration was in a "batten­
down-the-hatches" mood over Berlin in anticipation of a crisis the next month 
in expectation that Khrushchev would "go close to the brink."53 That same 
day, speaking in Las Vegas, Robert Kennedy reiterated his government's 
resolve to protect its interests if the military build-up in Cuba became 
threatening. In the same breath he warned, "It is quite possible that we will 
face a great crisis in Berlin in the weeks ahead. But the determination and 
unity of this country to maintain our position in West Berlin is apparent. 
American military strength has increased and we face that possible crisis with 
confidence."54 
On 10 October, McNamara confirmed that this confidence was based in 
part on the administration's willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend 
Berlin. His statement, though revealing nothing fundamentally new, was 
important m spearheading the administration's elaborate signalling 
campaign. But there was more to it. McNamara's statement was a small 
public glimpse of a large debate that had erupted behind the scenes which 
struck at the root of America's military alliances. It was designed in large 
measure to reassure America's allies during a time of strategic transition. In 
early September, the debate over nuclear strategy to defend Europe had 
resurfaced during a dispute between Norstad and Nitze on the role nuclear 
weapons should play in resolving a Berlin crisis. In keeping with NSAM 109 
"POODLE BLANKET," Nitze preferred a long line of non-nuclear actions before 
nuclear weapons were engaged, arguing that their premature use would be 
counter-productive. But Norstad preferred to retain authority to engage 
nuclear forces before the last phase of "POODLE BLANKET" had been reached. 
Such a drawn out procedure as proposed by Nitze, Norstad argued, 
53 Ibid., 9 October 1962. See also Ausland, Six Berlin Incidents. 
54 Robert F.  Kennedy's address to the American Legion Convention, 9 October 1962, JFKL. 
I am grateful to Rosie Atherton of the Kennedy Library for providing me with the text of this 
speech. 
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unnecessarily tied his hands and denied him the means with which to carry 
out his mission.ss 
But this essentially superficial dispute reflected a significant internal 
debate on a more serious problem: the administration's efforts to implement 
the strategic concept of Flexible Response. This, when coupled with a reversal 
of the Eisenhower administration's moves towards nuclear-sharing and new 
moves towards arms control, continued to trouble Adenauer and de Gaulle. 
Kennedy contended that without a credible build-up of conventional military 
strength by NATO, Europe remained vulnerable. This was especially true of 
the Berlin problem. And in order to make the deterrent more credible, 
Kennedy judged, it needed to provide more options than just general war or 
capitulation. As Kennedy told Brandt, "It would be hard for the Russians to 
believe that we would pause for sixty days of mobilization and then begin a 
nuclear war" and that "the geography of Berlin was such that the 
disadvantage lay with us because it was we who would have to make the first 
military move."56 Kennedy did not believe that it was credible that the first 
military move would be the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and he therefore 
wanted to emphasize a greater spectrum of options. 
While the controversy over Flexible Response had been simmering for 
some time, a series of military appointments in October 1962 provoked the 
Western Europeans to again express their concerns over the emphasis on sub­
nuclear forces in West Berlin's defence. With Lemnitzer nearing the end of his 
term as chairman of the JCS, Kennedy appointed Taylor as his replacement 
and sent Lemnitzer to Europe to replace Norstad as commander of NATO 
forces. But while both the French and the Germans, themselves moving closer 
ss Bundy to Kennedy, 10 September 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:313-315. Nitze's position was 
somewhat ironic givert that he is usually considered to be a "hawk." Even a few weeks later, 
during the ExComm deliberations in the height of the crisis, Nitze favoured a military strike 
over a blockade. But in the Kennedy administration Nitze had campaigned hard to convince 
NATO to build up its conventional forces and not to rely on early use of localized nuclear 
strike. See Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At tlze Center of Decision, (New York: 
Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), pp.208-238; and George W. Ball, Tlze Past Has Another Pattern, (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1982), pp.290-294. 
S6 Rusk to Dowling, 15 October 1962, FRUS 1 961 -63, 15:358. 
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toward rapprochement, regretted the loss of N orstad, their main concern was 
the appointment of Taylor as chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Taylor's scathing 
attack on Massive Retaliation in the The Uncertain Trumpet had been published 
only eighteen months previously. That Taylor was now being appointed to 
the top military post in the United States greatly alarmed de Gaulle and 
Adenauer who feared that by implying that nuclear weapons could not 
defend Berlin and thereby reducing nuclear retaliation to a calculable risk, the 
United States was inviting the Soviets to act. Though temporarily comforted 
by reports that suggested that Taylor may have changed his thinking on 
nuclear deterrence, Adenauer, in particular, remained watchful for any 
weakening of the American commitment to resort to nuclear weapons if the 
need arose to protect West Berlin.57 Thus, in the context of this behind-the­
scenes debate, McNamara's reiteration of America's willingness to resort to 
nuclear weapons if necessary was designed as much to reassure NATO as it 
was to signal intentions to the Soviets. It was followed on 14 October by 
Bundy's declaration during a television interview that the United States 
would act alone if necessary; a commitment that considerably assuaged the 
West Germans who believed that the decisive point in deterring the Soviets 
from acting in Berlin was the threat of US, rather than less credible NATO, 
re tali a ti on. 58 
Missiles in Cuba 
By October, then, the situation was tense. As John Ausland described, 
"Events in Berlin in the summer and early fall of 1962 cast an ominous 
shadow. It is hard to describe the atmosphere, but somehow everyone felt that 
57 For Eisenhower's account of his discussions with Adenauer on nuclear deterrence and 
NATO, see tape 21, Presidential Recordings, JFKL. For studies of Flexible Response in the 
European context, see Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.283-351; Gaddis, Strategies of 
Containment, pp.237-273; Schake, "The Case Against Flexible Response." 
58 See also Rusk to Dowling, 15 October 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:358. For the role of nuclear 
weapons in the defence of Berlin, Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.286-297; Schake, "The 
Case Against Flexible Response," esp. pp.268-275. 
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the real test regarding Berlin could not be avoided much longer."59 Yet the 
situation in Cuba also caused serious concern. Senator Kenneth Keating (R­
NY) had been exasperating the White House by declaring from the floor of 
the Senate that the Soviets were installing offensive missiles in Cuba but 
refusing to reveal his sources.60 Within the administration, only the new DCI 
John McCone had reached the same conclusion by observing the build-up in 
conventional Surface to Air Missile defences, but without hard evidence his 
warnings went largely unheeded. They did, however, contribute to a feeling 
that Cuba had to be watched more closely. Intelligence bodies increased their 
surveillance of the Soviet arms shipments to Cuba but found no reliable 
evidence of anything other than conventional weapons. Meanwhile, the 
United States had been mustering international support for its stand against 
these arms shipments. With Latin American governments, as well as the 
NATO allies apparently coming closer to Washington's line, the New York 
Times reported that /1 all in all, the news has not been good for Cuba and the 
Soviet Union in the last week. But," the newspaper judged, /1 it is hardly 
enough to make them tremble."61 
All the while, Berlin remained in the headlines. On 15 October, just the 
day before Kennedy was informed of the Soviet missile installations in Cuba, 
the New York Times broke the story that several weeks previously a high level 
communist official had approached a number of non-communist delegates to 
the UN claiming to be delivering an offer from Khrushchev to follow a more 
moderate course on Cuba if the United State relaxed its stand on West Berlin. 
This, the journalist surmised, explained Rusk's statement several weeks 
earlier dismissing a Berlin-for-Cuba deal.62 The next day, 16 October, the 
Washington Post carried State's dismissive reaction on its front page. In the 
same issue, veteran foreign affairs journalist Walter Lippmann forecast a 
59 Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis, p.66. 
60 For a briet yet interesting discussion of the difficulty of identifying Keating' s sources, 
see Tomas G. Paterson, "The Historian as Detective: Senator Kenneth Keating, the Missiles in 
Cuba, and His Mysterious Sources/' Diplomatic Histon;, 11, 1 (Winter 1987): 67-70. 
61 New York Times, 7 October 1962. 
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11 showdown at Berlin" and warned Moscow not to misunderstand 
Washington's resolve. In terms the politicians in the Kremlin could relate to, 
he said "President Kennedy cannot surrender Berlin even if he were the kind 
of man who wanted to. A surrender would destroy him." 63 
Accordingly, when Bundy showed Kennedy the U-2 photographs of 
the missile sites on the morning of Tuesday 16 October, Washington was 
already bracing for a Berlin crisis. As dramatic as the news of the missiles 
was, the President's attention was not so much diverted to Cuba as it was 
widened to include both Berlin and Cuba. Within hours, an ad hoc group of the 
President's top advisers, later dubbed the "ExComm," began the first of 
several meetings over the ensuing weeks to determine a reaction to the Soviet 
challenge. Some of the implications of the U.S. commitment to Berlin had an 
immediate impact on discussions. Others were revealed progressively over 
the next fortnight. But from the first moment, Berlin figured centrally in 
Kennedy's thinking on the issue, and his expectation of an imminent Berlin 
crisis coloured how he interpreted the Soviet move and greatly influenced his 
reaction. 
During the first ExComm meeting the President asked the group for its 
views on why Khrushchev had undertaken this move. Rusk replied that there 
were several possible explanations, but having already discussed the Soviet 
leader's "obsession" with Berlin, he was now forced /1 to wonder whether 
maybe Mr Khrushchev is entirely rational about Berlin" in light of the missile 
installations. Rusk speculated: 
they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cuba against 
each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action in Cuba 
which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect to 
Berlin . . . .  If they could provoke us into taking the first overt action, then 
the world would be confused and they would have what they consider to 
be justification for making a move somewhere else.64 
62 Ibid., 15 October 1962. 
63 Washington Post, 16 October 1962; Walter Lippman, "Showdown at Berlin," ibid. 
64 May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p.61 . Under Secretary of State George Ball also 
suggested that it was a "trading ploy" later that evening. Ibid., p.99. Also reprinted in FRUS 
1961-63, 11 :71. 
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Therein lay the problem. This dilemma, repeated by Kennedy to Ormsby­
Gore a few days later and several times before the NSC during the following 
weeks, lay at the heart of the ExComm's attempts to devise a response. It 
appeared that any action taken by the United States could justify parallel 
action by the USSR. For the first days of the crisis, when some form of military 
strike against the missile installations was the tentative consensus of the 
ExComm, the predicted Soviet reaction in Europe was a particularly difficult 
issue. Despite the publicity campaign conducted over previous months, if the 
United States triggered an escalation of the crisis by launching air strikes 
against Cuba, it could not be sure that it would have its NATO allies on side. 
Bundy spelled out some of the serious difficulties air strikes could lead to in 
Europe: "The amount of noise we would get from our allies, saying that they 
can live with Soviet MRBMs, why can't we? The division in the alliance. The 
certainty that the Germans would feel that we were jeopardizing Berlin 
because of a our concern over Cuba." Bundy added: "The prospect of that 
pattern is not an appetizing one."65 
Later that evening, at a dinner hosted by influential columnist Joseph 
Alsop to farewell Charles Bohlen before he left to become U.S. Ambassador to 
France, Kennedy questioned Bohlen, Isaiah Berlin, Alsop, and fellow 
columnist Phillip Graham on Soviet intentions, asking them why the Soviets 
were not making more trouble in Berlin. But with only Bohlen and Kennedy 
aware of what the U-2s had revealed in Cuba, the discussions could only be 
general, and no consensus was reached.66 Nevertheless, privately Bohlen 
suggested a Berlin-Cuba link.67 Early the next morning, on 17 October, 
Kennedy met again with his advisers. Thompson told Kennedy that 
Khrushchev's motivation behind installing the missiles was Berlin; that 
"Khrushchev knew what he was doing, wanted a showdown on Berlin, and 
65 Ibid., p.62. Quotation's punctuation original. 
66 Isaiah Berlin interviewed by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 12 April 1965, in New York Review of 
Books, 45, 16 (22 October 1998) : 31-37; Bohlen, Witness to History, p.489. 
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believed that missiles in Cuba armed him for that confrontation." Taylor and 
McCone agreed.68 Later that afternoon, as a group of senior officials tried to 
speculate about Soviet responses to any given U.S. action, Bohlen and 
Thompson maintained their insistence that Khrushchev's objectives involved 
Berlin.69 While this meeting was in progress Kennedy met with German 
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder and immediately raised the issue of 
Berlin, and, in doing so, attempted to push the West Germans into taking a 
definite position. Without revealing the existence of the missiles in Cuba, 
Kennedy told Schroeder that he expected difficulties in Berlin within the next 
two to three months. Warning that the West must be careful not to draw the 
line in the wrong place and risk military conflict over the wrong issue, he said 
that it was vital that the Western allies reach agreement on where that line 
was before the end of the month. Schroeder agreed, but argued that the West 
had to draw publicly some specific point beyond which the Soviets knew that 
they could not go without provoking nuclear retaliation. But even with this, 
he said, Khrushchev was likely to employ "salami tactics" by eroding Western 
rights piece by piece.7o 
The next day, 18 October, Kennedy met with Gromyko in a meeting 
that the Soviet Foreign Minister later described as "the most difficult I have 
had with any of the nine Presidents with whom I had dealings in my forty­
nine years of service."71 Deciding not to reveal for the moment that the United 
States had detected the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, Kennedy 
sought to probe Gromyko on Soviet intentions. In a veiled attempt to pre­
empt a connection between Berlin and Cuba, Kennedy stressed that West 
Berlin was not a NATO base and the Western forces stationed there had no 
offensive capabilities. Contrary to Soviet assertions, he said, the U.S. military 
67 Bohlen, Witness to Histonj, p.495. 
68 MemCon, McNamara, Bundy, Taylor, R. Kennedy, Ball, et al., 17 October 1962 (8:30 
A.. .M.), FRUS 1 961 -63, 11 :95; May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p.118. 
69 May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p.120; Bohlen, Witness to History, p.495. 
70 MemCon, Kennedy and Schroeder, 17 October 1962, FRUS 1 961 -63, 15:362-370. For the 
�ecording of the meeting, see tape 29, Presidential Recordings, JFKL. 
71 Gromyko, Memories, p.179. 
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presence was wholly symbolic. He stressed that although matters of 
procedure might be negotiable, the bottom line was that the United States 
would maintain its forces in West Berlin. But Gromyko would not be drawn 
and merely conveyed Khrushchev's hope to meet with Kennedy in late 
November when they could discuss "first and foremost the question of a 
German peace and . . .  West Berlin."72 Kennedy later described Gromyko's 
proposals as /1 completely unreasonable and downright insulting,"73 and his 
interpretation of the meeting was that Gromyko took a hard line on Berlin. He 
came away even more convinced that Berlin was the prize that the Soviets 
were after and that Cuba was only the means to that end. But Kennedy heard 
what he wanted to hear. There was a striking difference between the 
interpretations that the meeting's participants placed on the discussion. The 
American participants, influenced by the crisis atmosphere that they 
themselves had played a significant part in creating, came away from the 
meeting believing that Berlin was the major issue discussed. The Soviets, on 
the other hand, considered the principal topic of the meeting to be Cuba, 
while the problems of West Germany and Berlin /1 took a back seat" and were 
mentioned /1 only in passing."74 
Later that evening, after a dinner hosted by the secretary of state, Rusk 
and Gromyko talked privately. Gromyko wanted to clarify certain points 
before he returned to Moscow. He rejected American claims that West Berlin 
was not a NATO base because /1 objective reality was objective reality" and 
insisted that U.S. forces must leave and West Berlin be established as a 
demilitarized city. As the President had done, Rusk drew the line in clear and 
certain terms, metaphorically "taking the peels off the banana." Since U.S. 
72 MemCon, Kennedy and Gromyko, 18 October 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 15:370-376. 
73 MemCon, Kennedy and Adenauer, 13 November 1962, ibid., p.432. 
74 Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp.76-77; Gromyko, Memories, p.175. For the American 
perspective, see May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p.176; MemCon, Kennedy and Gromyko, 
18 October 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 15:370-376; Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p.805. Martin 
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forces in West Berlin were the main issue of contention, Rusk reiterated that 
there should be no misunderstanding: the United States could not be driven 
out of West Berlin without war. Therefore, Rusk warned, Khrushchev had to 
decide if he was willing to go to war to remove the West from the city.75 
In the crucial days when the U.S. response to the missiles was being 
developed, Berlin figured often in the discussions. Kennedy recognized that 
any action taken by the United States could be taken also by the Soviets in 
Berlin. While he did not believe that he could actually prevent Soviet action 
against West Berlin, he believed that a careful response might deny the 
Soviets of a pretext for taking such action.76 The President sought to devise a 
response that would satisfy several vital criteria: the missiles would be 
removed; it should not provoke an automatic military response; and, if the 
Soviets did move against Berlin, the United States should have the weight of 
world opinion behind it in order to invoke carefully prepared quadripartite 
contingency plans for Berlin's defence. At a meeting of the ExCornm on 19  
October, Kennedy placed the challenge clearly in  context of the global Cold 
War: 
I don't think we've got any satisfactory alternatives . . . .  On the other 
hand, we've got to do something. Because if we do nothing, we' re going 
to have the problem in Berlin anyway. That was made clear last night [in 
the meeting with Gromyko] . We' re going to have this knife stuck right in 
our guts, in about 2 months [when the missiles became operational] . And 
so we've got to do something. 77 
Of course, the question was fwlzat were they going to do?' Kennedy fully 
expected the Soviets to pressure Berlin whatever course he took, but if he 
launched air strikes against Cuba the Soviets would almost certainly react by 
using military force to take Berlin. This would lead inescapably to escalation. 
Kennedy had no intention of being confronted with u a bluntly nuclear choice'' 
to defend Berlin; he wanted that burden to be placed on Khrushchev. A 
7s MemCon, Rusk and Gromyko, 18 October 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 15:376-87. 
76 May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p.236-237. 
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blockade of Cuba, on the other hand, would still result in Soviet action against 
Berlin, but it would not so easily justify military force in retaliation. If 
Khrushchev responded to the more moderate course of a blockade of Cuba 
with military force, then Kennedy believed he would have the weight of 
moral authority and public opinion behind him. The course of ·action that 
Khrushchev was more likely to execute was to counterblockade Berlin- a  
threat for which there were already U.S. contingency plans in place and a 
stronger chance of securing NATO's support. And a compelling factor, as 
Thompson told the ExComm, was that /1 if we have to face the crunch on 
Berlin, then we should have some of them still with us." 78 
The first option that received support among the ExComm was for 
some form of quick air strikes to take out the missile sites. Plans outlining 
several degrees of air attack were prepared, but as the ExComm divided into 
the "hawks" and /1 doves" the argument shifted to choosing a course that took 
into account wider factors and was less limiting. The most influential 
argument against air strikes was perhaps Robert Kennedy's note to his 
brother, 11! now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor,"79 
but there were other, less emotive arguments. The Joint Chiefs could not 
guarantee that all targets would be hit, and McNamara and Thompson 
contended that any degree of air strikes would lead to rapid escalation by 
killing, at minimum, several hundred Soviet troops. Then, McNamara asked, 
"What kind of response does Khrushchev have open to him?" An attack on 
American missile installations in Turkey and Italy was one obvious option. 
Another was to take Berlin. Kennedy believed that although a quick air strike 
would neutralize the immediate danger of missiles in Cuba, it might provoke 
Khrushchev to launch any missiles that were operational in Cuba as well as 
take Berlin by force. And, since Berlin could not be defended with 
conventional forces, this escalation, Kennedy told the ExComm, "leaves me 
78 Ibid., p.154. See also "Possible Consequences of Military Action," 19 October 1962, box 
49, Sorensen Papers, JFKL. 
79 Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p.9. 
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only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons - which is a hell of an 
al tema ti ve. '' 80 
During a vigorous debate on 19 October, Kennedy's military advisers 
put their case for air strikes as a way of removing the missiles and, more 
importantly, maintaining the credibility of the deterrent the world over. 
Again they warned against assuming an explicit connection between Cuba 
and Berlin, placing Berlin as a small part of a bigger problem with which they 
would be faced. More crucial, they held, was the credibility of the general 
deterrent. "Our strength in Berlin, our strength anyplace in the world," Taylor 
maintained, " is the credibility of our response under certain conditions. And 
if we don't respond here in Cuba, we think the credibility is sacrificed." And 
General Curtis LeMay, who had directed the airlift in 1948-1949, told 
Kennedy bluntly: "I don't share your view that if we knock off Cuba, they're 
going to knock off Berlin. We've got the Berlin problem staring us in the face 
anyway. If we don't do anything in Cuba, then they're going to push hard in 
Berlin and push real hard because they've got us on the run." In short, "if you 
lose in Cuba, you're going to get more and more pressure right on Berlin."81 
Although he personally favoured a blockade over air strikes, the 
previous day Thompson had put forward a slightly different argument that 
supported the military's position. Thompson judged that Khrushchev had 
been under strict instructions from the USSR' s military leaders to abort the 
Paris summit in May 1960 because they believed that he was becoming 
impetuous and running risks. And because of Khrushchev's personal 
responsibility for the Berlin issue - he "got himself into this aggressive posture 
in Berlin and everything on his own" - American air strikes on Cuba might 
well lead the Soviet military leadership to undermine Khrushchev's position 
and pull him back. If the United States demonstrated its willingness to act 
militarily it would significantly add to the West's credibility in Berlin that the 
Soviets knew could be defended only with nuclear weapons. If they thought 
80 May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p.176. 
81 Ibid., p .177, 183. Italics original. 
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that the risk of nuclear war was great enough, Thompson reasoned, the 
USSR's military leaders might rein in Khrushchev. It was risky, and not based 
on any hard evidence, but Thompson considered it an idea worthy of 
consideration nonetheless. 82 
Ultimately, of course, Kennedy decided against immediate air strikes 
believing that, as the first move, this option led inexorably to a nuclear 
confrontation in which world opinion would be against the United States. 
Quite simply, Kennedy wanted more options than air strikes left him. 
Specifically, he wanted a greater degree of control over escalation. During the 
initial few days of the ExComm' s deliberations several senior advisers came 
to support the less provocative course of implementing a naval blockade of 
Cuba. The proponents of a blockade recognized that there were similar 
problems as with an air strike - especially in relation to Berlin. Initially the 
idea of a blockade had been an adjunct to other military action. It was not 
until the evening of the 16 October that McNamara, with Bundy's and Ball's 
agreement, began to proffer it as an independent policy option, and over the 
next few days several members of the ExComm came out in support of a 
blockade as a less provocative and ultimately more flexible option.83 But the 
President recognized that this option still had its difficulties. As he told the 
ExComm: 
If we begin the blockade that we' re talking about, the chances are that 
they will begin a blockade [in Berlin] and say that we started it. And 
there'll be some question about the attitude of the Europeans. So that once 
again they will say that there will be this feeling in Europe that the Berlin 
blockade has been commenced by our blockade.84 
82 Ibid., pp.150-51 . For an earlier meeting (8 August 1962) during which Thompson first 
offered his interpretation of the U-2 crisis to the President, see tape 8, Presidential Recordings, 
fFKL. This was along similar lines to a general argument that Thompson had been making 
about Presidium politics for some time. He argued that the Presidium generally had a 
restraining influence on Khrushchev and would pull him back before he plunged the world 
into nuclear war. See for example Thompson to Dulles, 11 November 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 
3:47-48; Thompson to Dulles, 9 March 1959, box 6, International, SS, WHO, DDEL. 
83 White, Missiles in Cuba, pp.120-121 . Bundy, however, shifted position a number of times 
:luring the ExComm' s discussions over coming days. 
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There was, of course, an important precedent. The Berlin blockade of 
1948-1949 had played an important part in shaping U.S. policymakers' 
understanding of the Cold War. Indeed, several of the President's advisers 
had played important roles in devising U.S. policy at the time and in 
implementing the airlift. But these same policymakers recognized that 
nothing that the United States had done in 1949, public opinion 
notwithstanding, had in any way discouraged Moscow from doing it again. It 
remained an important Soviet capability and, Washington believed, a viable 
policy option. In short, based on past experience, the Soviets could blockade 
Berlin with relative impunity. There was, however, an important new 
element. Unlike the situation in 1948, the United States now recognized the 
threat and had developed detailed contingency planning along with its 
Western allies. Therefore, they were prepared for a new Berlin blockade. 
Nevertheless, American policymakers were not sure that West Berlin 
was as solid as they hoped. David Klein of the NSC Staff evaluated the 
strength of Berlin if Cuba was blockaded and submitted his findings in a 
memorandum on 19 October. Assuming that "Khrushchev would trade Berlin 
for Cuba any day," but that such a trade would result in a heavy net loss for 
the US, Klein argued, "no matter how different the two cases, the simple 
psychological equality of 'blockade for blockade' would be powerful." And 
Khrushchev's options to respond were formidable. A blockade of Berlin 
"could be screwed up and down in a neat parallel to our Cuba effort," and 
this could be done simply to force an end to the Cuban quarantine or to take it 
further by taking Berlin. Whatever action the United States took there could 
be no escaping the perception in Europe that a new Berlin blockade was the 
:ault of the United States. This, coupled with British and French domestic 
)Olitical problems, would place the burden even more heavily on the United 
)tates to take unilateral action in Europe and "we may find ourselves in the 
s4 May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p .176. 
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usual position of bearing the full brunt of responsibility while our Allies stand 
by and watch us carry on," meaning that, 
we should have to shorten our reaction times, increase the directness and 
force of our responses, and be prepared to confront Khrushchev at a very 
early stage with a bluntly nuclear choice. This is a direct reversal of our 
current posture in a number of ways, but without it I do not believe that 
Berlin can be held.85 
Klein judged that the immediate U.S. response would be governed by the 
prepared contingency plans, but these were slow and incomplete and 
depended on a degree of Allied unity that did not seem feasible under current 
conditions. At best, these plans could protect Berlin for a few months, but 
under a prolonged blockade the Berliners' morale was likely to deteriorate 
rapidly and, Klein argued, "no one would fight a nuclear war for a dying 
city." In sum, it was difficult to see how the United States could protect its 
interests if Khrushchev blockaded Berlin: "such a confrontation could hardly 
lead to a lifting of the Berlin blockade without a parallel relaxation in Cuba. 
And then where would we be? Castro would be there still. His weapons 
system would be there still, and covert supply could continue."86 
A few days later, the CIA provided its own estimate of West Berlin's 
viability if blockaded. Economically the city was prepared for a total blockade 
with existing stockpiles sufficient to maintain the city physically for six 
months. But, the CIA said, "the critical factor . . .  is not physical or economic 
but psychological. Everything would depend on the context of the Soviet 
move, and how quickly and forcefully the U.S. reacted." If the United States 
did not take forthright action to break the blockade, morale would deteriorate 
rapidly. And, to complicate matters, the West Berliners would "become 
85 Klein, "The Defense of Berlin if Cuba is Blockaded," 19 October 1962; Klein to Bundy, 
"Immediate Military Measures for Berlin," 19 October 1962, box 85, NSF, JFKL. 
86 Ibid. 
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extraordinarily sensitive to, and suspicious of any indication from either side 
that the Cuban crisis might lead to an accommodation at their expense."87 
Despite these warnings, Kennedy decided on the course of indirect 
military action of a selective blockade of Cuba. As the great many studies of 
decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis point out, there were several 
factors influencing his decision. But the less provocative course was taken 
partly because he had no intention of his administration being remembered as 
"the trigger-happy Americans who lost Berlin."88 He still expected to face a 
crisis over Berlin, but was determined to face it on the best practicable terms. 
Having decided on a course of action, there still remained an important 
question - "How were they going to describe the action they were taking?" 
Many observers of the Cuban missile crisis have pointed out that a 
"quarantine," in terms of international law, was a more surgical operation 
and was more flexible and less overtly aggressive than a ublockade."89 While . 
this is certainly true, the selection of terminology was, in fact, done at a more 
basic level. The term ublockade" had been used for the duration of the 
ExComm' s deliberations, but when it came time to explain their action Rusk 
suggested that it invited too close a parallel between Cuba and Berlin. 
J'/Blockade" had entered the Cold War's lexicon in 1948-1949 at which time 
U.S. officials had done their utmost to ensure that the term was endowed with 
aggressive connotations. Therefore, Kennedy and Rusk thought it best to 
employ the euphemism u quarantine."90 
87 Abbot Smith to Mc.Cone, "Survivability of West Berlin," 23 October 1962, box 85, NSF, 
JFKL. 
88 May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p.175. 
89 See, most notably, Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), pp.25-40; Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, pp.56-61 . 
90 Minutes NSC Meeting, 21 October 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 11 :143. Reprinted in May and 
Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p.209; Minutes of NSC Meeting, 20 October 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 
11 :135. Rusk, apparently influenced by retrospective studies, offered a slightly different 
explanation for the choice of terminology in his memoirs: "To shed the barnacles and allow 
for maximum flexibility, we hit upon a new term, "quarantine," partly because no one knew 
exactly what a quarantine meant." Dean Rusk, As I Smu It, as told to Richard Rusk, ed. Daniel 
S. Papp (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), p.233; Bohlen, Witness to Histon;, p.493. Nitze 
explained the choice of terminology to the ambassadors of Britain, France, and West Germany 
the next day. Record of Meeting of the Military Sub-Grnup of the Washington Ambassadorial 
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Kennedy expected the Soviet reaction to his speech to be swift. He 
believed that as soon as he had finished the Soviets would "(a) hasten the 
construction and the development of their missile capability in Cuba, (b) 
announce that if we attack Cuba, Soviet rockets will fly, and (c) possibly make 
a move to squeeze us out of Berlin." But at the same time, Robert Kennedy 
argued that Berlin also offered a potential source of strength to the US, and he 
wanted to be certain that his brother's speech did not preclude the United 
States from giving nuclear weapons to Western Germany, West Berlin, and 
France.91 
When Rusk summoned Dobrynin to a 6 P.M. meeting at the State 
Department he handed the Soviet Ambassador a copy of the President's 
speech, that was scheduled for broadcast an hour later, as well as another 
letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev in the "pen-pal series." Much to the 
surprise and relief of the ExComm, the story had thus far been kept out of the 
newspapers - although not without a last-minute presidential intervention­
allowing the ExComm the luxury of deliberating in secrecy. Dobrynin, 
apparently unaware that his own government was installing missiles in Cuba, 
arrived at Rusk's office recognizing that "something serious was afoot," but 
uncertain whether it concerned Cuba or West Berlin - confusion that, 
significantly, was mirrored by the members of the Kremlin's Presidium who 
were aware of the missiles and had convened during the afternoon having 
heard that Kennedy was about to make a major speech on the Soviet threat.92 
Dobrynin' s uncertainty was exacerbated because the day before, fuelled by 
White House publicity, the New York Times reported that Soviet crisis 
Group, 22 October 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 15:392. Unfortunately the press was not helpful. 
When reporting the President's speech the Neio York Times preferred the more attention­
grabbing term "blockade" for its front page. Similarly, Lightner reported from Berlin: 
"Notably, West as well as East media and individuals call U.S. action 'blockade.' The 
distinction between this and 'American quarantine on shipments of offensive weapons to 
Cuba' apparently will require a continuing public information effort." New York Times, 23 
October 1962; Lightner to Rusk, 23 October 1962, box 98, NSF, JFKL. 
91 Minutes of NSC Meeting, 21 October 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 11 :141-49; Schlesinger, 
Thousand Days, p.803. 
92 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p.75, 78; Rusk, As I Saw It, p.235; Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell 
of a Gamble, p.240. 
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mongering had prompted senior administration officials to refine planning 
"for all contingencies in and around Berlin."93 But the letter Dobrynin was 
handed dispelled any confusion. Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba were 
intolerable and their removal was non-negotiable. However, of all the other 
points at issue between the United States and the USSR, the only one which 
was mentioned in this letter was Berlin - and it was mentioned twice. There 
should be no misunderstanding of U.S. intentions of defending its interests 
anywhere, Kennedy said. The United States could not tolerate Soviet offensive 
missiles in Cuba any more than it would give up Berlin. He warned 
Khrushchev that although at Vienna he had expressed his willingness to 
negotiate, 
I made clear that . . .  the United States could not tolerate any action on 
your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of 
power in the world. I stated that an attempt to force abandonment of our 
responsibilities and commitments in Berlin could constitute such an 
action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its 
command.94 
Accordingly, Kennedy demanded the withdrawal of the missiles, while 
leaving Khrushchev under no illusions about the stakes of a contest over 
Berlin. 
The President developed this theme further in his television address an 
hour later. Telling the American people that he was ordering a quarantine of 
Cuba, he attempted to pre-empt parallels between Berlin and Cuba. The 
Cuban quarantine, he said, would be selective: "We are not at this time . . .  
denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin 
93 New York Times, 21 October 1962. Hillenbrand has recently revealed such a conclusion 
was the intended outcome of subtle White House publicity. Hillenbrand himself was used as 
a decoy: "My assigned task was to enter the White House, rather ostentatiously, through the 
main front door, where I could be clearly observed. The press, of course, knew of my long 
association with the Berlin crisis and would immediately jump to the conclusion that 
something was brewing in that much headlined city." Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, 
p.204. 
94 Kennedy to Khrushchev, 22 October 1962, in May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp.281-
282. Also reprinted in FRUS 1 961-63, 6:165. 
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blockade of 1948."95 And, as always, the United States would not discuss any 
issue under duress. "That is why," he continued, 
this latest Soviet threat - or any other threat which is made either 
independently or in response to our actions this week - must and will be 
met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the world against 
the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed - including 
in particular the brave people of West Berlin - will be met by whatever 
action is needed. 96 
Meanwhile, Rusk warned U.S. officials in Europe to prepare for the 
worst.97 In Berlin, planned military training exercises were cancelled and 
convoys along the autobahn reduced in both size and number in order to 
avoid actions which might be construed as provocative. The initial response 
of West Berlin's political leadership and press to the President's speech was 
encouraging. Despite the risk that it might exacerbate the Berlin problem, 
West Berliners emphatically endorsed the American action.98 Just days before 
the crisis broke, Walt Rostow had conveyed a message from the President to 
the Berliners which said that Americans "cannot and do not attempt to 
differentiate between the safety of the Western Berliners and our own." 
Rostow said America would stand "firm and united" in determination that 
the city "shall remain free" by continuing the military protection "which the 
presence in Berlin of Western military forces alone can afford." And, although 
Berlin would remain "a temptation to the Communists so long as the Cold 
War continues," there should not be "the slightest doubt about the depth, the 
seriousness, or the steadiness of the American and Allied commitment." 
Nevertheless, the support of the West Berliners during the missile crisis 
95 For Kennedy's suggestion earlier in the day to make this distinction, see May and 
Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p.237. Also reprinted in FRUS 1961 -63, 11 :155. 
96 Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms 
Buildup in Cuba," 22 October 1962, Public Papers: Kennedy: 1 962, pp.806-809. Also reprinted in 
May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp.276-281 . 
97 Rusk to Paris AmEmbassy, "Cuba and Berlin," 26 October 1962, box 98, NSF, JFKL. 
98 Lightner to Rusk, 23 October 1962, box 98, NSF, JFKL. Lightner also raised the question 
of whether, given that the training exercises had been publicly announced a week previously, 
their cancellation might fan hysteria from speculation that U.S. forces were on special alert as 
a result of the Cuban crisis. 
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impressed Washington. In a 1964 article, Bundy looked back at the crisis and 
concluded that "in all the postwar annals of the bravery of West Berlin there 
is no moment in which the courage and strength of the Berliners - and indeed 
of all free Germans - have been more important in discouraging adventure." 99 
Post-Cuba 
Ultimately, the Soviets, whether by design or caution, did not raise the 
issue of Berlin during the missile crisis. In his correspondence with Kennedy, 
Khrushchev ignored the President's references to Berlin, and Soviet 
Ambassador to the UN, Valerian Zorin, played down rumors of imminent 
action in Berlin by telling a group of African and Asian UN delegates that 
"the Americans are thorough! y mistaken if they think we shall fall into their 
trap. We shall undertake nothing in Berlin, for action against Berlin is just 
what the Americans would wish." But after Zorin' s deception in the UN, 
Washington was not inclined to take him seriously. State had to concede, 
however, that, on the whole, the Soviets seemed to carefully avoid any hint of 
a direct link between Cuba and Berlin.100 
The resolution of the crisis imbued a sense of hope in many 
policymakers that a greater degree of reason might be injected into 
outstanding Cold War issues . The outcome of the crisis also confirmed what 
had recently been seriously questioned - that Khrushchev was fundamentally 
99 Kennedy to the people of West Berlin, 15 October 1962, box 85, NSF, JFKL; Rostow, "The 
Present Stage of the Cold War," Address to the Ernst Reuter Society at the Free University of 
Berlin, 18 October 1962, Dept of State Bulletin, 5 November 1962, pp.675-682; Bundy, "The 
Presidency and the Peace," p.361 . 
100 Zubok and Pleshakov report a conversation during the missile crisis when a senior 
Soviet official reminded Khrushchev of the opportunity to press the Berlin issue. Khrushchev 
responded with: "We are here trying to get ourselves out of this . . .  [reckless gamble] . . .  and 
now you are pulling us into another one!" Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold 
War, pp.260-261 . Rusk to U.S. NATO Mission, "Assessment of Current Soviet Intentions," 7 
November 1962, FRUS 1 961-63, 15:420. Rusk later wondered if this was because they had 
been caught off in their timing, and therefore he wanted to wait and see what would happen. 
MemCon, Kennedy, Adenauer, Rusk, and Schroeder, 14 November 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 
15:443. Zorin quoted in Lightner to Rusk, 26 October 1962, box 98, NSF, JFKL. See also 
Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p.823. 
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rational. This became an important factor in the administration's attempts to 
gauge his intentions in the wake of the missile crisis. It was possible, as 
Kennedy himself initially believed, that he might try to offset his losses by 
pushing hard on Berlin. While Adenauer and Brandt urged Kennedy to take 
the diplomatic offensive, the administration soon concluded that, assuming 
Khrushchev remained in power, a deliberately provoked crisis was unlikely 
because it would ultimately result in negotiations. Nevertheless, Washington 
remained reluctant to draw attention to the issue for the moment, and went to 
considerable lengths to downplay the issue.101 
There were several in the administration, however, who agreed with 
Adenauer and Brandt that Kennedy's "victory" opened a window of 
opportunity for the West to press for its own Berlin solution. The 
administration was in the fortunate position of having most of its Berlin 
experts familiar with the intricacies of the missile crisis. The relative calm in 
Berlin during the missile crisis allowed several of Washington's established 
policymaking bodies concerned with Berlin to divert their attention to the 
Cuban problem. The Washington Ambassadorial Group became a convenient 
forum for briefing NATO allies, and the Berlin Task Force was drawn into the 
Cuban problem partly because, according to its deputy director John Ausland, 
few State officials were cleared to receive information on the missiles. 
Accordingly, when the missile crisis receded, the officials on these bodies 
were able to apply their personal experience of the missile crisis to the Berlin 
problem.102 
Furthermore, on 23 October, Kennedy designated Nitze to chair a 
subcommittee of the ExComm for Berlin contingencies, which also included 
Thompson and Hillenbrand. For the moment, this group became the focus of 
the administration's high-level activity relating to Berlin. The group's official 
101 Telephone conversation, Kennedy and Truman, 28 October 1962, cassette L, 
Presidential Recordings, JFKL; Klein to Bundy, "Berlin - Some Random Thoughts - Late 
Sunday Night," FRUS 1961-63, 15:403; Rusk to AmEmbassies, 29 October 1962, NSF, JFKL; 
Brandt to Kennedy, 29 October 1962, box 98, NSF, JFKL. 
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report, which strongly reflected the views of Nitze, recommended that the 
United States seize the opportunity to find a permanent solution to the Berlin 
problem, because "otherwise we may find ourselves someday in a Berlin 
crisis, where we all will wish we had taken more radical measures to lance the 
boil despite the recognized risks, costs and difficulties." Nitze suggested that 
such a solution could be linked to a global effort which included compromises 
on both sides to reduce tension in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, 
as well as make progress on arms control. "The relation of all this to Berlin," 
he told Kennedy, "is that Berlin has been a focal point in the over-all Western 
confrontation with the [Soviet] Bloc. The long-term solution of Berlin can 
hardly take place except as part of a general readjustment of the terms of that 
confrontation. Because it was impossible to gauge the political temperature in 
the Kremlin with any certainty, it was difficult to predict whether Soviet 
policy towards Berlin would harden or relax as a result of Khrushchev 
backing down over Cuba. On the one hand, it was possible that Moscow had 
emerged from the missile crisis in a more cautious mood. On the other hand, 
it was equally possible that the Kremlin felt a need to push firmly to counter 
the damage to its prestige. On Washington's part, Nitze said, the "traumatic 
exposure to the imminence of war" had brought home the necessity of 
pushing its own interests with even more determination while its "prestige is 
higher; its capacity and maturity more respected; [and] its freedom to lead 
enhanced." Nitze' s report examined a spectrum of approaches. Yet it also 
conceded that "the effects of the Cuban crisis cannot yet be accurately seen" 
and that "many elements . . .  are not under our control." However, Nitze 
concluded that the dangers in not seeking a permanent solution vastly 
outweighed any other concerns.103 
Thompson disagreed with many of Nitze' s main points and drafted his 
own idea of a "package deal" on West Berlin. Proceeding from the premise 
102 See Ausland, Kennedy, Klzrushclzev, and tlze Berlin-Cuba Crisis, pp.69-70; idem, Six Berlin 
Incidents. 
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that a permanent solution to the problem was impracticable in the face of 
diplomatic realities, Thompson advocated more limited objective by seeking a 
modus vivendi that would reduce tension on the issue "for a considerable 
period of time." This could be accomplished, he said, by taking into proper 
account Soviet and East German interests as well as those of the West. The 
mechanics of such a scheme would be a series of reciprocal compromises that 
effectively recognized the status quo and guaranteed Western access. It would 
also allow the USSR to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR, which 
"would do much to get Khrushchev off the hook he is on."104 
Both proposals were forwarded to Rostow in his capacity as chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Advanced Planning. He suggested that there were 
several issue that might form the basis of negotiations, depending on the 
nature of the objectives. "Track A," as it was termed, included issues that 
were well studied and had long been the subject of East-West discussions. 
Previous discussions on arms control, Germany, and Berlin might potentially 
form the basis of agreement. "Track B" included more radical proposals that 
might be pursued informally with the Soviets in anticipation of a summit 
meeting.105 
It was into this general template that the administration fitted the 
various proposals from individuals and government agencies that were 
forthcoming. The Joint Chiefs had their own views on stabilizing the Berlin 
situation, as did officials stationed in Germany. Most of these papers held that 
respect for GDR sovereignty, even if not actual recognition, was an essential 
ingredient of making any proposal saleable to the USSR. But from here the 
debate divided. As David Klein of the NSC Staff summarized this debate: 
The differences are due in large measure to conflicting assessments of 
the Berlin problem. There is one view that if the Berlin problem were 
103 Nitze to Kennedy, n.d., FRUS 1 961 -63, 15:411-412; NSC Berlin-NATO Subcommittee, 
n.d., ibid., pp. 412-419. 
104 Thompson, "Possible Berlin Solutions," n.d., FRUS 1 961 -63, 15:422; Rostow to Bundy, 
"Negotiations," 9 November 1962, ibid., pp.423-424. 
10s Rostow to Bundy, "Negotiations," 9 November 1962, FRUS 1 961 -63, 15:422. 
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resolved, other outstanding problems between us and the Soviet Union 
would fall into place. Ergo the uLong Term" - or radical approaches . . .  
. The other position recognizes Berlin as the most serious problem now 
facing the U.S. and the USSR but does not believe its solution would 
necessarily lead to 0 the other problems falling into place." And, 
therefore, it believes it is important to carefully weight what can be 
sacrificed for a Berlin solution. In addition, there are different 
assessments of what the Soviets might be prepared to accept in Berlin 
in the post-Cuban period.106 
Over the following weeks, Kennedy tried to decide whether to pursue 
the Berlin question further. He told Adenauer that he had no confidence in 
Khrushchev after his deception about the missiles, and that, furthermore, the 
failure to foresee that Khrushchev would place missile in Cuba demonstrated 
the limitations of the West's assessments of Moscow's intentions. For these 
reasons he did want to take the initiative but rather to wait for Soviet moves. 
Furthermore, precisely what effect recent setbacks had on Khrushchev's 
behaviour remained unclear. The discussions about the removal of the 
missiles and IL-28 bombers, Kennedy said, would provide a good 
opportunity to gauge it.107 Parallel to these talks, State initiated its own 
attempts to probe the Soviets on their intentions for Berlin in the post-Cuba 
period. While Kohler spoke with Soviet officials in Moscow, Rusk sounded 
out Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan when he visited Washington at the end 
of November. None of these efforts revealed any fundamental change in 
Moscow's position. Soviet officials continued to insist that the United States 
remove its troops from West Berlin. However, Khrushchev no longer 
threatened to force the issue by visiting the UN, and the detection of a de­
emphasis on signing a peace treaty led State to conclude that Moscow was 
anxious that tension generated by Cuba not spill over into Berlin. Yet it was 
unsure whether this was due to fear or to avoid compromising negotiations.108 
106 Klein to Bundy, 2 November 1962, box 85, NSF, JFKL. 
107 MemCon, Kennedy and Adenauer, 14 November 1962, FRUS 1 961 -63, 15:427-432; 
MemCon, Kennedy, Adenauer, Rusk, and Schroeder, 14 November 1962, ibid., pp.434-443. 
ms Khrushchev appeared to have softened his position slightly during talks with British 
Ambassador Frank Roberts when he said that U.S. troops might remain "temporarily" in 
West Berlin under a UN flag, but he quickly backed away from this idea. Rusk to Kohler, 28 
The Berlin-Cuba Nexus I 311 
Ultimately, Kennedy agreed with the substance of Rusk's observation 
that "the lessons which the Soviets have presumably drawn from the Cuban 
experience have been the subject of considerable speculation but of little hard 
information."109 He decided, therefore, to take a cautious line until 
Khrushchev's intentions became clearer. Despite the many calls for the United 
States to seize the moment, therefore, Kennedy opted to let the situation settle. 
For their part, in somewhat of an anticlimax, the Soviets did not provoke an 
immediate crisis in Berlin in retaliation for the apparent loss in Cuba. 
The Problem Transforms, 1963-1971 
In the wake of the missile crisis, Robert Kennedy visited West Berlin as 
an act of reassurance. German politicians and press circulated rumours that a 
secret deal involving Berlin had been made in order to get Khrushchev to 
agree to remove the missiles. Robert Kennedy assured them that this was not 
the case. The freedom of West Berlin was not negotiable, he insisted, nor 
would it ever become so. In June 1963, the President himself visited West 
Berlin and received a raptuous reception when he told the large crowd that 
they could take pride in the fact that they were Berliners. 
But while Washington increasingly embraced moves towards detente, 
NATO was embroiled in its own quarrels over defence systems and economic 
collaboration.110 But it did so in the tacit understanding that a threat to West 
Berlin, though certainly still possible, was less likely. This confidence was 
only temporarily disturbed by the so-called Tailgate crisis in October 1963. It 
initially appeared that the Soviets might be making a move when the Soviets 
began harassing Western traffic to Berlin on the basis of not being able to 
inspect the contents of trucks. Tensions ran high, but the issue was resolved 
November 1962, FRUS 1 961 -63, 15:446-449; Kohler to Rusk, 3 December 1962, ibid., pp.425-
426; MemCon, Rusk and Mikoyan, 30 November 1962, ibid., pp.449-452; State to AmEmbassy 
Bonn, 7 November 1962, box 98, NSF, JFKL. See also FRUS 1 961 -63, 15:438 n.3. 
109 Rusk to Kohler, 28 November 1962. 
no See Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, pp.355-379. 
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peacefully within a few days. This episode did not, however, introduce 
anything fundamentally new to the situation.m 
The Cuban missile crisis ushered in a new kind of Cold War. So far as 
Berlin was concerned, after the missile crisis the nature of the problem 
changed. This was not because the problem had not been solved. The 
fundamental factors remained: Germany remained divided, West Berlin was 
still geographically isolated within the Communist bloc making it still 
militarily vulnerable, and the situation still held potential to spark conflict. 
But after the shock of the missile crisis, nuclear conflict over Berlin appeared 
somehow less rational. 
As tensions over the Berlin issue reduced m the Johnson 
administration, the Federal Republic began to pursue a more activist foreign 
policy. Culminating in Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, which actively sought FRG­
Soviet bloc relations, German issues were given a new dimension. With these 
early steps towards a more independent West German foreign policy, the 
German problem became less of a bipolar East-West issue. Periodically during 
the Johnson administration, Washington's fears of Soviet action against Berlin 
were aroused, particularly in the turbulence of 1968. But the Vietnam conflict 
engaged engaged far more of the attention of Washington policymakers. 
Thus, by the late 1960s, it was Vietnam not Berlin that was the linchpin of U.S. 
foreign policy. 
When the Nixon administration again brought the Berlin problem to 
prominence, it treated the problem in a very different way. Rather than being 
primarily a demonstration of American resolve to honour its commitments, 
Nixon and Kissinger incorporated efforts to negotiate recognition of the status 
quo in Berlin into a complex web of linked issues that featured, in particular, 
arms control. Specifically, they linked stabilization of the Berlin situation with 
progress on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Through a combination of 
formal negotiations and the creative use of secret informal channels, this 
111 See Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis, pp.73-90. 
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linkage finally came to fruition in the form of the Quadripartite Agreement 
for Berlin signed in September 1971, which effectively stabilized the situation 
by recognizing the status quo.112 Although much of the documentary record of 
this process, particularly the informal discussions, remains classified, it is 
clear that the nature of Washington's perception of the Berlin problem was 
markedly different under Nixon than it had been. Berlin was no longer 
perceived to be the great test of wills it was during the Truman, Eisenhower, 
and Kennedy administrations. 
112 See Sutterlin and Klein, Berlin; Honore M. Catudal, The Diplomacy of the Quadripartite 
Agreement on Berlin, (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag, 1978); Henry Kissinger, White House Years, 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), pp.800-810, 814-815, 823-833; Richard Nixon, 
Memoirs, pp.522-525, Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, pp.291-293; Raymond L. Garthoff, 
Detente and Confrontation:  American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed., 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), pp.135-139. For a thorough (and formerly 
classified) account of the official negotiations that led to the Quadripartite Agreement on 
Berlin prepared by the Office of the Historian in the Department of State, see Arthur G. 
Kogan, "The Quadripartite Berlin Negotiations, 1970-1971," September 1977, box 26, FOIA, 
National Security Archive. 
Conclusion 
It was perhaps appropriate that Berlin should provide the location of 
the most dramatic confirmation of the end of the Cold War. When German 
demonstrators breached the Berlin Wall in November 1989 with little 
resistance from East German border guards, it provided a convenient 
symmetry for the Cold War conflict. In that city, where over forty years earlier 
it was first confirmed for Americans that Soviet intentions were contrary to 
their own interests, the physical incarnation of the Iron Curtain was torn 
down, heralding the West's "triumph." 
But although by 1989 Berlin retained its symbolism, the tension that 
accompanied the Berlin issue for so much of the Cold War was but a memory, 
albeit a vivid one. Between 1948 and 1963, Berlin provided both cause and 
location of some of the Cold War's worst moments and Berlin mythology 
provided some of the Cold War's most potent symbols: the Berlin airlift, the 
Wall, the tank confrontation, and images of East German refugees fleeing 
Communism. But above all, the American commitment to the city provided 
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U.S. foreign policy during the "high Cold War" with its own potent symbol. 
Berlin assumed a global significance by embodying the American will to 
honour its assurances world-wide. 
Berlin became central to the way in which the United States waged the 
Cold War. But it was U.S. policymakers that assigned the issue its centrality. 
Americans did not instinctively equate their own security with that of West 
Berlin. Rather, that link was the result of a calculation of U.S. national 
interests. National security, U.S. policymakers argued, hinged on protecting 
the city from the encroachments of Communism. But Washington's 
perception of the relationship between U.S. national security and Berlin was 
not static. When Truman first committed the United States to maintaining its 
presence in Berlin "come what may," he did so to contain Soviet expansion. 
As soon as this commitment was made, it became a matter of U.S. prestige 
and honour. If the United States abandoned Berlin, presidents Eisenhower 
and Kennedy reasoned, it would reduce U.S. commitments the world over to 
"scraps of paper" to use Kennedy's phrase.  No longer would the nations of 
the so-called "free world" be prepared to risk their own survival on their 
relationship with the United States. The result would be that the "free world" 
would fracture, irreparably damaging U.S. national security. Then, the United 
States would be reduced to a "garrison state." For this reason, Berlin became 
the linchpin in U.S. foreign policy. There were other important issues, but 
none was regarded by Washington as so pivotal as Berlin. 
But in Berlin, geography ensured that the Soviets always held the 
tactical advantage. Broadly speaking, American assessments of Soviet motives 
in applying pressure in Berlin generally varied between those which argued 
that Moscow was using the issue as a lever to influence Western policy and 
those which argued that the Communists were trying to "win" the city. As a 
lever, Berlin seemed to offer a means to greater ends. In 1948, the general 
consensus in Washington was that the Soviets were trying to delay, if not 
prevent the creation of the West German state. In the 1950s, some argued that 
Khrushchev's pressure against the city was designed to prevent the arming of 
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the West German Bundeszoehr with nuclear weapons. Others argued that he 
was applying pressure to force the West to recognize the East German state, 
thereby acknowledging the division of Germany and risking the pro-Western 
orientation of the Federal Republic. Alternatively, there were those who 
argued that the Soviets' objective was in some respects more obvious in that 
they were seeking to evict the Western powers from the city. They argued that 
Berlin itself was the ultimate objective. As early as 1949, intelligence agencies 
in particular recognized that when the Soviets reciprocated the formation of 
the Federal Republic by forming a Communist state in the East, the new 
regime would not be able to tolerate the Western outpost in its midst. The 
destabilizing influence of its very presence, therefore, had to be eradicated to 
consolidate East Germany. For, just as the West pointed to the remarkable 
revival of West Germany as evidence of the merits of the West, the Soviet 
Union sought to give the GDR a similar role by demonstrating the potential of 
Communism in the "workers' paradise." There were other observers - and 
many of them - who argued a more extreme version of the "win" case. In this 
line of reasoning, Berlin presented, in Dean Acheson's phrase, a " glittering 
prize." The Soviets' primary purpose, the proponents of this argument 
suggested, was in attacking the United States where it was most vulnerable in 
order to seek a swift and direct victory. A Western withdrawal would result 
in instant humiliation that could conceivably unravel the "free world." 
But irrespective of the assessment of Soviet motives, Berlin remained 
central to Washington's experience of the Cold War. An historical study of 
Washington's perception of its commitment to Berlin illuminates much about 
how the United States waged the Cold War. It provides the valuable insights 
into U.S. policy during such key moments as the Cuban missile crisis and the 
Quemoy-Matsu crises. In some respects it also sheds light on American 
involvement in the Vietnam conflict insofar as containment and prestige were 
engaged there. The commitment to Berlin was at the centre of American 
deterrence doctrines during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. 
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And the parameters set by that commitment underpinned U.S. engagement 
with Europe. 
How, then, did it come to occupy such a position? The peculiar 
circumstances of the Berlin situation were not the result of any design on the 
part of the United States. During the final period of World War II, an 
occupation regime for postwar Germany was negotiated between the United 
States, Britain, and the USSR. As part of this regime, the United States agreed 
to jointly occupy a sector of Berlin, which was located deep within the Soviet 
zone of occupation. By 1948, however, the Soviet zone had become hostile 
territory. When Berlin was blockaded in mid-1948, it confirmed for many 
Americans their worst fears of East-West conflict. When Truman responded 
by standing firm, he made a decision that the United States would contain 
Communist expansion in Europe at risk of war. In many respects, Truman's 
decision was the quintessential decision of containment. The United States 
would maintain its forward line of defence for no other reason than to prevent 
the further expansion of Communism and to demonstrate American resolve. 
For without the justification of containment, Berlin held little, if any, strategic 
value. 
But although Truman hoped to make a convincing demonstration of 
American resolve, his administration presented him with few options to do 
so. The result was the Berlin airlift, an impressive demonstration of Western 
ingenuity but not a convincing strategic choice. The blockade was finally 
lifted, but Truman and many other policymakers remained unsatisfied. 
Above all, it was recognized that they had done little to lessen the 
vulnerability of their presence in the city. It was here that the perennial 
anticipation of a threat to Berlin had its roots. This anticipation was 
heightened little over a year after the blockade was lifted. When the Korean 
War broke out in June 1950, it appeared to many in Washington and Germany 
that it might be a preliminary move against Berlin. Moreover, Communist 
forces had used an unconventional tactic, war-by-proxy, for which U.S. 
policymakers struggled to account. One of the most striking and immediate 
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fears was that the Communist bloc might exploit the parallels between the 
Korean and German situations. As they struggled with the wider implications 
of the Korean conflict, they refined their understanding of the potential 
threats to the U.S. commitment to Berlin. 
When the Eisenhower administration came to office, it inherited the 
commitment to Berlin. Already, by the end of the Truman administration, 
staying in Berlin had become a matter of U.S. national prestige. Since the 
commitment had been already made, there appeared little choice except to 
honour it. Indeed, during the early period of the Eisenhower administration 
the absence of any fundamental reassessment of whether or not the United 
States needed to maintain its military presence in the city is striking. Officials 
in the Eisenhower administration debated not whether the U.S. should 
maintain its commitment to Berlin but rather how that presence could be best 
exploited to serve the strategic interests of the United States. The result was to 
move the issue in a decidedly more positive direction. Firstly, the 
administration consolidated the rhetorical symbolism of Berlin in its efforts to 
reclaim the ideological initiative back from the Kremlin. Secondly, it 
developed plans to force a clear outcome to any new threat to Berlin. The 
Eisenhower administration would do its best to avoid the type of ambiguity 
with which the blockade crisis had concluded. 
It was on the basis of this dual approach to the Berlin problem that the 
administration faced the challenges of the late 1950s when Khrushchev 
presented his ultimatum. The administration was widely criticized by its 
contemporaries for its apparent passivity in response to what many regarded 
as the greatest challenge to U.S. national security since the Korean War. But 
what these critics on the whole did not know was that this passivity was a 
deliberate tactic and, what was more, that the administration had quietly but 
deliberately developed aggressive, even confrontational policy to resolve a 
threat to its interests in Berlin. At the same time, it was increasingly seeking to 
resolve the crisis through diplomacy. 
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The outcome, however, was to delay the issue until a new president 
entered the White House. President Kennedy also inherited the Berlin 
problem but perceived it differently to Eisenhower. Kennedy interpreted the 
challenge in more dramatic terms and immediately sought to rebuild U.S. 
military forces so that he would be in a position to negotiate from strength. 
Contrary to Eisenhower's approach, Kennedy promoted an aggressive public 
posture, making little attempt to conceal his belief that the United States was 
facing one of its greatest crises. His administration also brought with it a 
heightened anticipation that the ultimate test of wills between East and West 
would pivot on Berlin and that this test of wills could decide the Cold War. 
The effect of this was evident during the Cuban missile crisis, which is often 
regarded as the Cold War's worst moment. The fact that Kennedy and several 
of his senior advisers suggested that the crux of the crisis was not about Cuba 
but Berlin is testimony to the depth of Washington's concern for its 
commitment. It was only after the Cuban missile crisis took the world to the 
brink that the psychological gap between Berlin and nuclear destruction 
became so great that its logic seemed to collapse. 
Much of the explanation for the centrality that Berlin came to occupy in 
U.S. foreign policy lies with U.S. policymakers themselves. Over the fifteen 
years that the Berlin problem was most acute it engaged the talents of many 
of America's leading policymakers. Since problems related to Germany 
formed some of the most complex and important that the United States faced, 
it was natural that many of the leading figures attempted to grapple with it. 
But policymakers do not approach problems with a clean slate. Therefore, the 
effect was that many of America's leading policymakers were conditioned by 
their training and experience to anticipate a challenge to Berlin. Thus, when 
faced with a challenge ostensibly unrelated, they looked for analogies 
between that situation and the one in Berlin and framed policy accordingly. 
In sum, Washington's perception of the Berlin issue from 1948 to 1963 
illuminates much about American Cold War foreign policy more generally. 
Berlin became the focus of the East-West confrontation during some of its 
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most dangerous periods. Moreover, many of the fundamental issues involved 
with the U.S. commitment to Berlin- specifically containment, national 
prestige, and the American will - were fundamental to other issues in U.S. 
foreign policy. But through its longevity and centrality, the commitment to 
Berlin offers unique insights into U.S. Cold War foreign policy. And U.S. 
foreign policy between some of the most dangerous years of the Cold War, 
1948 to 1963, cannot be fully understood without a full appreciation of 
Washington's perception of its commitment to Berlin. 
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